HANNAH HARPER-CRABBE, Appellant, v. HIS HONOUR H. SOE BAILEY, Judge of the Monthly and Probate Court, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Heard: June 5, 1989. Decided: July 14, 1989.

1. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine a case of action presented to it.

2. A court has no power to interfere with a judgment of another court of concurrent jurisdiction.

3. It is elementary that neither the law nor the practice of our courts will permit a subordinate court to depart from the strict wordings of the mandate or opinions of the Supreme Court.

4. Trial judges should follow strictly, both the spirit as well as the letter, all opinions rendered by the Supreme Court as one of the best means of unifying the practice.

5. The functions of a judge are to decide controversies between litigants. He is not an adjunct or advisor or investigating instrument of other agencies of government. His duties are to exercise judicial functions duly conferred on him by law; to expedite the function of his court and to act regardless of his feelings or sentiments; he must act fairly and impartially and render righteous and honest judgments without suspicion of unfairness and without unreasonable delay. A judge cannot relieve himself for his duties nor can he divest himself of jurisdiction by arbitrary dismissal of proceedings before him.

The appellant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Liberia to review certain irregularities carried out by he appellee judge for the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, including a ruling revoking appellant’s letters of administration and allegedly tampering with the mandate and opinion of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the ruling of the probate court judge and passing upon the petitioner’s petition, observed that the said judge had not only transcended his judicial bounds by reviewing and reversing the ruling of another probate court judge with whom he had concur-rent jurisdiction, but that he had refused to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court and had acted contrary to the Court’s opinion and mandate.

The Supreme Court therefore declared his acts to be ultra vires, fined him $800.00 for contempt of the Court, and reversed the judgment rendered by him.

J. Emmanuel R. Berry of the Berry & Berry Law Firm, S. Raymond Horace, Sr. and Moses K. Yangbe for petitioner. No one appeared for the respondent.

MR. JUSTICE AZANGO delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case emanates from the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia, where the Judge, His Honour Harper S. Bailey, is believed to have gone beyond the realm of his judicial office and authority, thereby committing several reversible errors. The facts of the case, as culled from the records are narrated as follows:

Upon the death of General Alexander R. Harper, Hannah H. Crabbe and Beno R. Harper became legal heirs of the late General Harper. Hannah H. Crabbe became heir by adoption, while Beno R. Harper became heir by natural birth. When General Alexander R. Harper died intestate on February 8, 1966, Beno R. Harper and his foster mother, Maggie R. Harper, represented by her son, William V.S. Tubman, Jr., petitioned the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County and were granted letters of administration to administer the intestate of the late Alexander R. Harper.

On November 3, 1972, Administrator Beno R. Harper and William V.S. Tubman, Jr. petitioned the probate court to close the estate, but the petition was denied because the said administrators had not reached any understanding with the appellant regarding the distribution of the assets of said intestate estate. The records revealed further that even though the administrators aforementioned had not reached an agreement yet when Co-administrator William V.S. Tubman, Jr. departed Liberia for foreign parts, Co-administrator Beno R. Harper and one Adella Giddings petitioned the probate court in November, 1978 for letters of administration to administer the same estate of the late Alexander R. Harper. The petition was granted by His Honour R. D. Urey, then Commissioner of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, on November 18, 1976.

Following the granting of letters of administration to Beno R. Harper and Adella Giddings, appellant, not having been given any of the assets of the said estate, also petitioned the probate court to be appointed Co-Administrator of her late father’s intestate estate. On the 7th day of November, A. D. 1981, Her Honour Gladys K. Johnson, who was then the Commissioner of the Monthly and Probate Court for Montserrado County, ordered the issuance of a letter of administration in favour of appellant in her capacity as legal heir and next of kin of the decedent. As per said orders, the letters of administration was issued.

On August 18, 1972, Co-administrator Beno R. Harper, quite surprisingly, appointed one Elias G. N. Ricks, a stranger to the late General Alexander R. Harper’s Estate, as executor for the late General Alexander R. Harper’s Estate. Predicated upon the appointment and following the death of Beno R. Harper, the said Elias G. Ricks, on June 20, 1986, petitioned the monthly and probate court and was granted letters of administration to administer the intestate estate of General Alexander R. Harper.

Thereafter, on the 30th day of September, A. D. 1987, the said Elias G. Ricks, now Elias G. Ricks Ngwayah, petitioned the monthly and probate court to revoke the letters of administration issued to the Appellant Hannah H. Crabbe on the 17th day of November, A. D. 1981 on grounds that he was the next of kin to Beno R. Harper and that the said Beno R. Harper had appointed him to act as co-administrator of the intestate estate of the late Alexander R. Harper.

The petition filed by Mr. Elias G. Ricks Ngwayah was denied by the judge of the monthly and probate court, His Honour Harper S. Bailey. Notwithstanding the denial of the petition, the said probate court judge, His Honour Harper S. Bailey, declared the letters of administration granted to the appellant, Hannah H. Crabbe to co-administer her late father’s estate as ultra vices and void. For the benefit of this opinion, we herewith quote the ruling of the said probate court judge verbatim.

“The Court having patiently listened to the arguments of counsel for both parties, and thereafter having diligently perused the pleading filed in these revocation of letters proceedings, has arrived at the following facts of the entire case. That from the file of the estate, the late General Alexander R. Harper died intestate on the 8th or 9th day of February, A. D. 1966, and as a result of which, his widow, Mrs. Maggie R. Harper, retained Counsellors Philip J. L. Brumskine and Joseph W. Garber of the Garber Law Firm who filed a petition in this court on March 3, 1966. Mrs. Maggie R. Harper was represented by and through her son, William V.S. Tubman, Jr. and Beno R. Harper, lineal heir of the deceased, as petitioners. This Court granted petitioner’s petition and on the said same day letters of administrations were issued to William V.S. Tubman, Jr. and Beno R. Harper, appointing them as administrators. Subsequently, these two administrators filed a petition for the closing of the estate on November 3, 1972 and this court granted the said petition and entered its decree granting the closing of the estate on November 3, 1972, and this brought the administration of the whole intestate estate of the late General Alexander R. Harper to a judicial settlement. For reliance, see Rules for the Governance of the Probate Court found in the Rules of Court, page 27, Rule 30, which states inter a/ia: “every estate shall be closed within one year of the date the orders of court is given to take inventory thereof: ….” See also Decedents Estates Law, Rev. Code 8: 119.12, which states inter alia: “Fiduciaries may be released and discharged from further liability without a judicial settlement of the accounts in accordance with the following procedure”

That after the filing of the petitioners’ petition for the closing of the estate which the court granted on November 3, 1972, this very court erroneously granted a petition of and appointed Co-Administrator Beno R. Harper and Adella Gidding as administrator and administratrix on November 18, 1976, commanding them to administer the very intestate estate of the late A. R. Harper which has already been closed. That in process of time, Co-Administrator Beno R. Harper died on January 16, 1980 and in keeping with the Decedents Estates Law that such vacancies must be filled and by operation of the law, one Rose K. Hollywood-Harper, by and through Counsellor S. Raymond Horace, Sr., filed a petition for letters of appointment to allow her to associate with Co-Administrator William V. S. Tubman, Jr. The court granted her petition and letters of administration was issued in her favor on March 18, 1980 thereby legally and equitably fulfilling the statutes. See Decedents Estate Law; Rev. Code 8: 107.4 (2), In re: “When no fiduciary remain”, Chapter 111, page 92, Section 111.8 subsection 1, In re: “Procedure when vacancy occurred”; chapter 107, page 66, sec. 107.7, In re: “Filing and hearing of objections to grant letters ….any person interested, before letters are granted to a fiduciary may file objections showing his interest in the estate and stating one or more legal objections to granting the letters to one or more of the persons about to receive them. Where such objections are filed, the court may stay the granting of letters to the person against whom the objections are made until the matter is determined.” That in spite of these above facts and circumstances, Co-respondent Hannah Harper-Crabbe filed her petition on June 10, 1981 praying the court for letters to appoint her as co-administratrix to administer the intestate estate of the late General A.R. Harper. The presiding probate judge at that time became unmindful of the legal maxim laid down by the Supreme Court in the case Roberts v. Roberts, [1878] LRSC 11; 1 LLR 107 (1878), text at page 109, which unequivocally states inter alia:”Every court is the legal guardian of its own records and master of its own practice”, coupled with the Probate Court Procedural Code, Decedents Estates Law, Section 111.8, subsection 1, relative to vacancy in office and administration de honis non, erroneously granted the petition and letters of administration was issued to appoint Corespondent Hannah Harper-Crabbe on November 17, 1981 commanding her to administer and to close the said estate within twelve (12) months.

Notwithstanding these glaring irregularities, co-respondent Hannah Harper-Crabbe, in association with Etta and John Harper, filed their joint petition before this court on September 4, 1976 praying the Court to re-open the Estate, but from the inspection of the estate file, we have not been able to come across any decree entered by this court as to whether or not the said petition for the reopening of the estate was ever granted or denied. That from the further perusal of the estate file, we came across the bill of information that was filed on September 14, 1983 by Mrs. Dorothy Cooper-Harper, widow of the late aco-Administrator Beno R. Harper, in which she raised contention over the Chicken Inns rental money of the estate that should come to her by right in lieu of her late husband. The court at that time, after having heard evidence pro et con, reversed its ruling of September 20, 1983. Whether same has been ruled upon, we have yet to know.

Ultimately, Elias G. N. Ricks, now called Elias G. Ricks Ngwayah, filed his petition for letters of administration to appoint him as administrator on June 17, 1986. The court again erroneously and unprecedentedly granted his petition and letters of administration was issued to him on June 20, 1986. That it was the promiscuous granting and issuance of the above mentioned vague, irregular, and unprecedented letters of administration to Adella Gidding, Elias Ricks Ngwayah by the former probate judge who presided over this court, which has motivated Co-Administrator Elias Ricks Ngwayah to file his petition for revocation of letters that were issued to Co-Administratrixes Gidding, Harper Hollywood and Hannah Harper-Crabbe on September 29, 1987. The new petition contained twelve (12) counts, and to which respondents also filed their returns on October 22, 1987, containing seven (7) counts.

Let us now turn to the Probate Court Procedural Code found in the new Decedents Estate Law, to determine whether or not the petitioner’s petition is supported by law, specifically, in re: “General provisions relating to letters granted to fiduciaries, chapter 107. Section 107.10, In re:

“Suspension, modification or revocation of letters for disqualification or misconduct; section 107.13, In re: “Cases in which letters may be suspended, modified or revoked without process”; and sec. 107.7, In re: “Filing and hearing of objections to grant letters”. It is stated that when petition is filed for letters of administration, it is only then that a petition to object to the appointment of such petitioners may be filed and not after the granting of such petition and letters issued thereon. In the case East African Company v. Dunbar, [1895] LRSC 5; 1 LLR 279 (1895), it is unequivocally stated therein, as follows:

It may be well for us to remark just here, that the law makes no distinction between men when before it; the high and low here are both on a equal level. The law, while just, has no sympathy; it neither makes men rich nor poor; hence, the claim to be rich can have no influence with it; and to plead poverty can awaken no sympathy.”

WHEREFORE, and in view of the above cited legal authorities, to the mind of the court, the only coadministratrix who had legally and equitably received and was granted letters was Rose K. Hollywood-Harper, who had succeeded the late Co-administrator, Beno R. Harper. As to Petitioner Elias Ricks Ngwayah himself, Adella Gidding and Hannah Harper-Crabbe, they were appointed illegally contrary to Section 111.8 of the Decedents Estates Law of this Republic and their respective letters are considered ultra vires and void. The petitioner and the other two respondents above mentioned are placed in a position of pari delicto; the interpretation of which means “to be in equal fault and in equal offense under the law.” This being the case, the petition of the petitioner being legally wanting in law and in equity, same is hereby denied and vacated without prejudice to none of the parties. The costs in these proceedings assessed against the petitioner. And it is hereby so ordered.”

To which ruling, Respondent Hannah Harper-Crabbe excepted and announced an appeal to the Supreme Court of Liberia sitting in its March Term, A. D. 1988.

Upon the announcement of appeal, Judge Bailey made the following record: “Because of the unmeritorious announcement and praying for an appeal against the decree of this court to the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia, the court’s decree that was entered in the case Hannah Harper Crabbe v. Ezzat S. Dean is hereby ordered revoked and the clerk of this court is hereby ordered to communicate with Mr. Ezzat S. Dean not to pay any cent to Miss Hannah Harper-Crabbe pending final determination of the appeal that has been announced by the said Crabbe in this case. The sheriff of this court is ordered not to collect any cent or money affecting the estate of the late General Alexander H. Harper in favour of Hannah Harper-Crabbe pending final determination of the appeal which has been announced by her in this instant case. And it is so ordered.”.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF
THIS COURT, THIS 26th DAY OF OCTOBER,
A.D. 1987.
/t/Harper S. Bailey”
S/Harper S. Bailey”
PROBATE JUDGE”

To this second ruling, exceptions were taken and an appeal announced to the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia, sitting in its March Term, A. D. 1988.

The petitioner filed an eight-count bill of exceptions, as follows:

“1. Because respondent says she was duly appointed by Your predecessor as co-administratrix of the intestate estate of her late father, General Alexander R. Harper, as will more fully appear from copies of letters of administration and oath dated November 17, 1981, duly signed by the clerk and Her Honour Gladys K. Johnson of the Monthly & Probate Court, Montserrado County, filed in the case file, whereupon the estate was re-opened. Consequently, under the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, Your Honour does not have the competence to declare her appointment as erroneous, illegal and contrary to law.

2. That in count three (3) of the returns and count nine (9) of the petition, it was conceded that Rose K. Hollywood is not kin to either Beno R. Harper, Jr. or Alexander R. Harper, therefore, on the 20th day of March, 1980, His Honour E.S. Koroma accordingly ruled that Rose King Harper Hollywood has no legal standing in the estate of A. R. Harper, hence, she could not question the parties to a lease agreement. Respondent gave notice to produce evidence at the hearing but the court never heard evidence and concluded that the appointment of Respondent Hannah Harper-Crabbe was illegal and void and Rose R. King Hollywood was legally appointed to succeed Beno R. Harper though Rose R. King Hollywood is not related to Beno R. Harper, Jr. or General Alexander R. Harper.

3. That the right of appeal from a final judgment of a court is one of those fundamental rights of litigants under the Constitution of Liberia and in exercise of her right, respondent announced an appeal to the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia. Yet, Your Honour got vexed because of the announcement of the appeal, sua sponte reversed the final judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia in Harper-Cralthe v. Dean et. al. and ordered the clerk to communicate with the Appellant Ezzat S. Dean not to pay a cent to Respondent Hannah Harper-Crabbe until the final determination of the appeal.

4. That Your Honour acted ultra vires when you on the 22nd day of October, A. D. 1987, sua sponte revoked, reversed and suspended the enforcement of the mandate of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia in the case Dean et. al. v. Harper- Crabbe, petition for error, thereby punishing respondent for appealing from Your Honour’s final ruling in two separate cases involving separate and unrelated parties; which act is unbecoming of a judge who must be fair and neutral in all cases in which you act as a tribunal.

5. That your ruling which ordered the enforcement of the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia supra was rendered by you during the 1987 June Term of your court. Therefore Your Honour sitting in the 1987 October Term of your court has no legal authority to sua sponte resume jurisdiction, interfere with, revoke or suspend the implementation of the orders and instructions of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia whilst in the 1987 October Term.

6. That the Court must pass upon all the issues of law or facts that are not to be decided by a jury. Counts 1 to 7 of the returns contained mixed law and facts which you did not decide.

7. That Your Honour acted ultra vires when you sua sponte revoked, reversed and suspended enforcement Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia, re: Dean v. Harper-Cralthe which is unbecoming of a judge who must a neutral in all cases which he acts as a tribunal.

8. That the ruling which Your Honour reversed and suspended is the enforcement of the mandate of the Supreme Court entered since 1987 June Term of the Monthly & Probate Court. Therefore, Your Honour, sitting in the October 1987 Term of this court, cannot overrule the ruling you made in the June 1987 Term.”

From the careful perusal of the entire records in the instant case, it would appear that the triable issues before the Court for final determination are:

1. Whether or not a judge of an inferior court can review and reverse the ruling of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia?

2. Can a judge of an inferior court review and reverse the ruling of his predecessor, both of whom are of concurrent jurisdiction?

In an attempt to deal with the issues raised supra, let us first commence by considering issue #2 which reads: “Can a judge of an inferior court review and reverse the ruling of his predecessor, both of whom are of concurrent jurisdiction? Before answering the issue at bar, we shall first of all look at the definition of the word jurisdiction. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3’ed) says the following with respect to jurisdiction: “Jurisdiction is the right of a court to exercise its powers in causes of a certain class or the right of a tribunal to exercise its power with respect to a particular matter”. Moreover, jurisdiction has been defined in 20 AM. JUR. 2d, Courts, § 88, as the “power of a court to hear and determine a cause of action presented to it, the power of a court to adjudicate the kind of cases before it, etc.”

From the aforesaid definitions, one can conclude that courts can be given exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. Admittedly, the Monthly & Probate Court for Montserrado County, having been granted exclusive jurisdiction over all probate matters, was petitioned by the Appellant Hannah Harper-Crabbe in 1981, to be appointed as co-administratrix; Her Honour Gladys K. Johnson, presiding as the Commissioner of Probate at the time, granted unto appellant letters of administration as co-administratrix of the estate of the late General Alexander R. Harper. Realizing further the exclusive jurisdiction exercised by the monthly and probate court over probate matters, the said monthly and probate court was again petitioned on the 30th day of September, A. D. 1988 by Elias G. Ricks Ngwayah to revoke the Letter of Administration issued the Appellant Hannah Harper-Crabbe on the 17′ day of November, A. D. 1981, on grounds that he was the next of kin to Beno R. Harper. The said petition being denied by the judge of the monthly and probate court, His Honour Harper S. Bailey, the said probate judge, to the dismay and surprise of this Honourable Court and in complete disregards of the laws, procedures and precedents, proceeded to declare the decree of his predecessor, Her Honour Gladys K. Johnson, which granted unto appellant letters of administration as coadministrator of the estate of her late father as ultra vires and void.

This action of Judge Harper S. Bailey again raises doubt as to his competency and proficiency as a judge. Judge Bailey’s continuous outright disregard for the laws of this land has on many occasions exposed party litigants to injuries and the entire Judiciary to public ridicule, as to whether the judiciary having been empowered by the Constitution to interpret the laws of this land is prepared to adequately cope with these challenges. This court, being under the constitutional mandate to regulate the activities of all subordinate courts within this Republic, and this Court having further been a court of precedence and has held in the case Republic v. Aggrey, 13 LLR 469 (1960) that “a court has no power to interfere with a judgment of another court of concurrent jurisdiction”, can under no circumstances whatsoever condone the outright disregard for the laws of this glorious land of ours and the opinions of this Court. Therefore, without any fear or favour, we strongly hold and rule that the said decree of Judge Bailey is illegal and void.

As to issue number one (1) which reads “whether or not a judge of an inferior court can review and reverse the ruling of the Honourable Supreme Court of Liberia, the answer is a big no“. (Emphasis ours.) It is elementary that neither the law nor the practice of our courts will permit a subordinate court to depart from the strict wordings of the mandate or opinions of this Court, before even allowing a judge of an inferior court to interfere with, review, or attempt to reverse the ruling of this Honourable Court.

This Court in spelling the duties and responsibilities of trial judges held in the case: Richards v. McGill and McGill-Hilton, [1937] LRSC 24; 6 LLR 81 (1937), that trial judges should follow strictly, both in the spirit as well as in the letter, all opinions given by this court, as one of the most potent means of unifying the practice.” Regrettably, we are shocked by the deliberate act of disobedience and insubordination that Judge Harper S. Bailey continues to show to the holdings and authorities of this Honourable Court by reviewing and declaring the opinion of this Court as void.

Ordinarily, this would have terminated the case at this juncture, but we can not afford the luxury or endure the potential scandals and reproach which may result into unpleasant situation that may embarrass the Court. We cannot enjoy the intellectual and emotional gratification and delight which a judge gets from allowing the brightness of justice to shine or authority and power of his office to uphold what is right, just or lawful from using the qualities of righteous, honest, impartiality and fair representation of the fact to be watered down.

The Legislature has conferred upon every judge judicial powers and responsibilities, powers which are defined by law. His functions are to decide controversies between litigants. He is not an adjunct or advisor or investigating instrumentality of other agencies of government. His duties are to exercise judicial functions duly conferred on him by law. A part of those duties is to expedite the function of his court and to act regardless of his feelings or sentiments. He cannot relieve himself of that duty nor can he divest himself of that jurisdiction by arbitrarily dismissing the proceeding before him. A judge is not a mere umpire; he must see to it that his judgment or decree or others are executed. In his capacity as a judge, he must act fairly and impartially. He is to render righteous and honest judgment without suspicion of unfairness and to do so without unreasonable delay.

After carefully reading and considering the writ of certiorari, together with the law controlling, we hold that respondent judge not having closely followed these principles of law, the writ of certiorari as filed must, as a matter of law, be sustained, and the certiorari proceeding now pending before this Court is ordered immediately proceeded with in keeping with the prayer of the petitioner.

Furthermore, the facts and circumstances in the instant case having evidently shown that the act of probate judge, His Honour Harper S. Bailey, was a gross disrespect to and disregard for the authority of this Court and the laws of this land, the said judge is hereby fined the sum of $800.00 (Eight Hundred Dollars) and is further ordered to have the said amount paid into government revenue within forty-eight (48) hours.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the Court below informing it of this judgment. And it is hereby so ordered.

Petition granted.