ANIS HALABY et al., Plaintiffs-In-Error, v. HIS HONOUR VARNIE D. COOPER, Assigned Circuit Judge, Sixth Judicial Circuit, and MESSRS. IMPORT-EXPORT COMPANY, Defendants-In-Error.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF ERROR AGAINST THE ASSIGNED CIRCUIT JUDGE, SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Heard: April 24, 2002. Decided: July 5, 2002,

1. A successor judge cannot interfere with, review and/or reverse the ruling made or other judicial action taken by the predecessor judge.
2. A judge of concurrent jurisdiction is without authority to correct the errors made by his predecessor of like status; it is only the Supreme Court that is legally vested with the authority to rectify errors committed by a subordinate courts of record.
3. A circuit court judge cannot grant a motion for summary judgment after the case has been ruled to trial by another circuit court judge.
4. The Supreme Court may only pass upon those issues it deems meritorious, worthy of notice, and germane to the determination of the case.
5. The Supreme Court need not pass on all of the issues raised in the bill of exceptions or in the briefs filed by the parties, and it acts in keeping with practice and precedence in addressing itself to only the most important and germane issues.

In 1969 the plaintiffs-in-errors obtained judgment against the co-defendant-in-error, Import-Export Company, in an act-ion of debt by attachment. However, the judgment remained unenforced because service of the bill of costs was never made on the co-defendant since its officers could not be found. Thirty-two years later the co-defendant-in-error filed a motion for relief from judgment and subsequently a motion for declaratory judgment praying the court to declare that the judgment secured by the plaintiffs-in-error was fake and fraudulent. The plaintiffs-in-error were never served with summons or copies of the motion and did not learn of the action until enforcement of the judgment in the declaratory judgment action was sought against them in Lebanon. The plaintiffs-in-error were also not served with notice of assign-ment for the hearing of the motion for declaratory judgment which was filed, assigned, heard and judgment entered on the same day.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, noting that not only was the proceedings irregular since the plaintiffs-in-error had never been served with summons or assignment for the hearing and that the returns of the sheriff clearly stated that service had not been made, but also because the judge, in the face of the sheriff’s returns, had proceeded with the hearing of the case rather than assign the same for another day, and had failed to deputized counsel to accept the ruling for the absent plaintiffs-in-error. The Court observed that the judge should have reassigned the case and that it was error for him not to have done so.
More importantly, however, the Court opined that the judge was without legal authority to review and reverse the judgment entered by a predecessor judge, and it ruled that his action in declaring the judgment of the predecessor judge as fake and fraudulent was void ab initio. The Court noted that only it, the Supreme Court, had the authority to effect such review and declaration. Accordingly, the Court set aside the proceedings of the trial court, reversed the judgment entered by the lower court, and restored the parties to status quo ante as of the date the original judgment was entered by the predecessor judge.

William A. N. Gbaintor of the Gbaintor and Associates Law Firm appeared for the plaintiffs-in-error. Cyril Jones of the Jones and Jones Law Firm appeared for the defendants-in-error.

MR. JUSTICE MORRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

According to the certified records transcribed and transmit-ted to this Honourable Court, the plaintiffs-in-error instituted an action of debt by attachment against the co-defendant-in-error, Import-Export Company, in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia, presided over by His Honour John A. Dennis, by assignment, and obtained a judgment on March 3, 1969, against the said co-defendant-in-error. A bill of costs was issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff for service but same was not served because the defendants in the debt action could not be found.
On April 6, 2000, approximately thirty-two (32) years later, Co-defendant-in-error Import-Export Company filed a motion for relief from judgment, praying the Civil Law Court for Montserrado County to relieve it from the judgment rendered against it in 1969. The plaintiffs-in-error submitted and contended that this motion was never served on them or their counsel. The plaintiffs-in-error also alleged that before the motion could be heard and disposed of, the co-defendant-in-error, on September 18, 2000, at the hour of 10:10 a. m., filed another motion, entitled “motion for declaratory judg-ment”, praying the Civil Law Court to declare the March 3, 1969 judgment in favour of plaintiffs-in-error to be fake and fraudulent. This motion was similarly not served on the plaintiffs-in-error or their legal counsel. On the same day, September 18, 2000, a notice of assignment was issued citing the parties for the hearing of the motion for declaratory judgment at 2:00 p. m. on September 18, 2000. The sheriff’s returns, dated September 18, 2000, indicated that the plaintiffs-in-error were not served because they were without the bailiwick of the country.
In spite of the above factors, including the fact that the plaintiffs-in-error were not served with the motions mentioned supra, and the notice of assignment, the judge presiding over the September Term, A. D. 2000, His Honour Varnie D. Coo-per Sr., irregularly heard the motion for declaratory judgment ex parte and rendered a judgment on September 18, 2000, declaring the March 3, 1969 judgment, made by His Honour John A. Dennis in favour of the plaintiffs-in-error, as fake and fraudulent. In addition to the above stated irregularities, committed by the trial judge, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper Sr., he also neglected to deputize a lawyer to take the ruling on behalf of the plaintiffs-in-error. Consequently, no appeal was announced or exceptions taken to the erroneous and adverse judgment rendered by the co-respondent-in-error judge, His Honour Judge Varnie D. Cooper, on September 18, 2000. The plaintiffs-in-error contended that they were therefore denied their day in court. They further alleged that they had gained knowledge of the final ruling on the motion for declaratory judgment only when the defendant-in-error attempted to enforce the adverse judgment against them in Lebanon, when the six (6) months required by statute for writ of error had almost expired.
On the 21st day of March, A. D. 2001 and during the March Term, A. D. 2001, of this Court, the plaintiffs-in-error filed an eleven-count petition for a writ of error. The said writ was issued on the 10th day of April, A. D. 2001, commanding the defendants-in-error to file their official returns thereto on or before the 20th day of April, A. D. 2001. On the 16th day of April, A. D. 2001, the defendants-in-error filed their returns to the petition and a motion to dismiss the petition. On the 19th day of April, A. D. 2001, the plaintiffs-in-error filed a fifteen-count resistance to the motion to dismiss.
On the 7th day of November, A. D. 2001, the plaintiffs-in-error filed with the Clerk of this Honourable Court a notice of withdrawal and simultaneously an amended petition, after the payment of accrued costs. The defendants-in-error on the 27th day of November, A. D. 2001 filed a twenty-three-count returns to the amended petition and a thirteen-count motion to dismiss said amended petition. On the 30th day of November, A. D. 2001, the plaintiffs-in-error filed an eighteen-count resistance to the motion to dismiss. Therefore, on the 17th day of April, A. D. 2002, both the plaintiffs-in-error and the defendants-in-error filed their respective briefs.
In their amended petition, the plaintiffs-in-error contended and averred, amongst other things:

(a) That they did not have their day in court during the hearing of the motion for relief from judgment and the motion for declaratory judgment, filed April 7, 2000, and September 18, 2000, respectively, because the said motions were never served on them;

(b) That on September 18, 2000, the day the petition for declaratory judgment was filed, the Civil Law Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, issued a notice of assignment for the hearing of the said motion at 2:00 p. m. on the same September 18, 2000, even though the sheriff’s official returns, dated September 18, 2000, said “that Respon-dents Anis Halaby et al. were not also served with the notice of assignment because the respondents were out of the bailiwick of the country…” That although no further effort was made by the court to serve them at another date, yet, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., on the same day, September 18, 2000, proceeded to hand down his ruling on the motion for declaratory judgment, contrary to law;

(c) That according to the statutory law of this land, as well as practice and procedure obtaining in this jurisdiction, the trial court neglected to appoint a lawyer to take the court’s final ruling for the respondents therein, now plaintiffs-in-error, who had not been served with neither the motion for declaratory judgment nor the notice of assignment for the hearing of the said motion;

(d) That the execution of the judgment had not been completed, and that they had paid all accrued costs as evidenced by the marshal’s receipt; and,

(e) That the amended petition for the writ of error had not been filed for the mere purpose of harassment or delay.
A careful review of the briefs filed, and after listening to the arguments made and advanced by counsel for both parties before this Honourable Court, we view the following as the contentions consistently asserted by the defendant-in-error:

(1) That the petition should be dismissed for reason that it was filed beyond the statutory period, which is six (6) months after the rendition of the judgment, which was handed down on the 18th day of September, A. D. 2000, by His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., whereas the peti-tion for the writ of error in this case, although undated, had an affidavit attached thereto, signed by Counsellor William A. N. Gbaintor, dated November 7, 2000;

(2) That the petitioner’s amended petition, which was un-dated and was received by the movant’s counsel on November 7, 2001, should be denied and dismissed together with the entire error proceedings for reason that recourse to the plaintiffs-in error’s notice of withdrawal will show that it reads: “Upon receipt of this letter, you will please spread on records that by this letter, plaintiffs-in-error have withdrawn with reservation to re-file the above captioned case”. From the wordings of the notice of withdrawal, it is clear that the plaintiffs-in-error withdrew the entire case with right to re-file it and did not withdraw the petition or pleadings;

(3) That there is a clear distinction in the practice in this jurisdiction between the withdrawal of a pleading and the withdrawal of an action. They asserted that one must specifically indicate in his notice of withdrawal which course he is taking, that is, whether he is withdrawing a pleading or the entire action, the reasons being that the procedure and requirement to re-file are different in each instance and that the option taken will determine whether or not prejudicial harm is done to the opponent which may not afford him the opportunity to protect himself;

(4) That plaintiffs-in-error had filed an amended petition and therefore did not apply for a new writ, even though they had withdrawn their entire case with reservation to re-file. Hence, defendants-in-error said, this Court had no jurisdiction over this matter and that there was no error proceeding before this Court for its determination;

(5) That as to counts one (1) and two (2) of the petition, the defendants-in-error said that the case emanated from an alleged court’s final judgment, dated March, 3, 1969, signed by His Honour John A. Dennis, presiding over the Civil Law Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, in which it is stated that the plaintiffs in the court below were repre-sented by the Morgan, Grimes & Harmon Law Firm. However, when the motion for relief from judgment was filed, the same was forwarded on two (2) occasions to Counsellor Lawrence A. Morgan, who wrote back on both occasions, refusing the said motion and further indicating that he had no knowledge of the existence of such case. They asserted therefore that the plaintiffs-in-error were estopped from denying that the said motions were not served on them and that they were denied their day in court;

(6) That as to counts three (3), four (4), five (5), six (6), and seven (7) of the petition, the defendants-in-error prayed that the said counts should be denied and dismissed for reason that all of them referred to the fact that the plaintiffs-in-error were not served with copy of the motion for declaratory judgment and/or the notice of assignment for disposition of the motion on September 18, 2000. That recourse to the statutes controlling motion for declaratory judgment, as found in the Civil Procedure Law, volume one (1), Liberian Code of Laws Revised, section 43.1, clearly states that “courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or pro-ceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment. The power granted to the court under this section is discretionary”;

(7) That since Counsellor Lawrence A. Morgan had refused the motion for relief from judgment, the declaratory judgment was prayed for purposely to declare the right and status of the co-defendant, Messrs. Import-Export Company, in such a situation and as provided by law. The co-defendant-in-error judge, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., therefore, was under no legal obligation to appoint a counsel to take ruling on behalf of the respon-dents in the court below, now plaintiffs-in-error;

(8) That as to count nine (9) of the petition, the defendants-in-error maintained that the same should be denied and dismissed for being false and misleading, in that the alleged court’s final judgment of His Honour John A. Dennis of March 3, 1969, out of which the present proceedings grew, was recently created without any other records, which is now sought to be executed by the plaintiffs-in-error, more than thirty (30) years from the purported date of the said judgment and which had not been completed, but was stopped by the motions for relief from judgment and declaratory judgment that have caused the plaintiffs-in-error to flee to this Honourable Court, when attempting to do so in the Republic of Lebanon;

(9) That as to count ten (10) of the petition, the defendants-in-error said that the same should be denied and dismissed as being false and misleading for reason that the petition was made for the mere purpose of harass-ment since, if no such attempt had been made to enforce a purported judgment entered more than thirty (30) years ago, a declaratory judgment is moot and of no effect and so would have no need for the petition for a writ of error. The defendants-in-error maintained that it had to be that some action was being taken or intended to be taken out of the judgment allegedly rendered by Judge John A. Dennis in 1969, which was stopped by the motion for declaratory judgment that had compelled the plaintiffs-in-error to apply for the writ of error.
On the basis of the foregoing, the defendants-in-error prayed this Honourable Court to deny and dismiss the said petition with the entire action, stating that the petition had been filed in violation of the statutes controlling, that it was false and misleading, and that it had been filed for the mere purpose of harassing the defendants-in-error. The defendants-in-error prayed also that costs of the proceedings be ruled against the plaintiffs-in-error.
Predicating upon the above contentions raised by the parties, as summarized from the certified records transmitted to this Court and the arguments made before us, we consider that the following issues are salient and germane for the determination of this case.

(a) Whether or not a judge has the authority to review or interfere with the act or ruling of his predecessor judge of concurrent jurisdiction?

(b) Whether or not a trial court is under a legal obligation to appoint or deputize a lawyer to take the ruling at the rendition of a final judgment when a party or his attorney is not present?
It is common knowledge under Liberian jurisprudence that one successor judge cannot interfere with, review and/or reverse the ruling made or action taken by the preceding judge. This issue or question is simple, as our decisional laws are replete and very clear and unambiguous on the point. What is more relevant or significant to us is whether or not the co-defendant-in-error judge, His Honour Judge Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., in his ruling of September 18, 2000, did in fact and indeed review or interfere with, the ruling of His Honour John A. Dennis, made on March 3, 1969.
A recourse to the certified records before this Honourable Court indicates that in 1969, the plaintiffs-in-error instituted an action of debt by attachment against Co-defendant-in-error Import-Export Company in the Sixth Judicial Circuit Court for Montserrado County, Republic of Liberia, presided over by His Honour John A. Dennis, by assignment; that it obtained a judgment on March 3, 1969 against the co-defendant-in-error; and that a bill of costs was issued by the said court and placed in the hands of the sheriff for service but same was not served because the co-defendant-in-error could not be found. Thirty-two (32) years later, on 6, April 2000, Co-defendant-in-error Import-Export Company filed a motion for relief from judgment praying the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, to relieve it from the judgment rendered against it in 1969 by His Honour John A. Dennis.
The plaintiffs-in-error averred further that before the motion could be heard and disposed of, the co-defendant-in-error, on September 18, 2000, at the hour 10:10 a. m., filed another motion entitled “motion for declaratory judgment”, praying the Civil Law Court to declare the March 3, 1969 judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-in-error fake and fraudu-lent. On the same day, September 18, 2000, a notice of assignment was issued citing the parties to appear for a hearing of the motion for declaratory judgment at 2:00 p. m. on the same September 18, 2000. The sheriffs returns, dated September 18, 2000, indicated that the plaintiffs-in-error were not served because they were without the bailiwick of the country.
In spite of the above factors, i.e. that plaintiffs-in-error were not served with the motions mentioned supra, and that the notice of assignment was also not served, the judge presiding over the September Term, A. D. 2000, of the Civil Law Court, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., irregularly heard the motion for declaratory judgment ex parte and ren-dered judgment thereon on September 18, 2000, reversing and declaring the March 3, 1969 judgment made by His Honour John A. Dennis in favor of the plaintiffs-in-error to be fake and fraudulent.
We are constrained to disagree with the defendants-in-error’s contention and assertion that Judge Varnie D. Cooper’s ruling of September 18, 2000, did not overrule Judge John A. Dennis’ ruling of March 3, 1969. On the contrary, we find a deliberate interference with, review of, and reversal of Judge John A. Dennis’ ruling by Judge Varnie D. Cooper, Sr. To say the least, this is unacceptable and reprehensible, and is con-trary to all norms, practice, procedures, clear cut decisional laws of our jurisdiction, and specific administrative practices.
Assuming, without admitting, that Judge Dennis had acted in error in his ruling in 1969, it was not for his colleague of concurrent jurisdiction, Judge Cooper, Sr., who had no autho-rity legally to correct and rectify that error. Rather, it is the Supreme Court that is legally vested with the authority to rectify errors committed by subordinate courts of record. This point was clearly articulated by Mr. Justice Henries who, speaking for this Court, said:

“Therefore, however sound Judge Flomo’s ruling might seem to be in substance, it cannot be upheld by any legal authority, and however erroneous or sound might be the ruling of Judge Dunbar in the ejectment action, the only judicial tribunal clothed with the legal authority to have reviewed it is the Supreme Court. Judge Flomo, presiding over the December, A. D. 1974 Term of the court, exercising concurrent jurisdiction with Judge Dunbar, who presided over the September 1974 Term, had no authority to review his acts”. See Dennis et al. v. Dennis et al., 24 LLR 299 (1976).
For the above reasons, the ruling of Judge Varnie D. Cooper, Sr., rendered on September 18, 2000, reversing the ruling of Judge John A. Dennis, cannot be upheld and is hereby accordingly reversed. Furthermore, we are taken aback that the motion for declaratory judgment was filed by the co-defendant-in-error, Import-Export Company, on September 18, 2000, and subsequently granted by Judge Varnie D. Cooper, Sr. after his colleague, Judge John A. Dennis, had ruled and decided the rights of the parties in the case at the trial, and a bill of costs had been issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff for service on March 3, 1969. The law, procedure, and practice hoary with age in our jurisdiction is that one judge cannot review the judicial acts of another judge of concurrent jurisdiction, and that it is only this Court of last resort that has the authority to undertake such review. This Honourable Court has held that “a judge cannot review the judicial acts of his peers; therefore, as in the case presented, a circuit court judge cannot grant a motion for summary judgment after the case has been ruled to trial by another circuit court judge.” Dennis et al. v. Philips et al.[1973] LRSC 14; , 21 LLR 506, Syl. 6, text at page 514.
In the Dennis case, Judge Kandakai had disposed of the issues of law and ruled the case to a trial by jury. Yet, when Judge Koroma came into jurisdiction thereafter he granted a motion for summary judgment and awarded judgment as a matter of law. This Court held then that Judge Koroma reviewed and interfered with the ruling of his colleague, and we therefore reversed his judgment and remanded that case for a new trial. The facts in the Dennis case and the instant case are analogous.
The judgment rendered by the co-defendant-in-error judge, His Honour Varnie D. Cooper, is therefore reversible and is hereby ordered reversed and declared null and void ab initio.
As to the contention that several issues were raised in this case but were not passed upon, it has always been the practice of this Court to pass upon only those issues it deems meritorious, worthy of notice, or germane to the legal determi-nation of the case. This Court need not pass on every issue raised in the bill of exceptions or in the briefs filed by the parties, and it acts in keeping with our practice and precedent in addressing only the most important and germane issues in determining this case. For reliance, see Lamco J. V. Operating Company v. Verdier, [1978] LRSC 9; 26 LLR 445 (1978).
Wherefore, and in view of the foregoing, it is the considered opinion of this Court that these error proceedings and the petition be and are hereby granted. The ruling of September 18, 2000 of the trial court is reversed and declared null and void ab initio, The proceedings in the court below are set aside, and the parties are returned to status quo ante as of March 3, 1969. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, commanding the judge therein presiding to resume jurisdiction over the case and to give effect to this opinion. Costs are ruled against the defendants-in-error. And it is hereby so ordered.
Petition granted.