FIRESTONE PLANTATIONS COMPANY, by and thru its Legal Representative or President, General Manager, and/or Authorized Agent, Appellant, Petitioner, v. HIS HONOUR EMERY S. PAYE, Assigned Circuit Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Margibi County, and BARBAR & SONS, Appellees/Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

Heard: May 8, 2002. Decided: June 14, 2002.

1. There is no law or rule of court that prohibits lawyers who are also legislators from engaging in the practice of law, and hence no basis for the exclusion and prohibition of lawyers who are legislators from practicing law in the courts of Liberia.
2. The exception to a lawyer, who is also a legislator, engaging in the practice of law is where the lawyer appears to defend someone charged with the violation of the Revenue and Finance Law, or where he appears on behalf of a trespasser upon public property.
3. Article 90(a) of the Liberian Constitution forbids public officials engaging in acts or conduct that create a conflict of interest situation or violate public policy.
4. Under the Liberian system of government, the governmental authority is divided into three separate, distinct but coordinate departments or branches with defined functions: the Legislative Department is clothed with the power to make laws, or legislate; the Executive department executes or enforces the law; and the Judicial Department has the responsibility to interpret or give meaning or life to the law, as enacted by the Legislature.
5. No department or official of any one of the three departments of the govern-ment has the right or authority to perform or interfere with or obstruct the duties and functions assigned to either or both of the other two departments.
6. The part which the judiciary plays in the law-making process is by way of its power of judicial review, in which the Supreme Court may declare a law passed by the Legislature to be in violation of the Constitution, and hence unconstitutional.
7. The Supreme Court, no matter how it feels about any given issue, would be acting ultra vires if it usurped the functions of the Legislature.

8. In the absence of the Legislature enacting a code of conduct on conflict of interest and public policy for public officials, or absent specific rules of the Liberian Senate and House of Representatives regulating the conduct of its members, as in the United States, the Supreme Court would be in violation of the Liberian Constitution in promulgating rules barring and prohibiting lawyers from representing their clients because they are members of the Legislature.
9. The Supreme Court, as the final arbiter of disputes, cannot be the one to initiate the passage of laws; rather it is the Legislature that is best suited to promulgate such rule or enact such statute.

10. The Supreme Court does not solicit views and inputs from people to be able to render decisions in matters of dispute brought before it for adjudication, as in the case of the Legislature seeking to pass a law.

11. The courts of Liberia do not render advisory opinions or make decisions on hypothetical averments, speculations, or presumptions, but on specific averments and evidence.

12. Prohibition will not lie to prohibit or restrain a counsellor-at-law from the practice of law before the courts of Liberia in the absence of any law prohibiting lawyers from practicing law in Liberia.

13. A successor judge cannot interfere with, review, or reverse the ruling made or action taken by a predecessor judge.

14. Where a predecessor judge of a court of record makes an error in his ruling or action, his colleague of concurrent jurisdiction lacks the authority to correct that error; only the Supreme Court has the authority to correct the errors made by such subordinate court.

In an action of damages for breach of contract filed by the Co-respondent Barbar & Sons, Petitioner/Appellant Firestone Plantations Company objected to the lawyer representing Co-respondent Barbar & Sons on the ground that the said lawyer was a Senator, his representation of the co-respondent violated the principle of separation of powers. The original trial judge determined that as the motion raised a constitutional issue which could only be decided by the Supreme Court, the case should be certified to that Court for disposition of the constitutional issue. However, the succeeding trial judge thereafter heard the motion, denied the same and ordered the trial of the case proceeded with on the merits. Whereupon the petitioner/ appellant filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial judge from hearing the case until the Supreme Court had disposed of the constitutional issue raised by the appellant. The appellant also contended that the succeeding trial judge had overruled the ruling of his predecessor, which he was forbidden by law to do.

The Chambers Justice denied the petition, holding that the trial judge had not overruled the ruling of his predecessor and that the co-respondent’s counsel was not prohibited by law from practicing before the courts because he was a member of the House of Senate.
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Chambers Justice, noting that there was no provision in the Constitution or any rule of law that prohibited lawyers who are also legislators from engaging in the practice of law before the courts, except in the instances specified by the Court, including defending a person charged with violation of the Revenue and Finance Law and appearing on behalf of a trespasser upon public property. The Court observed that while the Liberian Constitution forbid public officials from engaging in acts or conduct which created a conflict of interest situation or violated public policy and required the Legislature to pass a code of conduct for all public officials and employees stipulating the acts which constituted conflict of interest and which were against public policy and the penalties for violation thereof, the Legislature had not yet seen fit to pass such act. The Court opined that its power and authority extended to interpretation of the laws passed by the Legis-lature, by way of judicial review, and not to engage in the promulgation of such laws or initiation of such law or rule; nor, it said, could the court solicit views for that purpose. Such function is for the Legislature, it said, reiterating that any such promulgation or solicitation by the Court would be ultra vires.
The Court rejected the appellant’s contention that since Liberia’s laws mirrored those of the United States and the United States laws prohibited such conduct by a legislator, the same should apply to Liberia, noting that there were specific statutes and legislative rules in the United States regulating the conduct of its members, a situation which did not obtain in Liberia. The Court added also that the appellant had failed to show any undue influence by the co-respondent’s counsel over the trial judges or other conduct causing the said judges to manifest bias or prejudice against the appellant, or to show fear of, or intimidation, harassment, pressure, or other unusual influence by the co-respondent counsel. The Court therefore held that the co-respondent counsel was not prohibited from representing the co-respondent before the courts.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the portion of the Chambers Justice’s ruling which upheld the ruling of the successor trial court judge. The Court opined that a judge of concurrent jurisdiction could not review or reverse the ruling of his predecessor, which had been done in the instant case by the succeeding trial judge. The Court therefore reversed that aspect of the Justice’s ruling and ordered the case remanded for the commencement of trial of the facts, since the law issues had already been disposed of and since the Court had resolved the issue of whether a legislator could engage in the practice of law before the courts and affirmed the Justice ruling in that respect.

H. Varney G. Sherman and F. Musah Dean, Jr. of the Sherman and Sherman Law Firm appeared for the petitioner/ appellant. Richard K. Flomo appeared for respondents/ appellees.

MR. JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This Court en banc has been called upon to review and reverse a ruling made by the Justice presiding in Chambers denying a petition for a writ of prohibition. The two issues decided by the Chambers Justice and which have been presented to this Court for resolution are:

1. Whether or not the practice of law before the courts of the Republic of Liberia by a lawyer who is also a legislator is in contravention of the Constitution of Liberia and against public policy?
2. Whether or not Judge Paye had the power to review, set aside, or otherwise interfere with the ruling of his predecessor of concurrent jurisdiction?

Briefly stated, the facts are that on September 26, 1996, Firestone Plantations Company, as lessor, entered into a lease agreement with Barbar and Sons of Kakata, Margibi County, as lessee, for a gas station located in Harbel, Margibi County. It was alleged that Firestone, by a letter dated February 10, 1997, addressed to and received by Barbar and Sons, terminated the agreement. Barbar and Sons then retained Counsellor Francis Y. S. Garlawolu who, on February 12, 1997, instituted an action of damages for wrong on behalf of Barbar and Sons against Firestone Plantations Company, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Kakata City, Margibi County, Liberia.
Firestone, thru its retained counsel, Sherman and Sherman Law Firm, filed an answer to the complaint, in response to which Counsellor Garlawolu filed a reply for Barbar and Sons, after which pleadings rested. The law issues raised in the pleadings were disposed of on Tuesday, October 14, 1997, and the case ruled to a jury trial on the facts. The records do not reveal that any exceptions were taken to this ruling by any of the parties.
When, on the assigned date, Monday, October 20, 1997, the case was called for trial to commence, the appellant’s counsel informed the court that the appellant had filed a motion praying the court to deny the representation of Counsellor Francis Y. S. Garlawolu as counsel for Plaintiff Barbar and Sons because Counsellor Garlawolu was senior senator of Bong County and chairman of the Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, and that to allow him to represent a private client would be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers as enshrined in the Constitution of Liberia.
Counsellor Garlawolu was permitted by the trial judge, His Honour Manston J. Manley, to spread the coappellee/ respondent’s resistance on the minutes of court. The judge then entertained oral arguments pro et con on the motion and the resistance thereto, and handed down the following ruling:

“This Court cannot set aside rulings made by the Supreme Court; nor can it assume original jurisdiction over constitutional matters as same lie within the powers of the Supreme Court. In the mind of this court, the issue of stopping a counsellor or lawyer from practicing before this court because he is a member of the House of Representatives, either a representative or a senator, has been settled by the Supreme Court. What remains to be settled by the Supreme Court is whether or not it is unconstitutional for a legislator to appear before courts in the Judicial Branch of the Government. All matters of unconstitutionality must be decided by the Supreme Court and counsel for movant insists in his argument that it is unconstitutional for legislators to appear before the court. This court says that it holds the view that legis-lators appearing before our courts are not employed by the Judicial Branch of Government because they are not paid salaries and that is the intent of the constitution. But to say that they should not appear at all has not been decided by the Supreme Court. In the mind of this court, this is a test case of a constitutional nature and the power lies with the Supreme Court, under the doctrine of sepa-ration of powers, as enshrined in the 1986 constitution, to stop legislators from appearing before courts.
Wherefore and in view of the foregoing, this court says that it cannot pass upon constitutional issues and therefore requests and or orders the clerk of this court to transmit this motion to the Supreme Court, which is the proper place to determine the merits and demerits of the motion; and this should be done not later than tomorrow, Tuesday, October 21, 1997.”
The co-appellee excepted to this ruling, which exception was noted and the matter suspended. It does not appear that any further action was taken by the appellant to have the trial court’s ruling on its motion heard and determined by the Supreme Court. The records do show, however, that thereafter Judge Emery S. Paye assumed jurisdiction over the May Term 1998, of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court, by virtue of an assignment from the Chief Justice.
At the co-appellee’s request Judge Paye had the case assigned for a jury trial. However, when the case was called for hearing on July 6, 1998, the appellant brought to Judge Paye’s attention the earlier action taken by Judge Manley in ordering the motion transmitted to the Supreme Court for appropriate action since a constitutional issue had been raised.
On the following day, Tuesday, July 7, 1998, Judge Paye ruled, as follows:

“Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the motion filed by counsel for defendant to deny the representation of Counsellor Francis Y. S. Garlawolu and to further stay the proceedings before this court are hereby denied without any prejudice and this case is hereby ordered proceeded with.”
Also, on the self same day, July 7, 1998, the appellant filed with the Chambers of this Court a petition for the writ of prohibition praying the Chambers Justice to prohibit and restrain the hearing of the principal action of damages until such time as the Supreme Court shall have passed on the constitutional issue of separation of powers raised by the appellant. Secondly, the appellant alleged that Judge Paye had reviewed and reversed Judge Manley’s ruling, which is not allowed under our law.
The alternative writ was issued and the appellees filed, as required by law, their returns thereto. Thereafter, the Chambers Justice heard arguments, pro et con, and ruled thereon. In his ruling, the Chambers Justice held that Judge Paye did not overrule the ruling of Judge Manley. The Justice opined that the rulings of both Judge Paye and Judge Manley acknowledged the fact and confirmed the issue regarding legislators who are lawyers practicing before our courts, and that the ruling of Judge Paye confirmed that of Judge Manley when he ruled “in the mind of this court the issue of stopping a counsellor or a lawyer from practicing before this court because he is a member of the House of Representative or a Senator, has been settled by the Supreme Court.”
The appellant herein, defendant in the court below, has called on this Court to declare and adjudge that it is a violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers for a lawyer who is also a legislator to appear and practice law before the courts of Liberia. It says that besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers, the act of a legislator in practicing law before the courts also violates public policy and presents a conflict of interest situation.

The appellant acknowledges the decision of this Court in the case In re Lawrence A. Morgan[1974] LRSC 3; , 22 LLR 378 (1974), text at 387-388, wherein this Court held that there is no law or rule of court that prohibits lawyers who are also legislators from engaging in the practice of law. In the cited case, this Court stated as exceptions cases where lawyers appear to defend someone charged with violation of the Revenue Law (Corseen v. Republic[1929] LRSC 2; , 3 LLR 73 (1929)) or where they appear on behalf of a trespasser upon public property (Witherspoon v. Brown[1952] LRSC 14; , 11 LLR 199 (1952)).
The appellant argued, however, that in the United States, from whence Liberia takes its cue, there is a federal statute (18 US Code Section 204) and two congressional/legislative rules (Rule 37, paragraph 5(a) of the Senate Code of Conduct of the United States Senator and Rule 26(2) of the Rules of the House of Representatives) which prohibit a legislator of the United States from appearing before the courts of the United States to practice law for and on behalf of a client. The appellant argued further as follows: “Appellant urges upon Your Honours that even though our Legislature has not yet seen it fit to enact a law or promulgate rules similar to those of the United States of America, in the face of article 90 (a) of the 1986 Constitution, this Court in exercise of its inherent and constitutional power to make rules for the governance of the legal profession, which powers are confirmed by article 75 of said 1986 Constitution, that Your Honours will see fit to squarely and clearly hold that the practice of law in the courts of Liberia by a lawyer who is a legislator constitutes a conflict of interest and is violative of public policy.”
This Court takes note that article 90(a) of the 1986 Constitution of Liberia forbids public officials from engaging in acts or conduct which creates a conflict of interest or violate public policy. Also, article 90(c) of the 1986 Constitution further requires the Legislature to prescribe and enact a code of conduct for all public officials and employees stipulating the acts which constitute conflict of interest or which are against public policy, and the penalties for violation thereof. Although the appellant acknowledged that since the Liberian Constitution became effective on January 1, 1986 the National Legislature “has not yet seen it fit to enact laws or promulgate rules” similar to those of the United States, yet the former has urged this Court to make such declaration by way of its own rules which govern or regulate the practice of law in Liberia.

Under our system of government, the governmental authority is divided into three separate, distinct but coordinate branches with clearly defined functions. The Legislative Branch is clothed with the powers to make law or legislate; the Executive Branch executes or enforces the law; and the Judicial Branch has the responsibility to interpret or give meaning or life to the law as enacted by the Legislature. No branch or official of any one branch has the right or authority to perform or interfere with, or obstruct, the duties and functions assigned to either or both of the other two branches. LIB. CONST., art. 3 (1986).
The Judiciary does have some part to play in the law-making process, but that is only by way of its power of judicial review, in which the Supreme Court may declare a law passed by the Legislature to be in violation of the Liberian Constitution, and hence, unconstitutional, and no more. This Court, in spite of how it feels about a given issue, would be acting ultra vires if it usurps the functions of the Legislature. LIB. CONST., art. 2 (1986). Thus, in the absence of the Legislature enacting a code of conduct on conflict of interest and public policy for public officials similar to that of the United States Code (18 US Code, Section 204), or absent specific Rules of the Liberian Senate and House of Representatives regulating the conduct of its own members, similar to Rule 37(5) of the U. S. Senate and Rule 26(2) of the U. S. House of Representatives, the Supreme Court would be in violation of article 3 of the Liberian Constitution, supra, in promulgating rules barring and prohibiting lawyers from representing their clients simply because they are members of the Legislature.

The Supreme Court as an arbiter cannot be the one to initiate such law or rule; rather, the Legislature is best suited to promulgate such rule or to enact such statute since the deliberation leading up to the passage of such law would ordinarily, and in fact should involve soliciting views, participation, and input from the stakeholders who stand to benefit from or be affected by such law. Such stakeholders include but need not be limited to the lawyers who are themselves legislators, the Liberian National Bar Association, the business community, interest groups, civil society groups, human rights organizations, private individuals, and the public at large. In such public sessions, there will be debates and all the ramifications and implications will be considered.
Contrary to the process stated above, the Supreme Court of Liberia does not solicit views and inputs from people to be able to render decisions in matters of dispute brought to the Court for adjudication. The closest that the Court’s functions come to that process is where there is a challenge to a particular legislation by an aggrieved party adversely affected by the said law on the ground that the law is unconstitutional. In such a case, the Attorney General is called upon to present arguments in defense of the law. Another possibility is in matters of contempt of court, in which case the court appoints amicus (or amici) curiae to submit briefs which aid the court in determining whether contempt has been committed and what should be the punishment.
This Court reaffirms its opinion in the In re Lawrence Morgan case, supra, that there is no law and hence no basis for the exclusion and prohibition of lawyers who are legislators from practicing law in the courts of Liberia. Having said that though, this Court takes note that the appellant showed no specific instance or incident which established that the presence of Counsellor Francis Garlawolu, a senator, had any undue influence on the judge or contributed to the miscarriage of justice. Rather, it based its entire motion on suspicion, speculation and conjecture. In the absence of specific averment and evidence of intimidation, harassment, pressure or undue influence by Counsellor Garlawolu on either Judge Manley or Judge Paye, or any conduct of either or both of the judges tending to show bias, prejudice, fear or intimidation of, or favoritism towards Counsellor Garlawolu, this Court is reluctant to form an opinion or belief that his position as Senator adversely affected the appellant’s case. The courts of Liberia are not in the business of rendering advisory opinions or making decisions on hypothetical situations, speculation, or presumption, but rather on specific averments and evidence.

For the reasons stated above, this Court is constrained to concur with and affirm the ruling of our very distinguished colleague, the Chambers Justice, in his denial of the petition for the writ of prohibition and hold that prohibition does not and will not lie to restrain Counsellor Francis Y. S. Garlawolu from the practice of law before the courts of Liberia, as there is no law prohibiting legislators who are also lawyers from practicing law in Liberia.
We shall now turn to the second issue raised by the appellant, which relates to the authority of one judge reviewing or interfering with the act or ruling of his predecessor judge of concurrent jurisdiction.
It is common knowledge, and has been the position of this Court, that a successor judge cannot interfere with, review and/or reverse the ruling made or action taken by a preceding judge. This question is too simplistic as our decisional laws are replete, very clear and unambiguous on the point, that we need not go any further with this discourse. The question of more significance and relevance to us is whether or not Judge Emery S. Paye did in fact review or interfere with the ruling made by Judge Manston J. Manley? On this question, we beg to differ with our distinguished colleague as we are of the considered opinion that indeed Judge Paye did not only interfere with, but clearly and knowingly overruled and set aside Judge Manley’s action and ruling. This is clear from the very minutes of court where Judge Paye held as follows:
“THE COURT: In passing upon the motion and its resistance, our learned colleague conceded the point of contention on the part of the respondent’s counsel when he ruled as follows: ‘In the mind of this court to stop a counsellor or a lawyer from practicing before this court because he a member of the Legislature has been settled by the Supreme Court.” Notwithstanding this ruling, our learned colleague further contends that he cannot pass upon constitutional issues and, therefore, orders the clerk of court to transmit, sua sponte, all the records in the proceedings on October 20, 1997. Since then there is no showing from the records before the court that the Supreme Court has done anything about this case.” Emphasis supplied.

Judge Paye continued: “We shall now proceed to visit the statute with regards to the motion of the defendant and its resistance on the part of counsel for plaintiff” (Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing emphasized portions of Judge Paye’s ruling indicate that Judge Paye was aware of what he was doing. He acknowledged Judge Manley’s action and wondered why Judge Manley had done what he did. Judge Paye then proceeded to actually “visit the statute with regards to the motion of the defendant and its resistance on the part of the plaintiff.” We are therefore constrained to disagree with our colleague when he asserted that Judge Paye’s ruling did not in any way overrule Judge Manley’s ruling. On the contrary, we find deliberate interference with and review of Judge Manley’s decision by Judge Paye. This is reprehensible, to say the least. It is unacceptable and contrary to all norms, practice, procedures, and decisional laws of our jurisdiction, and even our general administrative practices. Even if Judge Manley was in error, as we believe he was, yet, it was not for his colleague of concurrent jurisdiction, who lacked the authority, to correct that error. Only the Supreme Court has the authority to correct errors committed by subordinate courts of record.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Henries, held in the case Dennis et al. v. Dennis et al., as follows: “Therefore, however sound Judge Flomo’s ruling might seem to be in substance, it cannot be upheld by any legal authority, and however erroneous or sound might be the ruling of Judge Dunbar in the ejectment action, the only judicial tribunal clothed with legal authority to have reviewed it is the Supreme Court. Judge Flomo, presiding over the December, A. D. 1974 Term of the court, exercising concurrent jurisdiction with Judge Dunbar, who presided over the September 1974 Term, had no authority to review his acts.” Dennis et al. v. Dennis et al.[1976] LRSC 7; , 24 LLR 490 (1976), at 494; Pierce v. Flomo et al[1977] LRSC 51; , 26 LLR 299(1977).
For this reason, this aspect of the ruling of the Chambers Justice cannot be upheld, and is hereby accordingly reversed.
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, this Court rules that aspect of the petition for the writ of prohibition praying the Court to prevent Counsellor Francis Y. S. Garlawolu from practicing law, simply because he is a senator, is denied. However, the writ of prohibition is granted to restrain Judge Paye from interfering with the ruling of Judge Manley.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Court ordering the judge therein presiding to resume jurisdiction over the case and to commence the trial of the facts in the action of damages since the law issues were already disposed of and the case ruled to trial. Costs are to abide final determination of the case. And it is hereby so ordered.

Petition denied.