THE MINOR CHILDREN AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE WORKMEN’S DEATH COMPENSATION OF THE LATE EMMETT J. SCOTT, represented by some of their mothers and the Beneficiaries of the Intestate Estate of the late EMMETT J. SCOTT, by and thru J. MONTGOMERY SCOTT, Administrator, et al. Informants, v. HER HONOUR GLADYS K. JOHNSON, Judge, People’s Monthly and Probate Court, et al., Respondents.
INFORMATION PROCEEDINGS GROWING OUT OF THE EXECUTION OF A MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT TO THE CIVIL LAW COURT
Heard: March 16, 1982. Decided: July 8, 1982.
1. Dependents, under the Labor Laws of Liberia, are those members of the family of an employee who are, at the time of his death or at the commencement of his disability resulting from an occupational injury or disease, wholly or partially dependent for the ordinary necessities of life, upon the earnings of such employee.
2. The coverage of the Workmen’s Compensation Statute is not limited to payments of benefits to injured employees, but also extends to persons who are dependent upon such an employee for support, and who are deprived of such support by reason of the employee’s death.
3. In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, relationship with the employee, either natural or legal, is not an essential element in establishing the status of a dependent.
4. The principal indications of dependency include the fact that the deceased made support contributions in the past, that claimant has no present means of support, and whether the claimant has reason to anticipate support contributions.
5. Workman’s death compensation is not a part of the estate of the deceased employee. It is the exclusive property intended for the dependents of the deceased employee.
6. Workmen’s compensation statutes which discriminate against illegitimate children are unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection under the law.
7. In matters of probate, the court should appoint the widow or the next of kin or both, and when these rules are not followed and where the court did not give a chance to all the parties to come and defend their claim, such appointment is voidable.
8. An administrator may not be removed for frivolous reasons but only upon showing or evidence of improper conduct and only after he has had an opportunity to defend himself.
These information proceedings emanated from the execution of a mandate of the Supreme Court to the Civil Law Court, growing out of a petition for judicial review of a workmen’s death compensation claim.
Emmet J. Scott, an employee of Weasua Air Transport, died intestate, leaving no real property. He left nine children who were wholly dependent on him for their nurture, education and welfare. Informant, J. Montgomery Scott, one of Emmet J. Scott’s brothers, received letters of administration to administer his intestate estate. Upon the strength of the letters of administration, J. Montgomery Scott obtained a workmens’ compensation award of $38,400.00 from the Ministry of Labor to provide for the continual support of the deceased nine children. On appeal to the Civil Law Court, the award was confirmed. From that judgment, Weasua Air Transport appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the award.
Just before the circuit court could, however, enforce the judgment, informant’s letters of administration were revoked and Bernice Cooper was appointed by the Probate Court as administrator. Acting upon the strength of this appointment, the Civil Law Court made partial disbursement of the judgment to Bernice Cooper, which it was alleged she used to benefit only her son and with the intention to exclude the other eight dependents of the late Emmet Scott on the grounds that they were not his legitimate children. Contending that the action of the Civil Law Court and the Probate Court violated the mandate of the Supreme Court, informants filed a bill of information to the Full Bench.
The Supreme Court held that the removal of J. Montgomery Scott by the Probate Court was arbitrary and capricious and that the workman’s death compensation benefit was not part of the estate of the late Emmet J. Scott. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the ruling of the Civil Law Court reversed and instructed that all proceeds paid to Bernice Cooper be returned to J. Montgomery Scott for distribution among the dependents.
M. Fahnbulleh Jones appeared for informants, while Julia F. Gibson and Raymond Hoggard appeared for respondents
MR. JUSTICE YANGBE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The informants, in a thirteen-count bill of information, have alleged that the decision of this Court affirming the workmen’s death compensation award to the nine dependents of the late Emmet J. Scott was not strictly complied with. The information alleged that the Monthly and Probate Judge for Montserrado County committed a reversible error when, upon a petition of one Bernice Cooper, she removed one of the informants, J. Montgomery Scott, as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Emmet J, Scott, and replaced him with Bernice Cooper. Informants alleged that the said Bernice Cooper had refused to assist or join in the original action, but is now attempting to collect proceeds of the award to benefit only her son, with the intent to exclude the eight other dependents of the late Emmet J. Scott on the grounds that they were his illegitimate children.
It is also alleged by the informants that His Honour Frank W. Smith, then assigned circuit judge but now our colleague, com-mitted errors, contrary to law, when firstly he allowed Weasua Air Transport Company to satisfy the judgment by installments, and, secondly, when contrary to the mandate of this Court, he authorized Weasua Air Transport Company to pay $13,000.00 out of the judgment to Bernice Cooper who was not a party to the action upon which the judgment was based.It was further alleged in the bill of information that Weasua Air Transport Company had refused or neglected to satisfy the bill of costs and the mandate of this Court, notwithstanding the entry of final judgment against it.
Appreciating the seriousness of the allegations contained in the informants’ bill of information and the need for an expeditious settlement of this claim in the interest of the beneficiaries involved, we deemed it appropriate to cite the respondents for a summary review. To avoid a needless repetition of the facts al-ready in the records, as found in this case by this Court during its October A. D. 1981 Term, we take judicial notice of our decision upon which this bill of information is based. Using that case as a background to this opinion, we now proceed to consider the merits or demerits of the informant’s bill of information. For that purpose, we shall first outline a brief general statement of the facts. On June 16, 1979, Emmet J. Scott died in a plane crash while employed by Weasua Air Transport Company as a commuter pilot. Upon Emmet J. Scott’s untimely death, his elder brother, J. Montgomery Scott, obtained letters of administration from the Probate Court for Montserrado County to administer the decedent intestate estate. It was later discovered that Emmett J. Scott died leaving no personal or real property, but that he left nine (9) children who were solely and wholly dependent on him for their nurture, education and welfare during his life. Upon the strength of the letters of administration issued to him, J. Montgomery Scott obtained a workmen’s death compensation award of $34,000.00 from the Labor Ministry to provide for the continual support of Emmet J Scott’s nine dependents. The decision was appealed by Weasua Air Transport Company to the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit for Montserrado County, for judicial review on the grounds that the award was excessive. The circuit court reviewed the findings of the Labour Ministry and the relevant statutes and upheld the award. Weasua Air Transport Company took exceptions and announced an appeal to this Court to consider the legality of the award. Subsequent to the call of the case before this Court, we heard arguments pro et con and after a thorough perusal of the briefs filed by the counsel for the appellants and appellee, we affirmed the judgment of the circuit judge, upholding the award. A bill of costs and a mandate for the enforcement of our decision were prepared and transmitted forthwith to the court below. Just before the circuit court could enforce the judgment as mandated, the probate judge revoked the informant’s letter of administration and appointed one Bernice Cooper to receive the award. Acting upon the representation of the newly appointed administrator, Circuit Judge Frank W. Smith authorized payments of $13, 000, 00 of the judgment to her. We are to consider the propriety of the conduct of these judges now under information.
As to counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 13 of the bill of information, we consider them useful but not essential to our decision. With respect to count 7, the informants alleged that the workmen’s death compensation is not a part of an estate or intestate estate because the beneficiaries to whom such com-pensation should be paid are expressly defined in the statute in question as dependents. We agree that a dependent is defined under section 3501 of the Labor Law as:
“Those members of the family of an employee who are, at the time of his death or at the commencement of his disability resulting from occupational injury or disease, wholly or partially dependent for the ordinary necessaries of life upon earnings of such employee”.
The purpose of the workmen’s compensation statute is not only limited to payment of benefits to injured employees during the period of incapacity but its coverage extends also to persons who are dependent upon such employee for support, and who are deprived of such support by reason of the employee’s death. In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, any relationship, either natural or legal, with the employee, is not an essential element in establishing the status of a dependent. 81 AM. JUR 2d, Workmen’s Compensation, § 186. The principal indications of the status of dependency, i.e. the fact that the deceased made support contributions in the past, the fact that the claimant has no present means of support, and whether the claimant has reason to anticipate support contributions, are all relevant factors to be considered. Ibid., §189. The amount payable to the beneficiaries never becomes a part of the estate of the deceased. It is the exclusive property of the beneficiaries, Ibid., §192. The Supreme Court of the United States has also held that workmen’s compensation statutes which discriminate against illegitimate children are unconstitutional and constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law. Weber v. Atana Casualty & Surety Co., [1972] USSC 93; 406 U.S. 164.
In view of the compelling legal authorities cited above, we are in complete agreement with the informants that the workmen’s compensation benefits are not part of an estate but a creature of the statute, intended for dependents of a deceased employee. It is the expectancy interest of one who has for some time looked to another for support that the law seeks to protect against deprivation, and not a right of inheritance that requires a determination of kinship of lineal heirs. It is therefore the opinion of this Court that the issue of legitimacy of heirship or heirs raised in count 4 of the respondent’s returns is completely irrelevant and immaterial to the case at bar.
As to count 12 of the information attacking the legality of Circuit Judge Frank W. Smith’s order authorizing the disbursement of the judgment money to Bernice Cooper as the newly appointed administrator of the estate of Emmett J. Scott, we find the same untenable as it applies to the provisions relating to courts generally. The Judiciary Law, Rev. Code 17: 12.4, states:
“Every court in this Republic, including the magisterial and the justices of the peace courts, shall have a distinctive seal which shall be judicially noticed.Every act of a court, unless otherwise directed by law or rule of court, shall be authenticated by the signature of the clerk, or the justice, judge, magistrate or justice of the peace thereof and the seal of the court.”Assuming that the purported letters of administration issued to Bernice Cooper were exhibited to His Honor Frank W. Smith in due form, with the seal of the probate court affixed thereon, together with the statutory prerequisites above, it was no error, but a mandatory duty of Judge Smith to have taken judicial notice of same. The affixing of the seal of any court on any document is by itself a presumption of the legality of the underlying transaction, unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence. Without more, we cannot agree that Circuit Judge Frank Smith’s recognition of Bernice Cooper’s apparent authority was contrary to 1aw and the rules of practice.
With respect to count nine of the information which alleged that while the mandate of this Court was being enforced, Co-respondent Probate Judge Gladys K. Johnson wrongfully revoked the informants’ letters of administration and issued instead letters of administration in favor of Bernice Cooper, we make the following observations:
“the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate is governed by certain statutory rules of priority.” Decedents Estates Law, Rev. Code 8:111.1.
In matters of probate, where it is necessary to appoint administrators, the court should appoint the widow or the next of kin or both and when these rules are not followed and where the court did not give a chance to all the parties to come and defend their claims, such appointment is voidable. Hodge v. Williams[1925] LRSC 1; , 2 LLR 487 (1925). To safeguard the interest of an estate from suffering waste or from other devious machinations, probate courts have been given broad discretionary powers, the exercise of which is not governed by ordinary legal procedure. Strong v. Williams[1925] LRSC 6; , 2 LLR 515 (1925). Probate courts must exercise extreme care and diligence to follow prescribed rules in the supervision of the administration of estates. Woodson v. Henston and Solomon, [1954] LRSC 26; 12 LLR 133 (1954). An administrator may not be removed for frivolous reasons, but except only upon showing of evidence of improper conduct, and only after he has had an opportunity to defend himself. Dennis and Bull v. Weeks et al.[1952] LRSC 30; , 11 LLR 317 (1952). The standard of diligence and care required of an administrator is good faith which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances in his own affairs. Sharpe v. Urey et al.[1952] LRSC 20; , 11 LLR 251 (1952). Furthermore, letters granted to a fiduciary are conclusive evidence of his authority until properly revoked; and where such revocation becomes necessary, the petitioner seeking revocation must show:
(1) where he was when the first letters of administration were issued;
(2) that the reasons for revocation did not exist at the time the letters were issued; and
(3) that the fiduciary is guilty of dishonesty. Decedents Estates Law, Rev. Code 8: 107.3 and 107.10.
In this case, and in view of Woodson v. Henston, supra, we are not convinced at all that service of summons was properly made on informant J. Montgomery Scott prior to his removal by the Probate Judge. There is ambiguity in the records of the revocation proceedings that service was made on informant J. Montgomery Scott on the same day as the date of appearance, which the Probate Judge considered “normal” and proceeded to hear Bernice Cooper’s petition of revocation. We consider this a patent error because such ambiguity should have been resolved in the light most favorable to the incumbent administrator. Revocation is not done by a simple act of judicial pronouncement; it must be accompanied by an accounting as well, which was not done here. Similarly, the appointment of an administrator requires the filing of an indemnity bond equivalent to an amount to be fixed by the judge. We have no record that Bernice Cooper executed any bond equal to $76,800 or 2 times the $38,400.00 in question. Decedents Estates Law, Rev. Code 8:108.1. She is not a surviving spouse or in any way related to the deceased by blood. We have testimony in the records that she failed to join her son’s claim with the other dependents when asked to do so by J. Montgomery Scott. Prior to being appointed as administratrix, Bernice Cooper also failed to interpose objections to the appointment of J. Montgomery Scott at the time he was appointed. There is no evidence of gross irregularity or dishonesty on the part of J. Montgomery Scott in managing the affairs of the estate. To the contrary, J. Montgomery Scott is seeking the benefit for all of Emmett J. Scott’s dependents, whether they be his legitimate children or not. How then, and upon what principle of law, did the probate judge base her decision to remove him? Where there was doubt as to the right of any beneficiary to receive any benefits from the death compensation, such issues of fact should have firstly been determined before issuance of the letters of administration. Harmon et al. v. Tompo and Draper, [1963] LRSC 16; 15 LLR 272 (1963).
In view of the above, we hold that the removal of Administrator J. Montgomery Scott by the probate judge was arbitrary, capricious, and reversible for lack of sufficient grounds. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate, with the bill of costs, to the lower court for strict compliance with the decision of this Court and that all payments hereto made to Bernice Cooper be transferred to J. Montgomery Scott, with interest, for the nine dependents of the deceased for equal distribution, with a further mandate that returns be made to this Court verifying the manner of compliance. And it is so ordered. Information granted.