SAMUEL B. GRIFFITHS, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued October 29, 1973. Decided November 23, 1973. 1. There is no precise form required for giving notice to the drawer of a dishonored check, as long as he receives written notice of dishonor. 2. Prosecution for the drawing of a worthless check will be averted if payment thereof by drawer is made within ten days after his receipt of notice thereof. 3. For an indictment to be sufficient it need only apprise the accused of the charge against him with such distinctness as to enable him to come fully prepared for his defense. 4. Statutes are to be construed not according to their mere letter but according to the intent and object with which they were enacted. 5. The remand of a case pursuant to appeal does not constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by reason of retrial. 6. Felonious intent need not be proved by positive testimony but may be inferred from circumstance. 7. When it appears that criminal proceedings have been initiated by a private prosecutor to assist him in the collection of a private debt, a judgment of conviction will be reversed and the defendant discharged. The appellant was indicted on September 24, 1971, charged with grand larceny for allegedly issuing knowingly a series of worthless checks to the Liberia Trading Corporation, which thereafter complained to the authorities, becoming as a consequence the private prosecutor in the resultant criminal proceedings. Prior thereto, in July, 1971, the appellant began a suit in replevin for the return of the dishonored checks held by the payee. Although the suit had not been resolved at the time of this appeal, it would seem that the checks had been ordered returned to the plaintiff therein. Subsequent to the indictment, on October IS, 1971, the Liberia Trading Corporation started an action in the Debt Court, against the appellant, in which it included the total of the worthless checks which formed the basis for the criminal prosecution, as well as the balance of other debts it said were 288 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 289 owing by the appellant. The second suit was also unresolved at the time of this appeal. In the present case, which appears to be the second trial, ordered after an apparent appeal, the appellant was convicted as charged and sentenced to seven years, fined and ordered to make restitution. He appealed from the judgment. Primarily he contended that adequate notice hadn’t been given him by the prosecution to redeem the dishonored checks and that being retried constituted placing him in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court discounted these arguments, pointing out their lack of substance. However, the Court was of the opinion that the criminal prosecution appeared to have been initiated by the private prosecutor to assist it in the collection of a private debt and, principally on such basis, reversed the judgment and discharged the appellant without day. Samuel E. H. Pelham and Joseph Williamson for appellant. The Solicitor General, the County Attorney for Montserrado County, and Jesse Banks, Jr. for appellee. MR. Court. JUSTICE AZANGO delivered the opinion of the Samuel Boston Griffiths, who once did considerable business with the Liberia Trading Corporation of the City of Monrovia, which business included the purchase and servicing of vehicles and the sale of accessories, was indicted on September 24, 1971, by a grand jury in Montserrado County. The indictment charged that on April 23, 29, May 8, 3o, June 5, 20, July 3o, and August 2, 1971, and January 18 through 20, 1972, defendant fraudulently and with intent to defraud the Liberia Trading Corporation, issued eleven checks drawn on the International Trust Company of Liberia to the order of the said Liberia Trading Corporation, aggregating $5,215.00, knowing at the time that he did not have funds in the In- 290 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ternational Trust Company of Liberia to cover said checks. And when the checks were presented to the said bank for payment they were returned for insufficient funds. As a result the defendant was indicted for grand larceny. Accordingly, a trial commenced in the court below with defendant’s counsel filing two motions, a motion to quash the indictment and a motion for discharge on the ground of double jeopardy. They were heard and denied by the trial judge. Defendant entered his plea of not guilty. A verdict of guilty against the defendant was returned after trial. Motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment were filed, resisted, heard, and denied. Final judgment was rendered against the defendant sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment and restitution of $5,z15.00, the amount charged in the indictment, together with a fine. Exceptions were noted and an appeal taken to this Court based on a bill of exceptions containing nineteen counts. Before turning our attention to the bill of exceptions, we will consider the contentions raised in appellant’s brief. In the first three counts counsel argues that by the language of the section in our Penal Law under which his client was convicted, the prosecution should have given the appellant ten days’ notice to make good the worthless checks before initiating prosecution. i. Any person who . . . (f) makes, draws, executes, utters or delivers to another any check, draft or order upon any bank or depositary for the payment of money when the person has no account or where funds are insufficient in the bank or depositary to pay the check, draft or order upon presentation is guilty of larceny. . . . “6. In cases arising under subsection (f) if the maker or drawer pays the face value of the check, draft or order, together with interest charges, protest fees, within ten days after receiving written notice of ” LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 291 dishonor, no arrest shall be made and no prosecution brought under this section.” (Emphasis supplied.) 1956 Code 27 :297 (1 ) (f) , (6) , as amended L. 1966-67. Commenting on the question of notice, we wish to observe that there is no precise form in giving notice of dishonor to the drawer or to an endorser. Its object is to inform him of the failure of the maker or acceptor to meet his engagement with promptness, and to advise him that he will be looked to for payment, in order that he may take measures for his indemnity, and any means of communicating this information, whether verbally or in writing, will be sufficient. Notice is information, intelligence, or knowledge. In other words, when the lawmakers specifically provided that “if the maker or drawer pays the face value of the check, draft or order, together with interest charges, protest fees, within ten days after receiving written notice of dishonor” (emphasis supplied) it is meant that the maker of the check shall receive that knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently pertinent in character to enable a reasonably cautious and prudent person to investigate and ascertain the ultimate facts. Generally, a person can be said to have notice of a fact only when it is actually communicated to him in such a way that his mind can and does take cognizance of it. It is sufficient if its object cannot be mistaken. Of course, when a person knows a thing, he has “notice” thereof, as no one needs notice of what he already knows. In other words, actual knowledge supersedes a requirement of notice. The record in the case reveals that on July 18, 1971, counsellor David A. T. Brown, resident legal counsel for the Liberia Trading Corporation, communicated with appellant, and appellant replied the next day. The letters and the charges and explanations in them, clearly show that appellant knew of the insufficiency of funds to cover the checks drawn. Moreover, counsellor Brown testified at length about the matter during the trial. 292 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS “These checks, according to their dates and their values, were submitted to the different banks for encashment by LTC, the private prosecutor; and when so presented to these banks they were dishonored, bounced and became worthless. The general manager before leaving called the defendant at his office and informed him that already four of his postdated checks had bounced, and asked him to redeem them and the remaining checks before he left, as he was going home to Switzerland for vacation. The defendant miserably failed to adhere and redeem his checks. These checks were only to be carried to the bank by LTC, whose name was indicated on the checks to receive the amounts placed thereon as its value; and there were no other marks besides the check itself made by defendant as collateral security and as guarantor not to be encashed; but they were made to encash on each date appearing on each and every check. The then general manager then left. During that period, Mr. Heniz Wealty resigned. The vicepresident of the company, Mr. Beur, came and he appointed Mr. H. E. Rachillian to act as general manager for LTC, the private prosecutor. The remaining checks, according to their dates, were presented to the different banks for encashment. They were returned to private prosecutor, LTC, bounced and were worthless checks. He was also asked by Mr. Beur and Rachillian to pay in money to reduce defendants heavy accounts which is approximately $73,000.00 odd or $8o,000.00 odd and defendant was also informed that failure to make payments against this huge sum of money that he owed LTC will not further grant him any credits, because of the big amount outstanding. LTC appealed to defendant to bring in more money to which he promised and failed. I recall the defendant went to the Department of Justice, now Ministry of Justice, with a complaint. The LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 293 manager and I appeared. We exhibited as our defense a stipulation signed by defendant himself, his bounced checks and our demands to redeem his bounced checks and pay some money against his general accounts. The Department of Justice also failed. I wrote the defendant. My letter is dated on the i8th day of July, 1971, enumerating the bounced checks, requesting him to redeem them. After repeated requests and failing to redeem them which covered the period from August, 1970 through January to July, 1971, making approximately eleven months between which the defendant failed to redeem his bounced checks, against grace period of ten days allowed by law, he failed and never redeemed his checks. In that letter I also mentioned that this failure not to redeem them upon the receipt of my letter dated i8th day of July, 1971, he, the defendant, will leave us with no alternative but to present the bounced checks to the proper forum and receive redress. Among many things written in the letter was that LTC, the private prosecutor, was not able to collect from assignments, LPAs, that the defendant assigned to LTC to reduce his general accounts. The defendant acknowledged by letter referred to on the 19th day of July, 1971, stating that he was aware that the checks had bounced and that LTC, private prosecutor was unable to encash them. He also referred to auditing his accounts in the face of his stipulation dated znd April 1971, covering the amounts of $42,872.51. His checks were already bounced and became worthless, and over repeated notice to redeem them, he failed. Mr. Rachillian, the manager, before coming to court after a series of requests made of defendant to redeem his checks, wrote him a letter asking him again to redeem his bounced checks and this letter was dated the 7th of September 1971. The defendant failed.” In view of the above facts and circumstances, we find 294 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS it difficult to agree with the contention of appellant that he was not given the ten days’ notice required by law to redeem his worthless checks. We hold that he received actual, implied, and constructive notice to redeem his checks. As to the ruling of the trial judge conceding the issues raised in appellant’s motion to quash the indictment, yet denying it on the ground that under our Criminal Procedure Law the grounds would not sustain a motion to quash the indictment, we must uphold the position taken by the trial judge. Under a universally accepted principle of criminal procedure and practice, the accused is entitled only to be apprised of the distinct charge made against him, in order that he may come fully prepared for his defense. Extreme technicality has characterized indictments and informations, and formerly the courts felt themselves constrained to adhere so strictly to form that punishment in many cases was evaded. The extreme technical accuracy formerly required called forth the remarks of Lord Hale, when he said : “The great, strict and unseemly, niceties required in some indictments, tend to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the Government, to the encouragement of villainy, and to the dishonour of God.” It may have been perhaps for this reason, that our Legislature on May 8, 1972, validated Volume I of the Liberian Code of Laws Revised, in the manner it did. “Section 1. The titles contained in Volume I of the Liberian Code of Laws Revised are hereby adopted as the law of the Republic of Liberia and are declared to be in full force and effect and to replace all general statutory enactments amending the Civil Procedure Law and Criminal Procedure Law or either to the date this Act becomes law.” The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 295 simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. Rev. Code 2 :1.2. In our opinion the indictment in this case has complied with section 14.3 thereof and is valid. The denial of the motion did not prejudice the rights of the defendant, for the indictment stated plainly every material fact constituting the offense charged. Counts one, two, and three of appellant’s brief cannot be sustained. Appellant has further contended in count two of his brief that the checks were his property, having recovered possession of them by a writ of replevin issued out of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, which replevin suit was still pending in said court. Consequently, under the doctrine of lis pendens the prosecution should have abated. The penal statute on larceny states clearly that the stolen goods must be the property of a person other than the taker, he argues, therefore, it follows that the Act of February, 1967, enlarging the definition of larceny is in pari materia with Section 297 of the Penal Law, supra, consequently to constitute larceny the property right in the subject of the charge of larceny must be in the private prosecutor. Legal authorities have held the doctrine of lis pendens, as to persons and property within its operation, to be that the court having jurisdiction of the suit or action is entitled to proceed to the final exercise of that jurisdiction, and that it is beyond the power of any of the parties to the action to prevent its doing so by any transfer or other act after service. If any of the parties, after the lis pendens has become operative, attempts to transfer the subject matter of the litigation, or to create any incumbrance or charge against it, or to enter into any contract affecting it, or to deliver possession of it to another, the action or suit may proceed without taking any notice whatever of such transfer, incumbrance, or change in possession, and the final judgment or decree, when entered, may be carried into effect notwithstanding. To consti- 296 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS tute a valid Us pendens the litigation must be about some specific thing, which must necessarily be affected by the termination of the suit; the court must have jurisdiction both of the person and the property, and the property must be sufficiently described in the proceedings. In other words, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is always essential to the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens. In its absence no effect can be given to proceedings, though they purport to be judicial. Therefore, if a petition or complaint does not disclose a subject matter within a jurisdiction of the court, the proceedings cannot operate as a lis pendens, even from the date of the service of process. Where the law gives a right of review to an appellate court, all persons are necessarily charged with notice thereof, and it would seem reasonable to hold that the operation of lis pendens ought to be adequate to give litigant protection until he can pursue all the remedies to which he is entitled in the action and, therefore, though a judgment or decree final in form has been entered, the cause ought still to be deemed pending while the right to prosecute it further by appeal remains. In looking through the record made in the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, we see that on July 22, 1971, appellant instituted a replevin suit in that court, alleging that he was the owner and entitled to the possession of ten checks totaling $4,815.00, issued by him to the complainant as a guarantee for services rendered. He alleged that satisfaction was made and that complainant had refused to return said checks only with intent to embarrass him. Proof of their satisfaction is attached to the complaint in form of exhibits marked A through E. The replevin action progressed to the reply and the matter is still pending. In addition on October i8, 1971, after the indictment for grand larceny was returned, the Liberia Trading Corporation, which is the private prosecutor in the criminal LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 297 action, began a suit in the Debt Court for Montserrado County, for $77,945.64, by way of attachment, from which amount the sum of $5,215.00, the total of the checks charged in the indictment, appears to have been excluded and apparently sued for separately in the same Debt Court. But when acting manager Raschillian of the Liberia Trading Corporation, was questioned on crossexamination during the trial, he strangely answered a question: “Q. In your letter of September 7, 1971, you said that Griffiths’ indebtedness stood at $77,945.64. Does this figure include the value of the checks, that is $5,215.00? “A. This represents the total indebtedness as of September 6, 1971, including motor accounts, goods accounts and bounced checks.” No attempt was made by the prosecution to have the witness for the prosecution explain or clarify $5,215.00, the total of the checks forming the basis for the prosecution, having been included in the civil suit. Legal authorities hold that prosecution for larceny is improper when it is employed to collect a debt or enforce payment of a civil claim. It is well established that the most frequent form that the abuse of criminal process takes is that of working upon the fears of the person under arrest for the purpose of extorting from him money or other property or compelling him to sign some paper to give up some claim, or to do some act, in accordance with the wishes of those who have control of the prosecution. It is not the design of government to permit citizens to use the criminal process for the redress of private grievances. Thus the use of criminal process to collect a debt is actionable as an abuse of process of arrest when it is employed to accomplish an ulterior purpose not within the scope of the criminal process. There can be no doubt that it consti- 298 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS tutes an abuse of the criminal process for which an action will lie. i AM. JUR., Abuse of Process, ��23, 24. However, since the Debt Court has not yet decided the matter, and since there is no substantial disagreement as to the facts, there appears to be no reason why this Court cannot entertain the appeal. There is evidence that there are two suits actually pending in two separate and distinct courts involving the same parties and the same subject matter, neither of which has been terminated by a judgment of a court. We shall comment on this later. Appellant in his brief has argued that the statute on larceny states unequivocally that the stolen goods must be the property of a person other than the taker. It follows, therefore, he contends, that the Act of February 1, 1967, enlarging the definitions of larceny is in parimateria with Section 297 of the Penal Law, supra, as aforesaid, and consequently the property right which is the subject of the larceny proceedings must unquestionably be lodged in the private prosecutor for the crime of larceny to be charged. It is not expected that one could take the argument of appellant’s counsel with a great deal of weight. It is a settled principle of law that enlargement statutes, such as the worthless check statute, are by and large remedial in character; it supplies defects and abridges superfluities in the former law and by it restrains another. The purpose of such statutes is to bring within the definition of larceny acts committed prior to its passage. The offense defined by some such statutes may be committed, notwithstanding all the elements of common law larceny are not present. We hold it to be true that the ownership of the property must be alleged only with the same accuracy as is required by the common law, as was done in the indictment in this case. We are of the opinion that the mere issuance of the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 299 checks to the Liberia Trading Corporation, for whatever purpose, immediately transferred ownership to the said corporation. The ownership of the checks was well recognized by appellant himself when he undertook to institute replevin proceedings against the corporation, alleging that it was detaining the checks only to embarrass plaintiff. “Statutes are to be construed not according to their mere letter, but according to the intent and object with which they were made. It occasionally happens therefore that the judges who expound them are obliged, in favour of the intention, to depart in some measure from the words. And this may be either by holding that a case apparently within the words, is not within the meaning; or that a case apparently not within the words, is within the meaning.” STEPHEN, Commentaries, 41. “Ordinarily, the legislature speaks only in general terms, and for that reason it often becomes the duty of the court to construe and interpret a statute in a particular case, for the purpose of arriving at the legislative intent, and of determining whether a particular act done or omitted falls within the intended inhibition or commandment of a statute. . . . There is always a tendency, it has been said, to construe statutes in the light in which they appear when the construction is given. The true rule is that statutes are to be construed as they were intended to be understood when they were passed. Statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions and the state of the law existent at the time of their enactment.” 25 R.C.L., Statutes, �� 211, 215. It may be in order to set forth the statutes involved, which are in our Penal Law. “Any person who : “(a) With no color of right steals, takes and car- 300 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ries away the personal goods of another with intent in so doing feloniously to convert said goods to the taker’s own use without and against the will and consent of the owner; or “(b) With intent to convert such property to his own use, by any trick or artifice induces another to part with the possession of his personal property; or “(c) By force suddenly steals, takes and carries away from the person of another and without his knowledge, any personal goods the property of the person so forcibly deprived thereof, with intent in so doing to convert said goods to the taker’s own use ; or “(d) Detains, delays or opens any letter, packet, bag or mail of letters or any mailable packet of merchandise lying in, or in the course of transit through the post offices of the Republic, or in the custody of any agent of the said postal service, or in any letterbox or pillar-box, and therefrom extracts any article, whether valuable or not, or secretes, destroys, steals, takes and carries away from the said post offices the article or articles so detained, delayed, opened, abstracted, secreted, destroyed or stolen, with intent in so doing to deprive the owner thereof of his property therein, and to convert such articles or letters or packet of merchandise to the taker’s own use; or “(e) Steals, takes and carries away any livestock, domestic animal, poultry or tame birds or other animal or product, any growing crop not yet harvested, fruit on cultivated trees, plants, scions of any kind in nursery beds or transplanted, vegetables or other garden plants, fishing traps and nets, bill of exchange or other written security for money, and deeds, with the intent in so doing to convert such movable property to the taker’s own use, is guilty of larceny.” 1956 Code 27:297. The statute under which this case is being prosecuted, LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 301 referred to before, is an Act to amend the foregoing section of the Penal Law, L. 1966-67. I. Any person who “(f) makes, draws, executes, utters or delivers to another any check, draft, or order upon any bank or depositary for the payment of money when the person has no account or where funds are insufficient in the bank or depositary to pay the check, draft, or order upon presentation is guilty of larceny. “6. . . . if the maker or drawer pays the face value of the check, draft, or order, together with interest, charges, protest fees, within ten days after receiving written notice of dishonor, no arrest shall be made and no prosecution brought under this section.” Comparing these two statutes, we perceive conflict in them and hence have read them conjunctively. One is complimentary to the other. They are to be read in the light of attendant conditions and the state of the law existent at the time of their enactment. Here it becomes helpful to mention that the condition that occasioned the enactment of the latter section was that larcenous individuals were issuing checks on banks, knowing full well that they had no funds to cover the checks, with intent to defraud the payee. In some instances the malefactors left the country. Therefore, when such a check is returned dishonored, the strict and technical rule with respect to alleging the essential element of larceny that the goods stolen are the property of another other than the taker, or that the property belonged to some person other than the defendant, is no longer necessary. Having treated and considered in full the questions of written notices, lis pendens and other issues raised in counts one, two, and three of appellant’s brief, we shall now direct our attention to the remaining counts in the bill of exceptions. In count two of the bill of exceptions appellant con(( 302 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS tends that the trial judge erred when he denied his motion to discharge on the ground of double jeopardy, based on the legal principle of autre fois convict, for a final judgment had been rendered against him by Hon. Emma Shannon Walser, and had not been reversed, although this case was remanded, but not at his request. He bases his argument on the Constitution which provides that “no person shall for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.” Article I, Section 7th. It is our holding that this contention of appellant cannot be sustained. The power to remand is vested by statute in the Supreme Court, and the exercise of this statutory duty cannot be said to be violative of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Especially is this so when remand is consequent upon appellant’s appeal from a judgment of the trial court. The order for a retrial invalidates the first trial and conviction, and in the retrial the court hears the case de novo. Moreover, a motion by the defendant in a criminal prosecution to quash the indictment, or to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, is deemed a waiver of defendant’s constitutional right not to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense. Williams v. Republic, [1961] LRSC 26; 14 LLR 452 (1961). Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the appellant’s brief are, therefore, not sustained. In count three of the bill of exceptions appellant argues that the judge erred when he disallowed a question to a witness, Richard Wright. “Did it not appear to you that you should have, in obedience to the subpoena duces tecum commanding you to produce certain documents which you now claim are in the possession of another party, brought the receipt from the party in whose possession you claim the documents are and exhibit same to this court to substantiate what you now allege?” The reason for this question, he states, was to guard against unidentified documents infiltrating into the records, a situation which had necessitated the remand of the case. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 303 It is our view that this question, intended to require the witness to produce a receipt to show that the documents were in fact delivered to someone else, was irrelevant and immaterial. The court, therefore, did not err in disallowing the question. Count eight of the brief is, therefore, not sustained. In count four of the bill of exceptions, appellant contended that the judge erred when he sustained the prosecution’s objections to a question put to Raschillian, the manager of LTC. “The stipulation provided such other name in the following terms ; it is hereby agreed that in the event of the sale of one of the above vehicles the proceeds shall immediately be paid to LTC; the trade-ins not being one of the vehicles in the stipulation it must have been outside of the provision therefor. What say you to that?” He contended further that the judge erred because the question involved a traded vehicle which was not referred to in the written stipulation, and any testimony on that trade-in in no way explained the stipulation. The reason for the question has to be seen in its full context, with the last question and the answer of the witness, as can be seen on sheets 5 and 6 of the record of February 21, 1971. It is our view that the trial judge did err in sustaining the prosecution’s objection because the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in a criminal case. Johnson v. Republic, [1962] LRSC 12; 15 LLR 88 (1962). In counts 5 and 6 of the bill of exceptions, appellant has contended that the trial judge erred in sustaining the prosecution’s objections to questions put to the aforesaid witness, such as the one now set forth : “Tell the court and jury whether you accepted that report as being correct, respecting the status of the account?” The appellant contends that the witness having testified to the report, it was within the scope of the cross-examiner to test his motives, inclinations, and prejudices. 304 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS Appellant contends that another objection was improperly sustained : “In answer to a previous question, you made the court and jury to understand that the $5,215.00, subject of this prosecution, had been merged in an account of $77,000.00 odd dollars, which account defendant protested through his counsel and an audit ensued. I now ask you that after having received the auditor’s report do you still confirm the correctness of that account?” To which defendant excepted. We must express our complete agreement with the trial judge in sustaining the prosecution’s objections, for the questions propounded were of no probative value as to the crime of grand larceny. Appellant has further contended that the judge erred when he sustained the prosecution’s objection to another question : “That being the case, checks identified by you drawn on the Commercial Bank are not part of the indictment, since the indictment refers only to checks drawn on the International Trust Company, not so?” We hold the view that the trial judge did not err in sustaining appellee’s objection, because assuming that some of the checks had been drawn on the Commercial Bank instead of the International Trust Company as stated in the indictment, they remain worthless checks if not proved otherwise, irrespective of the name of the drawee bank. Our Criminal Procedure Law is applicable. “An indictment shall not be held insufficient because it contains any defect or imperfection of form which does not prejudice a substantial right of the defendant upon the merits.” Rev. Code 2 :14.3 ( ). As to count 8 of the bill of exceptions, it is our view that the trial judge erred when he overruled the appellant’s objections to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against him for the production of checks and other documents to be tendered in evidence against him, for according to Article I, Section 7th, of our Constitution, he cannot be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 305 With respect to count 9 of the bill of exceptions, we are of the opinion that appellant’s objections should have been sustained, in that the proper duty of the court is to defend the rights of the oppressed against the oppressor, the rights of the weak against the strong, be the strong president, emperor, king, prince, potentate, or magnate. We maintain that the attitude of the trial judge in this respect during the trial of the case seemed to indicate a leaning toward the side of the prosecution, which obviously was the stronger of the two contenders. As to counts To, II, 12, 13, and 14 of the bill of exceptions, it is our view that the trial court committed no error by sustaining appellee’s objections, because the questions propounded could not be of probative value to the charge of grand larceny. Regarding count 15 of the bill of exceptions, it is our view that the trial court did not commit any error, since the parol evidence rule is inapplicable in the trial of criminal cases. Count r6 of the bill of exceptions alleges that the judge included in his charge to the jury certain veiled extraneous, irrelevant, and prejudicial matter which influenced the verdict of the jury. After carefully reading the charge of the judge, we feel that his instructions and charge to the jury did not go beyond the scope allowed by our Criminal Procedure Law. “The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed. The court shall instruct the jury on every issue of law arising out of the facts even though no requests to charge thereon have been submitted by counsel. The court shall instruct the jury in writing if requested and may give its instructions in writing on its own motion.” Rev. Code 2 :20.8 (1) . This count, therefore, is not sustained. Count 17 of the bill of exceptions charges that the trial 306 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS judge erred in denying appellant’s motion for a new trial, which was opposed. It is our holding that after a careful examination of the evidence adduced during the trial, it did not and cannot support appellant’s claim that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence in this case. The criminal intent on the part of appellant to defraud and cheat the private prosecutor, The Liberia Trading Corporation, is evident. He issued the checks in question knowing full well that he had not at the time sufficient funds in the International Trust Company to pay the checks. When he learned of the checks being dishonored he instituted replevin proceedings and had all the returned checks delivered to him on the court’s order without waiting until ten days elapsed, as the law requires. This move undoubtedly was to avert any possibility of the checks being used in evidence against him in the event of a criminal action against him. He had notice of the bad checks in accord with the statute, but failed to redeem them. The statute on issuing worthless checks is unambiguous and it is incumbent upon the courts to enforce the laws of the Republic without fear or favor. The felonious intent need not be proved by positive testimony, but may be inferred from circumstance. It is our holding that if the business interests of our citizens and foreigners dealing with us are to be protected and if trade and commerce are not to be hindered through the unreliability of checks, which have in the modern world become indispensable to buying and selling, those who issue worthless checks in contravention of the law should be made to suffer the penalty which the law provides in such cases. But all of this has been averted by the institution of the two civil actions in two separate competent tribunals by the same parties, involving the same subject matter and seeking the same remedy. We observed earlier in this opinion that the manager of LTC, the private prosecutor, LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 307 testified at the trial of this case that $5,215.00, representing the total of the bad checks giving rise to this prosecution, was included in the debt action the corporation brought against the appellant. As for the replevin suit, if the private prosecutor obtains judgment, Griffiths will be compelled to return the checks or the value thereof in the amount of $5,215.00. Under the circumstances, it is our opinion that the principle of lis pendens applies and the judgment finding Samuel Boston Griffiths guilty of grand larceny and sentencing him to seven years’ imprisonment with restitution and fine, be and the same is hereby reversed and the defendant discharged without day. The clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below informing it of this judgment. It is so ordered. Reversed, defendant discharged.