In re: THE SUSPENSION OF COUNSELLORS FRANCIS Y. S. GARLAWOLU, J. LAVELI SUPUWOOD AND J. EDWARD KOENIG.

PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND RELIEF FROM JUDGEMENT.

Heard: October 20, 1986. Decided: January 23, 1987.

1. Contempt is defined as a despising of the authority, justice or dignity of the court. Thus, a person whose conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect and disregard, or which interferes with or prejudices parties or their witnesses during a litigation, or which otherwise tends to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the Court in the discharge of its duties, is guilty of contempt.

2. With respect to courts having common law jurisdiction in matters of contempt, it is not essential to the existence of contempt for the conduct to actually obstruct justice; it is sufficient if the conduct tends to obstruct the administration of justice.

3. Contempt of court is described as conduct that, in law, constitutes an offense against the authority and dignity of a court or for a judicial officer in the performance of a judicial function.

4. Contempts of court are classified as direct and indirect, the test being whether the contempt is offered within or outside the presence of the court.

5. A direct contempt consists of words spoken or acts committed in the presence of the court or during its intermission which tends to subvert, embarrass, or prevent justice.

6. An indirect or constructive contempt is an act committed not in the presence of the court but at a distance from it; it is an act of disobeying or resisting process, intimidating a witness out of the presence of the court, or making any false or grossly inaccurate report of any proceedings while the same is pending before the court.

7.To constitute contempt, there must be an improper conduct in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to interrupt or interfere with its proceedings; or some act must be done not necessarily in the presence of the court which tends to adversely affect the administration of justice.

8.The Supreme Court will punish for contempt any deceptive practice which might have the tendency to reflect discreditably upon the Judicial Branch of government or which may tend to belittle its decision, or which might tend to show disrespect to it or its Justices, or which might defy its authority.

9. The power to determine whether or not contempt has been committed and to punish for it is inherent in a constitutional court and such power cannot be limited by statute.

10. The Court, without complaint, may of its own motion institute proceedings to punish for offense against its dignity or authority, although the contempt was not strictly speaking committed in the court’s presence.

11. The Supreme Court has the inherent power to punish for contempt any person who disobeys its mandate or who induces, coerces, compels, or maneuvers another into doing so.

12. The power to hold a member of the Bar in contempt is an inherent power of the Supreme Court of Liberia, and the Court cannot be questioned by any international organization or foreign state; nor is this Court answerable to questions from any source as to what it considers contemptuous.

13. The fact that a party appears and disclaims intent to demean the court does not as a matter of law purge the contemnor, even though in certain cases, it serves as a limited factor on the hands of the court in imposing a penalty.

14. The intent of a contemnor is subjective rather than objective. The intent must therefore be ascertained from all the acts, words, and circumstances surrounding the occurrence.

The petitioners, counsellor-at-law of the Supreme Court of Liberia, petitioned the Court to purge them of the contempt adjudged against them in a previous contempt proceeding and to reconsider its decision suspending them from the practice of ?,aw. In the petition, the petitioners disavowed any intent to demean the dignity and authority of the Court. They prayed at the court would therefore have mercy on them.

The Court, after reciting the opinions and views held by the court in decided cases, accepted the plea of the petitioners and reduced their suspension retroactively to the date of their uspension. The Court noted that as a constitutional court, it had the power to punish a party for contempt, especially with regards to lawyers practicing before the Court. That power, it said, could not be limited by statute. The court opined that any act or conduct which demeaned or had the tendency to demean the dignity or authority of the Court, or which tended to bring the Court into disrepute, or impede the administration of justice, whether done in the presence of the Court or without the presence of the Court, was contemptuous. The petitioners, it said, had demonstrated conduct in flagrant disregard of the authority and dignity of the Court both in their briefs and in oral arguments in previous proceedings had before the Court. The Court nevertheless opined that in the wake of the novel procedure adopted by the petitioners to appeal to the Bench to urge them of the contempt, and the apology extended by them, it was disposed to granting the petition with modification.

The Court therefore granted the petition, but rather than reinstating the petitioners immediately to the practice of law, it reduced the penalty of suspension imposed on them.

Henrietta Koenig represented the petitioners and the petitioners also represented themselves.

MR. JUSTICE JANGABA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners in the above captioned case filed a petition before this Honourable Court in its October, A. D. 1986 Term, requesting a reconsideration by this Court of its judgment rendered against them on August 1, A. D. 1986, and purging them from the sentence rendered against them, thereby allowing them to “resume their legal practices as this is the only profession petitioners possessed and to grant them such other relief as justice and equity demand”.

It is interesting to note that the petition is not a petition for reargument and that it presents the first case in this jurisdiction where the contemnors have been adjudged guilty of contempt by this Court and they have returned to the Court, in the subsequent Term of the Court, by some novel petition, to have the Court reconsider its position. It is therefore incumbent upon us to treat this matter exhaustively, both for the benefit of posterity and for the legal precedent which may be created thereby.

The petitioners are learned counsellors-at-law with long practicing experience before the Supreme Court Bench. They were recently, at the close of the March, A. D. 1986 Term of the Court, suspended from the practice of law by the Court after being adjudged guilty of contempt of its status.

The facts of the matter are that during the said March 1986 Term of Court, this Court cited certain leaders of the so-called Grand Coalition of Political Parties for contempt of the honor and dignity of the Court for refusing to honour the judgment rendered in a prohibition proceeding instituted by the Minister of Justice against them, to restrain them from holding a mass rally and from allegedly violating the extant laws of the Republic.

On May 30, 1986, this Court issued a writ of prohibition against Messrs Gabriel Kpolleh of the Liberian Unification Party, Jackson F. Doe of the Liberian Action Party, Edward B. Kesselly of the Unity Party, and Wesley M. Johnson of the then certificated United People’s Party, effectively restraining them from thereafter grouping in any shape or form under the name of a Grand Coalition of Political Parties, without first obtaining a legal identity therefor; and to further enjoin them from holding a proposed mass political rally contrary to law and the orders of the Minister of Justice.

While the said party leaders did not hold the intended mass political rally after the prohibition was issued by this Court, they nevertheless deliberately and contemptuously continued to function and be referred to as the Grand Coalition of Political Parties. In particular, they issued a press statement on June 23rd A. D. 1986 in the name of the said illegal coalition of parties.

This Court, considering that the foregoing acts of the so-called Grand Coalition constituted a flagrant affront to its dignity and authority as the highest Court of this land, cited the said leaders of the so-called Grand Coalition to answer to charges of contempt. After being afforded a fair and impartial hearing, the respondents were duly adjudged guilty of contempt for which appropriate fines were imposed. The respondents were ordered to pay the fines within seventy-two hours or three legal days from the date of the judgment, or proceed to jail upon their failure to do so, until the fines were deposited into the government revenue.

In the said ruling holding the party executives in contempt of this Honourable Court, Counsellor J. Edward Koenig, J. Laveli Supuwood and Francis Y. S. Garlawolu, the petitioners in this case, legal counsels for the said contemnors, were also suspended from the practice of law directly or indirectly for a specified period of time. In taking the contempt action against the counsellors, the Court noted that the returns filed before it by the petitioners, on behalf of the party executives, contained sarcastic and disdainful averments instead of merely addressing the legal issues raised in the citation for contempt. The Court had further discovered that the said counsellors, petitioners herein, had contrived, by serious unethical and illegal means to obtain from a conniving Clerk of the Supreme Court, an earlier copy of the judgment in the prohibition proceedings against the so-called Grand Coalition which was signed by only two Justices. The copy of that judgment, obtained by the counsellors was then included in the returns filed in the contempt proceedings. The counsellors deliberately and intentionally omitting from the returns the conclusive judgment which was signed by all of the four Justices who heard the petition, Mr. Justice Biddle being ill at the time. This method of practice, we believed, was obviously resorted to in order to belittle and trample the dignity of this Court, expose it to the public as inefficient and incompetent and to even portray it as corrupt and draconian in its administration of justice.

As though these acts were not enough, the said counsellors, petitioners herein, maintained an air of arrogance and disrespect before this Bench throughout their arguments in the course of the contempt proceedings against the political party executives, thereby giving the impression that they were the liberators of the people, and that this Court was the oppressor of the people. During the course of those arguments, the Court took time to particularly confront the petitioners about their illegal acts which they clearly and unequivocally admitted. However, rather than an apology to the Court for their misdeeds and asking for the mercy of the Court as they are doing now, the petitioners strenuously and unconvincingly attempted to rationalize their positions.

Hence, the Court reasonably inferred from the petitioners’ misconduct that they were in several ways responsible for the defiance shown it by the political party executives and for which the executives were held in contempt. This Court was however convinced that the petitioners in this case had exhibited a classic case of direct criminal contempt to judicial authority, contrary to the good ethical behavior expected of counsellors of this Supreme Court.

There is no question as to whether these lawyers were afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend their positions. They were confronted in open court during the course of their arguments in the interest of their clients and were afforded every opportunity at that time, by questions squarely and properly propounded to them by the Bench to vindicate their odious positions. At the conclusion of those exercises, the Court summarily adjudged the petitioners guilty of contempt as reflected in its opinion handed down during the March A. D. 1986 Term. As a result of that decision, the Court suspended Counsellor J. Edward Koenig from all legal practices for two consecutive calendar years and Counsellors J. Laveli Supuwood and Francis Y. S. Garlawolu for one calendar year respectively.

Despite petitioners professional misbehavior and flagrant disregard for the authority and dignity of this Court both in their brief and during the oral arguments before this Court, it is not very surprising that thereafter the petitioners have apparently re-gathered their professional wits and have therefore thought it fitting to return to this Court with this petition for reconsideration. In the petition, they have disclaimed any intention to contempt this Court, have further reaffirmed their loyalty to the Court, and have categorically restated their respect for the wisdom of its judgments. They have, in a word, now shed aside arrogance and defiance, and have invoke the merciful hands of this Court in order that they may regain their privileges as practitioners before this Honourable Court.

We have under the circumstances no legal issues before us to pass upon. Therefore, we have resolved to address ourselves to the inherent authority of this Court to adjudge a party in contempt. Accordingly, we shall discuss the following questions:

1. What is contempt of court and what power does this Court have to hold persons in contempt of court? and,

2. Whether or not contempt is purged by a mere disclaimer of intent to commit the act.

Starting with the first issue above, we note the following: “Contempt of court has been variously defined. Thus, it has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the Court. Generally speaking, he whose conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, interferes with or prejudices parties or their witnesses during a litigation or otherwise tends to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the court in discharge of its duties is guilty of contempt. At least with respect to courts having common law jurisdiction in matters of contempt, it is not essential to the existence of contempt for the conduct to actually obstruct justice; it is sufficient if the conduct tends to obstruct the administration of justice. Contempt of Court has also been described as any conduct that, in law, constitutes an offense against the authority and dignity of a court or for a judicial officer in the performance of a judicial function”. 17 AM JUR 2d., Contempt, § 3. Contempts of court are classified as direct and as indirect, the test being whether the contempt is offered within or outside the presence of the court. Indirect contempt are sometimes designated as constructive. A direct contempt consists of words spoken or acts committed in the presence of the court or during its intermissions which tends to subvert, embarrass, or prevent justice.

An indirect or constructive contempt is an act committed, not in the presence of the court, but at a distance from it. Indirect contempt has been generally characterized by the act of disobeying or resisting process, intimidating a witness out of the presence of the court, or making any false or grossly inaccurate report of any proceedings while the same is pending before the court.” 17 AM. JUR 2d., Contempt, § 6.

This jurisdiction is rich with precedents in contempt matters and this Court has variously defined contempt of court. We held in In re Moore that “Contempt of court in a general sense may be said to be a disregard of, or disobedience to a court, or a judge acting in his judicial capacity by conduct or language in or out of its or his presence which disturbs or tends to impair the respect due the court or judge”. In Re Moore, [1913] LRSC 5; 2 LLR 97 (1913). We have also held that “to constitute contempt, there must be improper conduct in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to interrupt or interfere with its proceedings; or some act must be done not necessarily in the presence of the court, which tends to adversely affect the administration of justice”. King v. Moore, [1911] LRSC 2; 2 LLR 35 (1911). More recently, this court held that “The Supreme Court will punish for contempt any deceptive practice which might have the tendency to reflect discreditably upon the Judicial Branch of Government, or which might tend to belittle it for its decisions, or which might show disrespect to it or its Justices, or which might defy its authority”. In re C. Abayomi Cassell, Counsellor -At-Law[1961] LRSC 22; , 14 LLR 391 (1961).

Concluding the first issue, we now consider the authority of this Court to hold any person in contempt of court. As early as 1913, this Court decided that “The power to determine whether or not contempt has been committed, and to punish for it, is inherent in a constitutional court, and such power cannot be limited by statute”. In re John Moore[1913] LRSC 5; , 2 LLR 97 (1913).

The Court has also held that “The Court without complaint may of its own motion institute proceedings to punish for offense against its dignity and authority although the contempt was not, strictly speaking, committed in the court’s presence”. Gibson v. Wilson, [1943] LRSC 10; 8 LLR 165 (1943). Further, we have said that “The Supreme Court has the inherent right to punish for contempt of court any person who disobeys its mandate or who induces, coerces, compels, or maneuvers another into doing so”. Branly v. Vamply of Liberia, [1973] LRSC 83; 22 LLR 337(1973). Finally, and in particular, this Court has held that “The power to hold a member of the Bar in contempt is an inherent power of the Supreme Court of Liberia, and cannot be questioned by any international organization or foreign state; nor does the court have to answer questions from any source as to what it considers contemptuous”. In re C. Abayomi Cassell, CounsellorAt-Law[1961] LRSC 22; , 14 LLR 391 (1961).

We will now consider the last question, that is, whether or not a disclaimer of intent purges a contemnor of contempt. We are of the view that the fact that party appears and disclaims intent to demean the court does not as a matter of law purge the contemnor even though in certain cases it serves as a limiting factor on the hands of the court in imposing a penalty. The fact that petitioners appeared and disclaimed intent does not of itself free them from the position they now occupy. In fact, this exact position was taken by our predecessors in the case of Gibson v. Wilson, [1943] LRSC 10; 8 LLR 165 (1943); In re D. C. Caranda, 8 LLR 249 (1944); and In re Jenkins K Z B. Scott[1984] LRSC 45; , 32 LLR 313 (1984). Generally, we hold ” . . . that the intent referred to in discussing the matter of contempt is subjective, rather than objective. The intent or purpose of the alleged contemnor must be ascertained from all the acts, words, and circumstances surrounding the occurrence”. 17 AM JUR 2d., Contempt, § 8.

From the foregoing issues and laws discussed, we are even more convinced that the petitioners had contempted this Court, that they were given every opportunity during the arguments to vindicate themselves, and that we had followed every legal procedure necessary in their cases to hold them in contempt and to have them adjudged in the manner they deserved. Therefore, we are satisfied that they deserve the position they now occupy.

However, considering the novel procedure they have taken to appeal to this Bench to purge them of contempt, we have thought it proper to reconsider our earlier decision and to grant their petition with modifications. Thus, Counsellor J. Edward Koenig’s period of suspension from the practice of law is hereby reduced from two years to ten calendar months, and Counsellors J. Laveli Supuwood and Francis Y. S. Garlawolu’s period of suspension from the practice of law is hereby reduced from one year to eight months, with both taking retroactive affect from the date of our last opinion in which they were suspended from the practice of law. And it is so ordered.

Petition granted.