BONG MINING COMPANY, Appellant v. HENRIQUE BENSON and THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPEALS, Appellees. .

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Heard: December 7, 1981. Decided: February 4, 1982.

1. The Minister of Labor has discretionary power and authority, based on the convenience of the Ministry of Labor, the parties, and the necessity and urgency for a hearing of a complaint, to decide whether the hearing shall be conducted at the work site or at the Ministry.

2. Every official of the Labor Ministry, including the Minister, is a hearing officer, when he originally enters upon the determination of a labor dispute.

3. An action of unfair labor practices accrues in favor of an employee, where his terms and conditions of services are less favorable than similarly situated employees with similar qualification.

4. An action of unfair labor practice seeks to impose personal judgment on the party liable. It is a transitory action; jurisdiction over the party defendant in such a case is in personam.

5. The assignment of any employee of the Ministry of Labour, who has expert knowledge of the duty to which he may be assigned, cannot be declared a wrongful delegation of authority so as to prohibit him from carrying out the Ministry’s assignments. Thus, any designated employee of the Ministry of Labour, including the Minister, may exercise original jurisdiction in the hearing of labour cases.

6. When one or more officials of the Ministry of Labour sit to hear and decide a labour controversy, he or they constitute an administrative court, a decision from which is reviewable by the judiciary in conformity with rules of courts. All other functions of the Ministry are executive duties.

Co-appellee, Dr. Henrique Benson, a medical doctor, was employed by appellant, pursuant to a written contract for a fixed monthly salary. Upon Co-appellee Benson’s discovery that other medical doctors of the same and similar qualification were being paid more, he commenced an action by way of a complaint to the Ministry of Labour, asserting discrimination against him. Appellant agreed to compromise the controversy, increased Co-appellee Benson’s salary and rated him in the relevant category. Subsequently, Co-appellee Benson filed another complaint with the Ministry of Labor against appellant, alleging that appellant failed and refused to regroup him in accordance with his employment contract. Appellant denied the allegation and maintained that it had regrouped Co-appellee Benson and, thus, had fully complied with the terms of the contract. The Minister of Labor appointed his Deputy as hearing officer; but appellant objected to the lack of jurisdiction of the hearing officer on the ground that he was a commissioned deputy minister of labor. The investigation overruled the objection, heard the case, and determined that Co-appellee Benson should be regrouped according to his contract of employment and properly, retroactive as of October 10, 1979, with all rights, privileges and emoluments.

The Board of General Appeals affirmed the ruling of the investigation, and the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the Board of General Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. ·

S. Edward Car/or and John Teewia appeared for the Appellant. M Fahnbulleh Jones appeared for the Appellees.

MR. JUSTICE MABANDE delivered the opinion of the Court.

By a written contract, Dr. Henrique Benson, a medical doctor, was employed on October 10, 1977 by the Bong Mining Company at a fixed monthly salary. Upon his discovery that other medical doctors of the same and similar qualification were paid more, Dr. Henrique Benson became dissatisfied with his salary. He filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labour asserting that his employer was discriminating against him. The employer agreed to compromise this controversy and increased the employee’s salary; he was also rated in category 12.3.

In 1980, Dr. Benson lodged another complaint with the Ministry of Labour against his employer, Bong Mining Company, charging it for unfair labour practices. He alleged that Bong Mining Company, the defendant, now appellant failed and refused to regroup him in accordance with his employment contract. Appellant Bong Mining Company defended that Plaintiff Henrique Benson now Co-appellee Benson had been regrouped and therefore it had fully complied with the terms of the agreement.

For the hearing of the case, the Minister of Labour appointed his deputy as hearing officer. At the investigation held before the hearing officer, the appellant objected to the lack of jurisdiction of the hearing officer. Ruling was made in favor of Co-appellee Benson and appellant appealed to the Board of General Appeals, where it again challenged the jurisdiction of the hearing officer. The Board of General Appeals ruled that the hearing officer properly exercised jurisdiction over the matter. The ruling of the hearing officer was affirmed by the Board of General Appeals and appellant petitioned the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, Montserrado County, to review the ruling.

Appellant, petitioner before the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court, filed a four count petition in which it asserted that the ruling of the General Board of Appeals was unfounded because the hearing officer, being a commissioned deputy minister of labour, had no jurisdiction as hearing officer and because the ruling of the Board of General Appeals is indefinite and therefore unenforceable since it rendered no money judgment.

Co-appellee Benson, respondent in the Civil Law Court, filed returns denying that appellant had complied with the contract. He also claimed that the compromise arrived at was for the ranking of Co-appellee Benson in class 12.3, as with all other physicians, and that this ranking eliminated the discriminatory act originally complained of by him. He further contended that the appointment of a Deputy Minister or any employee of the Ministry of Labour as a hearing officer was proper and legal; and submitting that the ruling of the Board of General Appeals is just and legal, in that the compromise arrived at did not cancel or rewrite the contract. After due consideration of the contentions, the trial judge affirmed the ruling of the Board of General Appeals and rendered judgment in favor of Co-appellee Benson. Appellant excepted to the judgment and announced an appeal to this Court.

The issues we regard important for our consideration are: (i) whether a commissioned deputy minister could serve as a hearing officer and exercise jurisdiction over a labor complaint? (ii) Whether the compromise arrived at by the parties in October 1978 constituted a compromise of any future case of unfair labor practices, including the suit now pending before this Court? (iii) Whether a judgment must be for a sum certain? (iv) Whether the affirming of a lower court’s ruling constitutes an endorsement of the factual and legal issues decided by it? (v) Whether a presiding judge is precluded from deciding a case after he has been assigned to serve in another circuit but while his appointment to the court in which he presides has not yet terminated? and (vi) whether the trial court raised any issue for any party litigant.

Appellant’s counsel opened his argument by asserting that the trial judge now co-respondent judge committed reversible error by affirming the ruling of the hearing officer who, he argued, had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because a commissioned deputy minister, by virtue of her position, could not have acted as a hearing officer. Respondents’ counsel contended that the statute creating the Ministry of Labour gave general supervisory jurisdiction to the Minister over all labour cases like the case in point. He argued that an action of unfair labour practices bears the elements of transitory action hence, the party defendant may be sued wheresoever’s he resides.

All actions often carry the problem of movability of the subject matter, availability or residence of the party defendant and the issue of a trial jury.

These primary issues determine the fundamental problem of whether an action is transitory or not, or whether, if the action is transitory, the forum is inconvenient for the defendant? Even where the action is transitory, if the plaintiff chose the forum mainly to harass and cause inconvenience to the defendant, in the interest of fairness and justice to both parties the case should be transferred to the court nearest and convenient to both parties. Appellant has its headquarters in Monrovia where most of its financial resources are available for local and world market. Its mining operation is in Bong Mines, Bong County, where its services are also maintained, but its operational site in Bong County has easier access to Monrovia where the Ministry of Labour is 1ocated than to Gbarnga, the capital of Bong County.

At its mining cite, the Ministry of Labour has an appointed labour inspector who also, according to the statute, has authority to hear all labour disputes except those of such magnitude that the minister himself, his deputy or a delegation appointed by him may decide at the site of operation or send for the contending parties for a determination at the Ministry. The determination of whether a dispute referred to the Ministry should be heard at the work site or at the Ministry rests with the Ministry according to its own decision based upon the convenience of the parties, the Minister, and the necessity and urgency for a hearing of the complaint. Because of the Ministry’s general supervisory authority over all labour disputes, no officer, including the Minister, is without jurisdiction to hear a case at the work site or at the Ministry.

An action of unfair labour practices seeks to impose Personal judgment on the party liable. It is a transitory action; jurisdiction over the party defendant in such a case is in personam. Where the jurisdiction of the court which renders a judgment is based on the court’s power over the person upon whom or in whose favour the liabilities are to be imposed, it exercises only personal jurisdiction.

In the contest of venue of a civil action, a defendant often seeks the invocation of the principle of forum non convenience as an effort to remind the trial court that although jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of the general venue statute, the plaintiff who seeks justice by his choice of court, has blended justice with harassment in a forum, which is greatly inconvenient for the defendant and even for plaintiff himself.

The Ministry of Labour was established chiefly as an administrative court to hear and determine all labour disputes within the spirit of the Labour Laws. Every official of the Labour Ministry, including the Minister, is a hearing officer when he originally enters upon the determination of a labour dispute. The fact that officials of the Labour Ministry are commissioned by the President does not render them less competent to hear labour cases. The designation therefore of any competent employee of the Ministry by the Minister to investigate a labour dispute is proper and legal. We are therefore of the opinion that the hearing officer had jurisdiction and therefore His Honour Fulton W. Yancy. Jr., committed no error in affirming the ruling of the Board of General Appeals on this jurisdictional issue.

Appellant further argued that the Ministry of Labour is guilty of discrimination against appellant, as the Ministry had heretofore limited appellant to first seek a determination of its cases by the labour agent residing in Bong Mines in accordance with sections 100 and 101 of the Labour Practices Law before appealing to the Minister.

Appellant’s counsel also argued that according to section 101 (c) of the Labour Practices Law, appellant falls within the category of the designated group of employees and therefore permitting him to commence his case at the Ministry is a violation of the law and it is also discriminatory. Respondent’s counsel contended that the administration of the entire labour affairs of the country rests solely with the Labour Ministry and that under sections 100 and 101 of the Labour Practices Law; the Ministry’s labour agents are merely its agents and reside in other places outside of the Ministry only at the instance of the Ministry of Labour, their principal.

In 1942-43 when the first cognizable labour statute was enacted, it established labour courts which were intended to exercise quasi-judicial functions strictly on county basis but this law was repealed in 1961. Act of the Legislature, 1942-43, Ch. XVIL

Under the Labor Laws, as amended by the Act of the Legislature, 1971-72 the Ministry of Labor, Youth and Sports has two basic functions, all of which are exercised by its personnel under the directive of the Minister.

When one or more officials of the Ministry sit to hear and decide a labour controversy, he or they constitute an administrative court, a decision from which is reviewable by the Judiciary in conformity with rules of courts. All other functions of the Ministry are executive duties.

Labour agents have no exclusive jurisdiction over the Minister who appointed them. They, as agents, are at all times subject to control by their principal. The facts reveal that the hearing officer’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case bears no element of discrimination.

Appellant’s counsel argued that the deputy minister has no original jurisdiction to hear a labour dispute since an appeal from her decision will not be fairly reviewed by the Board of General Appeals because the members of the Board are administratively subject to the deputy minister who is second in command to the Minister. The counsel further argued that according to Sections 100 and 101 of the Labor Practices Law only a labour agent, a labour commissioner or a labor inspector has the statutory duty to serve as a hearing officer. Counsel for Co-appellee Benson contended that the peculiarity of the labor administration lies in the necessity to give quick and speedy remedy to parties in order to quell labour disputes, ensure industrial tranquility and mutual confidence of labor and management. These, the counsel for respondents argued, are the chief and fundamental purposes of labor administration; and to achieve these ends, the counsel concluded, no employee of the Ministry is prohibited from being appointed to hear in the first instance any labor dispute, and hence all labor agents are subordinate to their principal.

As an agent has no supervisory authority over his principal, it is the Labour Ministry that controls its labour agents as required by the Labour Law. Therefore, the Minister of Labour as the overall supervisory principal may properly authorize any employee of the Ministry of Labor of whom the labour agents are part, to hear and determine a labour case.

The title or commission an official of the Labour Ministry holds does not prohibit him from hearing and determining a labour dispute. The knowledge of the official serving in that particular category to which he is appointed by the Minister is of paramount necessity. The maintenance of fairness and justice in the determination of a dispute is the utmost purpose of the law.

We are therefore of the opinion that the assignment of any employee of the Ministry of Labour who has expert knowledge of the duty to which he may be assigned cannot be declared a wrongful delegation of authority so as to prohibit him from carrying out the Ministry’s assignments as long as the assignments do not create the problem of conflict of interest. The right of appeal was not affected by the hearing.

Counsel for appellant argued that Co-appellee Benson’s complaint of unfair labour practices stated no cause of action and is therefore unmeritorious, especially as the grievance complained of has been compromised and finally terminated in writing signed by both parties with notice to the Ministry of Labour and to therefore allow Co-appellee Benson to sue for the same claim is violative of the law.

Counsel for appellees contended that the compromise arrived at was for a separate and independent claim. Appellees’ counsel further contended that the case now in point is for petitioner to strictly comply with the contract. Appellees’ counsel also contended that the compromise concluded by appellant and Co-appellee Benson did not cancel or modified clause 4 of the employment contract.

Recourse to the records revealed that Co-respondent Benson had earlier complained to the Ministry of Labour that, in his own opinion, he was not receiving salary on par with other experts in the same medical field, which he considered to have been discriminatory.

This controversy was compromised by the exchange of letters, the relevant portions of which read thus:

” Acknowledgment is made of your letter dated October 21, 1978, with respect to our offer to you of an incumbency salary and we further hereby assure you of management’s agreement to the below listed prerequisites as conditions precedent for your withdrawal of your case presently before the Ministry of Labour, as follows, to wit:

1. That the payment of incumbency salary of$250.00 will not preclude any future regrouping; nor will the incumbency salary be reduced or terminated when a future regrouping occurs, but same shall be paid in keeping with BMC’s Salary Guidelines;

2. That the incumbency salary shall not have any adverse effect on your Christmas Bonus and other existing or future emoluments; and

3. That you withdraw promptly, without reservation, your present case before the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports involving BMC;

In view of the above, your acceptance of the conditions alluded to should be done by signing a copy of this letter for our files.”

The compromise was evidently arrived at and respondent was elevated to the rank to which he was justly entitled when originally employed. The additional payment of $250.00 was an incumbency salary, that is, salary for the period he was working and his rank at the time. Count one of the compromise agreement quoted supra expressly stated, “that payment under the compromise will not preclude any future regrouping nor will the compensation be reduced or terminated when a future regrouping occurs.” The compromise agreement nowhere by its terms concluded that Co-appellee Benson was then being regrouped as per the contract of employment. Whether or not Co-appellee Benson was to have been regrouped remained for future determination according to the contract. We are therefore of the opinion that the compromise agreement previously arrived at bears no relevancy to the pending case.

Co-appellee Benson therefore breached no duty under the contract and is therefore not guilty of any violation of his obligations under the contract. Every person is legitimately entitled to take full advantage of the law in prosecuting and defending his rights. Doing so is violative of no law but the neglect to act is a violation of the law and would prevent a party from seeking any remedy or protection of the law.

Petitioner’s counsel argued that the judgment of the trial court is uncertain and indistinct because it awarded no sum certain. Appellant’s counsel argued that under the Civil Procedure Law, in order for a judgment to be enforceable it must be for a sum certain. Counsel for appellees contended however that not every judgment is specifically for a certain sum of money. The counsel further contended that a judgment must comply with and be supported by the claim asserted and the evidence produced by the aggrieved party. Appellees’ counsel concluded that the complaint filed and evidence produced support the relief sought by Co-appellee Benson, to the effect that appellant regroup him according to the specific term of the contract.

Judgments are of various kinds. A court cannot award a judgment for a relief not warranted by the facts before it. The complaint before us particularly requests for the elimination of all traces of unfair labour practices by the appellant regrouping Co-appellee Benson as required by the contract. Clause 4 of the contract reads thus:

“Job Evaluation: It is further agreed and understood by the contracting parties that after every two (2) years of service, the employer shall do an objective job evaluation of the employee’s performance for regrouping and/or promotion.”

Co-appellee Benson’s complaint is, in essence, that appellant has unfairly treated him by its failure to regroup him as required by the contract. The relief sought is not for a sum certain; hence no money judgment can be awarded. The evidence produced supports the judgment that Co-appellee Benson should be regrouped retroactively as of the date his two years of service actually ended.

According to appellant’s witnesses, Co-appellee Benson was classified in group 12.3 in compliance with the compromise agreement; Co-appellee Benson’s performances were evaluated for normal regrouping according to the company’s policy at the end of his two years of service; the findings were forwarded with recommendation that Co-appellee Benson be regrouped from 12.3 to 12.4. According to the records, the Board of General Appeals ruled that there is no conflict between the compromise of November 7, 1978, and clause 4 of the employment contract of October 3, 1977, as the former clearly states that the incumbency salary would not preclude any future regrouping of the respondent; that is, under clause 4 of the employment contract. Thus the compromise arrangement was to be considered distinct from the contractual obligations of the appellant under clause 4 of the employment contract clause 4 of the employment contract is unambiguous and the appellant has to regroup Co-appellee Benson every two years commencing from the date of his employment after an objective job evaluation. Co-appellee Benson, having been employed in 1977, was entitled to be regrouped in 1979 after the job evaluation was performed by the appellant and he was rated as a “good physician”. We are of the opinion that this ruling of the Board of General Appeals is in strict conformity with the evidence and the relief sought.

Appellant’s counsel further argued that his objection to the jurisdiction of the hearing officer was not passed upon by the trial judge and such failure to rule is a reversible error. We are of the opinion that the trial judge’s affirmance of the ruling of the Board which held that the hearing officer had jurisdiction to hear the case constituted a hearing by the trial judge and no error was therefore committed.

Appellees’ counsel further argued that the trial judge was without jurisdiction when he rendered the judgment therefore the judgment under review is unenforceable. The counsel contended that the trial judge had received a mandate from the People’s Supreme Court to proceed to another circuit court; hence he was without jurisdiction in the circuit over which he was presiding. Therefore all that he did thereafter in that circuit was a nullity.

The council did not however support his contention by proof that the mandate, by virtue of which the presiding judge was presiding over the case, had expired by its own force or by revocation.

After the assignment of a circuit court judge has expired, he lacks jurisdiction to try any case, but this was not evident in this case. According to our procedural law, a trial that begins with a term of court may continue until the case is finally determined by a judgment even though the term of the trial judge may have expired. Addo v. Texaco Africa, Ltd, [1976] LRSC 45; 25 LLR 229(1976).

Counsel for petitioner argued that the manner in which the trial of the case was conducted by His Honour Fulton W. Yancy was improper, bias, and illegal and that he violated rules of procedure by raising issues for one of the parties.

Respondent’s counsel contended that Bong Mining Company is reputed for full compliance with all of its contractual obligations except in the instant case where it refused to regroup respondent according to clause 4 of the contract. The counsel further contended that the charges of bias and irregularity against the judge are not supported by the record. The comment of the judge which counsel for appellant regarded as bias and irregular reads thus:

“This court has held that decisions of hearing officers and the Board of General Appeals will not be reviewed or overturned unless there be a showing that the award was obtained by fraud or corruption or undue means; or where there is evidence of partiality or bias on the part of the hearing officer or the Board of General Appeals; or where the procedure was irregular and the misconduct of the hearing officer is manifest and material to the case or where there was other misbehavior; or where the hearing officer or the Board of General Appeals exceeded their powers.”

This comment, we are of the opinion, is legally sound in law and ethics. It is proper and prejudices no party. It is evidence of the trial judge’s determination to maintain fairness and justice. A complaint of unfair labour practices is in essence a charge for discrimination by the aggrieved party against his employer.

In accordance with the facts, the evidence and the law controlling, we hereby affirm the judgment that Co-appellee, Dr. Henrique Benson, is legally entitled to be regrouped according to his contract of employment with petitioner, Bong Mining Company, and accordingly, that he be classified in group 12.4. Retroactive as of October 10, 1979, with all rights, privileges and emoluments thereto appertaining, with costs of these proceedings against petitioner. The Clerk of this Court is hereby commanded to send a mandate to the presiding judge of the trial court to resume jurisdiction over this cause and enforce this judgment. And it is so ordered.

Ruling affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE YANGBE dissents.

Even though I concur essentially with my learned colleagues in their majority opinion, it is regretted that I have found myself unable to join them in affixing my signature to the final result of this case.

A glance at the records certified to us reveals that the appellant, the Bong Mining Company, in counts three of its petition and count four of the bill of exceptions, respectively, contended, inter alia, that the judgments of the trial court, Board of General Appeals and the hearing officer are uncertain, indefinite, and thus unenforceable. A glance at the records further show that the judgment of the court of origin given on the 11th day of August, A.D. 1981, like that of the Board of General appeals, was not definite in its directives. The trial judge in his judgment ruled, among other things, that Co-appellee Benson be regrouped retroactively from the date of his employment, which was October 3, 1977, as his right to the re-grouping occurred October 19, 1979. The judge further directed that Co-appellee Benson receives the necessary adjustments by virtue of his employment contract letter.

As observed, one needs nothing more to realize that the judgment of the co-respondent judge, like that of the Board of General Appeals, left a big burden on the Co-appellee Benson to ascertain for himself what would be his actual entitlements under salary category 12.4, the new regrouping. In their respective judgments, the lower tribunals thus failed to spell out what exactly were to be the rights and privileges of Co­ appellee Benson accruing under category 12.4.

In their majority opinion, my learned colleagues have advanced the contention that a money judgment could be enforced without a sum certain; in that, judgments are of various kinds and that a court cannot award a judgment for a relief not warranted by the facts before it. In their opinion, Co­ appellee Benson had gone to the Ministry of Labour specifically to ask for the elimination of traces of unfair labor practices by the appellant in regrouping. I beg to differ on this point. As I see it, the complaint of Co-appellee Benson before the Ministry of Labor was based on the fact that the said Co­ appellee was not being adequately compensated for his services in view of his professional qualifications and competency. He argued, and this has been admitted by the appellant in a letter written to Co-appellee Benson, that local medical practitioners (i.e., Liberians) received a monthly salary of $1,815.00 while their European counterparts with similar qualifications were receiving $2,065.00 thus, $250.00 over and above! This, in the opinion of Co-appellee Benson, was discriminatory, warranting an investigation by the Ministry of Labour. Hence, the said co­ appellee took his complaint to the Ministry of Labor to get his appropriate salary grade and to receive all the arrears of his emoluments as per clause 4 of his contract of employment. This is the essence of Co-appellee Benson’s case.

Certainly, paying the European doctors a salary of $250.00 over and above that of local doctors with similar qualifications and experience, constituted unfair labour practices as Co­ appellee Benson alleges in this case. Having determined that unfair labour practices had been proven against appellant, the Board of General Appeals and the trial court should have thus ascertained the actual entitlements appertaining to group no.

12.4 since the appellant had a comprehensive salary guideline scheme. In failing to do so, the lower court, therefore, left the judgment open for speculative adjustments much at the expense and disadvantage of appellant. The object of a judgment of court is for the successful party to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments, which are awarded by the judgment and not to mount the judgment on the wall as a mere decoration.

Consequently, from the facts presented in this case, the principal and only question to be decided by this Court is, what rights, privileges and emoluments Dr. Benson, co-appellee in this case, will be entitled to when he is re-grouped retroactively as of October 10, 1979? As everyone can see, this question is essentially a factual one, thus calling for evidence written or otherwise, to determine it. The answer to this question, therefore, is that these entitlements will be ascertained only if the appellant is made to furnish the trial court the necessary documents (salary guidelines) appertaining to scale 12.4 under which Co-appellee Benson now falls. I am still at a loss to understand as to why this cardinal factual point escaped the attention of my learned colleagues. As it is, their judgment, like that of the lower courts, remains meaningless since the lower court is left at liberty to enforce the judgment the way it sees fit, and the Co-appellee Benson is thus left at the mercy of the appellant herein.

It now becomes necessary to consider the legal authorities which support the general view that judgments must be certain and definite to be enforceable. 46 AM. JUR. 2d, Judgments, § 67, speaks of certainty of judgments, thus: “It is a fundamental rule that a judgment should be complete and certain in itself, that the form of the judgment should be such as to indicate with reasonable clearness the decision which the court has rendered, so that the parties may be able to ascertain the extent to which their rights and obligations are fixed, and so that the judgment is susceptible of enforcement in the manner provided by law. A failure to comply with this requirement may render a judgment void for uncertainty.”

In the cases Firestone Plantations Company v. Greaves, 9LLR 250 (1947) and Lamco J. V. Operating Company v. Rogers, [1975] LRSC 26; 24 LLR 314 (1975), this Court made similar observations and remanded the cases to the lower courts with special instructions to get additional evidence to supply the missing links in the judgments before such judgments could be fully enforced. In the most recent case of The United Liberia Rubber Corporation and The Chairman of the Board of General Appeals v. McCauley, [1981] LRSC 34; 29 LLR 342 (1981), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bortue, reiterated the general and fundamental principle that judgments must be certain and definite to be enforceable. For reliance, the Court quoted Hansford v.Potter[1969] LRSC 9; , 19 LLR 176 (1969); Kennedy v. Republic, [1969] LRSC 39; 19 LLR 376 (1969); Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:41.1(a); and 46 AM. JUR. 2d, Judgments, § 67. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court with specific instructions to the lower court to obtain additional evidence before the judgment could be fully enforced. I am in complete agreement with the legal authorities quoted in the above case and the conclusion arrived at therein.

I find it difficult, therefore, to understand why this same Court, which delivered the opinion in the case just quoted above, to wit, The United Liberia Rubber Corporation and the Chairman of the Board of General Appeals et a/ v. McCauley[1981] LRSC 34; , 29 LLR 342 (1981), should now come up with views that are diametrically opposed to those expressed in that case.

It is quite plain from the evidence, written or oral, that the Co-appellee Benson filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labour not for unfair labour practices, per se, but for salary adjustments in pursuance of the terms and conditions of the contract of his employment. The Ministry of Labour, after due investigation, correctly sustained his claim and accordingly awarded him the necessary adjustments. Up to this stage the Ministry had done a fine job for Co-appellee Benson; but the Ministry should also have asked the appellant to produce its salary scale schedules as a basis for computing co-appellee Benson’s adjustments. This was a serious omission and thus a reversible error on their part and also on the part of the co­ appellee trial judge.

The argument against the production of company documents raised by the counsel for appellant is groundless, in that, it is the court and nobody else that has to decide whether or not a certain communication is privileged. A fortiori, it was for the trial court to decide whether or not the documents required from the appellant were confidential and thus privileged communication. In the American case “Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635, it was emphatically ruled that it is the sole province of the courts to decide whether or not a certain communication is privileged. In the more recent case, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through the Chief Justice, Warren Burger, dismissed President Nixon’s contention that presidential communications were privileged and hence unquestionable in a court of law forum. Hence, the Supreme Court, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, issued a subpoena duces tecum against the President for the production of what he termed “confidential and secret documents”. I also hold that the judicial powers vested in this Court and our lower courts in this regard are unchallengeable. Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances inherited in our tripartite system of government, and this is also recognized in PRC Decree No. 3.

In conclusion, therefore, it is my considered opinion that appellant should have been compelled to produce its salary and emolument scales so that proper adjustments could be made in favour of the Co-appellee Benson. This Court, therefore, should have concluded its judgment by giving special instruct­ ions to the lower court to obtain the required documents from the petitioner and enforce the judgment. As it is, the judgment leaves the trial court at full liberty to accept anything from petitioner, Bong Mining Company, to compute Co-appellee Benson’s claim at the discretions of the appellant and the trial court during enforcement of the judgment. This is my main fear and misgiving in this case. I, therefore, voted to remand the case to the trial court with specific instructions to that court to obtain the salary scale schedule from the appellant and any other relevant document for the computation of Co-appellee Benson’s claim with reasonable certainty. When this has been accomplished, the trial court should thereafter enforce the judgment as ordered.

I therefore dissent.