In re: JOSEPH K. JALLAH, CONTEMPT OF COURT.

CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS

Heard: November 26, 1986. Decided: January 23, 1987

1. All admissions made by a party himself is evidence against the said party. Thus, admissions made by a party himself or his agent, acting within the scope of his authority, are admissible.

2. A lawyer should avoid publication of anything pertaining to pending or anticipated litigation, as such publication might interfere with a fair trial of the matter and prejudice the due administration of justice. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in court; but even in extreme cases, it is better to avoid an ex parte statement.

3. All courts have the inherent power to punish for contempt.

4. While the Constitution of Liberia guarantees the right and privilege to speak and write freely on any subject, it makes the speaker or writer responsible for the abuse of this right and privilege.

5.The courts of Liberia make no error in adhering to rules which are peculiarly Liberian and which bare in no wise repugnant to the general principles of law or the proper dignity of courts.

6. Contempt of court is the despising of the authority of justice, or the dignity of the court, and a person is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect and disregard.

7. The maxim “Cursus curiae est lex curia”, meaning the practice of the court is the law of the court, is binding on the courts.

8. Every court is the guardian of its own records and the master of its own practice.

9. Lawyers practicing before the courts of Liberia, being under the jurisdiction of said courts, their offensive and obnoxious conduct, done in the presence of a court sufficiently justifies the court in taking the require disciplinary measures in accordance with the spirit and intent of the law, to the end of preserving order and decorum in the court, to serve as a deterrent against others embarking upon a similar ruthless course, and to prevent a repetition of such conduct.

10. It is legally permissible for a party to withdraw a defense or pleading within a given time, so long as the withdrawal does not unreasonably delay the trial of the case.

11. The withdrawal of a case after it has been called for hearing is tantamount to a retraxit and the party who effects such withdrawal loses his action.

12. Disclaimer of intentional disrespect or design to embarrass the due administration of justice is no excuse in a proceeding for contempt, especially where the facts constituting the contempt are admitted, or where a contempt is clearly apparent from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act.

13. A disavowal of intent to insult the court will always be considered on the question of the sentence to be imposed, but doe not purge the contemnor.

Following the Supreme Court disbarment of three lawyers from the practice of law in Liberia, growing out of their conviction for contempt, the respondent herein wrote and had published in a daily newspaper in Liberia an article in which he negatively characterized the decision of the Court as a “Kangaro’s” decision and challenged its action against the lawyers as being “political”. The Supreme Court regarded the article as contemptuous and cited the respondent for contempt. When the case was called for hearing, the respondent withdrew his returns and pleaded with the Court for clemency.

The Court rejected the plea and adjudged the respondent in contempt of the Court. The Court opined that it was vested with the inherent right to punish lawyers appearing before it who committed acts that had the effect of interfering with a fair trial, which prejudiced the due administration of justice, exposed the court to scandal and ridicule, or despised the authority and dignity of the Court. The Court therefore concluded that under the authority vested in it, it acted properly in disciplining the lawyers involved. The respondent’s reaction to that action, it reasoned, was an act of contempt.

The Court further opined that the withdrawal of the returns and the respondent’s disavowal of any intent to insult or embarrass the Court were no excuse, especially where the facts constituting the contempt had been admitted by the respondent. As such, it said, the actions taken by the respondent, especially after the case was called for hearing, did no relieve the respondent of the offence or purge him of the contempt. The Court noted that while the Constitution granted the right to individuals to write and speak freely, it also provided that such individuals were responsible for the abuse thereof. It observed that the act of the respondent was sufficient to justify subjecting him to disciplinary measures. It therefore adjudged him guilty of contempt and fine him two thousand dollars or be imprisoned until full payment of the amount was made.

M Fahnbulleh Jones, Julius Adighibe and Joseph Andrews Appeared as Amici Curiae. Joseph K Jallah, respondent, appeared for himself.

MR. JUSTICE DENNIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In addition to the protective and conservative rights as provided by law for the protection of all citizens and residents of this land and country, enforceable through the courts of justice, there are other laws which vest in the courts the power of contempt, designed to guarantee the dignity and integrity of our courts of justice. These laws are to be kept and upheld inviolate.

In utter and flagrant disregard for those laws, Joseph K. Jallah, the respondent herein, wrote and had published in the Wednesday, August 6, 1986, Vol. 2, No. 23 edition of a news paper known as the “Daily Star”, a very scurrilous and libelous article entitled “Supreme Court Opinion and mirror’s editorial”, which appeared under the features column, wherein he unequivocally asserted therein the following: “One funny aspect of the Supreme Court’s decision was the unfair, undemocratic and unconstitutional debarment of three lawyers, namely: Koenig, Supuwood and Garlawolo. What is incredible and unconstitutional about the ban is that the said lawyers were never parties to any conflict before the Supreme Court.” Writing further, the respondent stated that “the debarment procedure for law not observed by the Supreme Court in its `Kangaro’s, decision.’ He added: “Based upon the above analysis and facts, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s decision has no iota of legal merits. And one can probably infer that it is more political since in fact and in truth some members of the Court originally belonged to N.D.P.L., as argued by Mr. Kpolleh.” The respondent thereby ostensibly castigated this High Court.

In reviewing the returns of the respondent, one can hardly but reach or arrive at the inescapable conclusion of the correctness of the citation of this Court, which the respondent couched in his admission in count one of the aforementioned returns. This Court has consistently recognized the statutory pronouncement that “an admission made by a party is evidence against said party.” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code I: 25.8. Also, under the caption “Admissibility in general”, it is stated: “All admissions made by a party himself or by his agent acting within the scope of his authority are admissible.”

From time immemorial, this High Court has always been and is held in reputable esteem. The derogatory assertion by the respondent, contained in the publication outlined in the citation is, to say the least, pregnant with unbridled audacity, a trifle with the truth, and a questioning of the competence, inherent power and ultimate right of this Court to disbar any of its practicing lawyers for cause unbecoming of a lawyer. This outrageous conduct of the respondent, laid and contained in the publication issued against this High Court, is indeed a misdemeanor. In support of our holding, we herewith quote word for word Rule 16 of the Moral and Ethical Code of Lawyers of Liberia.

“The lawyer should avoid publication of anything pertaining to pending or anticipated litigation, as such publication might interfere with a fair trial of the matter, and prejudice the due administration of justice. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in court; but even in extreme cases, it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.”

All courts have the inherent right to punish for contempt. This right is as old as the law itself. The Constitution of Liberia guarantees the right and privilege to speak and write freely on any subject, being however responsible for the abuse of this privilege. Vide: LIB. CONST., Art. 15 (a). It is also recognized that the courts of all countries differ in some respects, both in construction and practice. For example, the American courts, which are the outgrowth of the English courts, differ from the latter courts essentially in their construction and procedure; and it is that very difference that makes the courts in America peculiarly American. It is no mark of development or backwardness if, in the conduct of our courts, we adhere to rules which are peculiarly Liberian, but which are in no wise repugnant to the general principles of law or the proper dignity of courts.

There are numerous opinions of this High Court defining contempt of this and all other courts of justice of our country. These opinions forcefully condemn, denounce and seriously frown on any person or persons, whether citizens or foreigners, who, without any justification or excuse, publish any matter, which tend to expose to scandal and ridicule the courts of our country. Briefly stated, the despising of the authority, justice or dignity of the court which tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrepute, disregard and disrespect, to say the least, lessens the public’s confidence and credibility in the court. That act, we have held, constitutes contempt of court. Thus, in Brown et. al. v. Sesay et. al.[1968] LRSC 49; , 19 LLR 86 (1968), this Court, in defining contempt of court, said: “Contempt of court is a despising of the authority justice or dignity of the court, and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard.”

There are numerous other opinions of this High Court defining as well as expatiating the principle of contempt. These opinions obviate the need for and make it quite unnecessary for us to extend our research to the very extensive and copious area of the common law, incorporated in our statutes, some of which are quoted word for word in this opinion.

In any event, as we have said earlier, it is hardly necessary to delve any further into the tiny legal buds, fine prints, facts and circumstances giving rise to these contempt proceedings, especially in the face of the respondent’s admission, except to refer to the issue of the disbarment of Counsellors Koenig, Supuwood and Garlawolo who were one time practicing before this Bench.

There is a binding, forceful and explicit maxim which resolves the relevant issue raised in the respondent’s returns with respect to the disbarment of the aforesaid lawyers. The maxim states:: “Cursus curiae est lex curia (the practice of the court is the law of the court)”.

This Court has also made the following declaration in one of its earlier opinions: “Every court is the guardian of its own records and master of its own practice.” Vide: Roberts v. Roberts, [1878] LRSC 11; 1 LLR 107, 109 (1978).

The lawyers named herein were under the jurisdiction of the court; their unbecoming appearance and offensive conduct were done in the presence of and in open court. Their conduct was sufficiently obnoxious to justify the court taking the required disciplinary measure according to the spirit and intent of the law, to the end of preserving order and decorum in the court and to serve as a deterrent against others embarking upon a similar ruthless course as well as prevent a repetition of such conduct as was demonstrated by respondent Jallah.

The impulse and inclination of man to exchange thoughts, either in writing or orally, is supported by law; but this is not to be done without rule and order, which are the basis of civilization.

After more than one request made by respondent Jallah for a postponement of the hearing of this matter, endeavoring thereby to impress the Court that he had some difficulty in obtaining a lawyer to defend his interest, the helping hand and long arms of the Court were extended to him by the Court’s appointment of Counsellor Logan Broderick, in association with Counsellor Ceapar A. Mabande, to defend him.

After the opening of the argument of this case on both sides, respondent requested leave of the Court to withdraw his returns to the citation. The amicus curiae, Counsellor Julius Adighibe, interposed no objections thereto.

It is well to record here that there is a time when, a place where and a mode of procedure for party litigants or suitors to secure and enjoy the great benefits of clemency prior to the call of the case by the Court or prior to interposing an appeal to the Court for clemency.

The Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1: 9.10, provides that it is legally permissible for a party to withdraw a defense or pleading within a given time, so long as the withdrawal does not unreasonably delay the trial of the case.

The withdrawal of a case after it has been called for hearing, as was done in the instant circumstances, is tantamount to a retraxit and the party who makes such withdrawal loses his action. Vide: Minus v. Ross, [1883] LRSC 3; 1 LLR 168 (1883).

The focal issue of the pretentious innocence and the appeal for clemency after the case was called and hearing commenced is neither taken nor accepted as having been made in good faith.

We cite as the authority of the law, which supports our unwillingness to accept the said plea for pardon, the case In re Caranda, 8 LLR 249 (1944), text at 254, which reads word for word as follows, to wit: “Disclaimer of intentional disrespect or design to embarrass the due administration of justice is no excuse, especially where the facts constituting the contempt are admitted, or where a contempt is clearly apparent from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act.” The old rule, however, was that where one charged with contempt denied under oath any wrongful intent, the contempt was purged, and in practice now, where it is apparent that no disrespect was intended, a disavowal of intention to commit a contempt will be considered in extenuation of, or sometimes even as purging, the contempt. 13 Corpus Juris, Contempt, § 61; 9 CYC. Contempt, 25-26 (1903).

In relation to the foregoing, we also have the following law citation: “A disavowal of intent to insult the court, it is said, will always be considered on the question of the sentence to be imposed. In some courts when the defendant is attached for contempt of court for a criminal offense and files a sworn answer, that answer, if sufficient to purge him of the alleged contempt, may be taken as true and the defendant discharged. But this rule applies where the proceeding is brought to vindicate the law or the dignity of the Court; it does not apply to acts treated as contempt for the enforcement of orders and decrees as part of the remedy sought to be enforced; and it has been held not to be conclusive.”

In view of the above enumerated surrounding facts and circumstances we are of the abiding conviction and considered opinion that the respondent be and he is hereby adjudged guilty and convicted of contempt, and fined the sum of two thousand dollars or serve imprisonment until said fine is paid in full.

Respondent adjudged guilty of contempt.