HIS HONOUR NATHANIEL K. HODGE, Judge, Debt Court For Grand Bassa County, LAMCO J. V. OPERATING COMPANY, Appellants, v. JAMES A. NIMROD and JAMES B. DENNIS, Hearing Officer, Ministry of Labour, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE GRANTING THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

Heard: October 30, 1989. Decided: January 9, 1990.

1. Appeal from a hearing officer to the National Labour Court or debt court, as the case may be, is perfected by filing a formal petition for judicial review in either court and the service of copies on the respondents.

2. The period of perfecting an appeal from the hearing officer of the Ministry of Labor to the National Labour Court or debt court is ten (10) days.

3. When an appellant fails and neglects to perfect his appeal within statutory period, a motion to dismiss the appeal filed before the appellate court is in place, and not a petition for enforcement of the judgment

4. Prohibition will lie when the trial court lacks jurisdiction.

Co-appellee, James A. Nimrod, filed a complaint of unfair labor practices against the Lamco J. V. Operating Company, appellant, before the Labor Commissioner of Grand Bassa County, claiming certain entitlements, including retirement benefits, under the Labor Practices Law. The appellant filed an answer in which it denied appellee’s allegations and submitted that appellee had earlier chosen pension benefits under the Scandia Insurance Company pension scheme in place of the regular benefits under the Labour Laws of Liberia, therefore the appellee was ineligible for benefits under the Liberian Labour Practices Law. The labor commissioner notwithstanding, ruled in favor of the co-appellee, awarding him the benefits he sought in his complaint. When the appellant announced an appeal to the ruling of the labor commissioner, but did not perfect it, the co-appellee filed a petition for enforcement of judgment in the Debt Court of Grand Bassa County. Co-appellant answered, alleging that there was an appeal pending before the Debt Court for Grand Bassa County on the matter.

When the case was called for hearing, both parties maintained their respective positions and thereafter the trial judge ruled that the appeal must be heard first thereby deferring the hearing of the petition for enforcement of judgment. The coappellee thereupon filed a petition for prohibition against the trial judge before the Chambers Justice who heard said petition and granted it. The appellant announced an appeal to the full Bench of the Supreme Court.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that an appeal from a hearing officer to the National Labour Court or debt court, as the case may be, is perfected by filing a formal petition for judicial review in either court and serving copy on the respondent. The court also held that when an appellant fails or neglects to perfect his appeal within statutory period, a motion to dismiss the appeal is the proper proceeding to file and not petition for enforcement of judgment. Hence, the judgment of the Chambers Justice was modified and affirmed.

Anthony B. Morgan appeared for the appellant. Alfred B. Flomo appeared for the appellee.

MR. JUSTICE GBALAZEH delivered the opinion of the Court.

This matter is on appeal from a ruling in the Chambers of this Court, granting the peremptory writ of prohibition against the appellants. The Chambers Justice held that the case is a labor matter, and therefore appeal from a hearing officer of the Ministry of Labour can only be heard by the National Labour Court or a debt court as the case may be, by a regular petition for judicial review duly filed with the clerk of either court within ten (10) days after the judgment is entered.

Mr. James A. Nimrod, petitioner for prohibition (co-appellee before us) had brought an action of unfair labor practices to recover certain benefits allegedly withheld from him after retirement by his former employer, the LAMCO J. V. Operating Company, respondent (co-appellant before us). Petitioner had continuously served respondent for about twenty-seven unbroken years (1957 – 1983) as a foreman.

The facts of the complaint are that in 1983, it became necessary to retire the petitioner from the respondent’s services after he sustained a serious injury while serving respondent. The injury later resulted into a ten percent (10%) disability. Upon retirement, the petitioner was entitled to pension benefits under the Labor Practices Law. As was usual with its retired employees, respondent gave petitioner the option of a Scandia Insurance Scheme that provides him the benefit of six percent (6%) of his last salary each month, until he reached sixty-seven (67) years of age. Respondent had a rule that where a retired employee opted for the Scandia Insurance Scheme, he automatically forfeited pension benefits under the Labor Practices Law.

Petitioner chose the Scandia Insurance Pension benefit which he allegedly enjoyed for about six months. Thereafter, he also requested from respondent the regular pension benefits under the Labour Practices Law, and other benefits which he contended were due him, but were allegedly not given him by the respondent. Apparently, the respondent denied petitioner demands for additional benefits. Petitioner then filed a complaint of unfair labor practices before the Labor Commissioner of Grand Bassa County in Buchanan, claiming certain entitlements, including all his regular retirement benefits under our laws. Respondent, as defendant, filed an answer denying the allegations of the complainant, and asserted that because petitioner had selected the Scandia Insurance Pension benefits, he was not entitled to the regular Liberian pension benefits. The Labor Commissioner ruled in favour of petitioner and awarded him the benefits he sought in his complaint.

On June 10, 1988, petitioner filed a petition for enforcement of judgment before the Debt Court of Grand Bassa County in Buchanan, which is the court vested with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of officials of the Ministry of Labour in labor matters in that County. Respondent appeared and filed an answer, claiming that there is a pending appeal already before the debt court on the same matter, and that a motion to dismiss its appeal is the appropriate legal remedy in such cases, and not a petition praying for enforcement of the ruling of the labor commissioner.

A hearing was conducted on July 4, 1988, and thereafter the debt court judge ruled for respondent, tabling the petition for enforcement, and sustaining the contention of counsel for the respondent that there was an appeal pending before the debt court, which must be heard first.

In response to this ruling, petitioner requested the Justice in Chambers for the writ of prohibition against the judge of the debt court and the LAMCO J. V. Operating Company, as respondents, to restrain the judge from proceeding with the hearing of the appeal. Petitioner contended that there was no appeal properly before the debt court and, as such, the petition to enforce the judgment of the labour commissioner should be heard and disposed of. The Justice in Chambers granted the writ on the ground that the LAMCO J. V. Operating Company, the co-respondent, had failed to perfect its appeal from the judgment of the labour commissioner to the debt court within ten (10) days after rendition of said judgment by filing a petition for judicial review before the debt court. The Chambers Justice held that based on that neglect or failure of the respondent, there was no appeal before the debt court. He therefore ordered the debt court judge to resume jurisdiction and enforce the ruling of the labour commissioner.

It is from this ruling of the Chambers Justice that respondent announced this appeal to the full Bench of this Honourable Court.

There are two basic issues confronting us on this appeal from the ruling of the Chambers Justice, and they are:

1. Whether or not the forwarding of the document in a labor matter appealed from a hearing officer to the labor court or a debt court, along with a letter to the court indicating an intention to appeal, are sufficient to give the court jurisdiction over the appeal.

2. Whether or not a petition for enforcement of judgment filed before the labor court or a debt court is the proper remedy where an appellant from the decision of an official of the Ministry of Labour fails to perfect the appeal.

The answer to the first issue is simply no. Appeal from a hearing officer to the National Labour Court or debt court, as the case may be, is perfected by filing a formal petition for judicial review in either court, followed by service of copies on the respondents. When the erstwhile Board of General Appeals of the Ministry of Labour was in existence, it required thirty (30) days after the date of the rendition of the ruling appealed from, for the appellant to perfect said appeal. However, upon the abolition of the Board, and with the availability of an appellate court in each county, the period has been reduced to ten (10) days for perfecting an appeal from a ruling of a hearing officer of the Ministry of Labour to the debt court or the National Labour Court. Where this has not been done, there is no appeal pending before that appellate court. And this fact has been emphasized by earlier opinions of this Court. Hennings et al. and Blamo v. Lamco J. V. Operating Company, [1989] LRSC 40; 36 LLR 518 (1989). See also INA Decree No. 21.

Fortunately, this point was readily conceded by counsel for appellant while answering a question from this Bench on the matter.

The second and final issue likewise receives our negative answer. We are convinced, and we hereby reaffirm several opinions of this Court to the effect that when an appellant fails and neglects to perfect his appeal within the statutory period, a motion to dismiss the appeal filed before the appellate court is in place, and certainly not a petition for enforcement of the judgment, as was done in this case.

Hence, we consider it proper to modify and affirm the ruling of our colleague in Chambers, Mr. Justice Robert G . W. Azango, granting the peremptory writ of prohibition against the Debt Court for proceeding contrary to the rules which ought to be observed at all times. Parker v Worrell, [1925] LRSC 9; 2 LLR 525 (1924). Prohibition will lie when the trial court lacks jurisdiction, as in this case where the debt court had attempted to hear an appeal which is not legally before it. Ibid.

We are also dismissing the petition for enforcement of the ruling of the hearing officer for being improper and innovative in the practice. Costs are disallowed. And it is hereby so ordered.

Ruling affirmed with modification.