BONG MINING COMPANY (BMC), Appellant, v. AMOS BAH, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE NATIONAL LABOUR COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: November 1, 1988. Decided: December 29, 1988.
1. A release issued with a proviso that there is a balance due the releaser cannot be a bar to a further claim for the balance.
2. A release is the giving up or abandonment of a claim or right to the party against whom such a claim exists or the right is to be enforced or exercised. A release is a discharge of the claim or obligation.
3. Where a release is issue for a cause, it relieves the releasee from further obligation to the releaser with respect to that cause.
4. The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, taking into consideration the entirety of facts and circumstances.
5. In interpreting a release to determine whether a particular claim has been discharged, the primary rule of construction is that the intention of the parties shall govern, which intention shall be determined and resolved in the light of all the facts and circumstances under surrounding the parties’ acts. .
6. There is no release unless there are unequivocal acts expressly showing or by necessary implication an intention to release.
7. A party cannot release a claim of which he or she has no knowledge or of which he or she is ignorant by virtue of fraud.
8. Where a release is granted as to known injuries, and it develops subsequently that there are substantial injuries of which the parties were not aware at the time of the release, such a release may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake.
9. A release may be avoided for mutual mistake even where the instrument contains a recited clause which was not the subject of express bargaining that the release shall apply to all unknown and unanticipated injuries.
10. For an injury to be compensable, ordinarily, it is essential that it should have proximately resulted from the cause or condition which brings it within the operation of the statute relied upon.
11. Disability or death for which compensation is sought should have proximately resulted from a compensable injury.
12. As a general rule, compensation must be allowed for all injurious consequences flowing from the original injury, and not attributable to an independent intervening cause.
13. Where death ensues from accident, it is immaterial whether the death was the reasonable and likely consequence of the accident if the death resulted from the injury.
14. Labor matters are equitable matters.
15. Upon review of the records, the Supreme Court may affirm, reverse or render such other judgment as will best effectuate the administration of justice.
16. Under Liberia’s labor law, disability or total incapacity means such incapacity whether temporary or permanent, that so disables a person so that he or she is unable to undertake such employment that he or she was capable of undertaking at the time they suffered the injury or disease causing such incapacity or disability.
17. Daily rates mean daily earnings.
18. When calculating awards for hourly workers, daily rates equals the hourly rate times the number of hours worked plus the daily value of other earnings. For salary workers, the daily rate is calculated by dividing the salary (including the value of other earnings) by the average number of days worked during the salary period.
Appellee was injured in an accident while riding in a car owned by appellant, his employer. As a result of the accident, he was declared disabled with respect to his work assignment prior to the accident, but was determined to be fit to do other work. Three years later, appellee was declared redundant and terminated. Appellee was required to sign a release , prepared by appellant, as part of the termination procedure; the release acknowledged receipt of all compensation and relieved appellant of any further claims in the future. Appellee issued the release, but noted reservations on it. Subsequently, appellee sought additional compensation when he discovered that he had sustained further injuries from the accident then was initially known. Appellant refused to pay the additional compensation on the ground that appellee had issued a release. Appellee filed action before the Ministry of Labor. The hearing officer dis-missed the claim, which ruling was affirmed by the Board of General Appeals. On appeal to the National Labor Court, appellee prevailed and was awarded additional compensation, from which ruling appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. In reviewing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that appellee had issued a conditional release, and accordingly could legally seek further compensation. The Court therefore affirmed the ruling of the Labour Court.
S. Edward Carlor for appellant. Roland Barnes for appellee.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GBALAZEH delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellee, Mr. Amos Bah, was previously an employee of the Bong Mining Company (BMC), appellant here. While on his way to work on November 23 1980, he was involved in an accident while riding in one of the company cars. Mr. Bah was employed by the company as a heavy duty, Caterpillar machinery operator. A report issue by the BMC Hospital on September 9, 1983, revealed that appellee was injured in the said accident, at which time he “sustained fractures of the 5th to 8th ribs right, fracture of the right acronion, pelvic fracture without dislocation….” That same report also noted that Mr. Bah, appellee, “was admitted to the hospital from the 30th September to the 27th November 1981, because of gastroenteritis and tuberculosis of the epididymitis. The latter resulted into the removal of one testicle because of granulomatous & orchestrates, (testicular tuberculosis) verified by pathological examination. Apart from the history given, and the treatments which employee has received, his present condition can be considered relatively good.” (Our emphasis).
The appellee later obtained another medical report on the state of his condition from the John F. Kennedy (JFK) Medical Center in Monrovia, issued by one Dr. R .J. De Siebenthal, M. D. and Orthopedic Surgeon and Associate Professor of Surgery at JFK. The report was concluded as follows: “The reduction of the function of the left part of the body by Mr. Amos Bah as a result of his accident is corresponding to a permanent partial disability of 10% according to the International Standard of Appreciation of 150 x Daily Rate Salary according to the Liberian Standard. I am not qualified to establish the disability resulting from the hemicastration performed after the accident neither to elaborate on the reasons of his operation. As a result of his accident of 1980, Bah is unfit for operating heavy duty vehicles, but can drive light cars or to be put on many other job assignments.”
Appellee continued to work at the company and received treatments at the company hospital but on July 28, 1983, his services were terminated on grounds that his position was declared redundant by management. Appellee was therefore paid $2,226.17 as redundancy pay and further paid the sum of $950.00 compensation for the disability he had suffered from the accident referred to, supra, which was for 10% partial permanent disability as indicated by Dr. de Siebenthal.
Appellee was required by appellant to issue a release to it, affirming the full payment of all compensations to him by the company and also relieving it from al; further claims against it in future. The release was prepared by the appellant, but the appellee signed it on November 16, 1983, as follows:
“Given under my hand and signature this 4t h day of
November, A. D. 1983. Amos Bah protect for the balance.
16/11/83 Amos Bah No.0348 Issued.”
That is to say, appellee agreed to append his signature to the said release only on protest or with reservations for additional claims to be made on the company in future for additional compensation for the effects of the accident on him.
Appellee in fact subsequently demanded further compensation from the appellant, claiming that while being treated at the BMC Hospital for the injuries he had sustained, he was operated upon, and his right testicle removed, which resulted in his impotence for which he deserved to be compensated further by BMC. Appellant refused to give appellee further compensation, claiming that appellee had been fully compensated for whatever claims he might have against the company and he had issued an unconditional release to the company. Appellee on the other hand contended that the purported unconditional release was in fact given with reservations or on protest for future, further claims. However, the company refused to honor his claims.
Consequently, on November 7, 1983, the appellee filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor, which was heard by the local hearing officer. The complaint was a claim for additional compensation from the Bong Mining Company (BMC), appellant, on the grounds that the release he issued was with reservations for such an additional compensation and that as a matter of fact he deserved that additional compensation on the ground that he was operated upon. while being treated by the BMC Hospital for the accident, his right testicle was removed and that resulted in his obvious impotence. He therefore claimed additional compensation for the said impotence, which he claimed was not provided for in the earlier compensation given him by the company.
Appellant denied the claim on the grounds that appellee had issued a release after being fully compensated for his injuries, and that as a matter of fact, his alleged castration and subsequent impotence was not occupational or a result of the accident, but rather caused by testicular tuberculosis as shown by medical reports.
The hearing officer dismissed the claim for additional compensation on grounds of the release. An appeal was taken to the Board of General Appeals, which upheld the said ruling. Subsequently, appellee appealed to the National Labour Court, which heard the appeal and reversed the board, awarding $14,600. as compensation to the appellee. Hence, appellant announced and perfected an appeal to this Court for a final review.
From the foregoing facts, the following issues need to be resolved by this Court in this matter:
1. Whether or not the release issued on “protest for the balance” or with reservation by the releaser absolving management from further claims, bars the maker of the instrument from making such a claim in future.
2. Whether or not the impotency alleged by appellee is by any means a consequence of the occupational injury earlier sustained by him.
3. How much of a male’s earning power is permanently affected by impotence and how does that justify the award made in this matter by the National Labor Court?
We will answer the first issue in the negative: that a release issued with a proviso that it is being issued on “protest for balance” cannot be a bar to further claims for the said balance.
“A release is the giving up or abandoning of a claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists or the right is to be enforced or exercised. A release is of itself a discharge of the claim or obligation. It is the discharge of a debt by the act of a party in distinction from an extinguishment which is a discharge by operation of law. The view that a release constitutes a contract is generally, although not uniformly, approved.” (Emphasis our). 66 AM JUR. 2d. §1 at 676-679.
That is to say, as long as a release is issued for some cause, it relieves the release from further obligations to the releaser with respect to said cause. But it is also a contract, so that there must be a meeting of the minds: the releaser and the releasee must have had in mind a particular cause for which the release is issued, and hence, it cannot be extended to other causes which were not intended to be a part of the said release. Therefore, there can be no release in respect of those others.
Authority hold:
The scope of a release is determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the particular instrument, considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances. The intention of the parties is to be gathered from the entire instrument, and in such inquiry that construction will be adopted which gives effect to each and every part of the instrument where that is possible. In interpreting a release to determine whether a particular claim has been discharged, the primary rule or construction is that the intention of the parties shall govern, and this intention is to be determined with a consideration of what was within the consideration of the parties when the release was executed, which in turn is be resolved in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances under which the parties acted. There cannot be a release without unequivocal acts showing expressly or by necessary implication an intention to release. A person cannot release a claim of which he has no knowledge, and of existence of which he has been fraudulently kept in ignorance. (Emphasis ours). 66 AM JUR. 2d., Release, §309 at 706-707.
In this case, appellee had indicated in the release he issued the appellant that he had issued the said release on “protest for balance.” That is to say, he was issuing the release in respect of the injuries he had sustained on the job, but that where the need arises for further claims then a demand will obviously be made in respect of such claims. At the time of making the release, the appellee was still taking treatment for his 5t h and 8′ ribs, which were fractured in the accident and in respect of that he issued the said release after the company paid him a compensation of $950.00; a release that he issued with the notation “protest for balance,” indicating an intention to make future demands in respect of whatever other developments he might experience with regard to the injuries he had sustained. In fact he had indicated that the amount he was paid was too small for the injuries he had sustained. As one of his medical reports indicated, he was no longer fit to operate heavy duty machines, but he could drive light cars and do other minor work.
Afterwards, appellee was operated upon and his right testicle removed in the process of treating the injuries he had sustained from the accident, and therefore, he made another demand on the company for additional compensation for the impotency caused by the removal of his testicle. It was the latter demand that necessitated the present action, which, gathering from all we have said, supra, he is not barred from making, as a result of the release he had given on “protest for balance.”
“Where a release is given with reference only to known injuries and it subsequently develops that a substantial injury then existed which was unknown to the parties and not taken into consideration, the release may be avoided on the ground of mutual mistake. This is true even though the instrument contains a clause, not the subject of express bargaining, that the release shall apply to all unknown and unanticipated injuries.” 66 AM JUR. 2d., Release, §20 at 604-605.
We will next consider whether or not the removal of appellee’s testicle and the consequent impotence he suffered came from the earlier occupational injury he had suffered. Appellee had undergone a surgical operation leading to the removal of his testicle In the course of being treated for the fracture of his 5th h ribs and 8t
Medical reports in the record of this case avoided saying whether or not the operation on the testicle was necessitated by the treatment he was receiving for the accident. Appellee’s doctor indicated that he was incompetent to say whether or not the removal of the testicle was a consequence of the accident and appellant’s doctor on the other hand said the removal was necessitated by appellee’s development of testicular tuberculosis, verified by pathological examination, but refused to say whether or not it was a consequence of the earlier accident and treatment he had received. However, there is nothing in the records to show that the testicular tuberculosis was an earlier case before the accident case. If the illness which had necessitated the removal of his testicle was completely unrelated to the effects of the injuries he had sustained as a result of that accident, but rather was such a serious infection, why had appellee never before reported the case to BMC Hospital for treatment until after the accident? Appellee contends that the infection was never present on him before the accident and only became known during the course of his treatment for the effects of the accident, which BMC Hospital had in fact undertaken to cure and had later gone ahead to remove his testicle allegedly for testicular tuberculosis, which only became obvious at that time. This was not rebutted by appellant.
In the circumstances of this case one can be convinced that the removal of the testicle might not have been the direct result of the accidents, but that it was a direct consequence of some of the effects of the injuries he had sustained from said accident and therefore he should be compensated for the removal of said testicle.
Authority holds, thus:
It is essential, ordinarily, that for an injury to be compensable it should have proximately resulted from the cause or conditions relied upon to bring it within the operation of the statute, and that the disability or death for which compensation is sough, should have proximately resulted from a compensable injury.
A difficult question is presented for determination, where it becomes necessary to decide in any particular case just how far an injury may be said to be the cause of an ensuing incapacity, the facts showing, as they frequently do, that with the injury commenced a chain of events, each of which was more or less dependent upon its predecessor. In this class of cases, the decisions are sustained and justified ordinarily by reference to the doctrine of proximate cause. The general rule is that compensation must be allowed for all of the injurious consequences flowing from the original injury, and not attributable to an independent intervening cause. It has been stated in this connection, that the doctrine that a tortfeasor is liable only for the natural effects of his negligent act is not applicable in workmen’s compensation cases. Where death ensues from accident, it is immaterial whether the death was the reasonable and likely consequence of the accident if the death resulted from the injury. (Emphasis ours). 81 AM. JUR. 2d., Workmen’s Compensation, §229 at 882.
From all the foregoing, we conclude that appellee deserves to be compensated for his impotence as a consequence of earlier injuries he had sustained around the ribs, the back and the pelvic girdle, from an accident in the course of his employment and services to BMC, and from subsequent medical operations he underwent on his testicle.
Finally, we will determine how much of a male earning power is permanently affected by impotence and how does such a consideration justify the award by the lower court. Labor matters are equitable matters. To return this matter to medics at this juncture in order to determine the degree of disability in appellee will be too much after all these years of litigation; as long as we have established a basic for liability for additional compensation, it is only equitable that we determine the level of such compensation from the record and circumstances of this case.
The BMC medical report said that appellee could no longer operate heavy duty automobiles for which he was trained and which he had earlier operated for the company, but that he could be used to drive light vehicles, such as cars, and to do other light works. Appellee’s own doctor said his loss was about 10% disability or the basis of which he was compensated the bare sum of $950.00.
But when we consider that appellee is now impotent, we believe he falls within a higher category of compensation than the previous one. Bouvier says that the consequences of castration, when complete, are impotence and sterility. BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (unabridged) 3′ ed. at 430. This means that after the removal of his testicle, appellee became impotent and sterile. He will no longer have the essential joy of sexual relations and consequently, he is sterile and can no longer reproduce children. The equitable result of this is that we now class him under total permanent disability; not merely to work, but also to have sex and to reproduce his kind, both of which are frustrating circumstances for any young man.
Hence, we have seen it fit to classify appellee under schedule A (8) of the Workmen’s Compensation Scheme provided by our labor law for compensating him. We believe only that can give appellee a fair and equitable treatment in his circumstances. This Court, upon review of the record on appeal, may affirm, reverse or render such other judgment as will, in its opinion, best effectuate the administration of justice and equity. Williams v. Tubman, [1960] LRSC 47; 14 LLR 109 (1960).
Our labor law gives a definition of what is meant by “total incapacity (or disability)” and that can assist us in determining the amount of appellee’s compensation as provided under schedule A (8), which we have decided to be the class for compensating him.. The statute provides that: “total incapacity (or disability) means such incapacity whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates an employee for any employment which he was capable of undertaking at the time he suffered the injury or disease causing such incapacity, provided however, that permanent total incapacity shall be deemed to have resulted from any injury or combination of injuries specified in schedule A or aggregate lump sum payment for which equals or exceeds 1,460 times the daily rate.” Liberian Labor Law; Chapter 36, Section 3501 (N), pages 95-96.
Daily rate means daily earnings. In the calculation of awards under our statute, daily rate equals the hourly rate times the number of hours worked, plus the daily value of other earnings for hourly workers; for salaried workers, the daily rate is calculated by dividing the salary (including value of other earnings) by the average number of days worked during the salary period.
Appellee’s hourly rate was $1.25, which gave him $10.00 for 8 hours each day, then times 30 days for the month which will amount to $300.00 a month. The statute intended the figure 1,460 to represent payment for 48 months. Therefore we multiply $300.00 x $1,460 to arrive at a total sum of $14,600.00.
Therefore, the trial judge was correct when he made an award of $14,600.00 to appellee, even though he neglected to give convincing reason for the award, or to say under which schedule appellee was allocated in his award.
From all what we have said, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs ruled against the appellant. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below, commanding the judge presiding therein to resume jurisdiction and enforce the judgment as to payment without the alternative of reinstatement. And it is hereby so ordered.
Judgment affirmed.