HIS HONOUR VARNIE D. COOPER, Assigned
Circuit Judge, and WATAMAL, represented by its Legal Representative or Agent, et al., Appellants/Respondents, v. MUSA B. KEITA, Appellee/Petitioner.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

Heard: May 20, 2002. Decided: June 14, 2002.

1. A judge of concurrent jurisdiction cannot review the acts or decision of another judge, also of concurrent jurisdiction.
2. The order to the Clerk of the Supreme Court to issue a citation directing the parties to appear for a conference and to instruct the trial judge to stay all further proceedings pending the outcome of the conference, the subsequent revocation of the said order and the decision of the Justice not to issue the alternative writ, and the order to the Clerk to inform the trial judge to resume jurisdiction and proceed with the trial of the case constitute judicial acts.
3. In the absence of a conference, an Assigned Chambers Justice exercises judicial discretion, and consequently performs a judicial act, in outrightly instructing the clerk not to issue a remedial writ.
4. A succeeding Chambers Justice cannot review the exercise of judicial discretion by a former Assigned Chambers Justice not to issue a remedial writ.
5. The petition for a remedial of certiorari writ will be denied where the petitioner has a remedy by regular appeal; the right course is to note exceptions to the judge’s ruling on the law issues and proceed to a jury trial of the case, as directed by the trial judge.
6. The noting of exceptions to a trial court’s ruling on the law issues places the said ruling before the appellate court for review on appeal.

Appellee/petitioner Musa B. Keita sought review of the ruling of the trial court judge in the disposition of the issues of law in an action of ejectment commenced by Co-respondent Watamal. The Justice in Chambers, who had ordered the issuance of a stay order pending the outcome of a conference to which the parties had been cited determined, after the conference, not to issue the writ of certiorari, and therefore ordered the trial court to proceed with the ejectment action. Thereafter, following a change of counsel by the petitioner and the assignment of a new Justice to preside in Chambers, a new petition for a writ of certiorari was filed. The new Chambers Justice ordered the writ issued and, after a hearing by another succeeding Justice, the petition was granted. It is from the granting of the writ that an appeal was taken by the respondents to the full bench of the Supreme Court, alleging that the action of the succeeding Justices was tantamount to a review and reversal of the ruling of the predecessor Justice in Chambers
The Supreme Court agreed with the contention of the res-pondents, holding that as the succeeding Justices in Chambers had concurrent jurisdiction with the predecessor Justice in Chambers, they could not review and reverse the former’s denial of the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. It rejected the argument of the petitioner that the act of the predecessor Justice in Chambers was not a judicial act and that therefore the subsequent granting of the petition for certiorari did not constitute a review or reversal of his ruling. The Court opined that the order of the predecessor Chambers Justice directing the clerk to issue a citation to the parties for a conference and to instruct the trial judge to stay all action in the case pending the outcome of the conference, as well as his decision not to issue the remedial writ and to inform the trial judge accordingly, with instructions to resume jurisdiction over the case and proceed therewith, were all judicial acts.
The Court also opined that even in the absence of a conference, a directive to the clerk not to issue the writ constituted a judicial act. As such, the Court observed, the action of the succeeding Justices in issuing the writ and granting the petition constituted a review and reversal of the former Justice’s decision. The Court noted that a succeeding Justice could not review or reverse the decision or judicial act of a predecessor Justice. The Court therefore reversed the ruling granting the petition and ordered the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

M Kron Yangbe of Cooper and Togba Law Firm appeared for the appellants. George S. B. Tulay of Tulay and Associates appeared for the appellee.
MADAM CHIEF JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal seeking a review by this Court en banc of a ruling rendered by the Assigned Chambers Justice granting a petition for a writ of certiorari prayed for by the appellee herein. The appellee, Musa B. Keita, filed an action of ejectment in the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, on February 6, 1997 to eject the co-appellant, Watamal, from premises to which he claimed ownership. An answer was filed by Co-appellants Watamal and the Cooper family, in response to which the appellee filed a reply.
On July 24, 1997, during the June Term, A. D. 1997, of the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, the assigned judge, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, entered a ruling on the law issues. Counsel for appellee, Counsellor Flaawgaa R McFarland, not being satisfied with the said ruling, filed before the then assigned Chambers Justice, His Honour Pei Edwin Gausi, a petition for a writ of certiorari. The said Chambers Justice ordered the Clerk of the Supreme Court to cite the parties to a conference, scheduled for August 12, 1997, and to instruct the trial judge to stay all further proceedings in the action of ejectment in the court below, pending the outcome of the conference.
On August 18, 1997, the aforesaid Assigned Chambers Justice ordered the Clerk of the Supreme Court to instruct the trial judge that the stay order previously issued had been revoked and to instruct the said trial judge to resume juris-diction over the case and to proceed with the hearing thereof. Before the March Term of the Honourable Supreme Court ended, there was a change in the membership of the Supreme Court. Following this change, the appellee secured the legal services of Counsellor George S. B. Tulay, who then filed before the new Chambers Justice another petition for a writ of certiorari. In the petition, the appellee challenged the trial judge’s ruling on the law issues in the action of ejectment and prayed for a reversal of the said ruling. This second petition for a writ of certiorari was filed before Associate Justice M. Wilkins Wright, the succeeding Justice in Chambers. Asso-ciate Justice Wright ordered the writ issued. Thereafter, another succeeding Chambers Justice, Associate Justice Karmo G. Soko Sackor, heard the petition and entered a ruling granting the petition. It is from this ruling that the appellants announced an appeal to this Court sitting en banc. Hence, this review.
The issue before this Court for determination is whether a succeeding Chambers Justice can review the decision and/or ruling of his predecessor not to issue a remedial writ? We hold that a succeeding Chambers Justice cannot.
The succeeding Chambers Justice, His Honour Karmo G. Soko Sackor, acknowledged, agreed and concurred with the fundamental legal maxim that a judge of concurrent juris-diction cannot review the acts or decisions of another judge, also with concurrent jurisdiction. This is clearly stated in the ruling under review, given by Justice Karmo G. Soko Sackor, the relevant portion of which we hereunder quote:

“…The last issue of importance is the jurisdiction of this Court to grant this writ. Respondents contend that Mr. Gausi mandated the co-respondent judge on August 18, 1997 to resume jurisdiction and proceed with the hearing in keeping with the ruling on the law issue, made on August 18, 1997, following a conference with the same parties herein.

In other words, respondents argued that Mr. Justice Gausi and Mr. Justice Wright had the same concurrent jurisdiction, and that Mr. Justice Wright could not undo the act of Mr. Justice Gausi by the issuance of a writ of certiorari previously denied, involving the same parties, the identical set of facts and circumstances and the same subject matter. Petitioner in his reply contended that Mr. Justice Gausi did not hear the petition and did not render any judgment in the case, and that a conference is not a legal requirement for the issuance of a writ by the Supreme Court or a Justice thereof.

We agree with the contention of counsel for the respon-dents that Mr. Justice Gausi and Mr. Justice Wright had concurrent jurisdiction, and that Mr. Justice Wright could not undo the judicial act of his former colleague. We observe that the writ was inadvertently issued by Mr. Justice Wright which commenced this special proceeding before us for determination..”
We unanimously confirm and affirm the quoted words of Chambers Justice Sackor which also reaffirmed and recon-firmed the principle enunciated in a long line of cases handed down by this Honourable Court. By our confirmation and affirmation we have also determined that the order to the Clerk of Court to issue a citation directing the parties to appear for a conference and to instruct the trial judge to stay all further action in the case pending the outcome of the said conference, as well as the subsequent revocation of the previous order and the new directive to the Clerk to inform the trial judge of the revocation of the previous stay order, done within the exercise of the Assigned Chamber Justice’s judicial discretion not to issue a remedial writ, constituted judicial acts. This Court herewith also determines that in the absence of a conference, an Assigned Chambers Justice exercises judicial discretion and consequently performs a judicial act, when he/she outrightly instructs the Clerk not to issue a remedial writ. Therefore, it is our holding that a succeeding Assigned Chambers Justice cannot review the exercise of the judicial discretion by a former assigned Chambers Justice not to issue a remedial writ.
The Assigned Chambers Justice, after acknowledging that his predecessor could not undo the judicial act of his former colleague and concluding that the issuance of the alternative writ was an inadvertence by Associate Justice Wright, pro-ceeded to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and to order the issuance of a peremptory writ. We concur with the Assigned Chambers Justice that Mr. Associate Justice Wright, sitting in Chambers, committed an inadvertence act when he ordered the issuance of the alternative writ after his predecess-or had exercised his discretion not to issue the said writ and had ordered the trial judge to resume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed therewith. However, we are constrained to disagree with Associate Justice Karmo G. Sackor that even though the Assigned Chambers Justice had reviewed the judicial exercise of discretion by a former colleague not to issue a remedial writ, there was a legal basis to grant the petition. We believe and are convinced that if the issuance of the alternative writ of certiorari was an illegal review of the judicial act of a concurrent Assigned Chambers Justice, then the logical thing to do was to dismiss the petition. We therefore hold that it was erroneous for the Chambers Justice to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
The question that comes to mind is whether the appellee has a remedy at law other than a writ of certiorari. We answer in the affirmative. The appellee still has the constitutional right of appeal. The prudent thing to do, and which appellee did, was to note exceptions to the judge’s ruling on the law issues and proceed to a jury trial, as ordered by the judge. The exceptions noted on the ruling on the law issues squarely placed the said ruling before this appellate court for review on appeal. This Honourable Court has held that “. . .the writ will not be granted where adequate relief can be obtained through a regular appeal. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. v. Perry, 13 LLR 522 (1960); Morris v. Flomo, [1977] LRSC 52; 26 LLR 314 (1977).
Wherefore and in view of the foregoing, the ruling of the Assigned Chambers Justice is hereby ordered reversed. The petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed, the alternative writ revoked, and the peremptory writ refused. The Clerk is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below with the order to resume jurisdiction over the case and proceed with the trial in keeping with law. Costs are ruled against the appellee. And it is hereby so ordered.

Petition denied.