Morris G. Dean, Jr. and Martha Dean of the City of Kakata Margibi County and the United States of America  respectively PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS Versus The Intestate Estate of the late David Z. Dean, represented by its Administrators, Thomas Travis, Edward Travis, Joseph Travis and including Thomas Popei and the late Samuel G. Dean, Sr. of the City of Kakata, Margibi, RESPONDENTS/APPELLEES

PETITION FOR THE REOPENING OF INTESTATE

HEARD: October 26, 2011                                                                                              DECIDED: July 6, 2012

MADAM JUSTICE WOLOKOLIE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT

This appeal comes from  a hearing  in the  13th Judicial  Circuit, Margibi  County predicated  upon  a mandate from  this  Court  during  its  October  Term  2009, reversing the trial Judge’s ruling  and remanding the case for a new trial.

A restatement of  the  facts  of  this  matter is that  Edward  Dean  and  Yunah

Dean, husband  and  wife had three  children, Samuel Dean, Sr., Kneepo Dean and

David  Z.  Dean.  Edward D e a n had a child o u t s i d e   of wedlock n a m e d Morris Dean.  Samuel Dean, Sr. the older child married Beatrice Dean.  The marriage was blessed with two children Samuel Dean, Jr. and Martha Dean. Kneepo Dean, the second child had a daughter, Bledee Dean. David Z. Dean, the youngest, had no child and it is alleged that he had a special affinity with his niece, Bledee Dean, who lived with him and was alleged to have been his adopted daughter. Later in life, Bledee Dean got married to Mr. John Travis and the union was blessed  with several children, the appellees  herein.

Samuel Dean, Sr. and David Z. Dean, during their lives, individually acquired real properties in Kakata, Margibi County.  David Z .  Dean  predeceased  his brother  Samuel  Dean,  Sr., and  Samuel Dean,  Sr. petitioned the  court  and got   Letters   of   Administration  to   administer  the   intestate  estate   of  his brother, David  Z. Dean.  Subsequently, Samuel Dean, Sr. died and his wife, Beatrice Dean, her son, Samuel Dean, Jr.  and one Ernest Palmer  obtained Letters of Administration to administer his  intestate estate. These administrators, it is alleged,  co-mingled the  administration of Samuel Dean, Sr. intestate estate  with  that  of  David  Z. Dean’s  to  the  exclusion  of  other collateral   heirs.  This  prompted  Bledee  Dean,  niece,  and  alleged  adopted daughter  of David Z. Dean, and  her  children, the  Travises,  co-appellees, to petition  the   Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Margibi County, for  Letters  of Administration to administer the intestate estate of David Z. Dean. The court upon hearing the petition, granted them the Letters of Administration.

As administrators, Bledee and the appellees filed a petition for  ejectment, seeking to oust the Tenants  that had been placed on the property by the administrators of  Samuel  Dean,  Sr.  and to have the court s t o p p e d  them from further interfering with  the intestate estate of David Z. Dean.

A legal tussle ensued  for  a protracted period  and  it is alleged  that  Samuel Dean, Jr. proposed  that the  parties  meet  and sit  as a family  and settle  the matter  out of court.  Both parties met and accepted the  proposal  and agreed that  all parties  would  withdraw their  court  papers  and thereafter petition  the court   to  close  the   David  Z.  Dean’s intestate estate.  A survey   of  the intestate  property  was  carried   out,  and  both   parties   acquiesced  to  have Bledee take the  7.4 acres on the left  side of the road, and Samuel Dean, Jr. take  the 5.12  acres  located  on the  right  side of  the  road;  thereby  dividing per stripes  the  intestate estate  of David  Z. Dean between  the  lineal heirs of the legitimate siblings  of David Z. Dean. The parties deeded out the parcel of land as agreed.

Based upon  the understanding reached  and  the  survey  held,  the administrators of  the  intestate estate,  on November  4, 2003,  informed the court  of the compromised reached by the parties  and requested  the court  for closure of the  estate  as agreed.   At a court’s hearing  on November  8, 2003, Judge  Mooney,  the  then  Resident  Circuit  Judge of  the   13th Judicial  Circuit, ruled closing  the  intestate estate  and allowing  the   distribution of the estate as agreed to by the parties.  The various legal contentions relating to the said estate were then withdrawn by the parties.

We must   note   here   that   the   appellees   have   alleged   that   one   of  the appellants  herein,  Martha  Dean, daughter  of Samuel Dean, Sr., was taken to America  by  some  missionaries in  1952,  at  an early  age  and  has not  been heard from  since. The other appellant, Samuel Dean, Jr., is the son of Morris Dean, Sr., David Z. Dean’s half brother who lived in Grand Bassa County and is also alleged to have been estranged from the rest of the Dean family.

This legal tussle  of  the  intestate estate  of  David  Z. Dean, thought to  have been  finally  settled, on August  26, 2004,  Counsellor  Richard  Flomo  filed  a petition  on behalf  of Morris G. Dean, Jr. and Martha  Dean, appellants  herein, alleging  misrepresentation and fraud  perpetrated in the closing  of the estate and requesting the  court  for  reopening  of the  intestate estate.  The petition filed before His Honor, Emmanuel M. Kollie, the Assigned Circuit Judge, by Morris G. Dean, Jr. and Martha Dean, reads:

PETITIONERS PETITION

And now come  your  humble  Petitioners in the above  entitled cause of action  and most  respectfully crave  thru  this  petition for  the RE-OPENING OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE herein stated  supra for cause showeth  therefore to wit:

1. Petitionersstrenuously maintain that   they   are   the   natural    children begotten in wedlock to Samuel G.  Dean, Sr.  and Morris Dean, Sr.  and that the  fathers  just  mentioned  above  died  intestate during  their  tender ages.

2. And also because Petitioners further averthat  after  the death  of the late Morris  and Samuel  Dean, Sr.,  Mr. Samuel  G. Dean, Jr.  administered the properties by

“LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION from the Honourable Probate Court of

Monsterrado County, at the time.

3. And also because during thecivil  crisis,  in the  year 1990, when  the war intensified, Petitioners fled  the  Republic  of  Liberia  into  exile  for  While in  exile,  without their consent,  knowledge and  awareness,  upon their  return to Liberia, November  A.D. 2003,  when asked as to what  was the   status   of   their   fathers’ estate,   both   the   Probate   Court,   Margibi County,   and  co-respondent,  Mr.  Samuel   G.  Dean, Jr.   informed   your humble Petitioners that  the entire  estate had been distributed among the respondents mentioned  herein supra.

4. ThatPetitioners not  being  satisfied  over  the  premature and  erroneous manner  the said estate was distributed and closed,  without the least consideration for  them,  have  decided  to  appeal  to  this  Honorable  Court and Your Honor to reopen the said estate so that they will be included as administrator/administratrix and not the Travises who have no relationship to them.

5. That Petitioners say Madam Bledee Dean is not the biological daughter of the late David Z. Dean to have benefited from Petitioners’ fathers’ estate and leave them out without any consideration.

WHEREFORE, it is the prayer  of your  humble  Petitioners that, in view of the facts and circumstances above  outlined, Your Honor  and this  Honorable  Court  will  grant their  petition to reopen  the intestate estate so that  their  rights  and benefits  will not be infringed  upon and grant  them  all such reliefs as seemeth  just and legal.

The   Respondents, appellees,   filed   their returns,  stating  that   the   entire petition was  unclear  as to  which  of  the  intestate estates  Petitioners  were petitioning  the   court   to   have   reopened   as  the   Petitioners’ petition   was ambiguous. Respondents   said   that the   allegation made was  false and unfounded  as at no time  did they  participate in the  distribution of properties belonging  to  the  intestate estates  of  the  late  Morris  Dean, Sr., and Samuel G.  Dean, Sr.,  and  at  no  time   were  they  given  properties as  their  share individually or collectively in the intestate estate  of the late  Morris Dean, Sr. and Samuel G. Dean, Sr.; that  the Travises never  served as an administrator for any of the intestate estate of Morris Dean, Sr. or Samuel G. Dean, Sr.

Also responding to the issue of Bledee Dean being the biological daughter of the late David Z.  Dean, the  appellees   said  that   there   are  several  legal grounds  for  which  an individual shall  benefit under  an intestate estate  and not only by biological  means; that  the late David Z. Dean, during  his life, not having  a  child  of  his  own  body,  took  his  sister’s   daughter, Bledee  Dean, when she was a child and gave her the name Dean. She lived  with  him  until his  death,  and  during   that  period, the  late  David  Z.  Dean did everything within  his power  to ensure  that  Bledee Dean was recognized  as his daughter by his family  members; that  as far as Respondents  is concerned, at no time did  Bledee  Dean  benefit   from   Petitioners’ fathers’ Morris Dean,  Sr.  and Samuel  Dean,  Sr.  estates.   It is therefore  not   clear  as  to  which  of  the Petitioners’ father’s estate  that  Bledee Dean is alleged  to be benefiting from.

A hearing  for the  law  issues  was called and heard  and  the  Judge Presiding, Judge Emmanuel  Kollie,  ruled  that  the  estate  of the  late  David  Z. Dean be reopened  with  the  proviso  that  the appellees  remain  party  to the  case while the Petitioners, Morris G. Dean, Jr. and Martha Dean appear before the Court to prove their  allegations.

The Respondents/appellees excepted to the Judge’s ruling ordering a reopening of the intestate estate.  Appellees stated  that  it was a gross error  by  Judge  Kollie  to  set  aside  his  predecessor  Judge Mooney’s  ruling  closing the   estate   when   there   was no  showing   of   fraud   or misrepresentation committed in  the  closing  of  the  estate  to  warrant  the  re-opening of  the estate.  Besides, it was David  Z. Dean’s intestate estate  that  was closed and not Samuel G. Dean, Sr. or Morris Dean, Sr. estates.

Reviewing  this  ruling  on appeal, this  Court  on January  21, 2010, ruled  that the  Judge  did  commit a  reversible error  by  overturning his  predecessor’s ruling  without taking  evidence  to  substantiate that  misrepresentation to the court  or  fraud  had  been  committed in  the  closing  and  distribution of  the intestate estate.  The  matter was remanded   with  instruction that  the  court below  proceed  to hear  the  allegation  of  misrepresentation and  fraud  made by the petitioners.

Based on this Court’s   mandate, the appellants   were called to proceed to present evidence of fraud and misrepresentation as alleged.

Hearing  began  in  the  May Term  2010  of  court  before  His  Honor  Judge  J. Boima Kontoe, Presiding Circuit  Judge. On June 17, 2010, the appellees  filed a  motion   asking  the  court  to  strike  the  petition   for  the  reopening   of  the estate  as to Martha  Dean, since Martha  Dean has been outside  the  bailiwick of  Liberia  since  the  year  1952,  when  some  missionaries took  her  to  the United  States of America; and in keeping  with our law extant, a party  who is outside  the bailiwick of the  country  can only  file a complaint by and through an  Attorney-In-Fact  duly   appointed   by   such   party;  that   there   was  no evidence of authorization from Martha Dean who lives in America, requesting the filing  of the petition on her behalf, and which made the petition  a subject fit to be stricken  in keeping  with our law extant.

On the  same June 17, 2010, the  appellees  filed  a motion to drop  misjoined party,  stating  that  the  appellants  by their  own  admission  have  alleged  that they  are  natural children  begotten in wedlock  to  Samuel  G. Dean, Sr. and Morris  Dean, Sr.;  that  the  portion  of  the  David  Z. Dean’s  intestate estate which  was deeded  to  Bledee Dean and  was now  being  administered by her children, the  appellees,  was separate  and distinct  from  the  intestate estate of the  late  Samuel  G. Dean, Sr.  and  Morris  Dean, Sr.  and this  means  that the  motion   to  reopen   the  Samuel  Dean,  Sr.   intestate estate  and  Morris Dean, Sr.  intestate estate  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  David  Z.  Dean, Sr. intestate estate  which was closed by the late Judge James G. Mooney.

Chapter 5, Section  5.56 of our Civil Procedure Law provides  that  upon proper motion   to   drop   by  a  misjoined  party,   the   court   may  drop   a  party   so misjoined at any stage of the action or on any terms  that  are just. Appellees submitted that  since  the  petition   for  the  reopening   claims  are  against  the Samuel G. Dean, Sr. and Morris  Dean, Sr. intestate estates, the inclusion  of the  appellees  who  were  administering a portion  of  David  Z. Dean’s  estate deeded  to their  mother  was erroneous; therefore, the  motion  to drop  would lie as in keeping  with  law.

The appellants  on the  other  hand, filed  a bill of information stating  that  the deeds for the  7.49  and  5.12  acres were  not  issued  by the  court  below, but rather  fraudulently executed  by one Thomas Popei and Thomas  Travis, one of the appellees.   Since there  was no decree issued by the  court authorizing them  to  issue  out  the  deeds  to  the  intestate estate,  their   action  was  a usurpation of the curator’s function  of the court and was therefore erroneous and void.

The case was called for argument on the law issues. Appellees’  motions  and appellants’ information were  all  argued  and  the  Judge  stated  that  all  the papers  filed  before the  court presented issues  of  law  and  facts  and  so  he ruled  the  matter to trial.

Immediately  after  the   court’s  ruling  of   the   matter  to   trial,  counsel   for appellants  requested  the   court  to   put   his  witnesses  on   the   stand.  The request was   granted and   the   appellants produced three witnesses who testified for the appellants.

The   appellants having  presented  testimonies  and rested  evidence, the appellees moved the  court below   for  Judgment during trial in  accordance with  Chapter 26.2  of our  CPLR. The appellees alleged  that they  were  entitled to  judgment  because the  appellants, from   their testimonies, had  failed   to prove  fraud and had  failed  to establish a prima facie  case before the  law.

Section   26.2   of  our  CPLR speaks  on  Motion   for  Judgment during trial. It states:

• 26.2 Motion for judgment during trial.

After  the  close  of  the  evidence presented by  an  opposing party with  respect to  a claim   or  issue, or  at  any  time on  the  basis  of admissions, any   party may   move   for  judgment  with   respect to such  claim   or  issue   upon   the  ground that  the   moving  party  is entitled to  judgment  as  a  matter of  law.  The motion does not waive the right to trial by jury or to present further evidence even where it is made by all parties. If the  court grants such  a motion in  an  action   tried by  jury, it shall  direct the  jury what  verdict to render, and  if the  jury disregards the  direction, the  court may  in its  discretion grant a new  trial. If the  court grants such  a motion in an action  tried by  the  court without a jury, the  court as trier of the  facts  may  then  determine them and  render judgment or  may decline to  render any  judgment until the  close  of all the  evidence. In such a case if the court renders judgment on the merits, the court shall make findings as provided in section 23.3(2).

Ruling  on the  motion for  judgment during trial, the  trial Judge  ruled  that  the petitioners had alleged that while  they  were  out  of the  country taking refuge, Samuel  G. Dean,  Jr.  and  the  other co-respondents distributed their fathers’ Samuel  Dean, Jr. and  Morris  Dean, Sr. property amongst themselves to their exclusion. They also averred that  Bledee  Dean  was not  a biological daughter of  the  late  David   Z.  Dean, and therefore she  should not  benefit from   his intestate  estate. On  these   issues   raised   by  the  petitioners to  reopen   the intestate estate, the  Judge   noted   that   there  was  no  supporting  evidence during the  trial to  substantiate the  appellant’s claims that their fathers own the  disputed property and  that   there was  fraud  perpetrated against them. Co-petitioner Morris  G. Dean, Jr., the  court said, had  admitted in open  court that  the  petition to  reopen the  estate  centers around the  intestate estate  of the  late  David  Z. Dean  and  not  the  intestate estate of the  Samuel Dean, Sr. or Morris  Dean, Sr. as stated in their petition to  reopen the  intestate estate of  their  late  fathers. Morris  Dean, Jr. himself, the  court said, had  admitted that  he is the  lone  administrator of his late  father Morris  G. Dean, Sr. estate and  that  said estate is located  in Grand  Bassa County and not  in Kakata  City, Margibi County where the  subject estate  is located. Upon  these  admissions, that   the   subject  estate  is  separate  and  distinct  from   appellants fathers’ property, this  confirmed the  movants/appellees’ resistance, that  there   was no  genuine issue  of  fact  in  dispute to  warrant further taken of  evidence in the case.

Ruling  further,  the   court   said,   co-respondent  Morris   G.  Dean,  Jr.  also testified that  he  was  asked  to  represent the  interest of  Martha  Dean, but there  was no power  of attorney executed  to that  effect  in regards  to the law of  Liberia,  which  is  clear  as  to  how  a  person  desirous  of  commencing  an action  before  the  courts   of  Liberia  may  proceed.  In the  absence  of  such instruments, no person  or counsel  in Liberia  can claim  to  have  authority to represent such parties.  We are therefore  in agreement with the appellees’ challenge  to the representation by Morris Dean of Martha  Dean.

Determining the  issue  whether  the  David  Z. Dean’s  intestate estate  which had  been  closed  forms  part  of  the  estate  of  Samuel  Dean,  Sr., the  court again said, although petitioner’s second and third witnesses tried  to convince the  court  in  their  testimonies that  the  disputed  estate  of  the  late  David  Z. Dean’s estate  belonged  to Samuel Dean, Sr., appellants gave  no proof; and as to the claim  of the  appellants, that  the appellees, children of Bledee Dean and  grandnephews  of  David  Z. Dean, cannot  inherit property of  David  Z. Dean because  they  are not  Deans, the court  said this  is an issue settled  by the   Decedent   Estate   Law.  The court   concluded   that   the allegations and averments contained in the pleadings were absent evidence; that there were no genuine issue of fact to warrant taking of evidence beyond   the testimonies of appellant/petitioner’s witnesses. The Judge therefore granted the motion for judgment during trial and ordered  that  the intestate estate  of David  Z.  Dean remains closed.  The petition to   reopen   the   estate   was therefore denied.

The  appellant   filed  an  eight  count  Bill  of  Exceptions  alleging   irregularities that  the trial  Judge committed, but  we shall consider  counts  1, and 2 which we  find  relevant to  the  evidence presented  and  the  determination of  the appeal. Counts 1 and 2 read:

1. ThatYour Honor  erred  when you  failed  to  fully  execute  the  mandate of the Supreme Court of Liberia in that, the subject mandate ordered determination of the issue of fraud, which must  be decided  by a jury. Your Honor  should  have taken  judicial  notice  of the law as required  of all judges  that  all issues of fraud must  be determined by a jury.

2. That Your Honorwas in both  error  of law and fact  when you granted respondents motion  during  trial, when  in fact  informants established cogent evidence    as   to    the    spurious    and    fraudulent   acts   of respondents, including but not limited to misrepresentation of co- respondents as heirs  of  the  Deans, illegal  apportionment of the  then Intestacy  and   the   illegal   conveyance   of   portion   of   same   in  the purported capacity  as administrators before  closure  of the Intestacy, the deed signed  by co-respondents Thomas Travis  and Thomas Popei bears  the  date  October  31, 2003,  and  the  court’s ruling  closing  the estate   is  dated   November   8,  2003,   by  His  Honor   the  late  Judge Mooney.

The appellants  contend  in count  1 of their  bill  of  exceptions that  the Judge did  not  proceed  consistent with  the  mandate  of  the  Supreme  Court  which instructed the  court   below  to  proceed with  the  hearing   of  the  case  and ascertain  the  allegation of misrepresentation and fraud  allegedly  engaged  in by the appellees.  In such case, appellants  say, the Judge should  have taken judicial notice  of  the  law  as required   of  all  judges  that  all  issues  of  fraud must  be determined by  a jury. The failure  of  the  Judge  to  insist  on a jury trial, appellants say, was erroneous and warrants an overturn of his ruling.

This brings   us to   the   question, where   fraud   and   misrepresentation are alleged,   whether   the  trial   judge   is under   an   obligation to   sua  sponte empanel a  jury   to hear the matter?

The mandate   from   the Supreme   Court overturning Judge Kollie’s ruling reads:

that the  Judge proceeds with  the hearing  of the  case to ascertain the allegation of misrepresentation and fraud allegedly  engaged in by the petitioners, and to proceed  in accordance  with law.

Does a reading of this mandate of the Supreme Court specifically mandated the court below to have a jury trial?

Firstly, the records  show that  His Honor, J. Boima Kontoe, who presided  over this  matter in  the  court  below,  sought  to  have  the  issues  clearly  set  out when he requested the parties  to appear for a pretrial conference  setting  out their  legal  contentious issues  in  a memorandum and  have  same filed  and serve twenty-four hours  before  the conference.  Both counsel for the parties failed   to  show   up   for   the   conference,   but   unlike   the   counsel   for   the appellees,  who  filed  a legal  memorandum, counsel  for  the  appellants  failed to file a legal memorandum clearly  setting  out the issues of fraud  as alleged and to pray the court  to have these issues submitted to the jury.

When the case was called for hearing, counsel for appellants did not request a jury trial, but instead requested   the court to qualify   his  witnesses.  The request was granted and the Judge then proceeded to hear  the  testimonies of the appellants’ witnesses  without a jury.

Our CPLR Section 22.1, “RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY reads:

1. Right The right  to trial  by jury  as declared  by Chapter  III, Article  20(a)  of the Constitution or as given  by statute shall be preserved inviolate.

1. Any partymay  demand  a trial  by jury  of any issue triable  of right  by a jury  by serving  upon  the  other  parties  a demand  therefor in writing  at any  time  after  the  commencement of the  action  and not  later than  ten  days  after   the  service  of  a  pleading   or  an  amendment  of  a pleading  directed to  such issue. Such demand  may  be indorsed  upon a pleading  of a party. A party  may not withdraw  a demand  for trial  by jury without  the consent  of all other  parties.

1. Specification of issues.In his demand, a party  may  specify  the issues which  he  wishes  tried  by  jury; otherwise he  shall  be  deemed  to  have demanded  trial  by jury  for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial  by jury  for only  some of the issues, any other  party  within  ten days after  service  of  demand  may  serve  a  demand  for  trial  by  jury  of  any other or all of the issues in the action so triable.

8. The failureof a party  to serve  a demand  for trial  by jury  of an issue as required by this  section  and to  file it as required by section  8.2 constitutes a waiver  by him  of trial  by jury  of such issue  unless  such a demand  has been served by another  party.

1. Relieffor  failure to  make demand. Notwithstanding the  failure  of a party  to demand  a jury  in an action  in which such a demand  might  have been made  of right, the  court  in its discretion upon  motion may  order  a trial by jury  of any or all issues.

1. Issues triable bya  jury  revealed at  When  it appears  in  the course  of a trial  by  the court  that  the  relief  required, even  though  not originally demanded by a party,  entitles  the  adverse  party  to  a trial  by jury  of certain  issues  of  fact, the  court  shall  give  the  adverse  party  an opportunity to  demand  a  jury  of  such  issues.  Failure  to  make  such  a demand  within  the time  limited by the court  shall be deemed  a waiver  of the right  to trial  by jury. Upon such demand, the court shall order  a jury trial  of any issues of fact which are required to be tried  by jury.

Nowhere  in the  records  do  we see a demand  made  by  the  appellants  for  a jury  trial  or request  made upon the call of the case for empanelling of a jury. Also, no motion was subsequently filed by  appellants  requesting the  court for  a  jury  trial. Rather,  the  appellants’ counsel,  who  was  first  to  present evidence,  requested  for  his  witnesses  to  be  qualified   to  testify   without   a demand  to  the  Judge  presiding. This  failure   of  the  appellants   to  make  a demand  for jury  trial  can only be interpreted as a waiver  by them  for trial by jury.

This  brings  us  to  count  2  of  the  bill  of  exceptions whether  the  appellants provided cogent     evidence  establishing  the  alleged   fraud   and misrepresentation  made  by  the  appellees  in  the  closing   of  the  David  Z. Dean’s intestate estate?

Count  2 of the  appellants bill  of exception  states  that  the Honor  was in both error  of  law  and  fact  when  he granted   respondents motion   during  trial, when in fact informants established  cogent evidence  as to  the  spurious  and fraudulent acts  of  respondents, including   but  not limited to misrepresentation of co-

respondents as heirs of the Deans, illegal apportionment of the  then  intestacy  and the illegal  conveyance of portion  of same  in  the   purported  capacity   as  administrators  before   closure   of  the Intestacy, the  deed  signed  by  co-respondents Thomas  Travis  and  Thomas Popei bears  the date  October  31, 2003,  and  the  court’s   ruling  closing  the estate  is dated  November 8, 2003, by His Honor the late Judge Mooney.

The appellants presented three  witnesses  to testify  on their  behalf.  We shall take a look at their  testimonies:

The first  witness, co-appellant, Morris  G. Dean, testified that  the property in dispute  was Samuel Dean, Sr.  property. He stated  that  Samuel  Dean, Sr., sometime  before   his  death   called  his sister   Kneepo  Dean,  the  Travises’ grandmother, and said, “You are my sister  and also sister  of David, but you are now part  of another  family.” So, Samuel Dean, Sr. took  one acre of land outside  the commercial area  and gave it to  his sister  Kneepo Dean, stating, “This  is for you and your  children; for now you are a part  of another  family; the  balance  property is  for  the  Deans.”  Morris further testified that  when Samuel, Sr. took  over  the  property, every  Dean used to  be satisfied.  When Samuel died, the  Dean family  got together and turned  the  property over  to his  wife   and   son, Beatrice   Dean  and   Samuel  Dean,   Jr.,   who became administrators of the  property. Once you were a Dean, Morris  said, anytime you went to Mrs. Beatrice  Dean for something, she would  give it to you. Mrs. Dean died, and Samuel  Dean, Jr. continued  to serve  as administrator for the property until  the war  broke  out in 1990, and some family  members  left  and went  into  exile.  When he came from  exile to Kakata, Morris  said, he felt that the  property  had  been   mismanaged,  that  the  property  had   been  divided between  Samuel Dean, Jr. and the Travises  with the Travis  on one side and Samuel  Dean, Jr. on the  other  side. He then  went  to Samuel  Dean, Jr. and asked why could he divide  David  Z. Dean’s property without the involvement of  other  Deans,  leaving   he  and  Martha  completely  out.   Samuel  Dean  Jr. responded  that  he was ill and was not involved in the  division. On the cross examination,  the  co-appellant  was  questioned  about   the  whereabouts  of Martha Dean, the  co-appellant. Morris  replied  that  Martha  Dean  was in the country, but  because  she had  to  leave  to  go back  to  her  family, she asked him  to represent her interest. Also, when  being  cross examination about  his father’s  Morris   Dean,  Sr.’s   property,  Morris   Dean  said  that   he  was  the administrator  of  his  father Morris  Dean,  Sr.’s  intestate Estate  which  was located in Grand Bassa County and not Kakata, Margibi County.

Appellants’ second witness,   Robert   Dean,  who  testified  that   he  was  an adopted  son of Samuel  Dean, Sr., was told  on the  direct  that  the appellants had  asked  for  the  reopening of  the  David  Z. Dean  intestate, accusing  the appellees of fraud and misrepresentation, and he was brought to substantiate  their claim by  telling  the  court  of  any  fraudulent act or misrepresentation committed by the appellees.

This  second  witness   of  the  appellants  then  testified  that   the  property in dispute  belongs  to Samuel Dean, Sr. who got in trouble with  the government and  was  imprisoned.  Based  upon  the  advice  of  his  wife,  Samuel  had  his property  deeded over to his brother David Z. Dean   for fear of the Government confiscating his property. Later, when Samuel  was set free, he requested  David  to return his property which he did. He testified further that it was one Ernest  V.  Palmers,  a  close  friend   of  Samuel   Dean,  Jr.,  who assuming  that  Bledee Dean was the daughter  of David  Dean, took  the deed of  the  disputed   property  to  Bledee  Dean  and  her  children, the  Travises. Thereafter, the Travises  began  to claim  the  property because  it was said to be  their   mother  father’s  property;  a   great   disgrace   brought   upon  the Deans, he said. This second appellants’ witness  spoke  mainly  on the family history,  relaying the  story   about  the  property  being originally  owned  by Samuel Dean, Sr. who had the property deeded to his brother David  Z. Dean to avoid  the property being confiscated  by President Tubman.

This issue  of whether Samuel  Dean, Sr. was the  real  owner  of the disputed property was delved  into  by this Court  in one of its past  opinions  and will be referred to later in this opinion.

The appellants’ third witness,  Julia Dean, sister  of Morris  Dean, when  asked on the  stand  to  tell  the  court  in  short  what  she knew  about  the  fraudulent act by the Travises,  she stated  that  all she knew  was that  the Travises  were not Deans, and they had taken  the Deans’ property. When questioned on the cross whether the Travises were the childrenof  Bledee Dean, and grandchildren of Kneepo Dean, David

Dean’s sister, Julia Dean admitted that the Travises  were  the  children of Bledee Dean and  grandchildren of Kneepo Dean, but as far  as she  was concerned, the  Deans  and Travises  were  not one family.

It is obvious  from  the  records  that  David  Dean’s  property was managed  by Samuel  Dean, Sr. and treated as communal property by the Deans especially  as David  had  no children. The fact  that  the  Travises  would  come into  the  property through their  mother, Bledee Dean, the  niece and alleged adopted  daughter of  David  Z. Dean and  who  appellants referred to  as non-Deans,  same  to  be  the  mean  contention for  the  reopening   of  the  estate which the appellants second witness  referred  to as a great  disgrace  brought upon  the   Deans,   and  as  the   third   appellants’ witness   said  during   her testimony,  As  far as she was concerned, the  Deans and Travises  were not one family.

Our  law  provides   that  in  order  for  a  court  to  overturn the  judgment and orders  of a predecessor  judge, the successor judge  must  be convinced  from the evidence presented that his predecessor acted upon fraud or misrepresentation; Page  Vs. Ward, 31LLR 637,  642  (1983). Elements  of fraud  in this  case must  be where  the  appellants  showed  that  the  appellees acted  under  false  pretense, and  the  judge  acted  based  on  his  reliance  on said pretense.  The alleged fraud and misrepresentation must be specifically proved.

One of the court’s  question  put to appellants  second witness, Robert P. Dean was:

Ques: Mr. Witness, by your testimony so far, I get the impression that you are claiming  that  the estate that  was closed on November  8,2002,  was that of your father  (Samuel  Dean, Sr.)  that I suppose all of you are lineal heirs to inherit after  his death.  Am I correct?

Ans: Yes, because the land is for my pa that is why I am trying to claim it from whoever has it.

The court also posed these questions to the appellants’ third witness, Julia Dean:

Ques: Madam witness, when did your uncle, Samuel Dean, Sr. tell you about the land transaction between he and David Dean?

Ans: I cannot remember the time; (It was) when he came from jail.  David  Z. Dean came from Buchanan at the time  we were living  at Borlorla  Road, then  he (Samuel  Dean, Sr.)  say, I thank God my  brother  to  see you at this  time.  He said, I put everything in your name, but as I am free from the trouble, you should come back and to turn everything over.

Ques: Madam witness,  did David Z. Dean returned the property to his brother, and if yes, by what means did he returned the property to Samuel G. Dean, Sr. and when was that?

Ans: David Z. Dean returned the deed that was executed by Samuel G. Dean in favor of him, David Z. Dean, but I cannot remember the time.

On the cross examination of this appellants’ third witness, this question was posed to her:

Ques:  Madam witness, the petition to re-open  the David Z. Dean’s intestate estate for which  you have come to testify  before this court  was filed by Morris  G. Dean, Jr., your brother, and Martha Dean of the United States of America.  Please tell this court the last time you and Martha Dean were together which made you come to testify on her behalf.

Ans: She and I were not together for her to tell me to come and testify. In fact, I have not seen her in my whole life

This  matter  of  the  Dean’s  estate  which  seems  to  be  constantly  appearing before   this   Bench  requires   an   understanding  of   the   Liberia   traditional practice  relating   to  real  property, especially  the  Bassa Tribe  from  whence come the  Deans. The Bassa Tribe, as it relates to ownership of property is patriarchal, and ownership of real  property is normally handled  in common among   male  siblings.   When  real  property  is  purchased,  especially   by  a younger  sibling,  the  deed  is normally presented  to  the  senior  brother  who keeps the deed and exercises  control  over  the  property with  the  real owner acting  as a nominal party. This obviously  accounts for the myth  that Samuel Dean,  Sr.  acquired   the  disputed   property  during  President   William  V.  S. Tubman’s  era when he was put in jail, presumably for political reason, and in order  to  avoid  the  government confiscation  of  his  property, he deeded  his property over to his younger  brother  David Z. Dean.

This  Court,  during  its  March  Term  2010, in  the  matter, Rocky  Ahmar  vs.   Madam Donzo and David  Siaway, decided  August  31, 2010, disposed of the claim  that  Samuel  Dean, Sr. owned  the disputed  property. This Court  said there  was clear  evidence  that  T.W. Leigh acquired  twenty acres of  land  in Block # 1FL, in 1933  in Kakata, Margibi County  and sold ten  acres to David Z. Dean’s  in 1937,  this  very  same  property and  the  intestate estate  which appellants  now sought  to reopen. This property the Supreme  Court ruled, belonged  to  David  Z. Dean, since Samuel  Dean, Sr.  could  not  have  owned the disputed  property and  transfer it to  David  Dean during  the Tubman  era when the  evidence  shows  that  the  purchase  by  David  Z.  Dean  from  T.W. Leigh was long before  the Tubman’s  administration.

From  the   testimonies  presented   by  the   appellants,  no  where   did  they attempt to  testify on, or  prove  any  of  the  allegations made  in  their  bill  of information as brought forward  in  count  2 of  their  bill  of  exception.  Their testimonies rather delved  on  how  the  property belonged  to  Samuel  Dean, Sr.  and not  David  Z.  Dean.  Nowhere  was it also  shown  that  the  disputed property was  that  of  Samuel  Dean, Sr. or  Morris  Dean, Sr., fathers  of the appellants, or that  Martha  Dean  who is in the  USA did  authorize anyone  to file  or  represent  her  interest in  this  matter. The  law provides   that  such persons  who desire  to commence some form  of legal action  in the  courts  of Liberia,  but  who  lives  in  a  foreign  jurisdiction, should  execute  a  power  of attorney vesting  in  a person  within  Liberia  the  authority to  commence  the action  on their  behalf  or in the  alternative execute  some  form  of a letter  of authorization with  the  appropriate authentication. Brvant  v.  The  African Produce  Company. U.S.A, 6 LLR 27, 30  (1937). Besides, if  she  were  to bring  any  action,  it would  be against  the  Samuel Dean, Jr. estate  since the property he acquired  from  the David Z. Dean intestate estate  was distributed per stripes  and she falls under the Samuel Dean, Sr. lineage.

This Supreme  Court  has said that  allegations  of fraud  and misrepresentation must   be  specifically proved.   The   Supreme   Court,   as  previously  stated hereinabove, said that  the disputed  estate belonged  to David  Z. Dean based on  his  purchase  of  said  property from  T.  W. Leigh  in  1937. Though  the appellants  in  their  testimony have  stated  that  the  Deans  and  the  Travises are not the  same, under  our  decedent  estate  law, the Travises  are properly entitled  to  administer the  disputed property based  on  their  mother  Bledee Dean’s inheritance right  as a distributee under  the  intestate estate  of David Z. Dean.

Section 3.2 and 3.5  of our  Decedent  Estate Law deal with  succession to real and  personal  property on intestacy, and  3.4  speaks  to  the  division  among relatives  of equal  and  different degrees. In this  case, Samuel  Dean, Jr. and Bledee Dean petitioned the  court,  sitting in its  probate  section, to have  the intestate estate  of  their  uncle  distributed per  stripes,  taking  on the  side of their  father  and  mother, David  Z. Dean’s  legitimate siblings.  The issue that the Travises or their mother  are not Deans has no place under  our law. The portion  of  the  estate  that  the  appellees  are  administering was legitimately transferred to  their  mother  under  our decedent  estate  law, as their  mother did acquire  said property as an issue of Knepo Dean, who was the legitimate sister  of  David  Z.  Dean.  The property legally being Bledee Dean’s estate, legally her children  are entitled to administer same.

We  agree   with   the   trial   Judge   that   the   appellants  did   not   by   their presentation of evidence  prove  fraud  or misrepresentation in the  closing  of the David  Z. Dean’s intestate estate  to  warrant  overturning his predecessor ruling  or the re-opening of the David  Z. Dean intestate estate.  We therefore uphold his ruling   on the motion for judgment during   trial, ruling  that  the David  Z.  Dean  intestate estate  remains  closed  as per  the  ruling  made  by Judge Mooney, the then Resident Circuit Judge of the  13th Judicial Circuit, on November   8,  2003,   with   costs  ruled   against   the  appellants.  AND IT IS HEREBY SO ORDERED.

The Appellants were represented by Counsellor Richard K.  Flomo and the Appellees represented by Counsellor Cooper W. Kruah of The Henries Law Firm in association with the Gbaintor Law Offices.