PETER DOE, Appellant, v. TANBOE TARPLAH and SACKOR WONKAR, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SINOE COUNTY. Argued March 28, 1963. Decided May 9, 1963. 1. The proper measure of compensatory damages in a civil action for personal injuries does not include penalties for criminal misconduct. 2. When a civil action seeking damages for personal injury arises from the same events as a criminal prosecution, the statute of limitations applicable to the civil action is not tolled by prior pendency of the criminal prosecution. On appeal, a judgment dismissing an action for damages for personal injuries was affirmed. T. E. Cess-Pelham for appellant. Beysolow and Cooper Law Firm by Daniel Draper for appellees. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WILSON delivered the opinion of the Court. This action was instituted in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Sinoe County, by Peter Doe against Tanboe Tarplah and Sackor Wonkar to recover damages for certain physical injuries allegedly inflicted by beating and flogging, which injuries allegedly compelled the present appellant to undergo extensive medical treatment, and left him with permanent physical disabilities. Before the institution of the action for damages against the appellees, the appellant was private prosecutor in a criminal prosecution for assault and battery with intent to do grievous bodily harm, arising from the same events as the said action for damages. The date of the flogging 410 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 411 alleged as cause of action in both the criminal prosecution and the action for damages was June ro, 1958. Upon the filing of the suit for damages, the appellees appeared and contested the right of the appellant to recover “penal damages” on the ground that the purpose and intent of such a civil action as was filed against them is not to punish the defendant but to indemnify the plaintiff; and that any damages in such an action must be computed on the basis of the actual amount of loss or injury complained of as the result of the bodily injuries inflicted, without regard to any criminal misconduct of the appellees, or to their possible guilt of the crime of assault and battery with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Appellees Also contended that appellant should have stated in his complaint the manner in which he arrived at the amount of damages he allegedly sustained in the amounts of $200 and $ roo, respectively, which sums he demanded as “penal damages” for “malicious injuries” resulting from the conduct of appellees; and that appellant should have made profert receipts of amounts allegedly paid by him for medical treatment. Appellees also pleaded the statute of limitations which mandatorily requires that an action seeking damages for personal injuries must be instituted within one year of the time the injuries complained of were inflicted. Appellees contended that, the complaint having alleged that the beating and flogging from which the appellant sustained severe bodily injuries took place on June 1o, 1958, and the action to recover damages for said injuries not having been filed or instituted until the month of November, 1959, more than one year after the alleged flogging took place, appellant was barred under the statute of limitations. Appellees cited the following statutory provision : “The time within which to commence civil actions after the cause of action has accrued shall be as follows : 412 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS ” ( e) In an action to obtain damages for personal injuries, one year. . . . “Failure to commence an action within the period specified therefor shall constitute a valid defense; but the party who wishes to avail himself of such defense must expressly plead the limitation.” 1956 Code, tit. 6, � 5o. Appellant’s reply advanced several contentions which, besides being evasive and not responsive, are confusing and inapplicable to the defenses set forth in the appellees’ answer. Nevertheless, appellees filed a rejoinder to said reply; and the pleadings progressed as far as the surrejoinder. In an effort to place a liberal construction on appellant’s pleadings, we will comment on the reply wherein he attempted to justify his failure to institute action within one year of the date on which the injuries complained of were inflicted by contending that appellee Tarplah, being a clan chief in the County of Sinoe, and enjoying certain immunities as a Government official, could not be sued in an action of damages resulting from any act done in his official capacity, since the said clan chief had ordered and participated in the beating and flogging of appellant because of appellant’s having stolen certain personal properties from one A. B. Johnson and fled; for which reason, appellee Tarplah could not have been sued to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by reason of said beating and flogging until after final determination of the criminal prosecution. This very obviously reflects a misinterpretation of the statute limiting the period of time within which an action seeking damages for personal injuries can be instituted, by confusing such damages with damages recoverable for malicious prosecution. Without laboring unnecessarily in review of the various LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 413 inappropriate arguments advanced by appellant, we find ourselves obliged to consider the defense of the statute of limitations asserted by appellees. But, before doing so, we must approve the contention of appellees that penal damages cannot be recovered in an action for personal injuries, since the purpose of such an action is to indemnify the person injured, and not to punish the defendant. The personal injury must be expressly laid in the complaint, and the measure of damages, together with the actual loss sustained by the person injured, must be alleged and proved without necessarily bringing to issue the criminal misconduct of the defendant. Moreover, a person sustaining damages from injuries inflicted on his person by another, as in the present case, does not have to wait until after criminal prosecution of the person inflicting the injury before commencing or instituting an action to recover damages resulting from said personal injuries. The controlling statute of limitations, cited, supra; makes it mandatory for a person sustaining injuries to commence such an action within one calendar year from the time when the injuries complained of were inflicted, and not await the outcome of a criminal prosecution, as was done by appellant. Appellant’s injuries having allegedly been sustained on June to, 1958, and the action seeking damages for personal injuries having been instituted in the month of November, 1959, almost one year and five months, subsequently, the statute of limitations bars appellant from recovery of damages against appellees. We would like to remark here that, whilst it is true that a clan chief, in the lawful discharge of his duty, does enjoy certain immunities from prosecution and actions of damages for acts committed by him whilst in office, this is an issue that does not fall within our consideration of the action of damages for personal injuries instituted against appellee Tarplah, as one of the defendants in this case, for the reason that an action seeking damages for 414 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS personal injury may be instituted independently of a criminal prosecution; and the determination of the criminal prosecution need not be awaited before institution of such a civil action as the one filed by appellant; nor could the action of damages for personal injury in this case be considered one for malicious prosecution, although appellant has apparently sought, by so arguing, to confuse the main issue. The immunity of a clan chief does not extend to an act which may be unlawful, such as the beating and flogging complained of in the present case. The appellant could have asserted his right of action by timely filing of his suit against appellee Tarplah, leaving it to the said appellee to invoke his immunity, which would have made it an issue for the court to decide whether the said appellee acted within the scope of his authority, and whether the flogging and beating were legally justified. The appellant thus has no right to assert the immunity of the clan chief. We are therefore of the opinion that the instant action, having been filed without the statutory time, is barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment of the court below is hereby confirmed with costs against appellant. And it is so ordered. Affirmed.