ALICE DOE, Petitioner, v. HIS HONOUR M. FULTON YANCY, JR., Judge presiding by assignment over the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Grand Gedeh County, and MATTHEW DWEH, Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE JUSTICE IN CHAMBERS DENYING ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Heard: October9, 1981. Decided: February4, 1982.

1. Certiorari will not be granted to review an interlocutory ruling on a question of law, where adequate relief can be obtained by a regular process of appeal.

2. Certiorari will not be granted in the absence of credible evidence to the effect that there is injury threatening and irreparable.

3. The failure of a judge to rule on all of the issues of law cannot be cured by certiorari.

Petitioner sued Co-respondent Matthew Dweh, as defendant, in an action of damages for injury to personal property in the People’s Seventh Judicial Circuit Court, Grand Gedeh County. Pleadings rested with the filing of co-respondent Dweh’s reply. Subsequently, the law issues were disposed of by the co-respondent judge. On the 1Oth day of December, A. D. 1980, petitioner, plaintiff in the trial court, fled to the Chambers of Justice Bortue and obtained the writ of certiorari against the respondents. The petition contended that the co­ respondent judge had failed to pass on the law issues raised in the reply, and thus, erroneously ruled to trial Co-respondent Dweh’s answer, which petitioner claimed she had attacked. Respondents contended that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter as the same was venued in the March, 1980 Term of the Court. After hearing on the merits, the Justice in Chambers granted the issuance of the alternative writ, setting aside and making null and void the ruling of the co-respondent judge on the issues of law. The writ further commanded the judge, presiding over the said court to hear anew the issues of law. Respondents appealed. The Supreme Court, en bane, held that certiorari will not lie as the co­ respondent judge ruled all counts in the petitioner’s complaint to trial. Moreover, it said, the petitioner had failed to state in her petition what issue of law the co-respondent judge failed to pass upon. In respect to the respondents’ contention that the Court lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the case was venued in the October Term, A. D. 1980 and not the March Term, 1980, as was wrongly indicated by the Clerk of Court in the alternative writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court also ruled that the change in its composition did not affect its powers and authority as the Court of final appellate review in Liberia. The alternative writ of certiorari was ordered quashed and the peremptory writ denied with costs against the petitioner. The ruling of the Chambers Justice was reversed.

Francis N Torpor appeared for the Petitioner. John A. Dennis appeared for the Respondents.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GBALAZEH delivered the opinion of the Court.

Alice Doe, plaintiff, sued Matthew Dweh, defendant, in an action of damages for injury to personal property, in the People’s Seventh Judicial Circuit Court, Grand Gedeh County. Pleadings progressed as far as reply and rested. His Honour M. Fulton Yancy, Jr., presiding thereat by assignment, disposed of the law issues and ruled the case to trial on the facts, and it is from this ruling that these proceedings in certiorari grew.

On December 10, 1980, plaintiff, now petitioner, petitioned Mr. Justice Bortue presiding in Chambers to grant the issuance of a writ of certiorari against the respondents in this case. After hearing on the merits, the Justice presiding in Chambers granted the issuance of the writ, setting aside and making null and void to all intents and purposes the ruling of the co­ respondent judge on the issues of law; and commanding the judge presiding over the trial court to hear anew the issues of law raised in the pleadings, with costs against the respondents.

From this ruling of Justice Bortue presiding in Chambers respondents excepted and brought the case before this Court en bane for a final review.

The petitioner has petitioned this Court to the effect that the co-respondent judge in disposing of the issues of law failed to pass on the law issues raised in the reply and thus erroneously ruled to trial Co-respondent Dweh’s answer, which the petitioner had attacked in her reply; thereby proceeding in a manner contrary to rules which ought to be observed at all times, and that said ruling is materially prejudicial to the interests of petitioner. Petitioner therefore prayed for the issuance of the writ of certiorari against the respondents.

The respondents in obedience to the order of the alternative writ of certiorari filed their returns containing four counts.

In count one of the returns the respondents have contended therein that the People’s Supreme Court was not in existence March 1980 but rather that this Court came into being later after April 12, 1980, that consequently this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case, having been filed for the March Term 1980; and further, that the order for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and writ itself are ultra virus, null and void, and hence the entire proceeding.

In count two of the returns the respondents maintained that certiorari would not lie and that the alleged legal blunder should have been saved for an appeal and that otherwise this Court would be disposing of matters by piecemeal if this Court entertained this proceeding in certiorari. Furthermore the respondents contended in counts three and four of their returns that the perusal of the ruling of the co-respondent judge showed that all of the issues of law had been comprehensively passed upon, and hence prayed that the alternative writ of certiorari be quashed and the issuance thereof denied.

The issues to be decided as culled from the records are:

1) Whether the People’s Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition that was venued in the October 1980 Term of Court but wrongly indicated by the Clerk of Court for March, A. D. 1980 Term of Court in the said writ of certiorari?

2) Whether the ruling of the co-respondent judge on the issues of law was illegal and therefore prejudicial to the interests of the petitioner?

3) Whether certiorari will lie to review an interlocutory ruling on questions of law where adequate relief could be obtained by regular process of appeal?

4) Whether failure on the part of a judge to rule upon all issues of law can be corrected by certiorari?

In passing upon said issues we shall proceed to discuss them in their serial order of sequence. From the perusal and inspection of the records certified to us in this case, it is difficult to see how the respondents in count one of their returns could have contended that this Court has no jurisdiction over the case, for the reason that this case had been filed for the March Term, A. D. 1980 while this Court came into existence only after April12, 1980. The Court says that a scrutiny of the petition plainly shows that same is venued in the October Term, A. D. 1980 and not the March Term, A. D. 1980 as wrongly indicated by the Clerk of this Court in the said alter­ native writ of certiorari. Count one of the returns is therefore not considered; this being the act of the Clerk of Court, which is harmless. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:1.5.

As regards the second issue, the Court observes that all the counts in the petitioner’s complaint in the court below for damages in the sum of $7,330.67 against the Co-respondent Dweh, were ruled to trial as supported by count one of her reply. No point in the complaint which forms the basis of the action was over ruled in any way. We fail to see why the petitioner has come to complain about the ruling as being illegal and prejudicial. Is it because she has been commanded to prove her allegation, which is the normal duty of a party­ plaintiff hoary with age? In our opinion, the ruling on the law issues of His Honour M. Fulton W. Yancy is not illegal or prejudicial to the interests of petitioner. In the case, Morris v. Flomo, [1977] LRSC 52; 26 LLR 314 (1977) this Court held that “where the ruling of an inferior court during the pendency of a case is not manifestly prejudicial to the rights of a party, certiorari will not lie.”

Also in the case, Vandevoode v. Morris et al., 12 LLR 325 (1986) the Court ruled that “The definite and specific function of a writ of certiorari is to review the records and correct prejudicial errors of a lower court during pendency of a case.” We maintain that in the absence of any credible evidence that there is an injury threatening and irreparable, no further comments are necessary as the same would serve no useful purpose. Therefore count two of the returns together with the prayer is sustained as against petitioner’s entire petition.

With regard to issues number 3 and 4, it is again necessary to define the office of the writ of certiorari:

“Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy which will not be granted where adequate relief can be obtained through regular process of appeal.” Raymond Concrete Pile Company v. Perry et al., 13 LLR page 522 (1960).

Therefore, this Court says that certiorari will not ordinarily be granted to review an interlocutory ruling on the question of law where adequate relief could be obtained by regular process of appeal, especially so, as in the instant case, where the petitioner has not stated in her petition what issue of law the co-respondent judge did not pass upon. Neither would a failure on the part of a judge to rule upon all issues of law be corrected by certiorari. Additionally, the method employed by petitioner in these certiorari proceedings is not only strange and irregular but also has the tendency to encourage multiplicity of suits and to delay justice. It also haunts us with the idea of reviewing cases in piecemeal, which has been held by this Court to be illegal. The law extant in this jurisdiction specifically provides that the disposition of law issues shall be the first duty of the trial court and the party against whom the ruling on the law issues is entered may except thereto, and the same may be reviewed by the appellate court which shall give such judgment as the trial court should have given, as will best serve the ends of law, justice and equity. Johns v. Republic, 13 LLR 143 (1958). Further this Court held in Raymond Concrete Pile v. Perry etc., 13 LLR 522 (1960), that “Certiorari will not ordinarily be granted to review an interlocutory ruling on a question of law.” In view of the foregoing facts, circumstances and the con-trolling law quoted herein above, the ruling of Mr. Justice Bortue in Chambers is hereby reversed, the alternative writ of certiorari quashed and the issuance of the peremptory writ denied with costs in these proceedings against the petitioner.

The Clerk of this Court is therefore hereby instructed to send a mandate to the judge presiding in the trial court as to the effect of this judgment. And it is hereby so ordered.

Ruling reversed.