HARPER S. BAILEY, Appellant, v. ANNA C. SANCEA, headwife of CHARLES B. SANCEA, by and through her husband,

Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT. COURT, SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, GRAND GEDEH COUNTY. Argued March 29, 1973. Decided April 26, 1973. 1. A bill of exceptions must particularize the aVeged errors of the lower court. 2. Plaintiff is required in his pleadings to allege the facts which give rise to his cause of action so as fairly to apprise the court and defendant of the cause of action. 3. When a party seeks the benefit of a statute he must plead appropriate facts to bring himself within its provisions and secure the benefit, as in the present case where plaintiff sought ejectment under statute, but failed to state facts sufficient to invoke it. 4. It is only an innocent subsequent purchaser for value who has superior title to realty when a purchaser fails to have the instrument conveying title probated within four months of acquisition. 5. A grantor who has warranted title to realty may not deny such warranty by reason of title after acquired by him. 6. When undue influence is alleged, the facts constituting it must be specially pleaded. 7. A person inducing belief in the existence of a certain state of facts is estopped from denying subsequently that such state of facts does not exist. 8. The doctrine of unjust enrichment will not permit a person to profit or enrich himself at the expense of another contrary to equity. In 1965, appellant apparently conveyed to appellee a one-quarter acre town lot from a parcel of one and onehalf acre town lots allotted to him by tribal authority. Though the instrument was designated a bill of sale, it contained all the elements of a warranty deed. The full purchase price was paid to seller. Two years later, a deed to the one and one-half acre lot was executed to appellant by the Republic. He thereafter brought an action in ejectment against the purchaser, primarily contending that he had no title to convey in 1965 and that, moreover, the defendant never offered the instrument for probate and was guilty of laches. The lower court dismissed the action, and the plaintiff appealed. The Su59 60 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS preme Court denied all arguments of appellant and emphasized the point that the grantor was estopped to claim any interest in the premises but after-acquired title, when he had warranted title at the time of conveyance to defendant. The judgment was affirmed. Appellant, pro se. Frank W. Smith for appellee. MR. Court. JUSTICE AZANGO delivered the opinion of the The record in this case reveals that on May 20, 1971, appellant instituted an action of ejectment against appellees to recover from them a one and one-half acre town lot situated on the left side of Tubman Avenue, in the City of Zwedru, Grand Gedeh County, of which the appellant claimed that he was the sole owner and possessor of the aforesaid one and one-half acre town lot covered by a public land sale deed in fee simple. He alleged that there had been a long-standing friendly relationship between appellant and appellees to the extent that at one time, while he was a stipendiary magistrate in the City of Zwedru, Charles B. Sancea was arrested and charged with the crime of grand larceny, and appellant became so concerned and involved himself that he was also arrested and charged with the commission of the crime of sedition. And again to show the state of relations, when Charles B. Sancea was arrested and charged with the offense of official misconduct as Bail Commissioner for Grand Gedeh County, on February 18, 1972, appellant’s law firm was retained to represent him. However, when the aforesaid appellee was approached on March 18, 1972, by appellant to compensate him for the legal services he had rendered, appellee refused and offered him insults and showed him ingratitude. Hence, according to appellant, “It was these exasperating attitudes of appellee, LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 61 Charles B. Sancea, that gave birth to the institution of the ejectment action.” He claimed also that he had been injured by means of appellees’ undue influence and persuasion exercised over him for the purchase of land, at the time when appellant had not acquired a fee simple of the parcel of land. In addition, he contends appellees are guilty of laches because they didn’t ask him for a deed at the time he received $40.00 from them six years prior to the start of the ejectment suit, and have said instrument probated. Pleadings were rested after plaintiff’s reply. Hector Harmon, assigned circuit judge presiding over the August 1972 Term of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Grand Gedeh County, then dismissed the action on September 20, 1972. Appellant noted his exceptions at the time and has appealed to this Court on a bill of exceptions containing five counts. It must be borne in mind that a bill of exceptions must show with particularity the alleged errors of the lower court. Quaff v. Republic, 12 LLR 402 (1957). And only errors attributable to the trial judge should be included in the bill of exceptions. Benwein v. Whea, [1961] LRSC 25; 14 LLR 445 (1961). It is in essence a complaint alleging that the trial judge has committed one or more errors, all therein specified, which have resulted in a final judgment adverse to the contentions of appellant. Richards v. Coleman, [1938] LRSC 15; 6 LLR 285 (1938). It would seem therefore that this court has no bill of exceptions before it to which to direct its attention to ascertain whether the trial judge’s ruling has been in accordance with law or not. Yates v. Brother, [1861] LRSC 2; 1 LLR 2 (1860. Nevertheless, we shall, in fairness to justice, examine the pleadings in this case in their reverse order and see whether or not the judge was justified in dismissing the action. From a careful reading of the pleadings, we are of the 62 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS opinion that counts one, two, and three of appellant’s reply are not sustained as against count one of appellees’ answer, for the reason that a complaint in an action of ejectment must state that plaintiff is possessed of the real property sought to be recovered and the defendant is wrongfully withhodling possession thereof, or that defendant has unlawfully dispossessed or ousted plaintiff or has trespassed or tortiously entered upon the premises, without any color of right. In such action the plaintiff may also ask for damages. Rev. Code I :62.1, 62.2, 62.3. Furthermore, one of the fundamental rules of pleadings requires that the facts on which the plaintiff predicates his cause of action, and the defendant his grounds of defense, shall be alleged and these are to be so stated as fairly to apprise the court and the adverse party of the cause of action or the nature and scope of defense. The sufficiency of a pleading depends upon facts stated therein, not upon the proof ; generally, the sufficiency of a pleading must be determined by inspection of the pleading itself without reference to the evidence. In this connection, it should be observed that there is an essential difference between matters of pleadings and matters of evidence, for in pleadings the facts must be positively averred while in presenting evidence, conclusions may be inferred. If a material fact is lacking from a complaint or a petition it will go down before a demurrer. 41 AM. JUR., Pleadings, � 6. Moreover, it is a universally recognized rule that the courts take judicial notice of public statutes and the general laws of the Legislature, although the statute itself is not required to be pleaded. However, it is obvious that in all cases, when one seeks the benefit of a statute he must by appropriate averment bring himself within its provisions; that is to say, he must plead facts demonstrating his rights to recover under the statute. 41 AM. JUR., Pleadings, � Inspecting the complaint of plaintiff, we see that al- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 63 though he has averred that at the commencement of the action he was and still is the owner and possessor of the one and one-half acre town lot within Zwedru, yet he has failed to state that defendant is withholding the property as required. Nor was a deed proferted to support plaintiff’s claim, and there is no showing upon the record that at the time of the sale of the quarter-lot to appellees in 1965, plaintiff had any legal right or title to the land and could sell. To the contrary, he has contended that “while he . . . was in the midst of his trouble which was solely and wholly attributable to the cause of appellee, Charles B. Sancea, he was persuaded and unduly influenced by the defendant Sancea to purchase his quarter-town lot and being in extreme need of money at the time, was constrained to yield to defendant’s request.” Of this we shall speak more later, although this does not constitute ground for the maintenance of an ejectment action under our code. He has further contended that defendants are guilty of laches and are therefore estopped from claiming title because the said deed executed to appellees by appellant has not been properly probated and registered, for if any person shall fail to have any instrument relating to real estate probated and registered within four months after its execution, his title to such real estate shall be null and void against any party holding a subsequent deed for the property which was probated and registered within four months. Salifu v. Lassannah, [1936] LRSC 13; 5 LLR 152 (1936). However, it is quite evident that such failure operates only in favor of an innocent purchaser for value, which appellant is not. More to the point is the argument advanced by appellees that a grantor is estopped from denying the validity of his own title. “Further that a grantor of land with full convenants of warranty is estopped to claim any interest in the granted premises. The principle is particularly applicable where the grantor seeks to set up an after- 64 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS acquired title. Where through subsequent conveyances of the same land the title returns to a grantor with warranty, he is estopped to allege a breach of the last warranty where the same proof would establish a breach of his own. A grantor is estopped by a deed itself to assert fraud in its inducement, as distinguished from fraud in the factum.” 19 AM. JUR., Estoppel, � 10, pp. 606-607. In other words, as argued by counsel for appellees, the law of estoppel does bar appellant’s right to recover the land, for the law of estoppel to avoid circuity of action is well established ; as where a party conveys land with warranty to which he has no title, and afterwards acquires a good title by descent or purchase, and thereupon brings an action against his grantee to recover the land. In such case, the demandant has a good title to the land, and no title passed by his deed to the grantee, yet as he would be liable on his warranty for the value of the land, if he should recover, the principle of avoiding circuity of action interposes and rebuts his rights. And further, an action of ejectment does not lie for the recovery of possession of land where there has been a contract for the sale thereof, the purchase price paid, and possession delivered in pursuance thereof. Being mindful of the universal principle of law that reality of assent is essential to the validity of a contract and that a party must not only be mentally competent but he must exercise his will freely and understandingly, we have not been able to discover from the pleadings, carefully read, any specific allegations to excite suspicion of undue influence exercised on appellant. On the other hand, the transaction appearing to have been just, proper, and reasonable, there is no presumption of undue influence. Besides, when undue influence is relied upon, according to the weight of authority, it must be clearly set up in the pleadings by stating in substance the facts which show the domination of the will of the influencing party. As in LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 65 the case of duress, undue influence is affirmative and new matter which must be pleaded specially. It must be established. That is, the facts constituting the undue induence must be stated, and general allegations of the ultimate fact of the undue influence is not sufficient. It is necessary to plead the facts constituting undue influence and not mere conclusions of law. On June 26, 1965, appellant conveyed a one-quarter acre town lot to Anna C. Sancea, from the one and onehalf acre town lot which had been alloted to him by tribal authority, by what appears to be a warranty deed, though the instrument of conveyance was called a bill of sale by the grantor. From a careful scrutiny of the record there is no indication that there was a principal and agent involved in the transaction from which one could perhaps legally conclude that the act of the agent in selling the one-quarter acre town lot to appellees was not authorized by appellant and, hence, fraudulent or beyond the agent’s capacity to convey. To the contrary, the sale was an outright one with the full knowledge and consent of Harper S. Bailey. The legal maxim that one cannot repudiate his own acts is as old as the law itself. That is, when one by his acts, representations, or omissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other person rightfully relies and acts on such belief he cannot subsequently deny the existence of such facts. In such a situation, the person inducing the belief in the existence of a certain state of facts is estopped from denying that the state of facts does not in truth exist. Since it was appellant who executed the unprobated “bill of sale” to Anna C. Sancea, head wife of Charles B. Sancea, he cannot be permitted to recover against her simply because in 1967 he later obtained a title deed from the Republic of Liberia, or contend that since appellees have not probated the instrument they are guilty of laches. 66 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS In addition, to permit appellant to prevail would be a disservice to the doctrine of unjust enrichment, which is that one shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself at the expense of another contrary to equity. With reference to count three of appellant’s reply, in which he contends that count three of appellees’ answer is a sham plea to the issue at bar, it is our holding that it is not sustained for the reason that there is no reason to believe that appellees have falsely alleged facts and have not pleaded the said issues in good faith. With reference to counts five, six, and seven of the reply, said counts are not sustained as against the answer, in that besides the inapplicable invocation of the doctrine of ex post facto, they are not only repetitious and redundant but are irrelevant and immaterial to the maintenance of ejectment actions. Earlier in this opinion, we mentioned that at the time appellant sold the quarter acre town lot in 1965 to appellees, he had not yet obtained a deed from the Republic of Liberia for the one and one-half acre town lot, including the quarter acre lot which he sold to appellee. This means that at the time appellant sold the parcel of land in question, neither appellant nor appellees had a deed covering the land. The conduct of the appellant, who is a member of this bar, was unethical, and we wonder how he expected to benefit from such an act when there was no legal theory he could proceed upon. Accordingly, appellant is precluded from insisting that his adversary cannot set up an outstanding title, or that defendant is a mere trespasser. And even if he could, if neither party has a legal title, appellant cannot recover on a claim of title he must establish in an action of ejection brought as plaintiff. In view of the foregoing the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered. 2115rmed.