INTER-CON SECURITY SYSTEMS, INC. and CHARLES C. TARN, Hearing Officer, Ministry of Labour, Petitioners, v. NATHANIEL BRIGGS et al., Respondents.
PETITION FOR RE-ARGUMENT.
Heard: April 19, 2001. Decided: July 6, 2001.
1. Typographical errors pointed out in the opinion of the Supreme Court do not constitute grounds for reversal of the Court’s judgment or a basis for granting reargument.
2. When it is shown that points decisive of the case and duly raised by counsel have been inadvertently overlooked by the Supreme Court in arriving at an opinion, a motion for reargument will be granted.
3. Typographical errors as to the admissibility of alleged letters into evidence by the trial court and not the hearing officer do not constitute a decisive issue upon which a case is decided and therefore do not constitute a basis for the granting of reargument.
4. A motion for reargument can only be granted by the Supreme Court where it is clearly shown that a previous decision inadvertently overlooked a salient point of law or fact raised at the prior hearing.
The petitioner for reargument filed a motion seeking reargument in a case decided by the Supreme Court, in which the Court held the petitioner liable to the respondents for wrongful dismissal. The Court held in a previous ruling that the petitioner had failed to give the respondents the required written notice in dismissing them from its employ. In the petition for reargument, the petitioner contended that it had given the requisite notice to the respondents and that this was reflected in the Court’s opinion, but that the Court had overlooked this fact. The petitioner also contended that the Court had overlooked the fact that although it had verbally given notice to the respondents of their dismissal, the petitioner had instructed them to go to its office thereafter to collect their letters of dismissal, but that the respondents had refused to receive and sign for the letters of dismissal. It also asserted that the Court had overlooked the fact that the respondents, in their testimonies, had admitted that written notice was served on them.
The Court rejected the contentions of the petitioner, holding that its inspection of the records in the case clearly revealed that no letters of dismissal were given to the respondents, and that the reference to letters of dismissal having been admitted into evidence by the hearing officer and the lack of such admission by the National Labour Court judge was a typographical error which did not constitute a basis for granting reargument. The Court observed that in order for re-argument to be granted, it must be shown that the Court had inadvertently overlooked a salient point of law or fact which had been raised in the previous hearing and which would have been important for the Court in arriving at its opinion. The Court noted that no such point was shown by the petitioner to have been overlooked.
Moreover, the Court opined that the line of questioning by the petitioner’s counsel at the hearing before the hearing officer clearly showed an admission by the petitioner that it did not give the respondents the required notice in effecting their dismissal, as required by the Labor Laws of Liberia. The Court held, therefore, that reargument would not lie and it accordingly proceeded to deny the petition.
Joseph N. Nagbe of the Freeman’s Legal Consultants, in association with Kemp & Associates Law Firm, appeared for the petitioners. Cooper W. Kruah of the Henries Law Firm appeared for the respondents
MR. JUSTICE SACKOR delivered the opinion of the Court
The rehearing of this case was ordered by Mr. Justice Morris, one of the concurring Justices in the judgment of this case during the October, A. D. 2000 Term of this Court, pursuant to Rule IX, Parts 1, 2, 3, & 4 of the Supreme Court Revised Rules of January 1999. Pursuant to the said order, Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. and Charles C. Tarn, Hearing Officer, Ministry of Labour, filed before this Court an 11-count petition for reargument, contending, among other things, that the Supreme Court had inadvertently overlooked the fact that the respondents had admitted being dismissed under section 1508(3) of the Labour Practices Law of Liberia; that the dismissal of the respondents was not wrongful, as held by this Court; that Nathaniel Briggs, John Miah, and Nelson Dennis were dismissed under section 1508(3) of the Labour Practices Law of Liberia, but that they had refused to sign for and received their letters of dismissal; that the other nine employees of Co-petitioner Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. were dismissed under 1508(2)(d) for abandonment of their job; and that the letters of dismissal of Briggs, Miah, and Dennis, and the installation sheets indicating that the other nine employees had abandoned their jobs were admitted into evidence by the hearing officer, but not Her Honour Comfort S. Natt, Judge of the National Labour Court for Montserrado County. The petitioners therefore prayed this Court to grant the petition for reargument
The respondents filed an 11-count returns to the petition for reargument, contending that Co-respondents Briggs, Miah, and Dennis had never admitted being dismissed under section 1508(3); that the admission of Miah was to the extent that the pronouncement of the dismissal under 1508 was verbal and without any written communication terminating the respondents services; that Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. had prevented the other nine employees from going to work; that Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. was subpoenaed to produce the record books which it kept and maintained at the various gates, wherein the names of the other nine employees were recorded, but that the company had refused to produce them on the ground that they were burnt; that the letters of dismissal for Briggs, Miah, and Dennis were admitted into evidence by the hearing officer on February 4, 1999 over the objection of the respondents’ counsel. The respondents there-fore prayed this Court to confirm its opinion of December 21, 2000, which awarded the respondents the total amount of US$47,224.12.
The sole pertinent issue for the determination of this case is whether or not this Court inadvertently overlooked any material issue of fact or law in its opinion of December 21, 2000, as would warrant denying the respondents of their benefits.
In count 4 of the petition for reargument, the petitioners contended that Co-respondent Miah had admitted on the minutes of the hearings before the hearing officer, at page 5, May15, 1998, that: “1 must admit on that day Briggs and 1 were dismissed on 1508.” The petitioners argued that the admission of Miah constituted a wrongful dismissal. A recourse to the records of May 15, 1998 revealed that Co-respondent Miah, while on the cross-examination, answered several questions, a few of which this Court deems relevant to deciding the contentions raised by the petitioners.
“Q. Mr. Witness, in your statement in chief, you stated that you, along with your colleagues or co-complainants, were illegally dismissed between the 17th and 20th of November, 1997. This statement to us suggests that there are two categories of dismissal. Tell us for the benefit of this records who all were dismissed on November 20, 1997?
A. Between the 17th and the 20th of November, 1997, it is mentioned because of the condition under which the 12 men were dismissed. They were all dismissed without any written letters of dismissal, which of course is against the Labour Laws of Liberia. They were all dismissed under one motive. That is sinister to get them out.
Q. Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that you, Mr. John G. Miah, and Mr. Nathaniel Briggs were informed of your dismissal on November 17, 1997, when you were called in the office of the deputy project manager and advised to report the following day to pick-up said letter? Since then, you never went and pick-up said letters along with your benefits?
A. Negative. This is the reason why 1 said the same way that Briggs and 1 were affected on the 17th that is the same thing extended to the 20th. We were not given any letters of dismissal or asked to come back for such. And the same pattern continued with the rest.
Q. Mr. Witness, from that answer 1 gather from you that indeed and in fact you and Mr. Nathaniel Briggs were terminated under 1508, sub-section (3) and were accordingly informed to pick-up your letters, but for reason(s) best known to you two, you decided to stay out, Not so?
A. 1 must agree that during that day, Briggs and 1 were dismissed on 1508, there was no section mentioned, and no letter.” (See minutes of the hearing of this case before the hearing officer, Ministry of Labour, May 15, 1998.)
The second question posed by Co-petitioner Inter-Con, quoted above, clearly points to the admission of the fact that Mr. John Miah and Mr. Nelson Dennis were verbally informed of their dismissal on the 17th day of November, A. D. 1997 whilst in the office of the deputy project manager, Mr. Leo C. Diggs. The petitioners contended, however, that the mentioned individuals were advised to report to the co-petitioner’s office the following day to pick-up their letters of dismissal, but that they never went to the said office to pick-up the said letters. We should point out that the question referred to herein, posed by the co-petitioner’s counsel to Mr. Miah, negated the assertion made by Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. that Nathaniel Briggs and John Miah had refused to receive and sign for their letters of dismissal on the 17th day of November, A. D. 1997 in the office of the deputy project manager. Equally important is that the question supported the respondents’ averment that Nathaniel Briggs and John Miah were verbally dismissed without any letters of termination of their services being served on them.
With regard to the dismissal of Nelson Dennis, Col. Leo C. Diggs testified in chief on the 28th day of January, A. D. 1999, as recorded on page 118 of the minutes of the hearing before the hearing officer, that Mr. Dennis was called to the office of the deputy project manager on the 24th day of November, A. D. 1997, where his letter of dismissal was read to him by the deputy project manager, who gave same to Col. Diggs. The witness said that the deputy project manager also read the said letter to Mr. Dennis and gave it to him, but that Mr. Dennis returned the letter to the deputy project manager in order to contact his legal counsel. (See minutes of investigation, page 118, January 28, 1999.)
The records further revealed that on the 19th day of April, A. D. 1999, the hearing officer questioned Mr. Diggs regard-ing the investigation of Mr. Dennis for loitering, an act which was in violation of Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc. Standards of Conduct and General Order. We hereunder quote verbatim the said question and the answer thereto for the benefit of this opinion.
“Q. Mr. Witness, you stated in your testimony in chief that Mr. Nelson Dennis was announced dismissed on November 24, 1997; that is to say, he was dismissed four days after the holding of posters and placards in front of the US Embassy, Gate One, on November 20, 1997. Why was he not investigated in violation of management’s Standards of Conduct and General Order for loitering and holding posters and placards since he was still in the employ of defendant management?
A. As 1 have stated on the record, the episode that transpired since the 17th of November 1997 up to the 24th November 1997, those guards that were involved did not show up to work and did not present any excuse whatsoever. So the Board did not have any investigation.”
It is clear from the above quoted answer of Mr. Diggs that Mr. Dennis was one of the guards involved in the loitering in front of the United States Embassy, but that he did not report to work from the 17th day of November, A. D. 1997, up to and including the 24th day of November, A. D. 1997, and that he provided no excuse therefor. Consequently, the Board of the co-petitioner corporation never investigated Mr. Dennis. Mr. Diggs’ answer to the question regarding the investigation or the lack thereof negated his testimony in chief, shown on page 118 of the January 28, 1999 minutes of the investigation that Mr. Dennis had refused to receive and sign for his letter of dismissal in the office of the deputy project manager on the 24th day of November, A. D. 1997, since Mr. Dennis never reported to work between the 17th day of November and the 24th day of November, A. D. 1997. Moreover, the records also showed that Mr. Dennis was dismissed on November 24, 1997, allegedly under section 1508(3) of the Labor Practices Law four days after the loitering of November 20, 1997, while he was being investigated by the Board of the co-petitioner. We are constrained to wonder why the co-petitioner dismissed Mr. Dennis under section 1508(3) when at the time he was the subject of an investigation by its Board for misconduct.
We shall now briefly examine the records regarding the other 9 former employees whom Co-petitioner Inter-Con Security Systems, Inc., alleged had abandoned their jobs. We quote hereunder one pertinent question of the investigation and the answer thereto for the benefit of this opinion.
“Q. Mr. Witness, you said and 1 quote, that from November 20, 1997, the nine complainants did not show up for work because they had abandoned their work, and therefore the management terminated their services. Did management write any of the nine employees informing them that their services had been terminated?”
A. Yes, management wrote them. But they refused to sign for their letters.”
The records in the case are however void of any evidence indicating that the co-petitioner ever submitted into evidence the alleged letters during the hearing before the hearing officer at the Ministry of Labour. We also observed from the records that the nine former employees were dismissed subsequent to the loitering in front of the United States Embassy for violation of the co-petitioner’s Standards of Conduct and General Order. Colonel Leo C. Diggs admitted that the nine employees were the subject of an investigation by the Board of the co-petitioner. We hold that these employees should first have been investigated and subsequently dismissed by the co-petitioner for any misconduct, only if they were found to be guilty thereof.
In count 11 of the petition for re-argument, the petitioners contended that the hearing officer admitted into evidence the letters of dismissal for Messrs. Briggs, Miah, and Dennis, in conformity with section 1508 (3), but that the National Labour Court Judge had disallowed the admission of the said letters into evidence, and had therefore ruled them out of consideration. While the records in this case, at page 132, April 19, 1997, showed that the hearing officer had admitted into evidence petitioner management’s exhibits “D-l” thru “D-22”, over the objection of the respondents herein, we have found nothing therein showing that the National Labour Court Judge had at any time admitted into evidence any of the alleged letters of dismissal of Briggs, Miah, and Dennis over the objection of the respondents. As such, this Court committed no error. The error to which the petitioners have pointed in the Court’s opinion of December 21, 2000, handed down during the October, A. D. 2000 Term, was only a typographical error in the opinion. Hence, count 11 of petitioner’s petition is hereby not sustained.
In the case Liberia Trading Corporation v. Cole, [1971] LRSC 53; 20 LLR 413 (1971), text at page 414, this Court held: “When it is shown that points decisive of the case and duly raised by counsel have been inadvertently overlooked by the Supreme Court in arriving at an opinion, a motion for reargument will be granted”.
This Court decided the decisive issue in its opinion, handed down at its of October, A. D. 2000 Term. We said then that the respondents herein were wrongfully dismissed by the co-petitioner, and that they were therefore entitled to their legal benefits in the amount claimed by them for the wrongful dismissal. This Court neither overlooked any principle of law, nor salient point of fact raised and argued by the petitioner during the prior hearing. The typographical error as to the admissibility of the alleged letters into evidence by the trial judge and not the hearing officer was not the decisive issue upon which we decided this case in our opinion of December 21, 2000. We re-emphasize that a motion for reargument can only be granted by the Supreme Court where it is clearly shown that a previous decision inadvertently overlooked a salient point of law or fact raised at the prior hearing. West African Trading Corporation v. Alraine (Liberia) Ltd., [1976] LRSC 23; 25 LLR 3 (1976), text at 10; Union National Bank v. M C. C., [1973] LRSC 31; 22 LLR 32 (1973), text at 35.
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the petition for reargument be, and the same is hereby denied. The respondents are entitled to their legal benefits growing out of their wrongful dismissal. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below commanding the judge presiding therein to resume jurisdiction over the case and give effect to this opinion. Costs are ruled against the petitioners. And it is hereby so ordered.
Petition denied.