SAMUEL FORD DENNIS, JEANETT DENNISPRATT, and ESTELLA LOUISE DENNIS, heirs of WILMOT F. DENNIS, deceased, Appellants, v. JAMES T. PHILIPS, JR., RUTH PHILIPS, T. ERNEST EASTMAN, PATRICIA GAYE, MARTHA HOLDER, AUGUSTUS MORRIS, AUGUSTA B. TARPA, and JEANETTE HOWARD-KING, Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY. Argued December 13, 1972. Decided February 2, 1973. 1. In the absence of special circumstances, it is the plaintiff who must join as parties all those whom he wishes to bind by the judgment. 2. A judgment ordinarily concludes only those persons made parties to the action, or who intervened therein. 3. In the application of rules of court to any precise state of facts they must be taken with a lively sense of their unexpressed qualifications and their purely operational character, for they are designed to administer, and not hinder, justice. 4. A defendant may move for summary judgment at any time, even after the issues of law have been disposed of. 5. Summary judgment can only be granted when no justiciable material issue of fact is presented to the court. 6. A judge cannot review the judicial acts of his peers; therefore, as in the case presented, a circuit court judge cannot grant a motion for summary judgment after the case has been ruled to trial by another circuit court judge. Appellants had prevailed in cancellation proceedings, but the appellees were not parties to the suit. Thereafter, an action in ejectment was instituted against them. One circuit court judge had ruled the case to trial by jury of the factual issues. Subsequently, another circuit court judge granted a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants. An appeal was taken from the judgment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the lower court, pointing 506 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 507 out primarily the appellate function asserted by the judge who overruled the finding of a colleague that justiciable issues had been raised which were to be determined by a jury. Samuel Pelham and Joseph Williamson for appellants. Julia Gibson and James Nagbe for appellees. MR. JUSTICE HENRIES delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1953, Angela Dennis-Brown, one of the heirs of Henry W. Dennis, learned that he, who was also an ancestor of the appellants, apparently died seized of zoo acres of land in Paynesville, Montserrado County. She informed the appellants and together they undertook a resurvey. Thereafter, the family issued quitclaim deeds to one another dividing the aforesaid parcel of land among themselves. The quitclaim deed to Angela Dennis-Brown was dated May 7, 196o. During 1962 and 1963, she sold parcels of land to the appellees out of her portion of land, and appellees began to improve their properties. In 1964, appellants filed cancellation proceedings against Angela Dennis-Brown seeking to cancel the quitclaim deed to her as well as the original warranty deed of their common ancestor, Henry W. Dennis, to the two hundred acres of land already apportioned, on the ground that they were induced to sign the quitclaim deeds upon the fraudulent representations of Angela DennisBrown. The appellants alleged that they inherited the two hundred acres of land as a result of a transfer of title executed in 1910 by Georgiana C. Dennis, sole executrix of the estate of Henry W. Dennis, to appellants’ father, Wilmot F. Dennis, who died seized of the property, and not to Henry W. Dennis, as claimed by Angela DennisB rown. 508 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS The appellees were never joined in the cancellation suit even though their properties formed part of the parcel of land in dispute. On August 7, 1969, the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, entered a decree cancelling the quitclaim deeds that were issued in 196o. Angela Dennis-Brown appealed, but the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court because the appellants failed to file an approved appeal bond and notice of completion of appeal within the statutory time. See Dennis-Brown v. Dennis, [1970] LRSC 49; 20 LLR 96 ( 1970). The appellants, still not in possession of the property despite the cancellation of the quitclaim deeds, instituted an action of ejectment in the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit against the appellees, who were not parties to the cancellation proceedings. The appellees contend that the conveyances to them were all made for valuable considerations and without notice of any fraud allegedly perpetrated by their grantor, Angela Dennis-Brown, and, consequently, each of them acquired his respective parcel of land as a bona fide purchaser for value. Pleadings ended with the plaintiffs’ reply. Judge James M. T. Kandakai disposed of the issues of law raised in the pleadings and ruled the case to trial by jury on the plaintiffs’ complaint and the factual issues raised to the answer. At the second quarterly session of the said court, presided over by Judge Emmanuel S. Koroma, the appellees filed a motion for summary judgment resisted by the appellants, and granted by the trial judge. The appellants excepted to this final judgment, and appealed to this Court praying that the case be remanded. At the outset it was argued by appellants that the appellees were guilty of ‘aches and had waived their rights because they failed to intervene in the cancellation proceedings which involved their interests. Appellees on the other hand, averred that it was incumbent upon the LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 509 appellants to have made appellees parties to the action and, since this was not done, the decree in the cancellation action is not binding upon them. Both parties relied upon the Civil Procedure Law, L. 1963-64, ch. III. Appellants cited section 561 which deals with intervention, and appellees cited sections 551 and 552 which relate to joinder of parties. It is agreed that because of their interest in the res, and in order to afford complete relief, the appellees could have intervened or could have been joined as defendants, but the statutory provision on intervention is silent as to the effect of failure to intervene, and, under section 552, the effect of failure to join is that “the court may dismiss without prejudice or, when justice requires, proceed in the action without making him a party.” Each side has sought to blame the other, but it is our opinion that the onus rested more on appellants who instituted the action to join appellees, for they knew that Angela Dennis-Brown had sold several portions of the land quitclaimed to her. According to 9 AM. JuR., Cancellation of Instruments, � 54, “When instituting a suit for the cancellation of a written instrument, the plaintiff or complainant should join as parties, either plaintiff or defendant according to the nature of their interests, all persons whose privileges may be in any way affected by the granting of the relief he seeks to obtain. Thus all parties to the instrument must be made parties. The judgment or decree in such an action operates in personam, and one who is not a party to the suit cannot be compelled to deliver up an instrument for cancellation.” The appellants have not shown conclusively that the cancellation proceedings were so widely known as to have afforded the appellees the opportunity to intervene. While trials of cases in our courts are open to the public, it does not necessarily follow that the public knows of every case that is being heard. We have been unable to 510 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS find any authority which makes a judgment binding upon one who was not a party to, or who did not intervene in, an action. On the contrary, the general rule is that a judgment concludes only those persons who were made parties to the action, or who intervened. Tubman v. Murdoch, [1934] LRSC 26; 4 LLR 179 (1934) ; 3o AM. JUR., Judgments, � 73. The cases relied upon by appellants, Savage v. Dennis, i LLR 51 (1871) ; Blunt v. Barbour, [1872] LRSC 4; 1 LLR 58 (1872) ; McAuley v. Madison, i LLR 287 (1896), and Sinoe v. Nimley, [1965] LRSC 2; 16 LLR 152 (1965), must be confined to the peculiar facts and circumstances involved therein. Since appellees did not come under the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment in the cancellation proceedings, either by service or process or by their voluntary appearance, we must hold, in accordance with the general rule, that the judgment in those proceedings was not conclusive as to them. A plaintiff in ejectment must recover upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of his adversary’s title. In the first count of the bill of exceptions, appellants contend that it was error for the trial judge to entertain the motion for summary judgment which was filed and served in violation of Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the Circuit Court. “Notice of all motions filed shall be given to the other party at least four hours before they are called for hearing, or the motion shall not be entertained by the court upon objections properly taken by opposing party.” The motion was served on the appellants when the case was called and, hence, contrary to the requirement of Rule 8. Though the trial judge acknowledged this fact, he did not hear the motion until five days later. Since the reason for the rule is to allow the opposing party time to study and ‘resist the motion, we do not find, and appellants did not show, that they were prejudiced by the motion being entertained five days after it was served. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 511 Therefore, we do not find any error on the part of the judge. The appellants’ contention reminds us of the physician who preferred that patients should die by rule than live contrary to it. While it is true that the rules of court have the force and effect of statutory law, Howard v. Dunbar, [1961] LRSC 31; 14 LLR 515 (1961) , yet, their purpose is to aid the speedy determination of causes, for the courts are established for the higher purpose of administering justice. Where the strict enforcement of the rule would tend to prevent or jeopardize the administration of justice the rule must yield to higher purpose. Pratt v. Phillips, [1949] LRSC 13; 10 LLR 147 (1949) � Rules should not be applied mechanically, for this signifies lack of thought or callousness. In their application to any precise state of facts they must be taken with a lively sense of their unexpressed qualifications and of their purely operational character. The next count in the bill of exceptions deals with appellants’ contention that under the Civil Procedure Law a motion for summary judgment is a pre-trial motion and should not have been entertained after the issues of law had been passed upon. (I I. Time for motion; grounds. A party seeking to recover upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of ten days from the commencement of the action or after service of the answer if the answer is served before the expiration of such period of ten days or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or a part thereof. A party against whom a claim or counterclaim is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in his favor as to all or a part thereof.” L. 1963-64, ch. III, � 1103. The first sentence of the statute just quoted permits a party seeking to recover on a claim (ordinarily the plain- 512 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS tiff) to move for a summary judgment in his favor: ( ) after the expiration of ten days from the commencement of the action ; (2) after service of the answer if the answer is served within the ten-day period ; or (3) after the service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, if the motion is served within the ten-day period. While the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is restricted by the ten-day rule, it is clear that under the last sentence of paragraph one of the statute, a defendant (appellees in the case at bar) may move “at any time” for summary judgment in his favor. The reason for this disparity in treatment of plaintiff and defendant, according to the Liberian Codification Project in its comments in 1961 on the prepared Civil Procedure Law, since enacted, is that “since the plaintiff in drafting his complaint is supposedly familiar with the basic facts of the case, there is no reason to restrict the time of a motion by the defendant. If he makes the motion before answer and it is granted, he may be saved the burden of preparing a pleading.” Under the circumstances, since the statutory provision does not specify the time period before a motion for summary judgment may be made, and since it does permit a defendant to make the motion at any time, we must hold that the motion is not limited to the pretrial stage of the action and, therefore, the trial judge did not err in entertaining it at the time that he did. The appellants contended that the granting of the motion for summary judgment was improper because it denied them the right to a jury trial which they were entitled to, because an action of ejectment involves questions of law and facts, and because it tended to reverse and set aside the ruling on the issues of law made by a judge of concurrent jurisdiction. While it is true that in ejectment mixed question of law and fact are usually presented, Harris v. Locket, r LLR 79 (1875), and hence, must be tried by a jury under the direction of the court, yet, where in a case, as in Roberts v. Howard, [1916] LRSC 3; 2 LLR 226 (1916), LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 513 the facts are admitted, leaving only issues of law to be determined, it is not error for the court to hear and determine them, without the intervention of a jury. Judge Kandakai, in his ruling on the issues of law, overruled, or more correctly, ignored all of the legal issues raised in the answer and reply, and ruled the case to trial on the complaint and the factual issues raised in the answer. A careful scrutiny of the pleadings shows that they did raise several questions of fact, particularly those relating to fraud and the plaintiffs’ supposed knowledge of the defendants’ acquisition of the title to their parcel of land, and whether or not defendants were really bona fled purchasers without notice. According to the Civil Procedure Law, supra, the court must grant summary judgment if it concludes that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is granted is entitled to it as a matter of law.” �I1o3 (3). Thus, a motion for summary judgment is properly granted only where no bona fide issue of f acts exists. Therefore, the trial judge must exercise extreme care in determining whether or not a motion for summary judgment should be granted. Although the purpose of the procedure is to achieve speedy and economical justice, where the judgment is improvidently granted it is productive of injustice and waste. The fact that the appellants did not specifically demand a jury trial, as required by section 2201 of the Civil Procedure Law, is of little import since the judge in his ruling on the issues of law had already ruled the factual issues to trial by jury. Since genuine issues of fact did exist in the pleadings, we must hold that the granting of the motion for summary judgment did deprive the appellants of their constitutional right to a jury trial. In the light of this holding, the questions of whether the rights of bona fide purchasers for value without notice can be affected by fraud allegedly committed by their grantor, and whether appellants were negligent in making it pos- 514 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS sible for appellees to be misled, must be held in abeyance, pending a jury’s determination of whether the alleged fraud and negligence did exist, and whether appellees did purchase without notice. It is obvious that the granting of the summary judgment by Judge Koroma did have the effect of reviewing Judge Kandakai who, having concurrent jurisdiction with Judge Koroma, had earlier disposed of the issues of law. Where Judge Kandakai had ruled the questions of fact to trial by jury, Judge Koroma’s granting of the motion had in effect taken the case away from the jury, despite the presence of genuine issues as to material facts, and awarded judgment as a matter of law. This Court has consistently held in a long line of cases that because all circuit judges have concurrent jurisdiction one circuit judge cannot review, modify, or rescind any decision or ruling of another circuit judge. Bracewell v. Coleman, [1938] LRSC 3; 6 LLR 176 (1938) Gage v. Pratt, [1938] LRSC 11; 6 LLR 246 (1938) ; Republic v. Aggrey, 13 LLR 469 (196o) ; Kanawaty v. King, [1960] LRSC 66; 14 LLR 241 (196o). Under the circumstances, we also hold that Judge Koroma erred when, by granting the motion for summary judgment, he altered or interfered with the ruling of Judge Kandakai. In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the court below is hereby reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Costs to abide final determination. Reversed and remanded.