CEPHAS B. REEVES, Informant, v. ELLENDA WEB STER-ANKRA, by and through her husband, Respondent.

CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS. Argued May 3, 1973. Decided June 8, 1973. 1. A bill of information must allege every material fact constituting the offense charged with precision and certainty, as well as permitted by the circumstances of the case. 2. A person served with process waives any objection to service by not acting promptly on such objections, as a person who has not been served with process waives objections by submitting himself to the court’s jurisdiction. 3. Deception which hinders execution of process constitutes contempt of court, as does disobedience of any valid order of a court which the person is able to comply with 4. Rights once adjudicated cannot again be disputed by the same parties. 5. Respondent in contempt proceedings cannot raise issues already adjudicated, in her answer to the information charging respondent with disobeying a mandate of the Supreme Court. Pursuant to a mandate of the Supreme Court, a writ of possession issued out of the circuit court on March 4, 1969, commanding that informant herein be placed in possession of the disputed property. The respondent and others residing thereat refused to vacate and continued thereafter to occupy the premises. A bill of information was presented to the Supreme Court relating that the respondent had told informant years before that a child born to her was his daughter, but the respondent subsequently informed him that she had deceived him, after he had purchased the property in the name of the child and built a house thereon. He thereupon instituted proceedings to cancel the deed to the child and to obtain a deed to the property in his name. After a great deal of litigation, he prevailed, which led to the present proceedings as recited. The respondent attempted to raise issues before the Supreme Court which had long before been adjudicated. The Supreme Court would not consider 181 182 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS such argument and adjudged the respondent guilty of contempt of court, fined her, and ordered the lower court to resume jurisdiction and, in effect, carry out the mandate of the Supreme Court as previously ordered. M. Fahnbulleh Jones for informant. bar for respondent. S. Benoni Dun- MR. Court. JUSTICE AZANGO delivered the opinion of the A bill of information to adjudge respondent in contempt of court was filed on March 27, 1973, alleging that informant had purchased a town lot, on which he later built a house, from David B. Gibson in the name of respondent’s daughter in the belief, as respondent informed him, that she was his child. Thereafter, upon being told by respondent, who subsequently married another, that she had deceived him, petitioner commenced an action for cancellation of the warranty deed executed in the name of the child. On July 18, 1967, a final decree granting cancellation was rendered by Judge Findley, assigned circuit judge. This prompted the institution of mandamus proceedings in the chambers of Mr. Justice H. Augustus Roberts by David B. Gibson, against Judge Dessaline T. Harris, Jr., assigned to preside over the March 1968 Term of the Civil Law Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, and Cephas B. Reeves. The Justice denied mandamus thereby affirming the judgment of the lower court and ordered that the judgment be enforced. Pursuant to a subsequent mandate of the Supreme Court a writ of possession to petitioner issued out of the aforesaid Circuit Court on March 4, 1969, but the respondent and her husband, who were apparently residing on the property, refused to obey the court’s command. LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 183 The bill of information seeks enforcement of the Court’s mandate and a finding and punishment of respondent’s contempt of court. The respondent has contended that her name appears nowhere in the title of this proceeding and, therefore, she is not properly before this Court. A person not served with process, who subsequently acts in the matter as though the court has jurisdiction, submits himself to the court’s jurisdiction as a person who has been served with process waives any objection to service by not acting promptly, King v. Williams, [1925] LRSC 8; 2 LLR 523 (1925), as in the present case, where respondent claimed she was not named in the caption but has contested the matter. We further hold that in a bill of information the respondent or accused is as a matter of law only entitled to a plain statement of the facts or charges against him, which must be more than a mere statement of a legal conclusion. The information must allege every material fact going to constitute the offense charged, with precision and certainty as well as the circumstances of the case will permit. The information now before us having fulfilled these requirements in our opinion is sufficient. Count one of the return, therefore, is not sustained. She has also contended that “she is presently defendant in an action of ejectment brought by Cephas B. Reeves pending before the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court. . . . [and he] asks this Court to take original jurisdiction in a matter undetermined in a subordinate court.” We find ourselves unable to agree with this contention. Every man has a right to protect his legal interests. If petitioner believes that an information to the appellate court affords him a remedy he may pursue it, and it cannot be interpreted as asking an appellate court to assume original jurisdiction in a matter now before a lower court. Count two of the return, therefore, is not sustained. In counts 3, 4, and 5 of her return, she raises issues 184 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS going to the merits of the matter adjudicated, contending, among other things, that her money was used to build the house on the property. From the contentions raised in these three counts, and other expressions, we can conclude that these feelings have been harbored in the mind of respondent and they have sown, as they germinated, the seeds of contempt. In other words, they have led her to assume a recalcitrant attitude in refusing to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court of Liberia. However, we shall reserve our comments until later on in this opinion. After the filing of respondent’s return, answering and replying affidavits were filed by counsel for the respective parties denying, supporting, and maintaining the positions earlier assumed by them in their respective pleadings. The record also discloses that several assignments were made for the hearing of the case, and the late counsellor Momolu S. Cooper having failed to obey the assignments, Reeves together with his witnesses were qualified and after their testimony the court granted the petition of Cephas B. Reeves, cancelling the warranty deed issued to Louise C. Reeves and ordering that another deed be issued to Cephas B. Reeves by David B. Gibson, as earlier mentioned in this opinion. According to respondent’s reply she stated that while it was true that Cephas B. Reeves succeeded in the cancellation suit, the entire proceedings were illegal in that respondent and her daughter never had their day in court. At this juncture, we wish to sound timely warning to all litigants and their counsel that no longer shall this Court tolerate any insinuations or vituperations against the integrity and ability of any former judicial officer for acts performed by them during their tenure of office, when they will not have the opportunity to adequately defend themselves. Moreover, all contentions raised long after the event are irrelevant. We are unable to understand what pre- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 185 vented respondent from taking advantage of any of the remedial processes or other proceedings when her interests were being assailed and waiting until a bill of information has been filed against her years later and she was cited to answer. He who is silent when he should speak is taken to assent, is an old legal maxim which should be applicable in the instant case. Respondent has also raised some unsupported contention, which is unfounded, concerning the disappearance of a file in an abandoned application for a writ of certiorari. Counsel for respondent also has argued that she is not in contempt of this Court because her daughter invited her onto the premises where they both now live, after the premises had been vacated pursuant to the writ of possession issued to petitioner by Judge Morris on March 4, 1969. After studying the writ of Judge Morris and the return of the sheriff, one would seem to gather the impression that petitioner was put in complete possession of his property without obstruction. But the veil of our impression was removed after a further inspection, for the record reveals that there has been no return filed by the judge to whom the mandate was directed for the enforcement of the lower court’s judgment, which required him to make his return thereto to the Supreme Court as to how the said mandate was executed. In the absence of any return from the presiding judge that the mandate of the Supreme Court had duly been obeyed and executed in keeping with law, it would follow logically that there was an obstruction to its enforcement which made it impossible to execute. This is reinforced by the return of the sheriff of Montserrado County who stated therein that respondent “refused to remove from the said premises and said that she would take up arms against Mr. Reeves and that the Justices of the Supreme Court were no use, and used many unwarranted and insinuating expressions 186 LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS against the courts of Liberia and that nothing would take them from the said premises.” This was not only an outright defiance to constituted authority, but was to all intents and purposes disobedience to the authority of the Supreme Court of Liberia. It is, therefore, clear that the mandate of the Supreme Court of Liberia has not fully been executed because of the tactics and subterfuge employed by respondent Ellenda Webster-Ankra. She seems to have been unmindful that immediately after the warranty deed upon which Louise Reeves relied for the occupation of the premises in question had been ordered cancelled by the court, her legal right of occupation ceased and any further reoccupation of the house and premises was illegal. In fine, her adroit conduct has made the execution of our mandate ineffectual. As to all arguments now raised by respondent long after their adjudication, we hold that a judgment of a court of record, as in this case, cannot be questioned. In other words, a fact which has once been directly decided shall not again be disputed between the same parties. Respondent is estopped because rights have been adjudicated. To hold otherwise would be condoning and lending aid to the institution of endless litigation and causes of action. The argument that she never had her day in court is not supported by the record of the trial court and its judgment. She was given specific opportunity to speak. In fine, it is our view that disobedience of any valid order of a court constitutes contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. Further, it is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of a court or to obstruct or to attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. “If a person hinders or prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as though he had ob- LIBERIAN LAW REPORTS 187 structed by some direct means. The intentional hindrance of the service of process is the thing which constitutes the contempt, rather than the particular means by which it is accomplished. It is unnecessary to go to the extent of holding that merely secreting property which the officer is seeking to seize constitutes contempt; but where the officer, by some device or deception, is hindered or delayed in the prompt execution of the process, this constitutes contempt even though there is no force or intimidation or direct refusal to obey the process.” C.R.C.L. 503. We therefore hold that Ellenda Webster-Ankra is guilty of constructive contempt in that her conduct in the instant case tends to obstruct the administration of justice by the courts. Liberian Bar Assoc. v. Gittens, [1941] LRSC 12; 7 LLR 253 (1941) ; In re Dennis[1947] LRSC 17; , 9 LLR 389 (1947) ; In re Cassell[1961] LRSC 22; , 14 LLR 391 (1961). In view of the foregoing, we find respondent guilty of contempt for having refused to vacate the premises ordered by this Court to be turned over to the informant, as shown by the record and by her admissions in the return and replying affidavit that she and her daughter are presently occupying the house and premises in question, contrary to the mandate of this Court. The judge next assigned to preside over the Civil Law Court in Monrovia is to resume jurisdiction over the case and evict the respondent and any other person or persons occupying the said premises and also put the informant in possession of the property, as previously commanded by the Supreme Court. To purge herself of the contempt of which we find her guilty, within 48 hours of this judgment she is to pay a fine of $ wo.00. Costs in these proceedings are ruled against the respondent. It is so ordered. Adjudged guilty of contempt.