HENRY FALLAH, Appellant, v. MCGILL BROW, CORMAH VAH, et al., Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, BONG COUNTY.

Heard: March 26, 2001. Decided: July 5, 2001.

1. Nothing tend greater to disturb tranquility, to hinder industry and improvement in communities than insecurity of property, personal and real, to prevent which courts of justice are established.

The appellant, owner of one hundred acres of land, instituted an action of ejectment against the appellees to eject and evict the latter from the claimed parcel of land. The appellees denied that the parcel of land which they had occupied and commenced agricultural activities was a part of the appellant’s one hundred acres of land. At a jury trial duly held, the jury returned a verdict in favour of the appellees, which was confirmed by the trial judge and a judgment entered thereon.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the verdict and judgment were reversed. The Supreme Court noted that the only issues presented for determination was whether the parcel of land occupied by the appellees was part of the appellant’s one hundred acres of land. The Court opined that in order to make that determination, it was the duty of the trial judge to commission an independent surveyor to ascertain from the metes and bounds indicated on the appellant’s deed whether the parcel of land occupied by the appellees was a part of the appellant’s land. The Court observed that this was particularly important since the appellees had failed to present any documentary evidence to show that the land occupied by them was different from the land claimed by the appellant. Accordingly, the Court, in reversing the judgment of the trial court, ordered that a survey be conducted by the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy, at the expense of the parties, and that the appellant be placed in possession of the one hundred acres of land claimed by him and shown on his public land sale deed from the Republic of Liberia.

Benedict F. Sannoh of the Center for Law and Human Rights appeared for the appellant. Francis S. Y. Garlawulo of Garlawolo and Associates appeared ro the appellees.

MR. JUSTICE SACKOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The facts and circumstances in this case present only one pertinent issue, which is whether or not the trial judge committed a reversible error when he failed to conduct a survey to identify and place the plaintiff in possession of his lawful property. The facts in the case may be briefly stated as follows: The appellant herein, Henry Fallah, instituted an action of ejectment against the appellees on the 22nd day of June, 1998, during the August Term, A. D. 1998 of the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, Bong County.

The appellant alleged in his complaint that he was the owner of one hundred (100) acres of land upon which the appellees had entered and commenced agricultural work without his will and consent. The appellant, in support of his complaint, attached thereto a public land sale deed from the Republic of Liberia, under the signature of the late President Samuel K. Doe. The records before us show that the appel-lant’s deed was duly probated and registered in accordance with law.

Upon being served with the writ of summons and the complaint, the appellees appeared and admitted the appellant’s ownership of the one hundred (100) acres of land, but they asserted that the land which they occupied and was in possession of was not part of the appellant’s one hundred (100) acres of land. The appellant thereafter filed a reply, upon which pleadings rested, and following which the case was subsequently ruled to a jury trial.

During the trial of the case, the appellant produced evidence establishing his ownership to the one hundred (100) acres of land, traceable from the Republic of Liberia by virtue of a public land sale deed. Also during the trial, the appellees, in their corroborative testimonies, testified that the parcel of land occupied by them was different from the land given to the appellant by the tribal authority. However, there is no record in the case indicating that the appellees ever produced a title deed to establish their ownership to the land which they occupied. There is also no record to show that the trial judge ever conducted a survey to identify the appellant’s one hundred (100) acres of land so as to place him in possession thereof. What the records do show is that after arguments by both parties in the case, the trial jury returned a verdict of not liable in favor of the appellees. The trial judge confirmed the verdict of the jury in his final judgment, from which judgment the appellant appealed to this Court of last resort for appellate review and a final determination of the case.

During the hearing of the case before us, the appellant argued that the evidence adduced at the trial was not sufficient to warrant a verdict of not liable in favor of the appellees, stating that the appellees had neither challenged the genuine-ness of the appellant’s public land sale deed in their answer, nor objected to its admissibility into evidence at the trial. The appellant also argued that the trial judge committed a reversible error when he confirmed the verdict of the jury without ordering an independent survey of the subject property to demarcate the same in accordance with the metes and bounds shown in his title deed.

In their argument, the appellees vehemently contended that the verdict of the jury was in consonance with the evidence adduced at the trial, in that the appellant had failed to establish that the one hundred (100) acres of land, for which he had obtained a deed, was the identical property upon which the appellees lived and operated.

We observed from the records in the case that the appellees did not dispute the appellant’s ownership of one hundred (100) acres of land. Instead, they contended that the parcel of land upon which they had entered and commenced their agricultural work was not the identical land given to the appellant by them, and for which he had obtained a public land sale deed from the Republic of Liberia. But the appellees did not produce any documentary evidence at the trial to establish that the parcel of land upon which they lived and operated was different from the subject property owned by the appellant and shown by his deed. Thus, the germane issue of fact for the trial court and jury to decide was whether or not the appellant’s one hundred (100) acres of land was the same parcel of land which the appellees had occupied and upon which they had commenced agricultural production.

In the case Larsannah v. Passawe, [1961] LRSC 42; 14 LLR 599 (1961), text at 600, this Court held: “Nothing tends greater to disturb tranquility, to hinder industry and improvement in communities than insecurity of property, personal or real, to prevent which courts of justice are established.” It was therefore incumbent upon the trial judge, in the interest of justice, to order an independent survey of the property to properly determine whether or not the appellant’s one hundred (100) acres of land was the identical parcel of land upon which the appellees had entered and operated. This salient issue of fact should not have escaped the trial judge’s judicial notice because the consideration thereof was indispensable to the equitable and just determination of the ejectment suit.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is hereby reversed and the case is remanded to the court below with the instructions that an impartial survey, paid for by the parties through the court, should be conducted by the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy of the one hundred (100) acres of land described by the meters and bounds in the public land sale deed from the Republic of Liberia to Henry Fallah. The survey should be conducted in the presence of all interested parties, and the trial court should subsequently place the appellant in possession thereof. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the trial court, informing the judge presiding therein to resume jurisdiction over the case and give effect to this opinion. Cost are assessed against the appellees. And it is hereby so ordered.

Judgment reversed.