JAMES B. FREEMAN, Appellant, v. LIBERIAN SUPPLY COMPANY (LIBSCO), by and through its manager, TONY SIMPSON, and LA FONDIARIA ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., represented by TRADEVCO, through its manager, F. MENCANI, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued October 22, 1969. Decided January 29, 1970. 1. There is no provision of law which confers on a trial judge the right to rescind a ruling of his or a judgment in its entirety, after having been rendered three days before. 2. The time spent by a plaintiff outside the Republic of Liberia is excluded from the computation of time within which an action must be instituted by him. The appellant was seriously injured in an automobile accident on December 28, 1966. After being hospitalized for about one month, he left Liberia to obtain medical treatment in the U.S.A., where he remained for almost ten months, returning to Liberia in November 1967. In February 1968, he instituted an action for personal injuries. One of the answers raised the defense of the statute of limitations, contending plaintiff should have commenced his action within one year of the accident which caused his injuries. The trial court denied this argument and pointed to the months spent in the United States seeking treatment, ruling that this interval was not to be computed in determining the time within which an action could be started. Three days thereafter he overruled himself and rescinded his first order, dismissing the action. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment therein. Judgment reversed, case remanded. John Stewart and Lawrence Morgan for appellant. No appearance for appellees. 438 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS MR. JUSTICE MITCHELL 439 delivered the opinion of the court. On December 28, 1966, plaintiff was driving his car when it was struck by another vehicle owned by defendant, and operated by one of its employees, causing injury to the plaintiff and to his car. Because of the injury sustained, the plaintiff was hospitalized in the Roman Catholic Hospital, Monrovia, where he remained until he was discharged in February 1967, so that he could travel to the United States in search of further medical aid. The complaint shows further that the defendant, recognizing and acknowledging the responsibility for the accident, accepted the bill from the hospital and paid it in full. Defendant also paid plaintiff the value of his car, but later refused to compensate plaintiff for the injury he sustained. This prompted the institution of an action of damages. After being discharged from the Roman Catholic Hospital, plaintiff left Liberia in February 1967, about one month after his accident, to seek further medical treatment in the United States, where he remained for a period of almost ten months, returning to Liberia in November 1967. In February 1968, he instituted his action of damages for personal injury in the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in its March 1968 Term. The defendants filed separate answers, that is to say, the Simpson law firm filed an answer in one count for LIBSCO, and Maxwell and Maxwell filed an answer for codefendant LaFondiaria Accident and Insurance Company Ltd., after each appeared separately. The one count of LIBSCO’s answer is as follows : “Because codefendant LIBSCO admits plaintiff’s right to an action against defendants, as is averred in count one of the plaintiff’s complaint, but he is forever barred from instituting said action for the reason that 440 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS statute provides that actions of damages for personal injury must be commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued. The defendant submits that count one of the plaintiff’s complaint avers that on the 28th day of December, 1966, the incident occurred ; consequently, plaintiff should have filed his said case on or before the 28th day of December, 1967, but he failed to do so and instead, he delayed filing his action and did so on the 3rd day of February, 1968, which bars plaintiff under the statute of limitations from recovering, and, therefore, said action should be dismissed, with costs against the plaintiff. Pleadings in the case progressed and rested at the surrejoinder. At the March Term, the case was called for hearing on the issues of law and thereafter a ruling was made: “There are variances, no matter how slight on this point, among common-law writers, but whatever their differences of opinion, our own statute dispels every scintilla of doubt or ambiguity. The statute states that: ” ‘If any party to an action is absent from the Republic of Liberia . . . when or after a cause of action accrues, the calculation of the time within which the action must be commenced shall exclude the period when the party is absent from the Republic. . . . Civil Procedure Law, 1956 Code 6 :5 I.’ “By the foregoing statute, it is my understanding that where, as in the instant case, plaintiff left Liberia after the action accrued to him and returned some eight months thereafter, the period of plaintiff’s absence from Liberia should be deducted from the time allowed by statute within which his action should be filed. And so, if the common law is resorted to, and found to be ambiguous, and our own law on the point is found to be unequivocal, the better choice should be to rely on our law on the given point. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 441 “In view of the foregoing, this court is constrained to overrule the amended answer of the defendant which only invoked the statute of limitations as filed by the Simpson law firm, and they are ruled to a bare denial of plaintiff’s complaint; the amended answer of codefendant LaFondiaria, represented by TRADEVCO, presenting mixed issues of law and facts, filed by Maxwell and Maxwell Law Firm, are ruled to trial together with plaintiff’s amended reply as well as plaintiff’s complaint. And it is hereby so ordered.” The ruling, from which the foregoing excerpts have been taken, was made on March 29, 1968. After the court made this ruling which, in effect, seemed to have been in conformity with prevailing statutes and with legal justification, on April 1 of the same year and during the sitting of the same term of the court below, he rescinded the ruling, by entering the following on the record in open court : “In the instant case, plaintiff suffered the injuries complained of in Liberia, therefore, the cause of action accrued to him while he was in Liberia, consequently, he cannot benefit under the statute of limitations, where, as in this case, he has instituted an action after the expiration of the time which the statute provides, he must first bring it. Plaintiff’s action is, therefore, abated and dismissed. This ruling rescinds and cancels the ruling made by me in this case on March 29, 1968, during the sitting of the March Term of the Civil Court of Monrovia ; for ‘Not that I love Caesar less, but Rome more.’ Costs of these proceedings are ruled against the plaintiff. And it is hereby so ordered.” Our statute provides that “A judgment is not effective until it has been entered on the record, but this should be done without delay.” We do not know of any provision of our law, nor is there any extant, that confers on a judge the right to rescind a ruling or judgment in its entity after 442 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS having been made three days before. The appellant excepted thereto and has brought his appeal. When this case was called for hearing no one appeared for the appellees, notwithstanding the case had been bulletined, but appellant’s lawyers being present, they argued and submitted. In their argument, they emphasized the rescinded ruling of the court below. The law seems clear on the point, as section 51, supra, has indicated. It is our opinion that the judgment of the lower court be and the same is hereby reversed and the case remanded, costs to abide the final determination of the case. And it is hereby so ordered. Reversed and remanded.