BONATI YONKON et al., Petitioners, v. HIS HONOUR FREDERICK K. TULAY, Presiding Judge over the December Term, 1983, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, TOE GBARDEA and FRANCIS KIEH, Administrator of the Estate of TOBY ANDERSON, SHERIFF P. EDWARD NELSON et al., Respondents.

APPEAL FROM THE RULING OF THE CHAMBERS JUSTICE GRANTING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION.

Heard: May 13, 1985. Decided: June 21, 1985.

1. The law will not presume anyone to be a party to a suit who is not designated by his name or described, identified and served as a party to the suit simply by the use of the phrase “et. al.” which refers to no particular person.
2. Under the Civil Procedure Law, all fictitious parties and fictitious designation of parties as required by common law are abolished.
3. A person who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or identity of a person who may properly be made a party to an action may proceed against such a person as an unknown party by designating as much of his name and identity as known. Rev. Code I :5.3.
4. The phrase “et. al.” means “others” and may be properly used in subsequent pleadings where the first pleading carries the names of the parties referred to as et. al.
5. Where the parties intended to be included in a suit as party-defendants are not specifically named in the initial pleading and included in the writ of summons, and duly served and returned served, the phrase “et. al.” will not be presumed or construed as making them party-defendants to the suit.
6. The rights of no one shall be concluded by a judgment rendered in a suit to which he is not a party, and a party cannot be bound by a judgment without being allowed his day in court.
7. While it is true that ordinarily acts already completed cannot be restrained, this does not include acts illegally and blatantly done.
8. Where the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of a party, it is illegal for the court to oust them from their property , especially when the property is not the subject of the litigation.
9. One who is not named as a party-defendant to a suit, or who is not served with precept to appear and defend, or who is not joined as a party-defendant or as a party by his voluntary appearance and participation in the trial, cannot be said to have had his day in court.

10. Persons who are not parties of record to a suit have no standing therein which would enable them to take part in, or control the proceedings.
11. A person having knowledge of an action which may affect his rights, but to which he is not a party, is not required to intervene in order to protect his rights.

The petitioners filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents to restrain and prohibit the presiding judge of the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, from enforcing a judgment in an eject-ment suit. The petitioners alleged that they were never made parties to the ejectment suit, not having been named in the complaint, or served with a writ of summons or assignment or joined as party-defendants. Notwithstanding, the petitioners alleged, the trial court attempted to eject and oust them from the property which they were occupying.
The respondents acknowledged that the petitioners were not specifically named or summoned in the ejectment action but contended that the phrase “et. al.”, used in the complaint and the summons included the petitioners. The Justice in Chambers rejected the contention and granted the petition. An appeal was taken therefrom to the full bench.

On appeal, the full bench confirmed the ruling of the Chambers Justice. Noting that the revised statute had abolished all common law fictitious parties and fictitious designations of parties, the Court held that in consequence of said abolition no person could be presumed to be a party to a suit who was not designated by his name or described in the initial pleading or the summons, or identified or served as a party. The use of the phase “et. al.”, it said, refers to no particular person; it means only “and others”. A person not specifically named as a party-defendant to a suit and served with process to appear and defend, or who is not joined as a party-defendant or as a party by his voluntary appearance and participation in the trial, can-not be said to have had his day in court, the Court opined. The Court noted that as the petitioners had not been specifically named, designated or served with precepts, they were never made parties to the action. The rights of no one, it observed, could be concluded by a judgment rendered in a suit in which he was not a party; such a party, it said, could not be bound by a judgment without first being allowed his day in court.
Moreover, the Court said, even if a party has knowledge of the institution or pendency of an action which may affect his rights, but to which he is not a party, he is not required to intervene in order to protect his rights.
On the issue raised that as the act complained had already been done and that therefore prohibition would not lie, the Court opined that while it was true that ordinarily acts which had been completed could not be restrained, this did not include acts illegally or blatantly done. It noted that the trial court had not obtained judgment against the petitioners, and hence it was illegal for the said court to seek to eject or evict petitioners from the premises occupied by them. Under such circumstances, the Court said, prohibition will lie to undo what was illegally done. The Court therefore affirmed the Chambers Justice’s ruling granting the petition.

MR. JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

This appeal was taken from the ruling of our distinguished colleague presiding in the Chambers of this Court in a prohibition proceeding in which the petitioners sought the issuance of an alternative writ of prohibition to prohibit and restrain the presiding judge of the Civil Law Court for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County, from enforcing a judgment in an ejectment suit. The petitioners alleged that although they were never party-defendants to the ejectment action, either by service on them of a writ of summons or by the court joining them as party-defendants, yet the trial court, in the enforcement of its judgment against the designated defendants, attempted to eject and oust them from the property they were occupying.
For the benefit of this opinion, we deem it appropriate to quote hereunder counts one and two of the petition which embody the primary contention of the petitioners in their five-count petition:

“1. Petitioners say that an action of ejectment was filed by co-respondents Toe Gbardea and Frances Kieh in their capacity as administrator and administratrix of the estate of Tobby Anderson against Kman Nimley, Nagbe Seke et. al. as is evidenced by the copy of the writ of summons hereto attached. Petitioners say that nowhere in said action were their names made mentioned of as party-defendants, neither were they served with summons or copy of the complaint to enable them to come under the jurisdiction of the court nor were they ever served with notice of assignment, all of which would have afforded them an opportunity to appear and answer and defend their rights to their various properties.

“2. Petitioners say that the ‘et al.’ in the writ of summons and the complaint can not be a proper designation of the petitioners as party-defendants to the ejectment suit. The petitioners had no reason to assume that the ‘et al’. had reference to them as at no time were the said petitioners notified either in writing, or by word, or summoned, or served with notice of assignment. The judgment should therefore not be enforced against them for to do so is to deprive them of their lawful properties without due process of law.”
The respondents filed a six-count returns in which they did not deny that the petitioners were not named in the complaint and the writ of summons as party-defendants, but contended that the designation of ”et al.”, coupled with the announcement of representation of the defendants by Counsellor Lewis K. Free, and the subsequent precepts of court indicating that petitioners were party-defendants, were sufficient indication that petitioners were party-defendants to the ejectment suit, and that if they felt otherwise they should have moved the court to intervene so as to protect their interest. Also, for the benefit of this opinion, we quote hereunder count one of the respondents’ returns which traversed the prime contention of the petitioners:

“Respondents say and aver that petitioners’ petition in its entirety should be dismissed in that it is true that the writ of summons dated December 26th A. D. 1980, served and returned served did not specifically carry the names of the entire defendants but simply named two of the defendants, Kma Nimley, Nagbe Seke et. al.; when the case was called on the 23rd day of July, 1981, as per assignment, Counsellor Lewis K. Free appeared and made an announcement to court: ‘At this stage, Counsellor Lewis K. Free, Sr. most respectfully begs to inform this Honourable Court that he is the legal representative, counsel for Kman Nimley, Nagbe Seke, et. al. of the Settlement of New Georgia in the intestate estate case of the late Tobby Anderson of New Georgia, Monrovia, Liberia.’ This announcement places the defendants under the jurisdiction of the court, that is, Civil Law Court from which the writ of summons emanated, most especially so when said representation of Counsellor Lewis K. Free, Sr. carried the names of Kma Nimley, Nagbe Seke et. al. If at all defendants now petitioners were not informed how possible could it be for them to retain the services of legal counsel, Counsellor Lewis K. Free, Sr. to represent their legal interest in the court below . . . .”
From a perusal of the precepts which respondents contended were indicative of petitioners’ involvement as party-defendants in the action of ejectment, we observe that the names of the petitioners herein are nowhere mentioned in any of the exhibits to the returns, including exhibits “A” through “E”. For example, exhibit “A” which is the bill of costs in the ejectment action carries the names of Kma Nimley, Nagbe Seke et al as defendants. Exhibit “B” is a writ of possession in which the names of Kma Nimley, Nagbe Seke et. al. are shown as defendants. Exhibit “C” is the writ of execution, and it carries the names of Kma Nimley, Robert Kartae, Mr. Teah Bonateh, Moses Jallah and Weatha Kladee as defendants. Exhibit “D”, which is another writ of possession carries the names of Kma Nimley, Robert Kartae and Teah Bonati as defendants. The petitioners in these proceedings are Monati Yonkon, Francis Walker and Togba Potae.

In our opinion, the only persons affected by the judgment in the action of ejectment are: Kma Nimley and Nagbe Seke who are designated as defendants and were placed under the jurisdiction of the court by means of the service upon them of the writ of summons and against whom the judgment was entered. The law will not presume anyone to be a party to a suit who is not designated by his name or described, identified and served as a party to the suit simply by the use of the phrase “et. al.” which refers to no particular person. Our statute provides that all fictitious parties and fictitious designation of parties as required by the common law are abolished. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code 1 :5.2. It is also provided by our statute that a person who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or identity of a person who may properly be made a party to an action may proceed against such a person as an unknown party by designating as much of his name and identity as known. Civil Procedure Law, Rev. Code I :5.3.
The phrase “et. al.” means and others and may be properly used in subsequent pleadings where the first pleading carries the names of the parties referred to as et. al., but where the parties intended to be included in a suit as party-defendants are not specifically named in the initial pleading and included in the writ of summons and duly served and returned served, the use of the phrase et. al. will not be presumed or construed as making them party-defendants to the suit. The petitioners herein not having been named in either of the pleadings in the ejectment action or joined as parties and brought under the jurisdiction of the court by means of the service of summons, their rights will not be concluded by the judgment in the ejectment action by the mere use of the phrase “et. al.”
Counsellor Arthur K. Williams, counsel for the respon-dents, filed his brief but failed to appear for argument despite the fact that he acknowledged the service upon him of the notice of assignment from this Court. Three issues which were advanced in the respondents’ brief for our determination are:

1. Whether prohibition will lie to prohibit acts already completed?
2. Whether the court below had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or of the person? and
3. Whether petitioners were not afforded an opportunity in the court below to be heard?

Reverting to the respondents’ returns as quoted supra, it was admitted therein that the writ of summons along with the complaint served and returned served on December 26, 1980, did not carry the names of the petitioners as defendants. It was also averred in the said returns that the party-defendants-in the ejectment suit were Kma Nimley, Nagbe Seke et al. We are not in agreement with the argument that the use of the Latin phrase “et. al.” includes the petitioners. In fact, we have already dis-cussed this issue lengthily and, therefore, the need to belabor it no longer exists. Moreover, the rights of no one shall be concluded by a judgment rendered in a suit to which he is not a party, and a party cannot be bound by a judgment without being allowed his day in court. See Tubman v. Murdoch, [1934] LRSC 26; 4 LLR 179 (1937); Eitner v. Sawyer, [1977] LRSC 47; 26 LLR 247 (1977), and Boye v. Nelson, [1978] LRSC 33; 27 LLR 174, 175 (1978).
Counsel for the respondents argued in his brief that prohibition will not lie to prohibit acts already completed, postulating that although the petitioners were not at any time placed under the jurisdiction of the court, or their names carried in the writ of possession which was served on them, but the fact that they were evicted under the writ of possession and ousted from their property precludes prohibition from undoing acts already done by the trial court.
While it is true that acts already completed cannot be restrained, yet this does not include acts illegally and blatantly done. We hold that the petitioners were not parties to the ejectment suit and therefore no judgment was rendered against them legally affecting their property rights by due process of law. The court below had not acquired jurisdiction over their person, and hence it was an illegal act on the part of the court to oust them from their property which was not the subject of the litigation. Prohibition, in our opinion, will therefore lie to restrain those acts of the court that remain to be done as well as to undo those acts which were illegally done. Ayad v. Dennis, [1974] LRSC 42; 23 LLR 165 (1974).

One who is not named as a party-defendant to a suit, served with precept to appear and defendant or is joined as a party-defendant or as a party by his voluntary appearance and participation in the trial, cannot be said to have had his day in court. Thus is the answer to the issue advanced by counsel for the respondents.
It is also contended by the respondents that the petitioners should have intervened in order to protect their own interest. We disagree with this argument because under the law, persons who are not parties of record to a suit have no standing therein which would enable them to take part in, or control, the proceedings. If they have occasion to ask for relief in relation to the matter involved, they must either strive to obtain the statue of the parties in such suit or they must institute an independent action. 39 AM. JUR., Parties, § 55. In the case Boye v. Nelson, cited supra,this Court held in syllabus 4, on page 147, that a person having knowledge of an action which may affect his rights, but to which he is not a party, is not required to intervene in order to protect his rights.
In view of the foregoing, and the law cited in support of our holding, the ruling of the Justice in Chambers is legally sound and should not therefore be disturbed. The said ruling is hereby confirmed and affirmed with costs against the appellants/ respondents.

Ruling affirmed.