Gbartoe et al v Washington [2002] LRSC 11; 41 LLR 117 (2002) (5 June 2002)
JOSEPH GBARTOE, DUNBAR GBARTOE and WANNIE CHEA, Appellants, v. WASHINGTON DOE, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: March 21, 2002. Decided: June 5, 2002.
- A trial court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment where such judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings.
- The sole object of a declaratory judgment is to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
- A declaratory judgment is not a possessory action to oust a party from premises and place another party in possession of disputed property.
- A declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties or exercises the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done, and the action is distinguished from other actions in that it does not seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing party.
- The Legislature has prescribed adequate remedy of ejectment to a person who is the rightful owner of real property and who is entitled to the possession thereof, where title is in dispute, or summary proceedings to recover posses-sion of real property when title to the said property is not in dispute.
- It is erroneous and irregular for a trial judge to declare the rights of the parties over a piece of real property and to subsequently order the execution of his declaration in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
- A party plaintiff to an ejectment suit may also demand from the defendant damages for the wrongful withholding or detention of the property or the possession thereof.
In a declaratory judgment proceeding commenced by the appellee, wherein he alleged that the appellants were illegally occupying and withholding property owned by the appellee’ s late mother and over which the appellee held letters of administration, the trial court entered judgment in favour of the appellee, ordered the appellants ousted from the disputed premises, and determined that the said appellants pay to the appellee L$45,600.00 for rent for the withholding of the premises and L$5,000.00 for legal fees. The Court rejected the contention of the appellants that the declaratory judgment proceedings were dismissible since the appellee had failed to pay the accrued costs in a previous proceeding for cancellation relating the same subject property.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding, firstly, that declaratory judgment proceedings were not possessory in nature, and that the sole design of such proceedings was to declare the rights of the parties rather than to oust one party from property in dispute and place the other party in possession thereof. The Court opined that the appropriate remedy, which the legislature had prescribed, was an action of ejectment, where title to the property is in dispute, or summary proceedings to recover possession of real property, where title to the property is not in dispute. In each of such cases, the Court noted that the plaintiff may demand damages for the wrongful withholding of the property. The Court therefore held that it was error for the trial judge to order execution on the declaration made by him.
The Court also ruled that declaratory judgment was appropriate only where it would completely terminate the controversy and not leave anything to be determined with respect to the controversy. In the instant case, it said, the declaratory judgment did not have the effect of determining whether the property referred to by the appellee belonged to appellee’s late mother or whether it was part of a lease property which was separate and distinct from the property claimed by the appellee, and particularly, the Court noted, since the Chambers Justice, in a prohibition proceeding had ordered that the appellants be repossessed of the property pending a determination as to title. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court, noting that the appellee could bring ejectment action if he feels that the appellants were encroaching on the property of the estate.
J. D. Baryougar Junius of Legal Clinic appeared for the appellants. Charles K. Williams of Dugbor Law Firm appeared for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE JANGABA delivered the opinion of the Court.
The brief history of this case is as follows: On October 1, 1982, a lease agreement was entered into and executed by and between Wannie Chea, as lessor, and Joseph Gbartoe, as lessee, for a parcel of land located in Old Kru Town, now “Power Plant”, West Point, for a period of twenty (20) years certain, commencing from October 1, 1982, up to and including October 1, 2002. Clause four (4) of the said lease agreement provide that the lessee should build thereon. We hereunder quote clause four (4) of the lease agreement for the benefit of this Court.
“4. And the said lessee hereby covenants with lessor that lessee will, within a reasonable time, erect a concrete building upon said land, of modern style and construct-ion, the entire costs of which shall be borne by the lessee.”
The appellee herein, Washington Doe, obtained letters of administration on April 3, 1992 to administer the affairs of the Intestate Estate of the late Madam Wleh Blidee, located in West Point. On August 14, 1992, the appellee, Washington Doe, by and thru his legal counsel, Counsellor Theophilus C. Gould, wrote Mr. James Ketter a letter informing him that the mentioned lease agreement had expired and requested him to vacate the subject property. An action of summary proceed-ings to recover possession of real property was instituted against Mr. Ketter, and Appellee Doe was placed in possession of the disputed property in September, 1992.
Co-appellant Joseph Gbartoe, upon returning to Monrovia, having been away for a period, instituted an action of sum-mary proceedings against Appellee Doe to recover possession of real property in the court of Justice of the Peace B. S. Tamba. A judgement was rendered in favor of Joseph Gbartoe, and Appellee Doe was evicted upon the strength of the lease which had been between Wannie Chea and Co-appellant Gbartoe. A motion to rescind judgment was filed by Appellee Washington Doe, the assignment of which prompted Co-appellant Joseph Gbartoe to file summary proceedings against the justice of the peace in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County.
A three-count bill of information was filed on May 5, 1997 by Appellee Doe informing and requesting the lower court to set aside the summary proceedings and conduct a “full scale investigation” since title to the property was in dispute. On July 4, 1997, the trial court entered a judgment against Co-appellant Gbartoe, dismissed the summary proceedings commenced by him, and mandated the justice of the peace to repossess Appellee Doe of the property, without a hearing of the appellee’s bill of information which was pending before the trial court or the motion to rescind judgment which was pending before the justice of the peace.
A writ of prohibition was sought from the Supreme Court and accordingly granted on the 4th day of November, A. D. 1997 by Mr. Justice Wright, presiding in chambers during the October, A. D. 1997 Term of this Court. The basis for his ruling is hereunder quoted for the benefit of this opinion:
“Prohibition is hereby granted and the peremptory writ is ordered issued, the execution of the trial court mandate is restrained and declared null and void, and the petitioner is ordered repossessed of the lease premises pending the determination of title as requested by Co-respondent Doe in his three-count bill of information of May 5, 1997, and a subsequent hearing of the motion to rescind judgment filed by the co-respondent which is presently pending before Justice of the Peace Tamba undetermined”
On November 28, 1997, the appellee filed a petition for cancellation of lease agreement for fraud, which was resisted on December 8, 1997. On December 10, 1997, Appellee Doe filed a notice of voluntary discontinuance of his cancellation proceedings. “Shortly thereafter, on December 15, 1997, Appellant Doe filed a five-count petition for declaratory judgment, counts 2 and 3 of which we hereunder quote for the benefit of this opinion:
“2. And also because petitioner says and avers that the defendants without any right whatsoever, are occupying and without any legal right withholding the property despite of the fact that said property is the bona fide property of the late Wleh Blidee”
- Petitioner says further that the lease agreement existing between Joseph Gbartoe and Wannie Chea does not refer to the property of the late Wleh Blidee and cannot therefore entitle the defendant to occupy any premises of the late Wleh Blidee. Petitioner says that the late Wleh Blidee has never transferred any right of ownership of the property to any person or persons.”
In count 4 of the petition, the appellee demanded the payment of rents for the illegal withholding of the property. He also prayed the trial court to declare his right to the property, to award him rents growing out of the wrongful occupation of the premises, and to have appellants pay L$5,000.00 as legal fees.
In their returns, the appellants denied the averments of the petition for declaratory judgment and prayed that the appel-lee’s petition be dismissed because of his failure to pay the accrued costs in the cancellation proceeding, which was with-drawn prior to filing the declaratory judgment petition. In response thereto, the appellee filed a reply, upon which pleadings in this case rested.
On the 3rd day of June, A. D. 1999, His Honour Joseph W. Andrews, Assigned Circuit Court judge presiding over the March, A. D. 1999 Term of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County, rendered judgment in the case, the relevant portion of which we hereunder quote for the benefit of the opinion.
“COURT’S RULING: This court says that in keeping with Section 43.1 of the Civil Procedure Law, 1 LCLR, it does have the power to declare rights, status and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. In the opinion of the court and from the evidence adduced at the trial court, the court is convinced that the property in question is the bona fide property of Wleh Blidee, the mother of Washington Doe, the petitioner in this case and the administrator of said property.”
JUDGEMENT
“Therefore, it is the judgment of this court that the respondent Joseph Gbartoe, Dunbar Gbartoe and Wannie Chea be evicted and ousted from the house now the subject of these proceedings, and to pay all costs and expenses made by the petitioner, including the rent withheld for the past eight (8) years in the amount of L$45,600.00 at the rate of L$5,700.00, per annum, together with the payment of L$5,000.000, being the amount paid by petitioner to petitioner’s counsel for legal services. The clerk of court is hereby ordered to issue a writ of possession and same place in the hands of the sheriff to be served on the respondents for the execution of this judgment.”
The appellants argued before this Court that the trial judge erred when he entertained and granted the petition for declaratory judgment since the appellee had failed to pay the accrued costs associated with the cancellation proceedings prior to filing the petition for declaratory judgment. The appellants also contended that a declaratory judgment must be based on the suit but that the court may refuse to render or enter the declaratory judgment where such judgment, if rendered on a lease agreement, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings. The appellant therefore requested this Court to set aside the declaratory judgment rendered by the trial court.
The appellee, for his part, contended and argued that Joseph Gbartoe and Dunbar Gbartoe were the tenants of the late Wleh Blidee during her lifetime and that they lived in the identical house, subject of this litigation, but noted that they had refused to pay rent to him after the demise of his mother, claiming that they had a lease agreement with one Wannie Chea, whom they said was the owner of the house. The appellee also contended that the property was owned by his late mother by virtue of the title deed of his mother, and that the appellants were illegally occupying the house without any document. In addition, the appellee averred that the appellants had failed to present any title deed to show that the land upon which the house in question was constructed was owned by any person other than Wleh Blidi, the mother of the appellee. The appellee further contended that the declaration on the rights of parties over a piece of real property requires the presentation of a title deed to the court for the property, and that it is only upon the strength of the said title deed that ownership can be legally declared in an action of declaratory judgment. He therefore prayed this Court to confirm the judgment of the trial court.
The paramount issues for determination of this case are:
- Whether or not a petition for declaration judgment is a possessory action or could be used to evict the appellants and place the appellee in possession of the disputed property?
- Whether or not a declaratory judgment can be granted when the controversy which is the subject of the litigation will not be terminated?
The above stated issues will be decided in the reverse order. With regard to the issue of whether or not a declaratory judgment can be granted when the controversy which is the subject of the litigation will not be terminated, this Court ob-serves from count 1 of the appellee’s petition for declaratory judgment that the house which the appellants now occupy is a part of the estate of the late Wleh Blidee which is admini-stered by the appellee as administrator. Count 2 of the petition alleged that the appellants were occupying and withholding the premises of his late mother without any legal right. In count 3 of the petition, the appellee conceded the existence of a lease agreement entered into and executed by and between Wannie Chea, as lessor, and Joseph Gbartoe, as lessee, and also that said lease did not refer to the property of the Late Wleh Blidee. The averments contained in count 3 of the appellee’s petition for declaratory judgment showed that there were two separate and distinct premises, namely: A house of the late Wleh Blidee, administered by the appellee, and which he alleged the appellants were presently occupying, and another property, owned by Wannie Chea, which was leased to the appellants in 1982 for a period of twenty (20) years. The Court also observed that clause 4 of the said lease, conceded by the appellee, provides that the lessee shall erect a concrete building on the parcel of land at his own expense.
As stated earlier, Mr. Justice Wright granted the writ of prohibition upon the strength of the lease agreement between Wannie Chea, as lessor, and Joseph Gbartoe, as lessee, and ordered that the lessee be repossessed of his leased property pending the determination of the issue of title, as requested by Appellee Doe in his three-count bill of information of May 5, 1997, and also the determination of the motion to rescind judgment filed by the appellee before Justice of the Peace Tamba, and which was still pending, undetermined. We are taken aback as to how the trial judge declared the appellee’s right and ownership to the leased premises that the Chambers Justice had ordered the lessee to be repossessed of, when indeed and in truth the lease agreement did not refer to the Intestate Estate of the late Wleh Blidee, a fact clearly admitted by the appellee in count 3 of his petition. We deduce from count 3 of the appellee’s petition that the leased property does not include the Intestate Estate of the late Wleh Blidee. We hold accordingly that there still exists uncertainty as to whether the appellants are in possession of the property owned by the late Wleh Blidee. Our statute clearly provides that a trial court may refuse to render a declaratory judgment where such judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or contro-versy giving rise to the proceedings. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:43.5.
The next and final issue for our determination is whether or not a petition for declaratory judgment is a possessory action or could be used to evict the appellants and place the appellee in possession of the disputed property? The answer to this question is no. The final judgment of the trial judge, ren-dered on June 3, 1999, ordered the eviction of the appellants from the leased property and the placing of the appellee in possession of the premises. We would like to remark that it is the Legislature that has the authority to provide a remedy for any relief sought by a party litigant in this jurisdiction. The sole object of a declaratory judgment is to declare rights, statuses, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. A declaratory judgment is not a possessory action to oust a party from premises and place another party in possession of disputed property. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:43.1. It is also a universal princi-ple of Law that “[a] declaratory judgment is one which simply declares the rights of the parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done, and the action is distinguished from other actions in that it does not seek execution or performance from the defendant or opposing party.” 26 C. J. S., Declaratory Judgment, § 1.
In the case at bar, the trial judge did not only declare the rights of the parties to the property, but he also ordered the execution of his declaration to the effect that the appellants should be evicted from their leased property and that the appellee should be placed in possession of the said premises. The Legislature has prescribed an adequate remedy to a party who is the rightful owner of real property and who is entitled to the possession thereof against another party who is wrong-fully and illegally withholding the possession of such disputed property. Such adequate remedy in this jurisdiction is either an action of ejectment, when title is in dispute, or summary proceedings to recover possession of real property, when title of said property is not disputed by the parties. This Court holds that it was erroneous and irregular for the trial judge to declare the rights of the parties over a piece of real property and to subsequently order the execution of his declaration in a declaratory judgment proceeding.
An action of ejectment can be instituted by a party right-fully entitled to the possession of real property against another party who is wrongfully withholding possession thereof. Such remedy is sought when title to the said property and the right to possession are in dispute. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:62.1. The statute also provides that the plaintiff in such action can also demand damages for wrongful detention of the property and the possession thereof. Id. section 62.3. We hold therefore that the proper action which should have been brought by the appellee for the wrongful withholding of his mother’s property, other than the leased property owned by Wannie Chea, was an action of ejectment instead of declara-tory judgment proceeding.
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below informing the judge presiding therein to resume jurisdiction over the case and give effect to this opinion. Costs are ruled against the appellee. And it is hereby so ordered.
Judgment reversed.