BONG MINING COMPANY, Appellant, v. RUDOLPH A. McDOWALD and RUSHU KARNGA, Chairman, Board of General Appeals, Ministry of Labor, Youth and Sports, Appellees.

Heard: April 18-25, 1979. Decided: June 14, 1979.

1. If the agent/employee, through negligence or want of exercising ordinary care and prudence, exposes his principal’s property or funds to waste, he breaches his fiducial trust and for such breach his agency/employment may and can be suspended or terminated
2. An employer has the right to suspend his employee for a brief period of time for his alleged involvement in the misuse of the employer’s property; and this brief period of time should consist of the period during which an investigation into the matter leading to the employee’s guilt should be instituted.
3. Where the reason for the suspension of an employee is a criminal offense and the employee reports the matter to the Ministry of Labor, Youth & Sports for an investigation, the employer is duty bound to timely move for the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports to delay its own investigation so as to allow the investigation into the alleged criminal offense to be commenced and completed, and the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports should grant such motion. The basis of this procedure is that the investigation into the alleged criminal offense will determine whether the employer should reinstate the employee or dismiss the employee for legal cause.
4. Termination of the services of an employee for reason of the commission of a criminal offense, without establishing the guilt of the employee for that criminal offense, is an infringement on the constitutional rights of the employee.
5. A complaint to the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports for an offense or charge, which is not provided by the Labor Law is dismissible; and the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports cannot on its own create a charge or complaint, which is not provided by the Labor Law.
6. In any monetary award of the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports, arising from a complaint in a labour matter, the amount should be clear, specific and definite or the award will be declared unenforceable and the case remanded for a new trial.
7. The trial court to which an appeal from an administrative agency such as the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports, is taken for judicial review, sits as an appellate court. So the rule that an appellate court is not bound to pass upon all issues raised in the records once it considers the salient issues of the case, which when put together, lead it to mete out transparent justice, is equally applicable to a trial court exercising appellate jurisdiction over administrative rulings.

Appellee, an employee of the Bong Mining Company, appellant, was indefinitely suspended from his job because of an alleged misuse of his employer’s funds which were under his control. Appellee thereupon complained to the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sport for “illegal suspension.” At the end of a hearing, the hearing officer ruled that appellee was guilty of “insubordination.” On appeal to the Board of General Appeals, the hearing officer’s ruling was reversed. The Board of General Appeals held that even though “illegal suspension” was not provided for by the Labour Law, the indefiniteness of the suspension made it tantamount to “illegal dismissal.” Accordingly, the Board ruled that appellant was liable to appellee for illegal dismissal and appellee should be paid for the entire period of his suspension.
Appellant then appealed to the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County, for a judicial review. The Sixth Judicial Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the Board of General Appeals. From this ruling, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court for a review of the entire records of the case.
The Supreme Court held, among other things, that an employer could not be held liable for an offense against his employee, which is not provided for by the Labour Law, and that the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports had no authority to legislate any offense in labor relations. The Supreme Court also ruled that where the basis for the suspension or termination of the services of an employee is the commission of a criminal offense, the allegation of the criminal offense should be investigated and established before the termination of the employee’s services. However, it said, the employee may be suspended for a brief period of time while the investigation into the alleged criminal offense is being conducted. The Court further held that in any monetary award arising out of a labor case, the amount should be definite and specific or it will be declared unenforceable and the case remanded for a new trial.

Because of the many errors committed in the case, beginning with the complaint and throughout the trial, the Supreme Court, although not specifically reversing or affirming the trial court’s judgment, remanded the case with instruction that the parties replead.

S. Edward Carlor appeared for appellant. Nete-Sie Brownell appeared for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE TULAY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Rudolph McDowald, co-appellee before this Court, was employed by the Bong Mining Company, appellant, under the title of resident manager, Bong Mining Company dock area in Monrovia. It is worthy to note here that he was the first African to hold that position. In the course of time, appellee received a letter from appellant indicating that his title had been changed to that of shipping superintendent. Also worthy of note is the fact that this change of title did not affect his salary, nor did it decrease his duties. Yet, in October of 1976, appellee addressed a letter to the President of Liberia in which he charged the appellant company with practices tending to defeat the Liberianization policy.
In December of 1976, one Mr. Bracewell, a subordinate employee of the appellant company working under appellee, wrote the appellant company charging appellee of misappropriating company funds. Mr. Bracewell alleged that the appellee had instructed one Mr. Amos to prepare two vouchers for the sum of $225.00 for the same purpose – to transport a crew of fifteen men from Monrovia to Roberts International Airport, Harbel, and back. The complaint further alleged that out of the $225.00, the bus driver received only $65.00.

To investigate this complaint, one Major Allen of the company’s plant protection force went down to the dock area and interviewed and collected statements from several of the employees, including appellee, though there was no confrontation of appellee by his accusers. When Major Allen returned to the mines, appellee was called to a conference, at which he was given an ultimatum – either to resign from his job or submit himself to an investigation by the Criminal Investigation Division of the National Police Force.

Appellee returned to Monrovia and then wrote a letter saying that he would submit to the investigation by the Criminal Investigation Division. However, instead of placing the matter into the hands of the Criminal Investigation Division, appellant subsequently wrote a letter to appellee, ordering appellee to report back to the mines for further investigation. Because appellee wrote to state his inability to answer the summons, this letter was addressed to him on the 23rd of December, 1977:

“Addressee
Mr. McDowald
Your letter Your ref. Our letter Phone Our Dept.
& Sign Date
Co/HOE/mj
23.12.77
“Your involvement in the misuse of company funds
Reference to our discussion with you on December 15, and our subsequent letter to you on December 20, and your reaction of December 21, 1977, we hereby note that you have agreed to our decision made known to you on December 15 and also stated in our memo to you dated December 20 that further probe into the serious criminal charges brought against you by Mr. Bracewell and others is undertaken. Ex. “C”

Since the original charges are of a criminal nature, we are constrained to immediately suspend you effective December 25, 1977, in accordance with company’s policy.

During the investigation and pending a final determination of the matter, Mr. Reginald Sherman shall act as Superintendent of the shipping department. Therefore, please turn the office over to Mr. Sherman with all the company’s documents and properties therein, including the BMC car assigned to you.
SGD: A. Herts-Richenord
(L. Morgan)”

Appellee lodged with the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sport a complaint against appellant for illegal suspension, as a result of which an investigation was conducted. At the end of the investigation, the hearing officer ruled against appellee on the ground of insubordination. Upon appeal, the Board of General Appeals reversed the hearing officer’s ruling and declared that the indefinite suspension of appellee was tantamount to illegal dismissal. The trial court substantially affirmed the ruling of the Board of General Appeals and ordered that appellee be rein-stated or be paid for the period he had been suspended. Appellant excepted to the trial court’s ruling and appealed to this Court. This is what brought the case before this Court.

The bill of exceptions carried ten (10) counts, but our consideration will be concerned with only four of them as the others do not, either each by itself or all together, lead us to affirm, reverse or remand the case. Those counts of the bill of exceptions that beg our attention are:

1. First, the Board of General Appeals ruled that appellee’s suspension was illegal and the trial court affirmed said ruling when section 1508 of the Labor Law of Liberia permits an employer to dismiss and/or suspend an employee for cause and appellee herein was suspended for cause, which is his involvement in the misuse of the employer’s funds.
2. Second, the trial judge, without passing upon the issues of law raised in the pleadings, passed upon the facts and entered judgment for appellee.

100. Third, the trial court’s judgment is indefinite in that it did not state a sum of money certain as an award to appellee; hence the judgment is unenforceable.

4. Fourth, the judgment declared that indefinite suspension is tantamount to illegal dismissal, an issue sua sponte raised by the court when such issue is nowhere embraced in the pleadings.
5. This Court admits that appellant had cause to suspend appellee but the question is whether the cause was a legal one? Appellee allegedly got involved in the misuse of company funds. Major Allen came down to the company’s dock area and perfunctorily conducted an interrogation of several persons, among whom was appellee. No confrontation whatsoever was allowed between appellee and his accusers, yet appellee was subsequently invited to the mines, where he was given an ultimatum to either face an investigation by the CID or resign from his job. Before an investigation was conducted by the CID, appellee was suspended from the job.

While there may always exist a cause for every occurrence that cause may not always be justifiable. So it was in this case.

If the agent/employee, through negligence or want of exercising ordinary care and prudence, exposes his principal’s property or funds to waste, he breaches his fiducial trust, and for such breach his agency/employment may and can be suspended or terminated. Appellee allegedly involved himself in the misuse of appellant company’s funds, but voluntarily submitted himself to a CID investigation that appellant elected not to institute. If he is suspended indefinitely without the investigation then the cause, as already stated, cannot be justifiable.

Appellee contended that his suspension grew out of his letter to the President of Liberia in which he alleged that the appellant company surreptitiously sought to defeat our Liberianization Policy. This letter was written on October 6, 1976; he was suspended December 23, 1976 – a period of over two months between. Let us, however, see if this accusation is well-founded.

Appellee, according to the records before us, was the first Liberian or African to hold the post of resident manager for the BMC dock area. He contended that the title of his position had been changed to that of shipping superintendent, BMC dock area. Whatever appellation the position received, the fact still remained that he was the first African ever to hold the post. His salary had not been reduced; no expatriate had been appointed resident manager, BMC dock area; his duties had not been minimized; his lone signature on vouchers, irrespective of amounts, was sufficient to authorize the cashier to pay out money from the company’s funds. As manager of the BMC dock area, appellee was monarch of all he surveyed. This contention about the appellant’s failure to comply with the Liberianization policy is therefore unfounded.

The next error complained of is the trial court’s failure to speak upon issues of law raised in the pleadings – the answer and the reply. When this count was argued before us, the Court asked appellant’s counsel if he would have us remand the case for reason of this error. In response, he said he was not asking for a remand but a reversal. Counsel for appellee, however, contended that there were no issues of law before the trial court aside from those raised in his motion for directed judgment, which were passed upon by the trial court. Besides, we reiterate that an appellate court is not bound to pass upon all issues raised in the records before it as long as it considers the salient issues of the case, which, when put together, lead it to mete out transparent justice. In this case the court below acted in its appellate capacity; and, as such, did not have to pass on every issue raised in the pleadings before it. This would have been our position on this issue even if our holding herein below were to be other than what it is.
The third argument advanced by appellant is that the judgment of the trial court — “that Mr. McDowald be paid for the period he has been suspended or reinstated” — is indefinite and uncertain in that it names no specific amount. Of course, counsel for appellee argued that the judgment is specific because appellee’s suspension covers a period of sixteen months and his monthly salary can conveniently be multiplied by sixteen months to arrive at the product.

In the case National Iron Ore Co. v. Gibson et al.[1978] LRSC 2; , 26 LLR 365 (1978), this Court passed upon the following judgment of the lower court:

“It is therefore adjudged by this court considering its surrounding circumstances and the Labour Laws in such case made and provided that the said appellee be compensated as of the date of his dismissal.”

In passing on the judgment above, this Court ruled in part as follows:

“Judgment which does not name money certain in a civil case is like a story by an idiot, full of words, signifying nothing”.

The judgment in that case was difficult, if not impossible, to enforce because the amount awarded was not specific. Therefore, appellant’s submission on this issue is sustained.

The last error complained of by the appellant is that both the Board of General Appeals and the trial court raised an issue which was not contemplated by the parties. Appellee’s complaint to the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports was for illegal suspension but the Board of General Appeals ruled against the appellant company for illegal dismissal and declared that the illegal suspension, because of its indefiniteness, was tantamount to illegal dismissal when in fact the Labour Law only treats wrongful dismissal.

We notice with dismay that this case commenced with irregularities, which continued throughout the various stages of the hearing and appeal. The complaint began with a caption “illegal suspension,” which is not provided for by our Labour Law. Counsel for appellant should have brought this fact out to the attention of the hearing officer, whereby the case would have been dismissed for improper charge made against appellant. The hearing officer raised the issue of insubordination, which was not part of the matter before him. The Board of General Appeals and the trial court stated that our current Labour Law attaches no penalty for illegal suspension, yet both fora declared the illegal suspension to be tantamount to illegal dismissal. This is another issue on which our Labour Law is silent.

The commencement and trial of the case was laden with errors, which the two parties failed to correct. Their failure to do the right thing, at the right place and the right time has led all of us to make much ado about nothing.

In the face of this anomaly, what can this Court do? Affirm? We cannot, because to do so would be legislating by providing penalty for illegal suspension, for which the current Labour Law attaches no penalty. Reverse? We dare not, as that would condone appellant company’s infringement upon appellee’s constitutional rights.

We hold that appellant company has the right to suspend appellee for a brief period of time for his alleged involvement in the misuse of its funds, and that this brief period of time should consist of the period during which an investigation into the matter leading to appellee’s guilt would have been instituted. Although appellee offered himself to be investigated at appellant’s behest, the investigation was never instituted. The argument by counsel for appellant that the investigation could not be instituted because of appellee’s complaint lodged with the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports is farfetched. We believe that if counsel for appellant had timely moved the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports to delay the investigation of appellee’s complaint so as to allow a CID investigation into the matter of the alleged misuse of the funds, the result of such an investigation would have led appellant to reinstate appellee with back pay or dismiss him for legal cause. All this trouble would then have been avoided. Appellee’s indefinite suspension for the alleged misuse of appellant’s funds under appellee’s control, without facing investigation, was an infringement on appellee’s constitutional rights. We cannot subscribe to this infringement as it is just a shrewd device being resorted to by companies to save money. When the employee’s salary gets to the level at which it is considered to be too good for him, he is laid off and a new person is employed in his stead with a lower salary. This Court, to say the least, looks upon such practice with disfavor. Our foreign concessionaires must now and forever abandon such practice.

To resolve the issue in the best interest of the parties concerned, we have to remand the case with the instruction that the parties replead; and immediately after the pleadings the appropriate forum should assume jurisdiction over the cause and dispose of it. Let it be noted here that no subsequent institution of criminal prosecution against appellee, which has not been instituted for the past sixteen months growing out of this case, may abate the hearing and the determination of the cause herein.

The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below in accordance with this opinion. And it is so ordered.

Judgment reversed; case remanded.