Afriland First Bank Liberia Limited v FMT Construction (2016)

Afriand First Bank Liberia Limited, by & thru its President/CEO, Mr. Hamadou O. Bayo, of the City of Monrovia, Republic of Liberia .MOVANT MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL VERSUS F.M.T. Construction Company, by & thru its CEO, Mr. Gabriel K. Frimpong, and all Authorized Officers of said entity, of the City of Monrovia, Republic of Liberia .RESPONDENT

NOTICE OF EXCEPTIONS TO APPELLANT’S BOND

ACTION TO DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

Heard: October 26, 2015.

Decided: June 24, 2016

MR. JUSTICE BANKS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Counsellor Sylvester D. Rennie of the Law Office of Legal Watch appeared for the movant/appellee. Counsellor Cooper W. Kruah of the Henries Law Firm appeared for the respondent/appellant.

Often and repeatedly the Supreme Court is deprived or denied the opportunity of delving into and deciding cases appealed to it on the merit, unpleasantly to the detriment of parties to the proceedings, and many a times with grave negative impact on and undesirable deleterious consequences for the effective, substantial, and transparent administration of justice, attributed in large measure to a series of factors, primary amongst which are: (a) the reckless or sometimes sheer negligent procedural blunders committed by lawyers [Kent v. Republic, 6 LLR 50 (1937); Deoud and The Board of General Appeals v. The Management of Firestone Plantations Company, 36 LLR 445 (1989); Ahmavr. Gbortoe, 42 LLR 1127 (2004)]; (b) the failure of, indifference to, refusal by, or inability of the affected parties to adhere to the clear and unambiguous dictate and mandate of the statute, not fully digesting or appreciating the significance of their acts or actions, or the lack thereof, on their rights, the cases, and generally the rule of law. [Ahmavr v. Gbortoe, 42 LLR 117 (2004); (c) the plain and open display of an apparent lack of knowledge of and appreciation for the law by some lawyers, judges and/or other court personnel; (d) situations which, although beyond the control of one or more of the disputing parties, such as the acts of God, or the illegal influence, or the corrupt or bias attitude or actions of trial judges or court staff, the lawyers or clients fail or neglect to alert the appellate court of or pursue the appropriate prescribed remedy or legal process; (e) the appellate court’s strict and sometimes unbending interpretation of and rigid compliance with the letter of the statute and the procedural technicalities embedded therein, without according due regard to

provision itself recognizes that the exercise and enjoyment of the right are contingent upon an orderly and meaningful implementation process prescribed by the Legislature. Blamo et al. v. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Supreme Court Opinion, October Term, 2006. This is what the Article states, after according the right of appeal: “The Legislature shall prescribe the rules and procedures for the easy, expeditious and inexpensive filing and hearing of an appeal.” LIB. CONST., ART. 20(b) (1986). See also The Intestate Estate of the late William M. Bowier v. Williams et al., 40 LLR 84 (2000).

The Supreme Court has recognized this dilemma and has, in a number of cases resorted to a balancing approach to the appellate process as ensured that the avenue to substantial justice remained open, was not overburdened by mere simple and insignificant legal technicalities which would otherwise defeat the intent and spirit of the law, but with the proviso that no injustice was meted out to or suffered by any of the parties. Liberia Electricity Corporation v. Tamba, 36 LLR 225 (1989); Municipal District of Buchanan v. Bridgeway Corporation, 36 LLR 470 (1989).

When the violations are not mere legal technicalities and the Court has found itself, painstakingly, adhering to and complying with the tenets of the statute and the procedural requirements stated therein, as it is constitutionally bound to do, even with the full knowledge that the wheels of justice and the rights constitutional guarantees of one or more of the parties are thereby jeopardized or exposed to severe beatings and unintended consequences, the Court has gone to great length to explain why, finding itself in a rather helpless state, unable to exercise the jurisdictional authority vested in it to determine cases on the merit, the justice which in the normal it was obligated to accord seemed unreachable in the particular case. [See Caranda v. Richards, Kimber v. Lloyd, Mirza v. Republic, and Walters v. Republic, 13 LLR 75 (1957); CITATIONS]

This is particularly the case where the statute, not being in contravention of the Constitution, the Court is without the power or authority to challenge or question the wisdom of the statute or of the legislature in enacting the statute, no matter how offensive, insensitive, deleterious and/or pernicious the statute may seem to be in the eyes of the court. [See Ganta Sawmill v. Tulay, 31 LLR 358 (1984); Cooper and Glender v. Bailey, 31 LLR 366 (1983); The Management of BAO v. Mulbah and Sikely, 36 LLR 404 (1989); Kartoe and Williams v. Inter- Con Security System, Inc., 38 LLR 414 (1997)]; that the Court is without the authority to introduce exceptions to the legislation by construction [Doe, Young and the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) v. Randolph, 35 LLR 724 (1988)]; that under the law, the Court is precluded from extrapolating the intent of the legislature, going beyond the specific wording of the statute, rewording or reworking the statute, or adding to or subtracting from the legislation where the meaning is clear and unambiguous [Shannon v. Liberia Trading Corporation, 7 LLR 66, 81 (1974); Buchanan v. Arrives, 9 LLR 1619 (1945); George v. Republic, 14 LLR 158 159 (1960); Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Company v. Crystal Steamship Corporation, 27 LLR 198, 205 (1978); Weasua Air Transport Company v. Scott and The Board of General Appeals, 29 LLR 65 (1981); Kasaykro Corporation v. Stewart and Winter Reisner and Company, 30 LLR 164 (1982); Kennedy and Johnson- Whisnant et al. v. Goodridge and Hilton, 33 LLR 398 (1985); Firestone Plantations Company v. The Board of General Appeals and Wilson, 34 LLR 385 (1987); and that the prerogative and the power to enact laws are not within the province or the authority of the courts but are clearly, by constitutional directive, vested in the Legislature.[Al- Boley and Sluwarv. The Proposed Unity Party, 33 LLR 309 (1985); Doe et al. v. Randolph, 35 LLR 724 (1988), Commercial Fisheries Corporation v. Puk Yang Fisheries Co. Ltd. et al., 35 LLR 534 (1988), The Liberia Company (LIBCO) v. Collins, 36 LLR 493 (1989), The International Trust Company of Liberia (ITC) v. Doumouyah et al., 36 LLR 358 (1989); The Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation v. Kollie et al., 37 LLR 239 (1993); Goodman Shipping and Stevedoring Corporation (GOSSCROP) v. National Port

“The following acts shall be necessary for the completion of an appeal:

(a) Announcement of the taking of the appeal;
(b) Filing of the bill of exceptions;
(c) Filing of an appeal bond;
(d) Service and filing of notice of completion of the appeal. Failure to comply with any of these requirements within the time allowed by statute shall be ground for dismissal of the appeal.” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.4

Moreover, and as noted hereinbefore, in addition to Section 51.4, an appealing party must also comply with the requirements stated in Section 51.7, which elaborates on the requirements in respect to the conditions and the timeframe within which the procedural prerequisites must be complied with in order that the appeal is heard by the Supreme Court. Section 51.7, states in part: “…The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within ten days after rendition of the judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court.” Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:51.7.

This Court is mindful of and has also recognized in numerous of its Opinions that the intent of the Legislature in promulgating the sections quoted above, and as envisioned by the Constitution, is not to stifle the administration of substantial and transparent justice; rather, as articulated by the Constitution itself, the intent is to provide a procedural framework for the orderly access to and enjoyment of substantial justice. Thus, the Supreme Court, within the realm of the recognized intent of both the Constitution and the Act, has held continuously that where a motion to dismiss an appeal embeds any one or more of the legal grounds provided by the statute for the completion of an appeal, and the motion establishes

Forestry Development Authority v. Forestry Development Authority Workers Union (FDAWU), 39 LLR 684 (1999); Blamo et al. v. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Supreme Court Opinion, October Term, 2006. , as opposed to the strict wording of the statute, the Court has vehemently articulated, reiterated and maintained the deep and powerful conviction that the mandate of the appeal statute is mandatory and compulsory, and are not mere legal technicalities to be overlooked by the Court. National Housing and Savings Bank v. Gordon, 35 LLR 323 (1988); Cavalla Rubber Corporation v.The Liberian Trading and Development Bank, 38 LLR 153 (1995).

In all of the cases mentioned, whether in them the Court dismissed the appeal or was otherwise motivated not to dismiss the appeal, it has applied a two- fold operating standard in making the decision: (a) a failure to comply with the mandatory statutory appeal provisions, not traceable to the negligence or other acts of the lower court, either by the judge or staff thereof, or other acts of God over which the appellant has no control, is not and cannot be regarded as mere procedural technicality; and (b) the negligence by the lawyer or client, but particularly the lawyer, in ensuring that certain mandatory statutory provisions are adhered to can form no basis for granting to the appellant an excuse for the failure to comply with the requirements of the statute or for any deviation by this Court from the clear mandate of the statute. Hussenvi v. Brumskine, Supreme Court Opinion, March Term 2013.

The attack on the appeal pursued by the appellant in the instant case is predicated upon allegations of a failure by the appellant to file its bill of exceptions within the statutory time and that the said failure precludes any consideration of an excuse by this Court, given that there were exceptional circumstances which rendered the performance of such act also impossible. We should note that the filing of the bill of exceptions rests almost exclusively upon the lawyer and not with the client; and this is the painful reality in the instant case where the basis for the challenge to the appeal, and hence to the jurisdiction of this Court to hear the appeal, is the negligence of the lawyer and not with the client. It is the lawyer that must prepare the bill of exceptions; it is the lawyer that must seek the approval of the trial judge of the bill of exceptions; and it is the lawyer that must ensure that the approved bill of exceptions is filed with the court within the time allowed and prescribed by the appeal statute.

The records in the case reveal that the matter had its genesis in an Agreement concluded and executed between the movant/appellee and the respondent/appellant under the terms of which the movant/appellee agreed to extend, and did extend to the appellant, in the form of an over- draft, a loan facility to the value of US(100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand United States dollars). The Agreement also provided that the respondent/ appellant would repay the loan amount within a period of six months of the time the loan amount was made available to the respondent/appellant.

The facts, as culled from the records, reveal that in compliance with the loan agreement, the movant/appellee began to make available to and allow the respondent/appellant to draw various amounts from the overdraft facilityup to the value of US)67,000.00 (Sixty Seven Thousand United States Dollars)of the agreed total amount of US$100,000.00(OneHundredThousandUnitedStatesdollars),withonlyUS$33,000.00 (Thirty- Three Thousand United States dollars) remaining to make up the full amount of the value of overdraft loan. According to the appellant, although it had made payment to the appellee of US$30,000.00oftheamountoftheextendedtoitbytheappellee,withabalanceofonlyUS$37,000.00 remaining to be paid, and that although the six month period for repayment of the loan had not expired, the appellee’s chief executive officer, without the knowledge, consent or authorization of the appellant or any order of court or notice to the appellant, but under the pretext that the appellee held a lien on the inventory of the appellant by virtue of a mortgage agreement under the terms of which the appellant

1. Movant says that it is the Respondent in the main Action of Damages for Breach of Contract and during the March Term, A. D. 2014, this Court entered its final judgment of not liable in its favor as per the final ruling of His Honor

jury returned a verdict of not liable in favor of the appellee, defendant in the lower court. A motion for new trial was filed and, upon arguments duly had thereon, the verdict of the jury was set aside and a new trial awarded to the appellant. At the second trial, the parties opted for a bench trial, that is, a trial without a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence, the judge determined that the appellant had failed to make a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence and hence entered judgment in favour of the appellee. To this judgment, entered on May 9, 2013, the appellant, being dissatisfied therewith, excepted thereto and announced an appeal to the Supreme Court.

It is this appeal, taken by the appellant, F. T. M. Construction Company, from the May 9, 2013 judgment of the Circuit Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, that the appellee seeks to have this Court dismiss, filing a motion to dismiss the appeal in order to achieve the said objective. The primary grounds for the motion are two- fold: (a) that the appellant’s bill of exceptions was filed 11 days after the rendition of the lower court’s judgment, which was one day beyond the ten day period mandatorily stated in the Civil Procedure Law for the filing of an approved bill of exceptions; and (b) that the appeal bond filed by the appellant was defective, in that there was no evidence of proof of any legal instrument from an appropriate authority showing that the insurance company which was serving as surety for the appellant possessed assets within Liberia sufficient to cover the amount stated in the appeal bond. We quote herewith, for the benefit of this Opinion, the said motion as follow, to wit:

AND NOW COMES MOVANT, Afrland First Bank, praying Your Honor and this

Honorable Court to dismiss the Respondent’s Appeal announced on May 9, A.D. 2014 to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Liberia, against the final judgment in the above captioned case, for the following legal and factual reasons, to wit:

1. Movant says that it is the Respondent in the main Action of Damages for Breach of Contract and during the March Term, A. D. 2014, this Court entered its final judgment of not liable in its favor as per the final ruling of His Honor

2. Movants says that on May 9, A.D. 2014 and the following the rendition of the final judgment in the above captioned case, the Respondent by and thru one of its Counsels Cllr. Cooper W. Kruahexcepted to the final ruling of the presiding judge and announced an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court of the Republic of Liberia. A copy of the May 9, A.D. 2014 final judgment is hereto attached and marked as Exhibit M/1 in bulk forming a cogent part of this Motion.

3. Movant further says that consistent with Session 51.4 of the Civil Procedure Law, 1 LCL Revised, found on Page 249, there are four requirements to be met by the appellant for the completion of an appeal and they are: (a) Announcement of the taking of the appeal; (b) filing of the bill of exceptions; (c) filing of an appeal bond; (d) Service and filing of notice of completion of appeal.

4. Movant says that further to count three (3) above, the respondent has failed to file its bill of exceptions in keeping with Section 51.7 of the Civil Procedure Law, 1 LCL Revised, found on Page 250, and quoted [herewith]: “A bill of exceptions is a specification of the exceptions made to the judgment, decision, order, ruling, or other matter excepted to on the trial and relied upon for appeal together with the statement of the basis for the exception. The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the judge within ten days after the rendition of the judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court”. Upon the failure of the respondent to file its bill of exceptions on or before May 19, 2014 which should have been ten (10) days after the final ruling, the respondent has failed to complete this major component of the appeal process and as such, movant obtained a Clerk’s certificate evidencing that the respondent failed to file its bill of exceptions within the statutory period. Movant then attaches the Clerk’s Certificate evidencing that the respondent has failed to file its bill of exceptions within ten days after the final judgment was rendered and said Clerk Certificate is marked as Exhibit M/2 forming a part of this motion.

5. Movant submits and says that as a consequence for the failure of the respondent to file its bill of exceptions within the statutory period of ten days after the final judgment of May 9, A.D. 2014 and in keeping with Section 51.16 of the Civil Procedure Law, 1 LCL Revised, found on Page 253, and quotes “An appeal may be dismissed by the trial court on motion for failure of the

6. That as to counts one (1), two (2) and three (3) of movant/appellee’s motion, respondent/appellant says same have no traversable issue.

7. That as to counts four (4) and five (5) movant/appellee’s movant, respondent/appellant avers and says that said counts are a legal fallacy and a misrepresentation of the fact, in that, respondent/appellant filed its bill of exception on the 19th day of May, A.D. 2014 which is evidenced by the presiding judge’s approval of the bond, even though the transcribed copy of the presiding judge’s ruling on the 9th day of May A.D. 2014, received by the respondent/appellant on the 16th day of May, A.D. 2014. Respondent/appellant most respectfully requests Your Honour to take judicial notice of the copy of the bill of exceptions and copy of the covered page of the transcribed ruling of the presiding judge used as exhibit by the respondent/appellant in these proceedings.

8. That as to counts six (6), seven (7), eight (8) and nine (9) of movant/appellee’s motion, respondent/appellant says that this case involves no money judgment and that it is a nominal case. Respondent/appellant asserts and says that the insurer has a re-insurance that covers an estimated value of total (including fixed and current assets) US(2,000,000.00 which is reflected and attached to the bond. Respondent/appellant insurance company is a duly qualified company with its articles of Incorporation. Business registration documents, with the legal authority to issued bond even though the Bank statement was inadvertently left out, it is not material to the extent that it can affect the bond. In the case Margaret E. Robertson, Letitia A. Reeves et al versus the Quiah Brother et al delivered during the October term, A.D. 2011, the Supreme Court opined that as long as the insurance company meets with the requirement to issue bail bond, as in the instant case, the insurance company bond is valid and justifiable. Attached is the copy of the bond statement marked “I)/ 1” that was inadvertently left out to form a cogent part of the records.

9. And as to counts ten (10) of movant/appellee’s motion and further to count two (2) above, respondent/appellant says that the appeal that was announced on the 9th day of May, A.D. 2014, after the ruling was given by the presiding judge, an appropriate fulfillment of the bill of exception was filed within statutory period followed by effective appeal bond and

10. Further to counts five (5) above, respondent/appellant avers and says that the appeal bond carries all on its face, all of the relevant signatories, including the insured, insurers, verified and approved by the circuit judge. Wherefore and in view of the foregoing law, facts and circumstances, respondent/appellant prays Your Honour and this Honourable Court to deny dismiss and set aside movant/appellee’s motion to dismiss appeal and grant unto respondent/appellant all relief that Your Honour may consider just, legal and equitable, and so pray.”

In respect of the foregoing, the appellant in its brief filed before this Court condensed its contentions on the motion to dismiss into a single issue, which it states to be: “Whether or not the appeal is dismissible where the bill of exceptions and the appeal bond and notice of completion of appeal were filed within the statutory period?” The issues, as framed by the appellant, misread the several contentions advanced by the appellee in the motion to dismiss. As culled from the contents of the motion to dismiss, the issue in relation to the appeal bond is not that it was filed without the statutory time, but rather that the bond was defective in that it lacked instruments from therelevant authority to show proof of assets held by the surety to indemnify the appellee from costs and injury as required by the appeal statute. This issue is quite different from the issue regarding the bill of exceptions, which is centered on the contention that the bill of exceptions was filed without the time allowed by statute, which failure renders the appeal dismissible. Given the difference between the parties in regard to the issues for resolution by the Court, we must determine, upon the entire facts, as revealed from the certified records the issue(s) which are properly before the Court for resolution. Indeed, such course is warranted not only because the parties do not present the same number of issues, but also because the issue regarding the alleged defectiveness of the bond, presented by the movant, may not warrant consideration by the Court since the disposition of that issue hinges upon how this Court resolves the first issue, which is whether the appellant complied with the requirement of the appeal statute in regard to the timeliness of the filing of the bill of exceptions; for if the Court decides that the bill of exceptions was filed without the statutory time, then there is no useful utility in delving into the issue as to whether the appellant’s appeal bond is defective or not. Indeed, if such be the case, then under the recent decisions of this Court, this Court must decide whether in fact the Court has the jurisdiction to decide at this level upon the dismissal of the appeal. Accordingly, we proceed to address this crucial issue and any other ancillary issue flowing therefore. This is consistent with the view stated by this Court in multiple Opinions that it need not resolve every issue presented by the parties but rather will focus only on the more critical issue(s) dispositive of the matter. Vargas v. Morris et al., 39 LLR 18 (1998); Kamara and Kollie v. Kindi et al., 39 LLR 102 (1998); Halaby et al. v. Messrs. Import- Export Company, 41 LLR 136 (2002); Scanship (Liberia) Inc./LMSC v. Flomo, 41 LLR 181 (2002).

From our review of the certified records it is clear that the judgment in this matter was delivered by the lower court on May 9, 2014. The parties not only do not deny this to have been the case but they openly admit in the instruments filed before this Court that the judgment was indeed handed down on the date mentioned herein. Where the parties differ is whether the bill of exceptions was filed outside of the period allowed by the appeal statute. The appellee contends that it was, while the appellant contends that it was not. What is rather interesting is that while the appellant admits that its counsel was in court at the time of the rendition of the judgment and that the counsel did except to the judgment and announced an appeal therefrom, which was granted by the court, it states that the transcript of the judgment was not available to the parties at the time since it was not ready and that in fact that it [appellant] only received the transcript of the judgment on May 16, 2014. What is even more interesting is that the appellant made the claim only as a matter of information in its brief rather than as a legal contention in justification for its bill of exceptions being filed without the time allowed by the appeal statute, as would warrant the attention of the Court.

Indeed, nowhere in the resistance does the appellant make the allegation,

We disagree with the contention of the appellant and emphasize that the date of approval of a bill of exceptions by the trial date does not constitute the date of filing of the document with the court. The two are separate and distinct as clearly revealed by the statute. The statute states in that regard that: “The appellant shall present a bill of exceptions signed by him to the trial judge within ten days after rendition of the judgment. The judge shall sign the bill of exceptions, noting thereon such reservations as he may wish to make. The signed bill of exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court.” Civil procedure Law, Rec. Code 1:51.7. We note that nowhere in the provision does it state that the date of signing of the bill of exceptions shall constitute the date of filing of the bill of exceptions. Rather, the law sets out two separate requirements: Firstly, that the bill of exceptions must be presented to the judge for his signature within ten days of the rendition of the judgment; and secondly, that the appellant must file the said bill of exceptions with the clerk of the trial court. The former requirement is not and must not be confused with the second requirement; for is one requirement constituted the other, then there is no utility in having the clerk of court affix his or her signature upon the instrument along with the date the instrument was presented to the clerk. Instead, the signing by the trial judge and affixing of the date would fulfil the requirement of the law. Such was never the intent of the law and the framers never contemplated that such would obtain in respect of the requirements stated in section 51.7.

Indeed, this Court, in giving interpretation to section 51.7, has said repeatedly that unless a bill of exceptions approved by the trial judge is filed with the clerk of court within ten days of the rendition of the trial court’s judgment, the bill of exceptions is rendered invalid and the appeal subject to dismissal on that account. Butler- Abdullah v. Pearson et al., 36 LLR 592 (1989); A.D.C. Airlines v. Sannoh, 39 LLR 431 (199); Kanneh v. Manley et al., 41 LLR 25 (2002. Thus, a bill of exceptions, although approved by the trial judge one day after the rendition of judgment need not be filed with the clerk of court until the tenth day following the rendition of judgment. But by the same token, a bill of

made by the appellant that it filed its bill of exceptions within the ten- day period allowed by the statute, is to give clarity as to legal requirements of the law in the face of the contention advanced by the appellant regarding whether it had filed its bill of exceptions within or without the statutory time, a factor that is a prime in determining whether the Supreme Court has or lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and entertain the motion to dismiss the appeal.

Having determined that the appellant did file its bill of exception without the statutory time and that by virtue of that lapse the Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain and determine the motion to dismiss on the merits,we are inclined to dismiss the motion and hereby order the motion dismissed, and the case remanded to the lower court for the disposition of the motion filed before it, noting that the lower court should take into full consideration what we have said herein about the bill of exceptions having been filed by the appellant without the statutory time and to act appropriately in disposing of the motion to dismiss the appeal.

We would like to note before concluding this Opinion that the movant/appellee, while conceding the contention of the appellant and acknowledging that under the circumstances of this case, the motion should properly have been filed before the lower court, this Court that it was compelled to file the motion before this Court because although it had filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the court below, the judge of the lower court had refused to take up the motion and dispose of the same on time, thereby allowing the appellant to file its appeal bond, approved by the trial court judge, and the notice of completion of the appeal, which as of the date of the filing of the notice of completion of the appeal divested the lower court of any further jurisdiction over the case, such that it could no longer delve into the motion to dismiss the appeal. Hence, the appellant states, it was constrained to withdraw the motion which it had filed in the lower court to instead file the said motion before this Court, the appellate Court, and including therein the further ground that the appeal bond was defective, further warranting the dismissal of the appeal.

We observe from arguments made before this Court the movant/appellee the claim that in fact it did file before the trial court a motion to dismiss the appeal, but that due to the failure by the trial judge to dispose of the motion on time, on the excuse that he was too overwhelmed with other matters to deal with the motion, the appellant proceeded to file an appeal bond, approved by the trial judge, and a notice of completion of the appeal, which was duly served on the appellee. The appellee argued that with the filing of the notice of completion of appeal by the appellant, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and, hence, it was left with no alternative but to withdraw the motion filed before the lower court to file the said motion to dismiss the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Our inspection of the records certified to this Court confirms the assertions made by the appellee/movant that it had filed a motion to dismiss before the lower court. The records show that on May 22, 2014, two days after the appellee/movant obtained a clerk’s certificate indicating that the appellant had failed to file its bill of exceptions within the time allowed by law, the appellee/movant filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss the appeal. This was forty- two (42) days prior to the filing of the appellant’s appeal bond on July 3, 2014, and forty- nine (49) days prior to the filing of the notice of completion of the appeal on July 9, 2014.

The records also reveal that on July 11, 2014, eight (8) days after the filing by the appellant of the appeal bond and two (2) days following the filing and service of the notice of completion of the appeal, the appellee filed with the trial court a notice of withdrawal of its motion to dismiss the appeal.

It is difficult understanding or appreciating any reason for the failure ofthe lower court to hear and dispose of the motion to dismiss. The judge knew or should have known that once the notice of completion of the appeal was filed he no longer had jurisdiction of the matter and that the motion to dismiss the appeal would thus be put into jeopardy, at least as far as the lower court is concerned.

That was more the reason to expeditiously dispose of the matter. The failure to dispose of the motion was plain negligence and carelessness by the trial judge. And while this Court has said in a number of Opinions that appeals will not be dismissed on mere insignificant technicalities [Liberia Electricity Corporation v. Lewis and Greenfield, 34 LLR 112 (1986); Dopoe v. City Supermarket, 34 LLR 343 (1987); Liberia Electricity Corporation v. Tamba, 36 LLR 225 (1989); Municipal District of Buchanan v. Bridgeway Corporation, 36 LLR 470 (1989)], it has also said that the mandatory requirements of the appeal statute are not mere technicalities and that where they are violated or not adhered to, absent inexcusable circumstances, the appeal should and will be dismissed. FodayKamara Butchery v. Pupo et al., 36 LLR 181 (1989); Cavalla Rubber Corporation v.The Liberian Trading and Development Bank, 38 LLR 153 (1995).Therefore, such act as was demonstrated by the lower court judge was gross transgression of our justice system and cannot be countenance by this Court as it makes a mockery of our judicial and justice system, ridicules the courts in the eyes of the public, and leaves a negative impression upon the society as to how and the manner in which the judiciary administers justice. We must admonish our trial judges that acts which expose our judicial and justice system to public ridicule will also expose the violator to reprimand by the Court, as it has the authority to do under the Constitution, the Judiciary Law, the Judicial Canons and the Rules of Court.

We are equally disturbed that following the filing and service of the notice of completion of the appeal, the appellee proceeded to withdraw the motion to dismiss the appeal which motion it had filed before the lower court when the court still had jurisdiction of the proceedings under the law. This action, although understandable in the circumstances, was also without the pale of the law. Certainly counsel should have known that once the notice of the completion of appeal was served and filed, it was without the right to file any instrument before the court and the court lacked the authority to act on such instruments, being still possessed of authority only as relates to clerk’s certificates to authenticate a challenge to the appeal made before the Supreme Court. The clerk of the trial court was similarly without the authority to file such instrument at the stage at which it was filed. Hence, we hold that the withdrawal, being illegal, was void ab initio and for all intent and purposes, the motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the clerk of the lower court, remained valid and in full effect.

Additionally, as the Supreme Court cannot simultaneously exercise jurisdiction over the same matter legally before the lower court, and for the reasons which we have stated herein, the motion to dismiss the appeal filed before this Court is denied and dismissed. Further, this Court having determined that the motion to dismiss the appeal, filed before the trial court is valid and remains in full effect, the case is remanded to the lower court to resume jurisdiction and dispose of the motion, giving full and complete consideration to the views expressed herein, and to accordingly dismiss the appeal.

Further, because we have stated earlier that the disposition of the motion on the issue of the failure to file the bill of exceptions within the statutory time, there is no need or utility in delving into the issue of the appeal bond, we refrain from any further comments on the issue of the appeal bond, consistent with the manifold Opinions of this Court espousing the discretionary power of the Court to refrain from dealing with all of the issues presented and to instead confine itself only to those issues relevant to and dispositive of the case.

This Court must again express its concern with the manner in which lawyers handle such delicate matters, as appeals, which places cardinal rights of their client in jeopardy. We are bewildered as to how a lawyer could confuse the date of approval of a bill of exceptions with the date of filing of a bill of exceptions, or how a lawyer could calculate the period between the date of judgment of May 9, 2014 and the filing of the bill of exceptions on May 20, 2014 as ten days. We view this act as sheer negligence and callousness on the part of the appellant’s lawyer, for it is that negligence that deprived the Supreme Court of the requisite jurisdiction over the case to delve into the merits and to decide whether the trial court acted properly and legally in the decision made against the appellant.

As noted earlier, it is such negligence that has not only restricted the Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution to review the judgments of lower courts, but has also placed the rights of parties, guaranteed by the same Constitution, at serious risks. We must therefore again admonish lawyers that this Court will pursue serious actions against such displace of negligence in the handling of their clients’ cases.

In view of all we have said above, the Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the lower court directing the judge presiding therein to resume jurisdiction over the case and to give effect to this Opinion. Costs are to abide the final determination of the case by the lower court, in accordance with the Opinion expressed herein.