THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL IRON ORE COMPANY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. JOHN DENNIS et al., and THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPEALS, Ministry of Labour, Youth & Sports, Respondents/Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY
Heard: December 15, 16 & 17, 1981. Decided: January 5, 1982.
1. A money judgment must be certain and definite in order to be enforceable.
2. In order for a money judgment in a class action involving a labor matter to be enforceable, the money judgment should state the name of each successful claimant and the corresponding amount that he is entitled to.
3. Res Judicata applies only where there is a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, in the absence of a formal hearing and ruling on the merits of a case before the Ministry of Labor, Youth & Sports, the results of a preliminary investigation by an official of said Ministry of Labor, Youth & Sports shall not bar a new case on the merits, on the basis of res judicata.
After a preliminary investigation into a complaint filed by the Mines Workers Union, on behalf of some workers, against the management of the National Iron Ore Company, the Ministry of Labor, Youth & Sports ruled against the appellees, finding that the matter was without magnitude. Later, however, the appellees commenced a formal case at the same Ministry of Labor, Youth & Sport, at which time the merits of the case was heard and a ruling entered in favor of the appellees. On appeal to the Board of General Appeals and the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, the ruling was confirmed. When an appeal announced by the appellant was not perfected, the appellees applied for and was granted a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of General Appeals to dispose of the case. A further hearing was had and ruling made in favor of the appellees. It is this latter ruling that is before the Supreme Court for disposition on the issues of whether the principle of res judicata is applicable and whether the money judgment awarded was definite.
As to the appellant’s contention regarding the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the Supreme Court ruled that the results of the preliminary investigation at the Ministry of Labor, Youth & Sports, not being a ruling on the merits of the case, did not constitute a bar to a trial of the merits of the case at a later date. The Supreme Court also ruled that the money judgment awarded by the hearing officer was indefinite and uncertain, and therefore unenforceable, since it failed to state the names of the claimants and the amount each was entitled to. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the ruling of the hearing officer and remanded the case for a de novo hearing.
Mr. Fahnbulleh Jones appeared for the appellant. Roger C.H Steele appeared for the appellees.
MR. JUSTICE MORRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The records in this case reveal that sometime in the 1967 the Mine Workers Union filed a complaint against the Defendant Company with the National Labour Affairs Agency stating that some workers of the defendant company had been deprived of the 30 minutes rest period since 1961 contrary to the Labour Practices Laws. From the contents of a letter dated October 16, 1967, under the signature of A. Dash Wilson, Director General of the then Labour Affairs Agency to Assist ant General Manager of Mine Management Associate Ltd., it would appear that some preliminary investigation was held and the Agency ruled the matter closed because there was no magnitude. We quote said letter for the benefit of this Opinion:
“REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA
NATIONAL LABOUR AFFAIRS AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
OCTOBER 16, 1967- NLAA/184/’67
“Mr. J. B. Tregar:
Assistant General Manager
Mine Management Associates, Ltd.
P. 0. Box 348
Monrovia
“Dear Mr. Tregar:
“In furtherance to our meeting of Friday the 13th instant, I am pleased to inform you that because our search of the records reveals no magnitude in the charge made by the union, this Agency has decided to consider the case closed. However, we are convinced that, for the period, the company has not convinced us, neither has the records revealed, that notices were posted as provided for by law. Since this covers a protracted period of time, we are left with no alternative but to impose a fine of $3,000.00 which, we trust, will be paid immediately, and that the obligation to post notices, as prescribed by law, will be commenced at once.
“Very truly yours,
“Sgd. A Dashward Wilson
DIRECTOR GENERAL CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE PHOTOCOPY.”
The Congress of Industrial Organization filed the same complaint on behalf of the workers against the defendant company in 1976 for chop time and rest period. The records reveal that management, union and CIO representatives con ducted an investigation and the findings of the investigation indicated that there was no viable claim against management. The Congress of lndustrial Organization being dissatisfied with the findings, appealed to defendant for reconsideration of the issue. Defendant rejected the approach made by the CIO and forwarded the case to the Ministry of Labour, Youth and Sports. The Board of General Appeals of the Ministry observed at the hearing that the labour relations officer to whom the case was assigned did not conduct a formal hearing and therefore the case was remanded to the Labour Relations Section of the Ministry for a formal investigation and for additional evidence. To this ruling of the Board of General Appeals, the defendant company excepted and prayed for an appeal to the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for a judicial review. The appeal was granted but the defendant company failed to perfect the appeal.
Counsel for plaintiff/appellee, represented by the CIO, petitioned His Honour Mr. Justice George Henries, then presiding in Chambers, for the writ of mandamus to compel the Board of General Appeals to resume jurisdiction and dispose of the case. The mandamus was granted. The Board of General Appeals then forwarded the case to the labour relations officer for rehearing and the taking of additional evidence.
The records further indicate that during the second investigation before the labor relations officer, the counsel for the defendant company requested for time to produce documentary evidence to disprove the complainants’ claim. This application of the defendant’s counsel was granted. When trial resumed to consider the expected documentary evidence, counsel for defendant then filed a motion for the labor relations officer to refuse jurisdiction over the subject matter on the ground that this case was disposed of by the then National Labor Affairs Agency in favour of the defendant company in 1967, and on the additional ground that PRC Decree No. 12 prohibit hearing of cases already concluded. The labour relations officer ruled that the decision of the National Labour Affairs Agency refers to the period 1961 to 1967 and the present claim covers the period 1972 to 1975. Referring to PRC Decree No. 12, the labour relations officer maintained that the decree does not relate to cases remanded for trial. He therefore denied the motion and ordered the hearing proceeded with.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the labour relations officer held that the complainants had proven their case against the defendant company and defendant company should there fore compensate complainants for their 30 minutes rest period from January 1972 to December 1973, calculated at time and a half using the formula provided in an appendix that was attached to the ruling and that the disbursement was to be made in the presence of an inspector of the Ministry. Below is Appendix A which was attached to the ruling:
“APPENDIX (A)
1. FIRST YEAR complainant: 45/60 X number of working days complainant was present and worked X his wage rate as at 31112/72
2. SECOND YEAR complainant: 45/60 x number of working days complainant was present and worked X his wage rate as at 31112/73
3. THIRD YEAR complainant: 45/60 X number of working days complainant was present and worked X his wage rate as at 31/12/74
4. FOURTH YEAR complainant: 45/60 X number of working days complainant was present and worked X his wage rate as at 31112/75”
The Board of General Appeals reviewed the ruling of the labour relations officer and modified it. We quote the two last paragraphs of the Board’s decision:
“The Board observed that the hearing officer has requested the appellant to produce certain documentary evidence to help in calculating the amount due those affected from 1972 to 1975 and appellant failed to do so.
“Wherefore and in view of the foregoing, the Board has no other alternative but to modify the ruling of the hearing officer to read that appellant should provide the necessary documents of only those involved in the ensuing case covering the period stated above and pay them in the presence of a labour inspector of this Ministry. Ruling modified; and it is hereby so ordered.
“Sgd. John T. Freeman- Chairman
Tony Arthur- Member”
Counsel for the defendant company has strongly contended that the judgment of the labour relations officer, as modified by the Board of General Appeals, is indefinite and uncertain as the defendant company does not know the names of all the complainants since they were referred to as John Dennis, et al. Therefore, if the judgment of the Board of General Appeals, affirmed by Judge Fulton Fancy, presiding over the People’s Sixth Judicial Court, is upheld by this Court, it will be difficult to enforce due to its uncertainty. Recourse to the records, we observe that this point of the uncertainty and indefiniteness of the judgment was raised by counsel for Defendant Company before the Board of General Appeals and conceded by counsel for complainants as per his undated letter, which we quote hereunder words for words:
“THE STEELE & STEELE LAW FIRM
MEAMARINNA BUILDING – SUITE 103
RANDALL/KING SAO BOSSO STREETS P.O. BOX 3836, MONROVIA, LIBERIA
TELEPHONE: RESIDENCE: 271033, OFFICE: 222198
ROGER C. H. STEELE, ESQ. COUNSELLOR-AT-LAW
“Gentlemen:
Re: John Dennis et, al vs. Mine Management – Chop Time or Period Money
I take this opportunity to bring to your kind attention as well as to refresh your memory the fact that I called your attention to the names of the workers of the Mine Management who had not been listed to receive their chop time or rest period money in the ruling giving by the Labour Counsel in the above entitled cause of action.
When the case was argued, in the month of April, Counsellor M. Fahnbulleh Jones, representing Management raised the issue that the labour counsel who heard the matter below erred by failing to list the names of the workers who are to receive remuneration for their rest period. He also raised the issue about the exact amount of money to be paid to the workers, which was not clearly stated in the ruling of the labour counsel.
I considered these points raised by Counsellor M. Fahnbulleh Jones and appealed to the Board of General Appeals to request management, the appellant herein, to submit a list of the names of the workers to the Board in order for the Board to have the names available for preparation of its ruling. I also requested the Board to state the amount the poor workers (masses) are to receive.
I attempted to make an application to this effect but the Board told me that it was not necessary since indeed both lawyers had raised the same points therefore you would take the necessary steps to rectify the same errors made by the said counsel below.
Gentlemen, this matter is long overdue; the poor masses are suffering; they are in dire need of their money, please help them. It would be a travesty of justice for this matter to reach the People’s Supreme Tribunal and be remanded on simple errors which can be corrected by your Ministry.
We are therefore appealing to you, in the name of humanity and transparent justice that you do all that lies within your power to speedily render ruling in the said matter in order for these poor workers to get what they are legally entitled to receive.
IN THE CAUSE OF THE PEOPLE, THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES!
Very truly yours,
STEELE & STEELE LAW FIRM
Sgd. Roger C. W. Steele
COUNSELLOR AT-LAW
“The Chairman & Members Board of the General Appeals Ministry of Labour” Monrovia – Liberia.”
During the arguments before this Court we asked counsel or plaintiffs if he knew the names or had the list of his clients and the total amount due them or each of them. He replied in the negative. This Court has repeatedly warned counsellors of this Bar to exert keen interest in their clients’ cases.
If this Court was inclined to affirm the judgment of the lower court, how many of the workers would become the beneficiaries and how much money will each receive? Or can we affirm the judgment and then instruct the lower court to take new evidence as to the amount and the names of those involved? This, we cannot do as an appellate Court. This Court cannot uphold or affirm an unenforceable, indefinite and uncertain money judgment. Our statute defines money judgment as an interlocutory or final judgment or any part thereof for a sum of money or directing the payment of a sum of money. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1:41.1(a). In this case, although a money judgment, no sum certain is being prayed for, pleaded or is known so as to direct the payment of same in case the judgment is affirmed. A money judgment must be certain and definite in order to be enforceable.
With reference to the contention of res judicata, as raised by the defendant company, we wish to make it clear that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable where the case had been judicially and conclusively decided on its merits. There is no showing that this case has been judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, save the letter quoted above from Mr. A. Dashward Wilson, Director General of the then National Labour Affairs Agency to the Assistant General Manager of Mine Management Associate, Ltd., which is only suggestive of a preliminary investigation being held. Res judicata is defined as the rule that final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights of parties or their privies on all later suits on points and matter determined in the former suit. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1470 (4th ed.). Therefore res judicata will not lie since there is no evidence that this case has been judicially determined in any court of competent jurisdiction. Counts one and two of the bill of exceptions are sustained.
The other four counts of the bill of exceptions are not pertinent to the reversal of the trial court’s judgment. Hence, we have only dealt with counts one and two of the bill of exceptions.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that as the judgment is a money judgment, it should have stated a sum certain, which can only be arrived at by providing the names of the plaintiffs and the amount due to each of them. This information is indispensable to the enforcement of the judgment; for to do otherwise would encourage the multiplicity of suits.
We therefore hold that this case should be remanded for retrial beginning with the labour relations officer. Costs to abide final determination. And it is so ordered.
Ruling reversed; case remanded for de novo trial.