In re: PETITION OF THE NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION OF LIBERIA, BY AND THRU ITS EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, Petitioner.

Heard: November 3, 1986. Decided: January 23, 1987.

1. The Court, without a complaint, may of its own motion institute proceedings to punish for offenses against its dignity and authority, although the contempt may not have been committed in the court’s presence.

2. Contempts of court are classified as direct and indirect or constructive, the test being whether the contempt is offered within or outside the presence of the Court.

3. Where the contempt relates to acts committed by the contemnors indirectly or constructively outside the presence of the court, it is not only correct but also necessary that they be cited in separate contempt proceedings prior to their punishment by the Court.

4. In situations of indirect or constructive contempts involving acts committed outside the presence of the Court, it is necessary that the contemnors be informed of the acts committed by them out of the presence of the court, that they be allowed a hearing, and that they be permitted, if they so desire, to interpose a defense to the charges before punishment is imposed. But where the contempt is direct and is committed in the presence of the Court, no citation is necessary to punish the contemnors.

5. Where the contemnors are confronted by the Court regarding their acts of contempt committed in the presence of the Court, a second confrontation consequent upon a citation would serve no useful purpose.

6. Direct contempts which are committed in the presence of the court or so near it as to interrupt its proceedings are punishable at once by the court acting upon its view of the incident and without trial. In such case, the respondents are not entitled to notice of the accusation or to notice of motion for an attachment since in such cases, the notices will serve no useful purpose.

7. When contempt is committed facie curiae, the court may, in committing the offender, act of its own knowledge without further proof or examination, and the accused is not entitled to be heard in his own defense; nor can he complain that his constitutional rights are infringed by the refusal of a hearing. The court may however, in its discretion, permit the contemnor to be heard before he is sentenced.

8. The power to determine whether a contempt has been committed and to punish for it is inherent in a constitutional court, and such power cannot be limited by statute.

9. The definition of contempt of court applies in a special manner to lawyers and the offense is deemed much more grave than when committed by laymen.

10. Deceit by a counsellor-at-law amounting to an abuse of the function of his office may be punished as a contempt. Where the conduct of a counsellor-at-law, whether in or out of court, is disrespectful to a judge, such conduct constitutes contempt. If the conduct be in court and in connection with the hearing of a case, it is direct contempt; but if it be outside the court, it is constructive contempt.

11. The Supreme Court will punish for contempt any deceptive practice which might have the tendency to reflect discreditably upon the Judicial Branch of the government, or which may tend to belittle it for its decision, or which might embarrass it in the performance of its duties, or which might show disrespect to it or its Justices, or which might defy its authority.

The Liberian National Bar Association, petitioner in these proceedings, petitioned the Supreme Court to lift the suspension of three counsellors of the Supreme Court who had been adjudged in contempt of the Court, giving as reason for the petition that the Court had committed certain palpable and inadvertent errors and mistakes in the procedure adopted by it in the suspension of the lawyers.

The Supreme Court held the petition to be un-meritorious, noting that as a constitutional court it had the authority to hold a party in contempt where that party engaged in conduct which tended to bring the court into disrespect and disrupt; that it could, on its own motion adjudge a party in contempt; that the contempt which was committed being in the nature of constructive contempt, the contemnors were not entitled to a formal citation or notice stating the acts of contempt, or to an opportunity to defend since the contempt was committed in the presence of the Court; and that its power of contempt could not be curtailed by statute.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that it had erred in suspending the lawyers without first referring the matter to the Grievance and Ethics Committee of the National Bar Association or citing the lawyers for contempt so as to afford them their day in court. The Court observed that it had confronted the contemnors in open court about the false allegations contained in the returns filed on behalf of their clients, to the effect that in an earlier contempt proceedings held against their clients, only two Justices of the Supreme Court had signed the judgment, and that it had at that time provided them with the opportunity to exonerate themselves. The Court noted that the lawyers had refused to acknowledge the wrongness of the allegations and to amend the returns. A second confrontation, it said, would have served no useful purpose.

The Court therefore concluded that under the circumstances, it had every right to hold the lawyers in contempt, the act of constructive contempt having been committed in its presence. The petition was therefore denied.

David A. B. Jallah, H Varney G. Sherman, E. Winfred Smallwood and Joseph P. H Findley appeared for the petitioner.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE NAGBE delivered the opinion of the Court.

On the 30th day of May, 1986, the Supreme Court sitting en banc, granted a petition filed by the Ministry of Justice for a writ of prohibition against the then Grand Coalition of Political Parties, represented by William Gabriel Kpolleh of Liberia Unification Party, Chairman, Jackson F. Doe of the Liberia Action Party, First Vice Chairman, Edward B. Kesselly of the Unity Party, Second Vice Chairman, and Wesley M. Johnson, Third Vice Chairman, all of the City of Monrovia, prohibiting the said Association of Political Parties from holding a then planned Mass Political Rally. The alternative writ was granted by the Chamber Justice, His Honour Elwood L. Jangaba, but the subject petition was referred to the Full Bench because of the constitutional issue therein raised. We upheld the granting of the alternative writ and ordered the issuance of the peremptory writ, since indeed the Grand Coalition which had elected its officers and possessed all the attributes of an association, had refused to register in accordance with the Elections Law and the Constitution. Counsellor J. Edward Koenig, J. Laveli Supuwood and Francis Y. S. Garlawolo represented the respondents.

Despite existence of the prohibition, the Coalition of Political Parties convened a meeting, again as an association, to deliberate on political matters in direct disregard and violation of the Supreme Court’s opinion on the subject.

The Supreme Court, considering the conduct of the officers of said association to be contemptuous, cited them, that is to say, William Gabriel Kpolleh, Jackson F. Doe, Edward B. Kesselly and Wesley M. Johnson, for contempt.

“The Court, without complaint, may of its own motion institute proceedings to punish for offenses against its dignity and authority, although the contempt was not strictly speaking committed in the Court’s presence.” Gibson, Jr., v. Wilson and Blackie, [1943] LRSC 10; 8 LLR 165 (1943).

Following the service of the citation for contempt, the respondents appeared and were represented by their legal counsel, namely: Messrs. J. Edward Koenig, J. Laveli Supuwood and Francis Y. S. Garlawolo. On the 3rd day of July, 1986, respondents’ returns were filed by their legal counsel aforesaid, and on the 7th and 8th of the same month, arguments were heard. As pointed out in our opinion delivered on August 1, 1986, the entire returns filed by these lawyers contained mostly “sarcastic and disdainful averments” and a mockery of the issue at bar. At one point, one of the counsel, Counsellor Supuwood, had to be urged to stand up in answering questions from the Bench.

Immediately after the reading of the Court’s opinion adjudging Messrs. Gabriel Kpolleh, Jackson Doe, Edward Kesselly and Wesley Johnson guilty of contempt, the judgment there-under, which was signed by the Chief Justice and three Associate Justices, was also read. The contemnors, alluding to that judgment in their returns filed in their behalf by their counsels, the counsellors herein, and with intent to ridicule and disparage this Honourable Court, falsely alleged in count 14 of the said returns that the judgment was signed by only two justices of the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution and statutory laws of Liberia. The said count 14 read as follows:

“Respondents beg to inform this Honourable Court that the judgment resulting from the opinion subject of these proceedings as served upon their counsel were signed only by two Justices, namely: Justice Frederick K. Tulay and Justice Elwood L. Jangaba. This further confused respondents because the procedure and practice in this jurisdiction is that judgments resulting from an opinion of the Supreme Court must be signed by at least three Justices, which constitutes the majority. To hold the respondents for contempt for allegedly disobeying the judgment signed by only two Justices is unfair and will set a dangerous precedent as to the functions and operation of the Supreme Court. We attach hereto copy of said Judgment marked exhibit “A” and made a part of this return.”

The returns were verified by Counsellor Koenig, one of the suspended lawyers, before Mrs. Veronica Corvah, acting Clerk of the Supreme Court, as Justice of the Peace.

Upon the filing of the returns and immediately after reading count 14, we at once sent for the Acting Clerk and Justice of the Peace, Mrs. Corvah, to come to our office where Counsellor Koenig was then attending other business, and to bring along the original copy of the judgment. In the presence of Associate Justice Biddle, Counsellor Koenig was confronted with the judgment bearing the signatures of four Justices of this Court. When asked why he was attempting to play such a deceit and whether in view of the fact that he had seen the signatures, the returns would be withdrawn and amended in light of the evidence, Counsellor Koenig did not respond, and the returns were never amended.

Again, during the arguments of the proceedings before the Full Bench, this false allegation impugning the integrity of this Court was not withdrawn when counsels for the contemnors were all again confronted therewith.

Because of the general unethical behavior of these lawyers before the bench and the conduct of the Acting Clerk, they were all punished along with those cited for contempt.

On August 15, 1986, the National Bar Association filed a petition in favor of the suspended lawyers, stating among other things, that it wanted to bring to this Court’s attention certain palpable and inadvertent errors and/or mistakes evident by the procedures adopted” by this Honourable Court in the suspension of these lawyers.

In support of its contention, the National Bar Association advanced the following citations: “And for reliance Your Humble petitioner cites the following:

(a) Section X of the procedures governing the operation of the National Bar Association of the Republic of Liberia in matters of unprofessional and unethical conduct of Lawyers. RULES OF COURT, 1972.

(b) Section 17.7, Subsections 1-5 of the NEW JUDICIARY LAW, 1972.

(c) In Re: Contempt Proceedings against Honourable Jenkins K. Z. B. Scott, Minister of Justice, OCTOBER, A. D. 1984 TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS.

(d) In Re: Counsellor Samuel E. H. Pelham[1978] LRSC 29; , 27 LLR 112.

(e) In Re: MacDonald Acolatse[1977] LRSC 56; , 26 LLR 456.

(f) In Re: C. Abayomi Cassell, [1961] LRSC 22; 14 LLR 391.”

With reference to the above cases cited by petitioner for reliance, none of them is analogous to the case at bar. All of the said cases relate to indirect or constructive contempt. ‘Contempts of court are classified as direct and as indirect or constructive, the test being whether the contempt is offered within or outside the presence of the Court.” 12 AM JUR, Contempt, § 4. As all of the contempts referred to in the citations relate to acts committed indirectly or constructively outside the presence of the Court, it was not only correct but it was also necessary that the contemnors be cited in separate contempt proceedings prior to their punishment by the Court.

The citations were relevant in such instances because the contemnors had been informed of the acts committed by them outside the presence of the court. But where the contempt is direct and is committed in the presence of Court, no citation is necessary to punish the contemnor.

It is also contended that to suspend the lawyers without first having referred the matter to the Grievance and Ethics committee or citing them for a formal hearing of contempt, deprived them of their day in court under our due process system. The lawyers having already been confronted by the Bench, particularly regarding their deception, as contained in count 14 of the returns, a second confrontation consequent upon a citation would have served no useful purpose. The principle of law adhered to in this jurisdiction states:

“Direct contempts which are committed in the presence of the court or so near as to interrupt its proceedings are punishable at once by the court acting upon its own view and without trial. The respondent is not entitled to notice of the accusation or to notice of motion for an attachment, since in such a case the notices cannot serve any useful purpose.” 12 AM. JUR. Contempt, § 69.

As a general rule, when contempt is committed in facie curiae, the court may, in committing the offender, act of its own knowledge without further proof or examination, and the accused is not entitled to be heard in his own defense, nor can he complain that his constitutional rights are infringed by the refusal of a hearing. The court, however, may, in its discretion, allow a contemner to be heard before he is sentenced. With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed without the actual presence of the court, it is essential that a hearing be allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense to the charges before punishment is imposed.” Ibid., § 70.

It was argued by the petitioner that “[w]here the contempt is committed during litigation actually in progress, the court may summarily impose a fine as punishment and suspend the litigation until the fine is paid.”

What would have happened then if the fine was not paid, which we believe was going to be the case, as shown by subsequent events in the other contempt cases which these lawyers were defending? Would it not have resulted in the indefinite suspension of the litigation, operating thereby in favor of the contemnors and the respondents, to the chagrin and humiliation of this Honourable Court? This would have been the situation since the contemnors, then counsels for the respondents were arguing and insisting that defiance of the court was necessary in order to avoid tension. But what if this court had decided not to summarily punish the lawyers but to instead defer such punishment of the contemnors until the end of the term or at the time of giving its opinion in the relevant case? Has the Supreme Court no discretion or choice? Where is the law against this? Where is the law which says that where the Supreme Court defers (summary) punishment of a contemnor in the matter of a direct contempt, the Court thereby waives its right to impose any punishment? The laws are to the contrary, a few of which we herewith quote:

“The power to determine whether contempt has been committed, and to punish for it, is inherent in a constitutional court, and such power cannot be limited by statute.” In re John Moore[1913] LRSC 5; , 2 LLR 97 (1913). “The definition of contempt of court applies in a special manner to lawyers and the offense is deemed much more grave than when committed by laymen.” Branly v. Vamply of Liberia, Inc., [1973] LRSC 83; 22 LLR 337 (1973). “Deceit by a counsellor-at-law amounting to an abuse of the functions of his office may be punished as contempt. Where the conduct of a counsellor-at-law, whether in or out of court, is disrespectful to a judge, such conduct constitutes contempt; if it be in court and in connection with the hearing of a case it is direct contempt; and if it be outside the court it is constructive contempt. The Supreme Court will punish for contempt any deceptive practice which might have the tendency to reflect discreditably upon the judicial branch of the government, or which night tend to belittle it for its decision, or which might embarrass it in the performance of it duties, or which might show disrespect to it or its Justices; or which might defy its authority.” In re C. Abayomi Cassell[1961] LRSC 22; , 14 LLR 391 (1961), also cited by petitioner. As already stated, the petition was filed by the petitioner on August 15, 1986, with the request that the Supreme Court convenes a special session to accommodate said petition. The request was of course ignored and the matter was duly assigned on November 3, 1986, after the regular opening of this Term of Court.

Interestingly, no mention was made of Veronica Corvah, the Justice of the Peace and Acting Clerk of Court who was a party to the deceit conspired against the integrity of this Honourable Court. She too was punished, not at once or summarily, but subsequently at the determination of the case.

This Court is of the unanimous opinion that the contemnors, having been confronted and given an opportunity to exonerate themselves, as has been recounted earlier in this opinion, have not been denied any rights and that they were therefore accorded their day in Court as is done in the instance of a direct contempt of Court.

The petition of the National Bar Association, being unmeritorious and unsupported by any pertinent law on the subject, is hereby denied. And it is hereby so ordered.

Petition denied.