BONG MINING COMPANY, by and thru its Representative, Appellant, v. WILLIE RAGLAND and the SENIOR RESIDENT LABOUR INSPECTOR, Bong Mines, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE DEBT COURT FOR BONG COUNTY.
Heard: November 8, 1989. Decided: January 9, 1990.
1. Where an employee is dismissed for an alleged criminal conduct without trial, his dismissal is an absolute violation of the due process of law guaranteed by our Constitution.
2. A defendant in a criminal case is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; and in the case of reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to acquittal.
3. In a labor complaint for dismissal arising out of criminal offense, time lost, while awaiting trial and during trial, cannot be compensated.
Co-appellee Willie Ragland was employed by the appellant, Bong Mining Company, on February 13, 1973, and remained in said employment until he was suspended off the job without pay as a result of his alleged involvement in a caterpillar fuel pump theft. The appellant later lifted and revoked said suspension but only to dismiss the co-appellee the day following the revocation of the suspension. The appellee then filed a complaint of wrongful dismissal before the labor commissioner of Bong County. The labor commissioner, after conducting an investigation in said matter, held the appellant liable to the co-appellee and awarded the said appellee the sum of $28,200.00. From this ruling, the appellant excepted and appealed to the Debt Court for Bong County for judicial review. The debt court judge affirmed the ruling of the labor commissioner, with the modification that the appellant pays the co-appellee an additional amount of $9,400.00 for time lost. It was from this ruling that appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that the coappellee did not have his day in court to prove his innocence or guilt. The Court also held that the conduct of the appellant in lifting and revoking the suspension of the appellee purged him of said crime, and that the subsequent dismissal of the coappellee by the appellant for the crime of which he was purged was tantamount to wrongful dismissal. The Court further held that the debt court judge erred when he awarded the appellee an additional sum of $9,400.00 for time lost. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the lower court’s judgment with modification that the additional amount of $9,400.00 awarded the co-appellee by the debt court judge for time lost be removed from the award. The judgment was affirmed with modification.
Victor Hne and S. Edward Carlor appeared for the appellant. Francis Y S. Garlawolu appeared for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE AZANGO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Willie Ragland, co-appellee in the case at bar, was employed by the Bong Mining Company, appellant, on February 13, 1973 and continued in said employ until May 9, 1988 when he received a letter from his employer (appellant) suspending him from work without pay as a result of his alleged involvement in a caterpillar fuel pump theft. According to the letter of suspension, the co-appellee was to resume work only upon the presentation of a clearance from a competent Liberian authority manifesting his innocence. For the benefit of this Honourable Court, the suspension letter is herein quoted below, verbatim:
“May 9, 1988
Mr. Willie Ragland No. 312941
Bong Range, R.L.
Dear Mr. Ragland:
Effective May 7, 1988, you are suspended from work with-out pay pending investigation, ruling, and your presentation of a clearance from the competent Liberian Government authority in connection with your implication in the case of the caterpillar pump incident at our supply department.
You should further understand that BMC reserves the right to revoke this suspension at anytime and apply the appropriate disciplinary action against you as may be deemed necessary.
Very truly yours,
BONG MINING COMPANY
t/(Ciapha K. Ware
s/(Ciapha K. Ware
(Harold K. Deemer
ACTING GENERAL MANAGER
CC: SD”
In consonance with the reservation contained in the suspension letter of May 9, 1988, appellant, on June 24, 1988, in the following letter also quoted herein verbatim, lifted and revoked co-appellee’s suspension with pay:
“June 24, 1988
Mr. W. Ragland
SD/WH
Bong Range
REVOCATION OF YOUR SUSPENSION
Dear Mr. Ragland:
We hereby give notice of the lifting of your suspension with pay effective June 24, 1988, as contained in our communication addressed to you on May 9, 1988, wherein the Bong Mining Company reserved the right to revoke your suspension at any time.
Very truly yours,
BONG MINING COMPANY
(H.C. Scheider (M. Finlay)
GENERAL MANAGER COMPTROLLER
CC: LA
AC
SD”
Notwithstanding, its letter of revocation, appellant on June 25, A. D. 1988, addressed yet another letter to co-appellee this time, dismissing him effective as of the date of the receipt of the letter for “breach of duty, in particular breach of faith”. Herein quoted below is the letter of dismissal:
“June 25, 1988
Mr. W. Ragland
SD/WH
Bong Range
Dear Mr. Ragland:
In order to maintain the high level of credibility in our operation, we, after internal investigation and probe, came to the conclusion to lift your suspension as contained in our letter of June 24, 1988 effective immediately and have meanwhile decided to inform you that in keeping with the provisions of the general employment regulations of Bong Mining Company, which are cogent and an integral part of your employment contract, your services with the Bong Mining company is hereby terminated as of June 25, 1988 for breach of duty, in particular breach of faith.
You are therefore requested to contact our salary section in order to receive your May and June 1988 salaries.
Very truly yours,
BONG MINING COMPANY
(H.G. Schneider) (M. Finlay)
GENERAL MANAGER COMPTROLLER
CC: LA
AC
SD”
The records of the case further revealed that in conformity with the requirement contained in the suspension letter demanding the presentation of a clearance from any competent Liberian authority, absolving him from the commission of the crime of theft of the caterpillar fuel pump prior to his resumption of work and the grand jury having brought a bill of ignoramus in his favor, co-appellee secured from the office of the clerk of the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, Bong County, a certificate of clearance, but appellant refused to honor it. We herein also quote the said certificate verbatim for our consideration.
“CLEARANCE
REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Plaintiff, v. WILLIE RAG-LAND, defendant.
This certifies that the above-named defendant, Willie Ragland, was allegedly charged with the commission of the crime of Criminal Facilitation and after a diligent , careful and due deliberation by the grand inquest for Bong County, sitting in its May, A. D. 1988 Term, Ninth Judicial Circuit Court, brought in a bill of ignoramus in favour of said defendant acquitting him of the crime allegedly charged herein mentioned supra.
Based upon the unanimous bill of ignoramus brought in open court on the 10th day of June, A.. D. 1988, by the grand inquest aforesaid, the court hereby sets defendant Willie Ragland at liberty from further answering to said alleged charge anymore, his bond if any, ordered returned to him as well as any other documents belonging to him. Hence, this certificate of clearance by order of court.
Given under my hand and seal
of Court in the City of Gbarnga, Bong County,
this 211d day of July, A. D. 1988
t/Samuel E. Taylor
s/samue 1 E. Taylor
CLERK OF COURT”
SEAL
$5.00 Revenue stamps affixed on original”.
It was appellant’s refusal to re-instate the co-appellee that gave rise to this case which commenced on July 4, 1988 with the filing of the complaint of wrongful dismissal by appellee’s counsel before the labor commissioner of Bong County, who, after conducting an investigation into the matter ruled in favour of co-appellee awarding him twenty-four (24) months pay with other benefits amounting to twenty-eight thousand two hundred dollars ($28,200.00). The rationale behind said ruling, the commissioner maintained, was that the clearance obtained by the co-appellee from the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court negates the breach of duty and faith for which appellee was dismissed.
From this ruling, appellant took exceptions and announced an appeal to the Debt Court in Gbarnga, Bong County, for a judicial review of the matter.
In his ruling of March 6, 1989, the judge of the debt court affirmed the ruling of the labor commissioner with the modification that co-appellee be paid an additional amount of nine thousand four hundred dollars ($9,400.00) for lost time between May 9, 1988 to February, 1989, thus increasing the total award to thirty-five thousand seven hundred twenty dollars ($35,720.00). In arriving at his final ruling the judge noted that “Appellee’s statement to the police was made under duress by not having been advised of his constitutional rights and that the clearance from the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court makes the statement of the appellee to the police of no legal weight.”
It was from this final ruling of the Debt Court Judge that appellant appealed to this Honorable Court of last resort.
From the facts thus enumerated, the pivotal issues that emerged for this Court’s consideration and determination are:
1. Whether or not the appellant’s conduct in finally dismissing appellee after it had lifted and revoked appellee’s suspension constitutes wrongful dismissal?
2. Whether or not the debt court judge erred in confirming with modification the decision of the labor commissioner?
In matters of purely industrial relations, it is important to note that an employer has the absolute right to hire and fire employees at will. Notwithstanding, the insulation of workers against unjustifiable dismissals is one of the most important pivots around which our Labor Practices Law revolves. Under Section 1508 of the Labor Practices Law:
1. No employer shall dismiss any employee with whom he is bound by a contract for a definite period before the end of that period unless it is shown that the employee has been guilty of a gross breach of duty or a total lack of capability to perform. Where this has not been proven, the dismissed employee shall be entitled to claim full remuneration for the unexpired portion of the contractual period.
2. The following acts and violations shall be deemed to be gross breaches of duty (without limiting the generality of the terms) within the meaning of section 1 of this chapter and shall dispense the employer from payment of compensation for dismissal under the provisions of that section.
(a) any unprovoked assault by an employee upon the employer or his agents in the course of or arising out of employment;
(b) persistent disregard by an employee of the technical measures for safety of the staff of the undertaking, provided that the said measures have been embodied in rules posted as required by law and the employer or his agent have ordered the employee in writing to comply with said rules;
(c) disclosure by an employee of the working secrets of the employer’s undertaking; and,
(d) absence of an employee for more than ten (10) consecutive days (or more than twenty (20) days over a period of six (6) months) without good cause, in which case the employee shall be deemed to have terminated his contract. Save in the case of vis major, an employee shall be required to notify the employer or his agent of the reason for his absence.
3. Where the contract is concluded between the employer and the employee for an indefinite period, the employer shall have the right to dismiss the employee on condition that he gives him two (2) weeks written notice in the case of nonsalaried employee and four (4) weeks written notice in the case of salaried employees or payment in lieu of such notice.
4. The period of notice shall begin to run on the first day of the pay period next following that in which the notice was served.
5. Notwithstanding, the provisions of section 1508 of this chapter, an employer may dismiss an employee engaged for an indefinite period without notice, subject to payment only of wages due, where it is shown that the employee has been guilty of a serious breach of duty.
6. The following acts and violations shall be deemed to be serious breaches of duty within the meaning of the preceding section entitling the employer to terminate without notice or payment in lieu of notice contracts of employment for an indefinite period:
(a) any of the acts or violations specifically set in the subsections of this section;
(b) lack of skill or manifest inefficiency of the employee which makes impossible the fulfillment of his duties under the contract; and
(c) if the employee commits any other serious offense against his obligations under the contract. Labour Practices Law, Rev. Code 18-A: 9
On the issue of wrongful dismissal, provides that where wrongful dismissal is alleged, the Board of General Appeals shall have the power to order reinstatement, but may order payment of reasonable compensation to the aggrieved employee in lieu of reinstatement. The party against whom the order is made shall have the right of election to reinstate or pay such compensation. In assessing the amount of such compensation the Board shall have regard to:
(i) reasonable expectations in the case of dismissal in a contract of indefinite duration;
(ii) length of service; but in no case shall the amount awarded be more than the aggregate of two years’ salary or wages of the employee computed on the basis of the average rate of salary received six (6) months immediately proceeding the dismissal; however, if there are reasonable grounds to affect a determination that the dismissal is to avoid the payment of pension, then the board may award compensation of up to but not exceeding the aggregate of five (5) years’ salary or wages computed on the basis of the average rate or salary received six (6) months immediately preceding the dismissal;
The Board of General appeals may assess and order the payment of all arrears of remuneration payable in any case referred to it.
Considering the facts of this case and the relevant legal provisions cited, this Court in passing on the first issue is of the unanimous opinion that the conduct of appellant in dismissing co-appellee under the circumstances is not in harmony with law and logic. The reasons for this position are that in the first place, even though the case at bar raises industrial issues, yet, it has its origin in an alleged criminal conduct – namely the theft of a caterpillar fuel pump to which co-appellee was linked. His arrest, detention and suspension culminated finally into his dismissal without trial – a conduct that is absolutely violative of the due process of law as guaranteed by our Constitution. As correctly argued by counsel for appellees, Article 20 of our Constitution provides that:
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, security of the persons, property, privilege or any other right except as the outcome of a hearing judgment consistent with the provisions laid down in this constitution and in accordance with due process of law. Justice shall be done without sale, denial or delay; and in all cases not arising in courts not of record, under court martial, and upon impeachment, the parties shall have the right to trial by jury.”
Also, Article 21 (c), (e) & (f) of our Constitution provide that:
“(c) Every person suspected or accused of committing a crime shall immediately upon arrest be informed in detail of the charges, of the right to remain silent and of the fact that any statement made could be used against him in a court of law. Such person shall be entitled to counsel at every stage of the investigation and shall have the right not to be interrogated except in the presence of his/her counsel. Any admission or other statements made by the accused in the absence of such counsel shall be deemed inadmissable as evidence in a court of law.
(e) No person charged, arrested, restricted, detained or otherwise held in confinement shall be subject to torture or inhumane treatment; nor shall any person except military personnel, be kept or confined in any military facility; nor shall any person be seized and kept among convicted prisoners or treated as a convict, unless such person first shall have been convicted of a crime in a court of competent jurisdiction. The Legislature shall make it a criminal offense and provide for appropriate penalties against any police or security officer, prosecutor, administrator or any other public official acting in contravention of this provision; and any person so damaged by the conduct of any such public official shall have a civil remedy therefor, exclusive of any criminal penalties imposed.
(f) Every person arrested or detained shall be formally charged and presented before a court of competent jurisdiction within forty-eight (48) hours. Should the court determine the existence of a prima facie case against the accused, it shall issue a formal writ of arrest setting out the charge or charges and shall provide for a speedy trial. There shall be no preventive detention.”
It is also a settled principle of our criminal law that: “A defendant in criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved; and in the case of reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to acquittal.” Criminal Procedure Law, Rev. Code 2:2.1.
In the instant case, the co-appellee did not have his day in court to prove his innocence or guilt in order to substantiate appellant’s allegation of breach of faith. Besides this fact, even though co-appellee was able to secure a certificate of clearance from a court of competent jurisdiction in fulfilment of the requirement imposed on him in the suspension letter, appellant refused to accept and honor same and thereby dismissed him. At this juncture, this Court will like to re-echo the view that an employer has the right to hire and fire employees at will but that where the dismissal is unjustifiable, this Court will frown upon it. We shudder and recede at the very thought that appellant could suspend a worker, lift and revoke said suspension only to dismiss said worker the day following the revocation of the suspension.
Let us assume arguendo that the appellee did actually take part in the commission of the crime of theft of the caterpillar fuel pumps, thus breaching the faith that management had in him which resulted in his suspension. Notwithstanding, the conduct of appellant in lifting and revoking the suspension purged him of the commission of the crime. His dismissal, therefore, predicated upon the crime from which he has been purged, is tantamount to a wrongful dismissal.
As to the second issue discerned from the facts of the case as contained in the records, this Court’s unanimous decision is that the lower court judge did err when in his ruling he awarded an additional amount of nine thousand four hundred dollars ($9,400.00) for lost time between May 9, 1988 to February, 1989.
Therefore in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, this court adjudges that the petition for judicial review be and the same is hereby denied.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the Court below informing it of this court’s judgment with instructions that it will resume jurisdiction over the subject matter and to proceed to enforce its judgment with the modification that the additional ten (10) months pay in the amount of nine thousand four hundred dollars ($,9,400.00) awarded by the trial judge for lost time be excluded. Costs are ruled against appellant. And it is hereby so ordered.
Judgment affirmed with modification.