Citizens Solidarity Council by and thru its Chairman, James Brooks of the City of Monrovia, PETITIONER VERSUS The Government of the Republic of Liberia, by and thru the Ministry of Justice , represented by the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of the Republic of Liberia, City of Monrovia, Liberia, RESPONDENT

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Heard: May 25, 2016                                                     Decided: June 27, 2016

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE KORKPOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

Chapter XI, Article 90 of the Liberian Constitution (1986) provides: “a) No person, whether elected or appointed to any public office, shall engage in any other activity which shall be against public policy, or constitute conflict of interest.
b) No person holding public office shall demand and receive any other perquisites, emoluments or benefits, directly or indirectly, on account of any duty required by Government.
c) The Legislature shall, in pursuance of the above provision, prescribe a Code of Conduct for all public officials and employees; stipulating the acts which constitute conflict of interest or are against public policy, and the penalties for violation thereof.”

Pursuant to the mandate of Chapter XI, Article 90 of the Liberian Constitution (1986), the 53rd Legislature of Liberia enacted into law on June 20, 2014, “An Act of the Legislature Prescribing a National Code of Conduct for all Public Officials and Employees of the Government of the Republic of Liberia” (hereinafter the (“Code of Conduct Act”). The Code of Conduct Act was subsequently signed by the President and printed into handbill by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under Liberian law, any act passed by the Legislature of Liberia and signed by the President does not become law and therefore not enforceable or operational until it has been printed into handbill by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the printing into handbill of the Code of Conduct Act, subject of this petition for declaratory judgment, made said Act a law of this Republic.

This case requires us to determine whether or not Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act passed into law by the 53rd Legislature of Liberia in 2014, are unconstitutional. Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Act provide as follows:
“5.1 All Officials appointed by the President of the Republic of Liberia shall not:
a) engage in political activities, canvass or contest for elected offices;
b) use Government facilities, equipment or resources in support of partisan or political activities;

c) serve on a campaign team of any political party, or the campaign of any independent candidate.
“5.2 Wherein, any person in the category stated in section 5.1 herein above, desires to canvass or contest for an elective public position, the following shall apply;
a) Any Minister, Deputy Minister, Director-General, Managing Director and Superintendent appointed by the President pursuant to Article 56 (a) of the Constitution and a Managing Director appointed by a Board of Directors, who desires to contest for public elective office shall resign said post at least two (2) years prior to the date of such public elections;
b) Any other official appointed by the President who holds a tenured position and desires to contest for public elective office shall resign said post three (3) years prior to the date of such public elections;
c) However, in the case of impeachment, death, resignation or disability of an elected official, any official listed above, desirous of canvassing or contesting to fill such position must resign said position within thirty days following the declaration by the National Elections Commission of the vacancy.”

On August 4, 2014, Citizens Solidarity Council, a corporate body/association represented by and thru its Chairman, Mr. James Brooks, of the City of Monrovia (hereinafter the “appellee/petitioner”), filed a twelve-count petition for declaratory judgment before the Sixth Judicial Circuit for Montserrado County, against the
Government of the Republic of Liberia, by and thru the Minister of Justice/Attorney General (hereinafter “appellant/respondent”) is challenging the constitutionality of Part V, sub-paragraphs 5.1 and 5.2 of the Act. We quote the relevant counts of the petition for declaratory judgment:
“1. That Petitioner is a pressure group with a membership of little more over 1,500 persons comprising both male and female, organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of Liberia with a mandate to engage in advocacy aimed at ensuring that the rights of all Liberian citizens guaranteed by the Liberian Constitution are preserved and kept inviolate.
“2. That Chapter 43, Section 43.1 of the Liberian Civil Procedure Law, 1LCLR, provides at Page 217 that courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relation whether or not further relief is or could be claimed and no action or proceeding shall be opened to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment is prayed for. Petitioner submits that under the law extant such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment.
“3. That by virtue of Petitioner’s status as a pressure group purposely organized to advocate for the rights of persons who have been encroached upon and the existence of the statutory provision empowering a court of record to declare one’s rights, which declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment, Petitioner has therefore submitted this petition for Your Honor and this Honorable Court to declare the rights of Liberian citizens currently occupying official positions in Government to contest elective positions come the 2014 Mid Term Special Senatorial Elections and the 2017 Presidential and Legislative Elections without any hindrance or recondition.
“4. Petitioner submits that the Liberian Constitution at article 25 provides that obligation of contract shall be guaranteed by the Republic and no laws shall be passed which might impair this right. Also, article 26 of the Constitution is clear that where any person or any association alleges that any of the rights granted under the Constitution or any legislation or directives are constitutionally contravened, that person or association may invoke the privilege and benefit of court direction, order or writ, including a judgment of unconstitutionality, and anyone injured by an act of the Government or any person acting under its authority, whether in property, contract, tort or otherwise, shall have the right to bring suit for appropriate redress.
“5. That notwithstanding the existence of article 25 of the Liberian Constitution which guarantees obligation of a contract by Government and prohibits the Republic from making laws that might impair this right, the Respondent has, through legislative assembled, enacted laws that contravened the above mentioned provision of the Liberian Constitution, particularly article 25. This is so because reading through the pages of the “Act Creating the Code of Conduct”, it is no secret that Part V, Section 5.2, Paragraphs a & b of the Code are in contravention of article 25 of the Liberian Constitution.

The Court is requested to take cognizance of the relevant provisions of the Code of Conduct which reads as follows:
“Wherein, any person in the category stated in section 5.1 herein above, desires to canvass or contest for an elective public position, the following shall apply;
a) Any Minister, Deputy Minister, Director-General, Managing Director and Superintendent appointed by the President pursuant to article 56 (a) of the Constitution and a Managing Director appointed by a Board of Directors, who desires to contest for public elective office shall resign said post at least two (2) years prior to the date of such public elections;
b) Any other official appointed by the President who holds a tenured position and desires to contest for public elective office shall resign said post three (3) years prior to the date of such public elections.”
“6. Petitioner says that every employment relationship is contractual and therefore the enactment of statutory provisions by the Respondent to coerce Liberian Citizens found amongst the class [of] persons mentioned in the above Code of Conduct and possessed of the relevant competence to resign from the employment of his employment prior to the expiration of his employment contract to serve the people of Liberia impairs the contractual rights and obligations of the contracting parties to the employment contract created by the employer and the employee. Hence, the above stated statutory provisions of the Code of Conduct are indeed in contravention of article 25 of the Liberian constitution are therefore unconstitutional and must be declared as such.
“7. Petitioner submits that Part V, Section 5.2, Paragraphs a &b of the Code are also in contravention of article 25 of the Liberian Constitution because same are discriminatory. Paragraph (a) of Section 5.2 requires persons found in the category of a Minister, Deputy Minister, Director-General, Managing Director and Superintendent appointed by the President and a Managing Director appointed by a Board of Directors who desires to contest elective position for public office to resign [their] post at least two (2) years prior to election, while Paragraph (b) requires persons found in the category of other official appointed by the President who holds a tenured position who desires to contest elective position for public office to resign [their] post at least three(3) years prior to election. Petitioner submits that under the Constitution at article 11(c), all persons, irrespective of ethnic background, race, sex, creed, place of origin or political opinion, are entitled to the fundamental rights and freedom of individual. Petitioner says notwithstanding the existence of this constitutional provision, the Respondent is bent on enforcing this provision of the Code which is indeed grossly discriminatory and in violation of the Constitution. Hence, Your Honor and this Honorable Court are humbly requested to declare the above stated provision of the Code unconstitutional.
“8. Petitioner says article 21 of the Liberian Constitution frowns upon the making of expo-facto laws by the Republic. This means that the Republic shall not make laws to be enforced retroactively; this is, laws enacted are to be applied to future happenings and not after the facts. In the instant case, Petitioner says assuming without admitting that the foregoing provisions of the Code of Conduct are in line with article 25 of the Liberian Constitution, the application of all provisions of the Code of Conduct to happenings in the past cannot and should not be entertained; for to do so, shall certainly affect persons already serving in the positions mentioned by the Code adversely, thereby rendering the laws so enacted unconstitutional. Again, Petitioner maintains that an attempt by the Respondent to enforce Part V, Section 5.2, Paragraphs a & b of the Code of Conduct against persons already serving in the above mentioned positions prior to the enactment of the laws will sustain the enactment of an ex post facto law contrary to the intent and spirit of the Liberian Constitution, the Organic law which is the outward manifestation of the collective will of the Liberian people to administer their own affairs. Petitioner humbly requests Your Honor and this Honorable Court to take cognizance of the relevant provision of the Liberian Constitution which is quoted verbatim as follows:

Article 21 “No person shall be made subject to any law or punishment which was not in effect at the time of commission of an offense, nor shall the Legislature enact any bill of attainder or ex post facto law.”
“9. Petitioner says that article 2 of the Liberian Constitution provides that the Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of Liberia and its provisions shall have binding force and effect on all authorities and persons throughout the Republic. The Constitution provides that any laws, treaties, statutes, decrees, customs and regulations found to be inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no legal effect. In the instant case, Petitioner says Part V, Section 5.2, Paragraphs a & b of the “Act Creating the National Code of Conduct” is indeed grossly inconsistent with [this] constitutional provision and should therefore crumble as justice demands. Hence, the provisions of the Code which are under discussion must be declared unconstitutional by Your Honor and this Honorable Court, they being inconsistent with provisions of the Constitution.

“10.The Petitioner submits that at 20(a) of the Liberian Constitution, it is clear that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, security of the person, property, privilege or any other right except as the outcome of a hearing judgment consistent with due process of law. Also, consistent with the practice of criminal Jurisprudence hoary with age in our jurisdiction, the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Petitioner submits that notwithstanding the existence of the above stated constitutional provision and the age old practice of Criminal Law obtaining in our jurisdiction, the Respondent, in glaring violation of the law, is attempting to enforce Part V, Section 5.1, Paragraphs a, b & c of the “Act Creating the National Code of Conduct”, all of which read as follows:
“All Officials appointed by the President of the Republic of Liberia shall not:
a) engage in political activities, canvass or contest for elected offices;
b) use Government facilities, equipment or resources in support of partisan or political activities;
c) serve on a campaign team of any political party, or the campaign of any independent candidate.”
Petitioner says Part V, Section 5.1, Paragraphs a, b& c of the Code of Conduct is unconstitutional because same condemns before hearing. Hence, Your Honor and this Honorable Court are requested to declare [it] unconstitutional.

“11. That article 90(a, b & [c]) of the Liberian Constitution provides as follows:
a) No person, whether elected or appointed to any public office, shall engage in any other activity which shall be against public policy, or constitute conflict of interest.
b) No person holding public office shall demand and receive any other prerequisites, emoluments or benefits, directly or indirectly, on account of any duty required by Government.
c) The Legislature shall, in pursuance of the above provision, prescribe a Code of Conduct for all public officials and employees, stipulating the acts which constitute conflict of interest or are against public policy, and the penalties for violation thereof.
Petitioner says the Legislature was mandated to prescribe a Code of Conduct for all public officials and employees, stipulating the acts which constitute conflict of interest or against public policy but to the outmost surprise and disappointment of Petitioner, the Legislature has enacted a Code of Conduct that runs counter to the spirit and intent of article 90(a, b& [c]) of the Liberian Constitution which the Respondent is attempting to enforce. Petitioner says Part V, Sections 5.1a, b & c and 5.2a & b of the Code of Conduct have failed to address the question of what constitute[s] conflict of interest or what acts constitute acts against public policy. Hence, Part V, Sections 5.1a,b&c and 5.2a & b of the Code of Conduct [are] unconstitutional and must be declared as such.

WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FACTS AND THE LAW CONTROLLING, Petitioner prays Your Honor and this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner’s Petition, thereby declaring Part V, Sections 5.1a,b & c and 5.2a & b of the Code of Conduct unconstitutional and rendering same void ab initio; that Your Honor and this Honorable Court will declare the right of Liberians desirous of contesting elective positions to canvass and participate in the 2014 Mid Term Senatorial elections and the 2017 Presidential and Legislative elections without any precondition; that Your Honor will grant unto Petitioner all that seem just, legal and equitable in the premises.”

When the petition for declaratory judgment was served on the appellant/respondent, it filed a motion for enlargement of time to file its returns. The appellee/petitioner interposed no objection, hence, the trial court granted the motion for enlargement of time. Thus, on September 15, 2014, the appellant/respondent filed returns to the petition for declaratory judgment containing seventeen counts, along with a motion to dismiss. We also quote the relevant counts of the returns as follows:
“1. That as to the entire Petition, Respondent says that same should be dismissed and denied on grounds of Petitioner’s lack of proven capacity and standing to institute the instant lawsuit. In the instant case, the Petitioner has filed a petition by and thru a Mr. James Brooks whom it designates as it[s] Chairman. However, the Petitioner has failed to provide any proof that Mr. Brooks is indeed the Chairman of the Petitioner, neither is there a showing that assuming he is the Chairman, that he is authorized to institute this Petition for Declaratory Judgment.
“2. Further to Count One (1) above, Respondent says that the Petitioner having averred that it is a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic, must consistent with the Associations Law of the Republic of Liberia, provide a resolution from its board authorizing the purported Chairman to institute the instant action.
“3. Respondent says that the Supreme Court of the Republic of Liberia in the case Concerned Sector Youth v. LISGIS et al., Opinions of the Supreme Court, March Term, decided 30 August 2010, held that the purpose of the law on standing is to protect against an improper plaintiff and ensure the benefit of a real adverse party who is entitled to a relief. The Court held that even if it were established that the one instituting the action is the Chairman of the Board of an organization, the chairman would still need authorization from the organization to institute a lawsuit in such representative capacity.
Normally, a board resolution giving authority would issue.
“4. Respondent says that Title 1, Chapter 11, Section 2(e), provides that: Time; grounds. At the time of service of his responsive pleading, a party may move for judgment dismissing one or more claims for relief asserted against him in a complaint or counterclaim on any of the following grounds:
That the party asserting the claim has not legal capacity to sue. Respondent maintains that the entire complaint should be dismissed consistent with the above quoted citation of law, because the Petitioner through its Chairman has failed to show that it is authorized to institute the instant suit. Hence, because of Petitioner’s proven lack of capacity to institute the instant suit, the petition in its entirety should be dismissed, and Respondent so prays.

“5. Further to Count Four (4) above, Respondent says that the Petitioner, Citizens Solidarity Council, has no standing to bring this suit, in that it has failed to show or establish how its rights were or would be affected by the Code of Conduct. Our law provides that one who may be prejudiced or threatened by the enforcement of an act of the Legislature may question its constitutionality. A group or organization can also have standing as a representative of its members in bringing in a suit. But the group or organization must allege facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy as if the members themselves had instituted the suit. A mere interest in a problem, no matter how qualified the group or organization is in evaluation of the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render a group or organization adversely affected or aggrieved for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain judicial decision. Only a real party in interest has the right to question the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance before the court.
“6. Further to Count Five (5) above, Respondent says that the Petitioner has failed to aver that its members are Presidential Appointees holding tenured and/or non-tenured positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1a,b&c and 5.2a&b of the Code of Conduct (2014) are directed and who would be allegedly affected thereby. Hence, the Petitioner has presented no proof that the organization is adversely affected or aggrieved by the Code of Conduct, for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain a judicial decision. The petition in its entirety should therefore be dismissed and Respondent so prays.
“7. That as to Counts Four (4) and Five (5) of the Petition, Respondent submits that Petitioner’s interpretation of Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia (1986) digresses the spirit, intent, meaning, purpose and unambiguous language of the said provision of the Constitution. Article 25 quotes verbatim as follows: that ‘Obligation of contract shall be guaranteed by the Republic and no laws shall be passed which might impair this right’. Article 25 speaks to the obligation of contract as a matter of right. Presidential appointees serve government on the basis of pleasure and/or privilege of the President as guaranteed in Article 56 of the Constitution; they do not enjoy rights under a contract of employment as anticipated under Article 25 of the Constitution. Respondent submits that the positions of presidential appointees are political, and hence, Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia is inapplicable to political appointments.
“8. Further to Count Nine (9) above and further traversing Counts Four (4) and Five (5) of the Petition, Respondent says the appointing power being the President of the Republic of Liberia, did sign into law the Act Creating the Code of Conduct, thereby placing those she appoints or has appointed on notice that in order to enjoy the presidential privilege of holding an appointed position, he or she must conform to the Code if he/she desires to take a certain action-same being contesting for public elective office.
“9. That as to Count Seven (7) of the Petition, wherein Petitioner averred that Part V, Section 5.2, Paragraphs a & b of the Code of Conduct are discriminatory, Respondent says same are hereby denied and should be dismissed because said provisions of the Code of Conduct are not discriminatory. The aforesaid sections are directed to Presidential Appointees based [on] various categories. The Code does not discriminate amongst appointees in the same category. Like any other law, distinction is drawn based on category. For example, qualification required to become a member of the House of Representative differs from that required to be a President. The qualification for being a Vice-President differs from that required to be a member of the Senate.
“10. That as to Counts ten (10) and Eleven (11) of the Petitioner’s petition, same should [be] denied and dismissed because Part V, Section 5.2, Paragraphs a & b and Section 5.1 [are] clearly consistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia and general constitutional principles.
“11. Respondent says as to Count Twelve (12) [of the Petitioner’s petition], that the Act Creating the National Code of Conduct is consistent with Article 90(a & b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia. Therefore Count 12 is hereby denied and should be dismissed.”
WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Respondent prays Your Honor and this Honorable Court to deny and dismiss petitioner’s petition and rule costs against petitioner and grant unto Respondent any other just and proper relief deemed.”

As stated earlier the respondent filed, along with its returns to the petition for declaratory judgment, a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s petition. We quote the motion to dismiss:

“MOVANT’S MOTION
AND NOW COMES MOVANT praying Your Honour and this Honourable Court to deny and dismiss Respondent’s Petition and for reasons showeth the following to wit:
“1. That as to the entire Petition, Movant says that same should be dismissed and denied on grounds of Petitioner’s lack of proven capacity and standing to institute the instant lawsuit. In the instant case, the Petitioner has filed a petition by and thru a Mr. James Brooks whom it designates as it[s] Chairman. However, the Petitioner has failed to provide any proof that Mr. Brooks is indeed the Chairman of the Petitioner, neither is there a showing that assuming he is the Chairman, that he is authorized to institute this petition for declaratory Judgment.
“2. Further to Count One (1) above, Movant says that the Petitioner having averred that it is a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic, must consistent with the Associations Law of the Republic of Liberia, provide a resolution from its board authorizing the purported Chairman to institute the instant action.
“3. Movant says that the Supreme Court of the Republic of Liberia in the case Concerned Sector Youth v. LISGIS et al., Opinions of the Supreme Court, March Term, decided 30 August 2010, held that the purpose of the law on standing is to protect against an improper plaintiff and ensure the benefit of a real adverse party who is entitled to a relief. The Court held that even if it were established that the one instituting the action is the Chairman of the Board of an organization, the chairman would still need authorization from the organization to institute a lawsuit in such representative capacity.
‘Normally, a board resolution giving authority would issue.’
“4. Movant says that Title 1, Chapter 11, Section 2(e), provides that: ‘Time; grounds. At the time of service of his responsive pleading, a party may move for judgment dismissing one or more claims for relief asserted against him in a complaint or counterclaim on any of the following grounds: That the party asserting the claim has not legal capacity to sue.’ Movant maintains that the entire complaint should be dismissed consistent with the above quoted citation of law, because the Petitioner through its Chairman has failed to show that it is authorized to institute the instant suit. Hence, because of Petitioner’s proven lack of capacity to institute the instant suit, the petition in its entirety should be dismissed, and Movant so prays.
“5. Further to Count Four (4) above, Movant says that the Petitioner, Citizens Solidarity Council, has no standing to bring this suit, in that it has failed to show or establish how its rights were or would be affected by the Code of Conduct. Our law provides that one who may be prejudiced or threatened by the enforcement of an act of the Legislature may question its constitutionality. A group or organization can also have standing as a representative of its members in bringing in a suit. But the group or organization must allege facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy as if the members themselves had instituted the suit. A mere interest in a problem, no matter how qualified the group or organization is in evaluation of the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render a group or organization adversely affected or aggrieved for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain judicial decision. Only a real party in interest has the right to question the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance before the court.
“6. Further to Count Five (5) above, Respondent says that the Petitioner has failed to aver that its members are Presidential Appointees holding tenured and/or non-tenured positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and
5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014) are directed and who would be allegedly affected thereby. Hence, the Petitioner has presented no proof that the organization is adversely affected or aggrieved by the Code of Conduct, for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain a judicial decision. The petition in its entirety should therefore be dismissed and Movant so prays.”

To the above quoted motion, the petitioner, on September 25, 2014, filed a six count resistance, praying the trial court to deny and dismiss said motion. We also quote the petitioner’s resistance to respondent’s motion to dismiss as follows:

“PETITIONER’S RESISTANCE
“The Petitioner/Respondent in resisting the Respondent’s/Movant’s Motion denies the legal and factual sufficiency of same and request Your Honor and this Honorable Court to deny and dismiss Movant’s Motion for reasons showeth the following to wit:
“1. That as to the Motion in its entirety, Petitioner/Respondent says that it has capacity and standing to institute the instant lawsuit; in that, Petitioner/Respondent is threatened by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014) because in keeping with the aims and objectives of the Petitioner as per its articles of incorporation, Petitioner is required to promote national unity, peace, social justice, civil liberty, monitor and observe general, local, special and bye elections in Liberia. With this mandate of the Petitioner/Respondent, should it sit without questioning the constitutionality of Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014), then it would be doing a disservice to the Liberian people. Hence, the Motion must crumble.
“2. That further to Count 1 hereof, Petitioner submits that under the law extant, the constitution is the charter creating the government. It has the status of supreme law and when it asserts a certain right or lays down certain principle of law or procedure, it speaks for the entire people as their supreme law and is full authority for all that is done in pursuance of its provision. (16 Am Jur., 2d, section 2, pages 180-181). Also the constitution, as defined [by] Hubrich, is the outward manifestation of the collective will of the people of Liberia to administer their own affairs. This means that when a provision of the constitution is contravened, any Liberian citizen has the right to question the constitutionality of the act. Therefore, under the parity of reason just explained, the Petitioner/Respondent is a real party since its action in filing this suit is in line with its mandate (article of incorporation). Hence, the motion is a nullity and should therefore crumble.
“3. That as to Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Respondent’s/Movant’s Motion, Petitioner/Respondent says that indeed Mr. James E. Brooks is its Chairman authorized to file this suit. The relevant documents to substantiate this contention are hereto attached as Petitioner’s/Respondent’s Exhibit R/1 in bulk to form a cogent part hereof.
“4. That as to Counts 4 and 5 of the Respondent’s/Movant’s Motion, Petitioner/Respondent says that it maintains Count 2 of its resistance that indeed it is the proper and real party and has standing to maintain this action consistent with law. Hence, Counts 4 and 5 should be overruled.
“5. That as to Count 6 of the Respondent’s/Movant’s Motion, Petitioner/Respondent says the averments contained therein are false and misleading; in that while admittedly the truth lies that Petitioners/Respondents are Presidential appointees holding tenure[d] and non-tenure[d] positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014) are directed and would be affected thereby. Petitioner/Respondent says the disclosure of the names of such members shall also expose them to hardship since they are currently serving in such positions. More besides, the non-disclosure of the names of those persons does not legally disrobe Petitioner of its status as real and property party. Hence, Count six (6) is a nullity and should therefore be overruled.
“6. Petitioner/Respondent says also as to the Motion in its entirety, this court has the statutory mandate to declare rights of person be it natural or artificial whose rights have been encroached upon or who is threatened by the act of another. In the instant case, the Petitioner and its members as well as every Liberian are threatened by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014). Hence, the motion should be denied and the matter ordered proceeded with.”
When pleadings rested, the trial judge, His Honor Emery S. Paye, entertained arguments on the motion to dismiss and entered a ruling thereon on October 15, 2014. The trial judge considered two issues in deciding the motion to dismiss:
“1) Whether or not the petitioner lacks capacity and standing to bring this action?
“2) Whether or not the petition and returns raise constitutional issue?
In ruling on the first issue, the Judge held that the petitioner has standing and capacity to bring this action. Here are excerpts from the Judge’s ruling:
“[From a careful perusal] of the case file, it is conveniently clear that the Petition[er] does [have] legal capacity and standing to maintain this action, in that the charter/article[s] of Incorporation creating the petitioner that is to say the Citizens Solidarity Council, has as one of [the] several aim[s] and objective[s] of petitioner (to promote national unity, peace, reconciliation, bureaucracy, justice, civil liberty, etc. etc.) Also R/1 in bulk annex[ed] to the petitioner’s resistance which are [excepts] of minutes and meetings held by the incorporators to organize the Board of Directors and the Board Meeting to empower the chairman to file suit against any person, be it natural or artificial, who has violated or intend[s] to violate the rights of Liberian Citizens in line with the aim[s] and objectives of the organization and the board resolution. Petitioner’s exhibit R/1 in bulk and its Article[s] of Incorporation sufficiently support the contention of petitioner that it does have legal capacity and standing to maintain this action.”

As regards the second issue, Judge Paye ruled that based on various counts of the petition for declaratory judgment, the returns thereto, the motion to dismiss and returns thereto, this case raised constitutional issues and as such forwarded it to the Supreme Court to pass on the constitutional issues raised. Here are excerpts of his ruling:
“In view of the above mentioned, this Court says [the] Supreme Court of Liberia is the court of competent jurisdiction to exercise jurisdiction over such issue. Hence, such constitutional issues are require[d] to be address[ed] by the Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia. Therefore, this Court will take judicial notice of the law controlling and decline to hear the petition relative to the constitutional issue[s] and order its transfer to the Supreme Court to be determined by the full bench. “Wherefore and in view of all that [have] been said, the motion to dismiss with respect to the petition[er’s] standing and capacity to sue is hereby denied and dismissed. The motion with respect to the constitutional issue[s] raised in the petition, returns and reply, this court not having jurisdiction to pass on the same, the case is hereby ordered transfer [red] to the Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia. The clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to [transmit] the records of the case under the supervision of the petition[er] for onward transmission to the Honorable Supreme Court of Liberia.”

The appellant/respondent noted exception to the above-quoted ruling of the trial judge and announced an appeal to this Court.

We have determined, based on the foregoing background facts and circumstances, the pleadings exchanged by the parties and the oral arguments presented before us, that this case presents two salient issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has legal capacity and standing to bring this action.
2. Whether or not Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Act are repugnant to the Liberian Constitution (1986) and therefore unconstitutional.

But before delving into the issues raised above, let us note that whenever the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature is raised, the Supreme Court en banc is the proper forum to decide such issue, and if the act of the Legislature complained of is indeed found to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court is under obligation to so declare. So, the trial judge acted properly by referring the quest6ion of whether or not Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act are repugnant to the Constitution and therefore unconstitutional for our determination. On this point, Article 2 of the Liberian Constitution (1986) provides:
“This Constitution is the supreme law of Liberia and its provisions shall have binding force and effect on all authorities and persons throughout the Republic.

Any laws, treaties, statutes, decrees, customs and regulations found to be inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no legal effect. The Supreme Court, pursuant to its power of judicial review, is empowered to declare any inconsistent laws unconstitutional.” [Emphasis supplied].
Consistent with this power of judicial review as directed by Article 2 of the Constitution quoted supra, this Court, in a long line of cases, has held that laws found to be repugnant to and inconsistent with the Constitution are void ab initio and the Supreme Court has the authority to declare such laws unconstitutional. Our decisional laws are replete with cases in which this Court has declared such laws that are found in conflict with the Constitution to be unconstitutional: The Management of B.A.O. v. Mulba and Sekeley, [1988] LRSC 89; 35 LLR 584, (1988), Vargas v. Reeves et al.[1999] LRSC 6; , 39 LLR 368 (1999); Williams v. Tah, Supreme Court Opinion, October Term, 2011.

In the Tah v. Williams case cited above, Archie Williams, petitioner, claiming that his constitutional rights had been violated by the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of 2009, filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, seeking a declaratory judgment on the TRC REPORT that banned him from holding public office, elective, or appointed for a period of 30 years. The petitioner stated in his petition that although he was never served with notice, oral or written to appear, and thus did not appear before the TRC to be heard in accordance with the constitutional provision of due process, yet the TRC Report recommended that he be barred from holding public office. The named respondents in the petition for declaratory judgment appeared and raised several issues, including the issue of standing, alleging that the petitioner had not suffered actual disbarment from holding public office. The matter was referred to this Court to settle the constitutional issues raised. This Court held that Archie Williams had standing to sue. On the constitutional question, whether or not Section 48 of the TRC Act which authorized the President of Liberia to implement a recommendation made in the TRC Report to ban petitioner Archie Williams was in violation of the Constitution, this Court answered in the affirmative. The rationale was that Archie Williams was adjudged guilty of having committed crimes without being accorded due process. This Court then declared section 48 of the TRC Act unconstitutional.

However, we should also note that while the Supreme Court is vested with the power and authority to declare unconstitutional, null and void any law that is contrary to and inconsistent with the Constitution, that power, this Court has held, should be exercised with great deliberation, caution and even reluctance; a statute should never be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity is beyond all reasonable doubt and the conflict with the Constitution is irreconcilable. It is said that an act of the Legislature is presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution until the contrary is proven. And where there is a doubt about the constitutionality of a law passed into law by the Legislature, the doubt should be resolved in favor of that law. Over the years, this Court has consistently upheld this guiding principle whenever it was called to declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional.

In an early case: Bryant et al. v, Republic[1937] LRSC 27; , 6 LLR 128 (1937), Mr. Justice Tubman, speaking for the Court said the following on the issue of declaring an act of the National Legislature unconstitutional.”We should here state that while it is an axiomatic principle of the American system of constitutional law which has been incorporated into the body of our laws that the courts have inherent authority to determine whether such laws are not constitutional, courts in exercising this authority should give the most careful consideration to questions involving the interpretation and application of the Constitution, and approach constitutional questions with great deliberation exercising their power in this respect with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance, and they should never declare a statue void unless its invalidity is, in their judgment, beyond a reasonable doubt and it has been held that to justify a court in pronouncing a legislative act unconstitutional, the court must be so clear as to be free from doubt, and the conflict of the statue with the Constitution must be irreconcilable. It is a decent respect to the wisdom, the integrity and the patriotism of the legislative body by which all laws are passed to presume in favor of the validity of the law until the contrary is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore in no doubtful case will the Judiciary pronounce a legislative act to be contrary to the Constitution. To doubt the Constitutionality of a law is to resolve the doubt in favor of as validity.”
This is the standard which this Court has followed in every case in which it has been urged to decide the issue of constitutionality of an act of the Legislature.

Let us now address the above stated issues which are determinative of this case. The first issue is whether or not the petitioner has legal capacity and standing to bring this action. As a matter of law, we must decide the issue of standing before considering any other issue. We cannot pass on the constitutional questions raised by the parties in this case unless and until we have determined that the petitioner has standing to bring this case. If the petitioner has no standing to bring this case, the case will be dismissed for lack of proper party, without deciding the substantive issues, including constitutional issues. Courts of justice are only required to decide issues squarely raised by proper parties before them; a party without standing or capacity to sue cannot enjoy the benefit of a court decision.
Standing, as we have consistently held, is a legal doctrine which holds that a party’s ability to bring a lawsuit in court is or must be based upon the party’s stake in the outcome of the case. A party seeking to demonstrate standing must show the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law, action or inaction challenged; otherwise, the party lacks standing to bring the lawsuit. In order to establish standing to sue, a party must show that: (1) the party has suffered an injury in fact-that is, the party has suffered or will suffer a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest or right if the party does not bring the suit; (2) the injury is a result of the defendant’s conduct. In other words, there must be a causal connection between the injury allegedly suffered and the conduct complained of; and (3) a finding in the party’s favor is likely to redress or remedy the injury. According to the doctrine of standing, also, a party seeking to demonstrate standing must assert his or her own rights and cannot raise the claims of a third party or third parties who are not before the court; nor can such a party make claims of generalized injury common to the body politic-the claimed injury must be individualized and unique or personal to the plaintiff.

In a long line of cases, this Court has applied the doctrine of standing to prevent parties having no interest in a subject matter from utilizing the courts of this Republic to file claims wherein there are no real parties of interest.
In the case: Morgan v. Barclay et al.[2004] LRSC 22; , 42 LLR 259 (2004), this Court defined legal capacity to sue as the “right to come into court.” In that case, the Court held that: “The standing to sue doctrine means that a party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.” Standing’ is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court. The requirement of standing’ is satisfied “if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation.”

In the case: Center for Law & Human Rights Education et al. v. Monrovia City Corporation et al.[1998] LRSC 20; , 39 LLR 32 (1998), a petition for declaratory judgment, similar to the one in the instant case, was filed challenging the constitutionality of Section 11 of City Ordinance # 1 promulgated by the City Corporation of Monrovia prohibiting selling on Sundays. The petition argued that Section 11 of City Ordinance #1 tended to give preference to the Christian Religion over other religious sets in that it banned marketing on Sunday which is a day on which Christians worship; thus according to the petition, the Ordinance was discriminatory. In passing on the issue of standing which was raised, this Court, speaking in a unanimous decision through Chief Justice Gloria Scott, held that the Center for Law & Human Rights Education, one of the petitioners in the case, lacked standing to mount a challenge to the City Ordinance because it failed to show how it or its members were adversely affected by Section 11 of the Ordinance.

The Court stated:
“A group or organization can also have standing as the representative of its members, provided that it has alleged facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy had the members themselves brought suit. A mere ‘interest’ in a problem, no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render an organization adversely affected or aggrieved for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain judicial review. The group seeking review must have suffered an injury. Before a law can be assailed by a person on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, he must show that he has an interest in the question, in that the enforcement of the law would be an infringement on his rights. Assailants must therefore show the applicability of the statute to them and that they are thereby injuriously affected, and that a statute or ordinance will not be struck down unless plaintiffs are actually aggrieved and prejudiced by its enforcement. Thus it is said only a real party in interest has the right to question the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance before the court. These rules are applicable to all cases, both at law and in equity, to attacks on ordinances and to criminal proceedings. Further, one who is not prejudiced by the enforcement of an act of the legislature (city council) cannot question its constitutionality. Absent a showing of injury, actual or threatened, there can be no constitutional argument.”
In a more recent case, The Concerned Sector Youth v. LISGIS et al., decided by this Court on August 30, 2010, we reaffirmed the doctrine of standing and held that the organization, The Concern Youth Sector lacked standing to institute the action. We stated: “Standing to sue means that [a] party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy. The requirement of ‘standing’ is satisfied if it can be said that the plaintiff has a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation.’ The doctrine of standing ensures that the courts will have the benefit of real adverse parties in cases. Thus, the question [of] whether a party has standing to participate in a judicial proceeding is not simply a procedural technicality but, rather involves the remedial rights affecting the whole of the proceeding. Standing involves jurisdictional issue which concerns [the] power of courts to hear and decide cases and does not concern ultimate merits of substantive claims involved in the action. Before a matter can be decided on its merits the issue of standing must first be decided. And if it is determined that the plaintiff lacks standing to institute the actions, the action will be dismissed without deciding the substantive issues raised in the case.”

We are aware that our organic law, the Constitution of Liberia (1986) at Article 26, recognizes that a natural person or an association who may be injured by a governmental action or inaction may seek redress from court, including a judgment of unconstitutionality.

Article 26 of the Constitution provides: “Where any person or any association alleges that any of the rights granted under this Constitution or any legislation or directives are constitutionally contravened, that person or association may invoke the privilege and benefit of court direction, order or writ, including, a judgment of unconstitutionality; and anyone injured by an act of the Government or any person acting under its authority, whether in property, contract, tort or otherwise, shall have the right to bring suit for appropriate redress…”

Given the clear and unambiguous language of Article 26 of the Constitution quoted above, there is no denial that a person or association whose right as granted under the Constitution of Liberia which right is affected by an act of the Legislature, governmental action or inaction may bring a suit in court. But we have interpreted Article 26 of the Constitution, as reflected in the numerous cases referenced hereinabove, to mean that only a properly identifiable natural person or association whose right has been affected that may file a claim alleging that an act of the Legislature, governmental action or inaction has affected him/her. The natural person must state his /her name and the wrong or injury sustained which is traceable to an act of the Legislature, governmental action or inaction. And if making the claim in a representative capacity, the natural person must present proof of authority from the person or institution he/she is representing. Without this, the natural person would have no standing to bring a suit.

In the case of an association making the claim on behalf of its members, as in the instant case, the position of this Court has been and still remains that the association is required to state facts as the members themselves would have stated, had they brought the case in court themselves.

Now, a natural person bringing this suit for a wrong or an injury he/she has or will suffer on account of the Code of Conduct Act should state his/her name; the appointive position he/she currently holds in government; the time of such appointment; exhibit copy of a contract of employment (if he/she is a contractual employee); state what elective position he/she intends to contest in 2017; and how the Code of Conduct Act has or will affect his/her right. Since this suit was not brought by a natural person but rather by a an organization called Citizen Solidarity allegedly on behalf of a group of Liberians, that organization was required to state a case as its members themselves would have stated with specifics as we have enumerated above. This is the interpretation the Supreme Court has given to Article 26 of the Constitution as reflected in our decisional laws cited above, especially in the case: Center for Law and Human Rights. The appellee/petitioner in this was required to make a case on behalf of its alleged members, as the members themselves would make if they instituted this suit; otherwise, the suit would be dismissed for lack of standing.

We note that of Article 26 of the Constitution, two of our dissenting Colleagues say as follows:
“Our critical examination of the quoted constitutional provision reveals that that provision has two separate and distinct constituent parts or segments. In the first part, and for the purpose of the instant case, the right is granted to “any person or association” to seek court direction, including a judgment of unconstitutionality, predicated solely upon the allegation that an act of the Legislature or directive of Government, is in contravention of the Constitution or rights granted by the Constitution. This part of Article 26 does not require that in order to challenge or that as a prerequisite to challenging the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature, a person or association must show that he/she or it is so directly affected by the Act that he/she [is] likely to be injured or is or will suffer harm by the Act. The provision accords a blanket right [to] a citizen, natural or legal, to challenge the constitutionality of any Act of the Legislature believed to be in contravention of the Constitution. One does not have to be affected by the Act to challenge its constitutionality. You have only to allege that the Act contravenes the Constitution. The provision is clear that for the purpose of assailing the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature, it confers standing.”
Speaking further on Article 26 of the Constitution and specifically on the second part or segment thereof, our Colleagues said:

“The second part of the Article, separate and distinct from the first part, sets out the instance where a person, directly injured by the Act or is likely to be injured by the Act of the Legislature. In this second part, the Article clearly states who may commence an action where direct injury results from the Act or action taken under the Act. In this segment, the Article clearly sets out that a person who is injured by the Act or by actions taken by the Government or any person acting under the authority of the Government, whether the act relates to property, contract, tort or otherwise, the person, natural or legal has the right to bring suit against the Government for appropriate redress. The specificity of this latter part of the provision leaves no doubt that the framers intended that in order for a person to enjoy that part of Article 26, the person, natural or legal, must show that he/she/it has been, is being, or is likely to be injured by the act or action, or that he/she/it is likely to be injured by the enforcement of the Act or action taken thereunder, and that accordingly the person has standing or the legal capacity to bring the action, assert the claim or protect the right. Thus, as to this latter part of Article 26 of the Constitution, there is absolutely no doubt in our minds that the principles of standing and legal capacity are applicable and that in like manner section 11.2 of the Civil Procedure Law, as the governing law is similarly applicable.”

We disagree. We hold that part one and two of Article 26 of the Constitution are in harmony in respect of standing to sue regarding a natural person or association. Our interpretation of Article 26 of the Constitution, as stated earlier, is that in order for a natural person or association to bring suit in the context of that Article, the natural person or association must be properly identified as a real party of interest who is duly authorized to bring the suit. We do not believe, as advanced by our dissenting Colleagues, that it was the intent of the framers of the Constitution to set two different standards and requirements for parties who seek redress for violation of rights provided for under the Constitution. That is, on the one hand and in one section of the same Article 26, provide “a blanket right” to a citizen, natural or legal, to challenge the constitutionality of an Act of the Legislature believed to be in contravention of the Constitution without due regards, whatsoever, to whether or not that natural or legal person has to standing, while in the other section, provide that standing is a necessary requirement. It is a well settled principle of constitutional interpretation that “The constitution must be interpreted in light of the entire document rather than a sequestrated pronouncement, as every provision of the constitution is of equal importance. None of the provisions of the constitution should be interpreted so as to nullify or substantially impair the other provisions, and even where there is apparent discrepancy between different provisions, the Court should harmonize them, if possible.” Galawolo et al. v. National Elections Commissions, 41 LLR, 377-384 (2003).
Section 11.2 (e) of our Civil Procedure Law, provides that at the time of service of a responsive pleading, a party may move for judgment dismissing one or more claims for relief asserted in a complaint or counterclaim for reason, amongst others, that the party asserting the claim has no capacity or standing to sue. As we see it, this section of our statute is in harmony with Article 26 of the Constitution quoted above. Thus, where parties coming to court have failed to show capacity or standing to sue, our courts, relying on section 11.2 of the Civil Procedure law, have never wavered or hesitated in denying and dismissing such claims.

As we have said, the nature and extent of the facts necessary to establish standing in an action that seeks to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, or a governmental action or omission depends largely upon whether or not the plaintiff is or will be personally affected by the action or omission at issue. Thus, this Court has also held that a plaintiff wishing to contest, on constitutional grounds, the validity of a legislation, or governmental action or omission must show not only that the legislation or action or omission is invalid, but that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the enforcement or omission of the legislation or action and not merely that he will suffer in some indefinite way. If the plaintiff is directly affected, then there is little or no doubt that the action or inaction has caused the plaintiff injury and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will provide redress. (See Gonsahn et al. v. Vinton et al.[1992] LRSC 5; , 37 LLR 47 (1992).

But where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff asserts that an injury will be suffered not by the plaintiff, but by third parties as a result of a legislation enacted by the government’s regulation of the conduct of some third parties, much more than the mere existence of alleged injury and an organization’s general role as a civil society organization or pressure group dedicated to the protection of human and civil rights of the Liberian people is required; because in such circumstance as it obtains in this case, causation and redress depend on the response of the regulated third parties to the government’s action.

In some common law jurisdictions whose laws are similar to ours, it has been held that the existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing depends on the choices made by independent actors or third parties who are not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict. Therefore it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redress of the alleged injury. (See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization), 426 U.S.26, 41-42 (1976).

This is because when the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges, standing is not necessarily precluded, but it is “substantially more difficult” to establish. This means that in the instant case, the petitioner must demonstrate factually that the petitioner or one or more of its alleged members have sought or are seeking elective positions and that Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act has or will prevent the petitioner or those members of the petitioner from contesting for elective positions.

Let us now apply these well-established concepts and principles of standing to this case to determine whether or not the petitioner herein has standing to bring this petition for declaratory judgment.
In the motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment, the Government of Liberia has contended that the appellee/petitioner lacks capacity and standing to institute the instant lawsuit; that the appellee/petitioner has filed this petition by and thru a Mr. James Brooks who it designates as its Chairman, but the appellee/petitioner has failed to provide any proof that Mr. Brooks is indeed the Chairman of the appellee/petitioner, neither is there a showing that the said purported Chairman was authorized to institute this petition for declaratory judgment.

The Government also argued that the appellee/petitioner having averred that it is a corporation organized under the laws of the Republic, it must, consistent with the Associations Law of Liberia; provide a resolution from its board authorizing the purported Chairman, James Brooks, to institute the instant action. The Government further argued that the appellee/petitioner, Citizens Solidarity Council, has no standing to bring this suit, in that it failed to show or establish how its rights were or would be affected by the Code of Conduct Act; that our law provides that one who may be prejudiced or threatened by the enforcement of an act of the Legislature may question its constitutionality; a group or organization can also have standing as a representative of its members in bringing in a suit. But the group or organization must allege facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy as if the members themselves had instituted the suit; a mere interest in a problem, no matter how qualified the group or organization is in evaluation of the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render a group or organization adversely affected or aggrieved for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain judicial decision.

Finally, the Government contended that the appellee/petitioner has failed to aver that its members are presidential appointees holding tenured and/or non-tenured positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct.
Act are directed and who would be allegedly affected thereby; hence, the appellee/petitioner has presented no proof that its organization is adversely affected or aggrieved by the Code of Conduct Act, for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain a judicial decision.

In its returns filed to the motion to dismiss, the appellee/petitioner contented that it has capacity and standing to institute this action because it is a pressure group comprising 1,500 members who are threatened by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.l(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct Act; that in keeping with its aims and objectives contained in its articles of incorporation, it is required to promote national unity, peace, social justice, civil liberty, monitor and observe general, local, special and bye elections in Liberia.

The appellee/petitioner also contended that with this mandate if it should sit without questioning the constitutionality of Part V, Sections 5.1(a) (b) and 5.2(a) (b) of the Code of Conduct Act (2014), then it would be doing a disservice to the Liberian people. The appellee/petitioner further contended that Mr. James E. Brooks is its Chairman authorized to file this suit; that some of its members are presidential appointees holding tenure[d] and non-tenure[d] positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct Act are directed and would be affected thereby; that the disclosure of the names of such members shall expose them to hardship since they are currently serving in such positions; and that the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County and other courts of this Republic have statutory mandate to declare the rights of parties.

In addressing the contentions of the parties we say firstly, that the appellee/petitioner does not state or even allege that it has been or will be personally affected or injured by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act. Secondly, the appellee/petitioner does not state the names of its members or state that the interests of such members have been or will be personally affected by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act. These are threshold requirements necessary to confer standing as outlined earlier herein. What the appellee/petitioner has stated instead is its interest in the general protection of the rights of all Liberian citizens as a pressure group. But as this Court said in Center for Law & Human Rights Education et a!, “A mere interest in a problem, no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render an organization adversely affected or aggrieved for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain judicial review. The group seeking review must have itself suffered an injury.” Or, the group, if acting on behalf of its members, must clearly state a case the members themselves would have stated if they were in court.

The appellee/petitioner also contends that its membership includes “presidential appointees holding tenure[d] and non-tenure[d] positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct Act are directed and would be affected thereby and that the disclosure of the names of such members shall expose them to hardship since they are currently serving in such positions. This argument, we hold, is farfetched, conjectural and speculative at best. We see no evidence to arrive at such conclusion. Not a single name of the appellee/petitioner alleged member who desires to seek elective post and who is currently holding presidential appointment was mentioned in the petition for declaratory judgment. But even assuming that some of the appellee/petitioner’s unnamed and unknown members are or will be adversely affected by Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act, the persons so affected or to be affected should be before the court to benefit from the court decision.

Therefore, in order to have survived the Government’s motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment the appellee/petitioner should have submitted evidence showing, through specific facts, that apart from the appellee/petitioner’s special interest in protecting the rights of Liberian citizens generally, the appellee/petitioner and one or more of its members have been or will be directly affected by Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Act. This, the appellee/petitioner woefully failed to do.

With respect to the appellee/petitioner’s argument that the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County and other courts of this Republic have statutory mandate to declare the rights of a person whose rights have been encroached upon or whose rights are threatened by an act of the Legislature, we do not dispute, but we are of the opinion that while this argument is true, the person must show that it has or is entitled to the rights to be declared. Therefore in order for the appellee/petitioner to benefit from this statutory mandate, it bears the burden of establishing that (1) it has suffered an injury in fact-that is, the appellee/petitioner or its specified members has suffered or will suffer a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest or right if it does not bring the suit; (2) the injury is a result of the appellant/respondent’s conduct. In other words, there must be a connection between the injury allegedly suffered and the conduct complained of; and (3) a showing that a finding in the appellee/petitioner’s favor is likely to redress or remedy the injury. And because these elements of standing are an indispensable part of the appellee/petitioner’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the appellee/petitioner bears the burden of proof.

In the instant case, there exist no such rights, since the appellee/petitioner, being an artificial person who is not even a political party, cannot contest or compete for elective position and is therefore unqualified to hold elective position. In order for a group or artificial person such as the appellee/petitioner to have standing to sue on behalf of its alleged members whose names are undisclosed, it must show how it or its said members are or will be adversely affected by the law, governmental action or inaction being challenged. This is the standard or yardstick used by this Court in Center for Law & Human Rights Education et al. We confirm that position and hold that the appellee/petitioner being unqualified to hold elective position, has failed to establish standing by showing that it or its members have been or will be affected or injured by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act.

We are therefore of the opinion that the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County failed to apply the above principles of standing in denying the appellee/respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory judgment. The Court focused on the appellee/petitioner’s articles of incorporation and the minutes of meetings of the appellee/ petitioner’s incorporators and board of directors in deciding that the appellee/petitioner has standing to bring this action. The trial court stated:

“From a careful perusal of the case file, it is conveniently clear that the Petition[er] does [have] legal capacity and standing to maintain this action, in that the charter/article[s] of incorporation creating the petitioner that is to say the Citizens Solidarity Council, has as one of its several aim[s] and objective[s] of petitioner (to promote national unity, peace, reconciliation, bureaucracy, justice, civil liberty, etc.) Also R/1 in bulk annex[ed] to petitioner’s resistance which are minutes and meetings held by the incorporators to organize the board of Directors and the Board meeting to empower the chairman to file suit against any person, be it natural or artificial, who has violated or intend[s] to violate the rights of Liberian Citizens in line with the aim[s] and objectives of the organization and the board resolution. Petitioner’s exhibit R/1 in bulk and its Article[s] of Incorporation sufficiently support the contention of petitioner that it does have legal capacity and standing to maintain this action.” [Emphasis supplied]

In so ruling, the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Civil Law Court suggests that the mere fact that the articles of incorporation of a corporate entity authorizes the corporation to sue and be sued, coupled with a resolution adopted at the time the board was being organized, empowering the chairman of the board or other officers of the corporation to bring an action on behalf of the corporation ipso facto confers standing on the chairman of the corporation to bring an action. We disagree. It is a general practice in this jurisdiction and other jurisdictions for all corporate entities to include in their articles of incorporation that that corporation has the right to sue and be sued. But our law requires that for a chairman or an officer of a corporate entity to file a suit in the name of the corporation, that officer must be authorized through a board resolution to file the action in a particular case and not in a generalized context as stated in the articles of incorporation. In other words, in every given case where it is necessary for an action to be filed on behalf of a corporation, the board must authorize its chairman or officer to do so. This is done on a case by case basis.

Therefore, we hold that a statement in the minutes of a board meeting which generally gives authority to the chairman or officer of a corporation to file “suit against any person, be it natural or artificial, who has violated or intend[s] to violate the rights of Liberian Citizens” as stated in the ruling of the trial judge will not suffice. Thus, James Brooks, if even he was indeed the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citizens Solidarity Council, was never authorized by that organization to file this suit in the name and on behalf of Citizens Solidarity Council.
Further, we hold that in addition to a board resolution authorizing the filing of the suit, in order for an officer of a corporation to bring an action in any court within this Republic, the position of the Supreme Court has consistently remained that the corporation must demonstrate standing as define hereinabove. So, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the appellee/petitioner’s Chairman, James Brooks was authorized through a board resolution to file this action, the appellee/petitioner was still required to clearly state facts establishing that the petitioner and/or its members are injured or will be injured by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Act. We cannot see how the mere assertion of the “aim[s] and objective[s] of petitioner (to promote national unity, peace, reconciliation, bureaucracy, justice, civil liberty, etc.) constitutes a clear statement of facts that the petitioner and/or its members were injured by the Code of Conduct Act so as to confer standing on James Brooks to bring this suit on behalf of members of Citizens Solidarity Council.

We should note that the appellee/petitioner in this case has proposed a novel theory and element of standing which is, the disclosure of the names of alleged members of the appellee/petitioner who are presidential appointees holding tenured and non-tenured positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014) are directed will expose those members of the appellee/petitioner to hardship since they are currently serving in such positions. Hence, because of fear of their exposure to hardship, a court of justice should confer standing upon them although they are not named in the petition. In other words, an organization, without disclosing the names of its members concerned, should be allowed to file a law suit in the names and behalf of such members who may be affected by an act of the Legislature or some challenged governmental action because disclosing their names and identities will expose them to hardship. Who these members are, whether they indeed exist and have political ambitions as alleged by the appellee/petitioner and what hardship they will suffer are anybody’s guess.

This proposition of the appellee/petitioner presents a new scenario by which an organization may claim standing to bring an action in the courts of this Republic. We disagree with the proposition which we believe, will open a floodgate for any unidentified person, natural or artificial, to inundate our courts with law suits with no proper party of interest. Our cases have always held that in order to have standing to sue, a party must establish a legally protectable interest and actual or imminent harm or injury to that interest which is traceable to a challenged act of the Legislature, governmental action or inaction. Therefore the appellee/petitioner’s contention that an organization has standing to sue because, at some point in the future, one or more of the organization’s unnamed and faceless members may engage in conduct prohibited by a challenged legislative act or governmental action or inaction is inconsistent with the requirement of real party of interest, actual or imminent harm or injury which have been the hallmark of our jurisprudence relating to the doctrine of standing.

In our opinion, the appellee/petitioner has not established that his concrete interest or that of its members is threatened or will be threatened by the Code of Conduct Act; rather, the appellee/petitioner has merely made generalized claims that its members will be affected as a result of the passage of the Code of Conduct Act. We hold the view, therefore, that the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County erred in holding that the appellee/ petitioner had standing to bring this action on the ground that the petitioner’s articles of incorporation and the minutes of meetings of the appellee/petitioner’s incorporators and board of directors confer on the appellee/petitioner the right to “file suit against any person, be it natural or artificial, who violated or intend[s] to violate the rights of Liberian Citizens,” notwithstanding the failure of the appellee/petitioner to allege any concrete injury it or its member will suffer as a result of the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.1 of the Code of Conduct.

In Counts 5 and 6 of its motion to dismiss, the Government argued as follows:”5. Further to Count Four (4) above, Movant says that the Petitioner, Citizens Solidarity Council, has no standing to bring this suit, in that it has failed to show or establish how its rights were or would be affected by the Code of Conduct. Our law provides that one who may be prejudiced or threatened by the enforcement of an act of the Legislature may question its constitutionality. A group or organization can also have standing as a representative of its members in bringing in a suit. But the group or organization must allege facts sufficient to make out a case or controversy as if the members themselves had instituted the suit. A mere interest in a problem, no matter how qualified the group or organization is in evaluation of the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render a group or organization adversely affected or aggrieved for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain judicial decision. Only a real party in interest has the right to question the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance before the court.

“6. Further to Count Five (5) above, Respondent says that the Petitioner has failed to aver that its members are Presidential Appointees holding tenured and/or non-tenured positions to which Part V, Sections 5.1(a)(b) and 5.2(a)(b) of the Code of Conduct (2014) are directed and who would be allegedly affected thereby. Hence, the Petitioner has presented no proof that the organization is adversely affected or aggrieved by the Code of Conduct, for the purpose of giving it standing to obtain a judicial decision. The petition in its entirety should therefore be dismissed and Movant so prays.”
We fully agree with the averments of Counts 5 and 6 of the respondent’s motion to dismiss and hold that the appellee/petitioner lacks standing to bring this action because it has woefully failed to establish that its rights or the rights of one or more of its members have been infringed or will be infringed by the enforcement of Part V, Sections 5.1and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct (2014).

Because we hold the view that the appellee/petitioner lacks standing to bring this action, there is no need for us to address the second issue raised above, which is whether or not Part V, Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Code of Conduct Act are repugnant to the Liberian Constitution (1986) and therefore unconstitutional. Established constitutional principle of law requires that the court will refuse to decide constitutional questions if a case can be decided on a statutory ground or on a general rule. Dukuly v. National Elections Commissions, 43LLR 191 (2005).Zoe v. National Elections Commissions, 43 LLR 175 (2005). Sieh v. LACC, Supreme Court Opinion, October Term, (2014). And as we have said, standing involves jurisdictional issues which concerns the power of courts to hear and decide cases and does not concern the ultimate merits of substantive claims involved in the action.

Where, as in this case, it is determined that the party lacks standing to institute the action, the action is dismissed without deciding the substantive issues, including constitutional issues. So, with our position that the appellee/petitioner lacks standing, we need not pass on, and have therefore declined to pass on the constitutional questions raised by the appellee/petitioner. These questions can be deferred to another day when there is a real party of interest.

WHEREFORE AND IN VIEW of the foregoing, the ruling of the trial court holding that the petitioner/appellee in this case has standing to bring this suit is reversed and the petition for declaratory judgment is denied.
The Clerk of this Court is ordered to send a mandate to the Sixth Judicial Circuit for Montserrado County from whence this case emanated to resume jurisdiction inform the parties of this judgment. It is so ordered.
Counsellors C. Alexander B. Zoe and Beyan D. Howard appeared for the appellee/petitioner. Counsellor Betty Lamin-Blamo, Solicitor General of the Ministry of Justice, appeared for the appellant/respondent.

Petition denied.