FIRESTONE PLANTATIONS COMPANY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. PETER A. BURGE and THE BOARD OF GENERAL APPEALS, MINISTRY OF LABOUR, Respondents/Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Heard: April 29-30, 1985. Decided: June 20, 1985.

1. The term “employee” does not have a fixed definition; instead, it is defined by the statute from where it appears.
2. Whether one is an employee or not within a particular statute depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
3. The Liberian statute provides for the exclusion of certain persons from the definition of the term ‘employee’, including persons engaged in domestic and professional services and those holding managerial positions or employed in a confidential capacity.
4. The Liberian Labor law excludes from the definition of ‘employee’ foreign employees, whether employed in the public or private sector, if by special contract such persons are entitled to compensation equivalent to or more favorable than compensation provided by the Liberian Labor Law.
5. The Liberian labor policy relating to redundancy payment awards one month’s pay for each year of service, but does not provide for other benefits.

Co-appellee Peter A. Burge’s services with the appellant company were terminated and the co-appellee paid two weeks for each year he worked with the appellant, the total of such payment being $10,377.06. The appellee also received other compensation and benefits at the time his services with the appellant were terminated. The payments were made in conformity with the provisions of the International Foreign Policy, under which co-appellee operated while in the employ of the appellant. Six months after the termination of his services by the appellant, the appellee commenced proceedings in the Ministry of Labour, claiming entitlement to redundancy pay, as provided by the Liberia Labor Law. Under the Liberian labor policy, an employee whose services are terminated due to redundancy is entitled to one month’s salary for each year of service with the employer.
The hearing officer at the Ministry of Labour found in favor of the appellee and awarded him $14,629.35, the same representing two additional weeks’ pay for each year of service. On appeal to the Board of General Appeals, the ruling was affirmed, with the modification that the award be reduced to $12,600.00. On a further appeal to the Circuit Court, the trial judge affirmed the award of the Board, but modified the same by adding thereto interest amounting to $723.60. From this ruling, a final appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Board and trial court, giving as reason therefor that under the Labor Law of Liberia a foreign employee is in the category of employee excluded from the definition of “employee” covered by the benefits stipulated by the Liberian labour policy with respect to redundancy. The Court cited section 1305, sub-section (g)(ii) which provides that the definition of employee exclude foreign employees in Liberia, whether employed with private or public employers, if by special contract, such employees are entitled to compensation for occupational injury or disease equivalent to or more favorable than provided for by the Liberian Labour Practices Law.
The Court opined that while the mentioned statutory provision related to injury and disease, it should also be applicable to redundancy. The Court observed that under the International Foreign Policy Scheme, to which appellant had subscribed, appellee receive more benefits than were accorded by the Liberian Labor Law redundancy policy, under which a redundant employee is awarded only one month’s salary for each year of service, with no other benefits, which the appellee in the instant case were entitled to and did receive. As such, the Court held, the appellee fell within the exclusion category specified by the Liberian Labor statute, and therefore could not be viewed as an employee. That being the case, the Court said, the appellee was not entitled to the compensation prescribed by the Liberian redundancy policy. It therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court and the Board of General Appeals.

Victor D. Hne, John A. Dennis and George E. Henries appeared for the appellant. David Dwayan and Julius Adighibe appeared for the appellee.

MR. JUSTICE MORRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The co-appellee, Peter A. Burge, was an employee of the appellant company from May 29, 1969, to February 28, 1982, when his services were terminated. He was paid two weeks for each year of service in the amount of $10,377.06, as provided by the revised terms of the employment contract of the Inter-national Policy under which he served. He was also given an additional amount of $118.59 for two days travel time and an air ticket, as were provided to all other foreign employees of the same category whose services were terminated at that time. Six months after he had received the above payment, co-appellee proceeded to the Ministry of Labour, where he presented a claim for compensation for two additional weeks for each year of service, commensurate with the Liberian policy governing redundant payment. On December 29, 1983, the hearing officer who first heard the complaint, ruled in favor of the co-appellee, awarding him two additional weeks’ pay for every year of service. Under the calculations made by the hearing officer, the total award amounted to $14,629.35. On appeal, the Board of General Appeals modified the ruling of the hearing officer and awarded $12,060.00. Judge J. Henric Pearson, before whom the case was appealed for judicial review, confirmed and affirmed the ruling of the Board of General Appeals, with the modification that the amount of $12,060.00 be paid the appellee with interest of $723.60. The judge also ordered that this amount, with interest and costs, be paid forthwith by the petitioner/appellant management. It is from this ruling of Judge J. Henric Pearson that the petitioner/ appellant has appealed to this Court of dernier resort. Hence this case is before us for final determination.

The main contention which is the decisive issue in this case is whether or not the co-appellee, Peter A. Burge, is entitled to the benefit of redundancy payment under the Liberian labour policy, since he worked in Liberia during his term of service with the appellant. The Liberian statute is completely silent as to the payment of redundancy. However, we believe that the redundancy payment scheme came into existence in 1977 when the Liberia Mining Company embarked upon a mass redundancy of its employees. Here again, the policy has not been clearly defined as to those employees who are to benefit from the policy of receiving redundancy payment and those employees who are excluded, as has been with other statutory provisions.
Legal authorities maintain that the term “employee” does not have a fixed definition; rather, that it is defined by the statute from where it appears.
In the case United States et al. v. American Trucking Association, Inc. et. al., decided May 27, 1940, the Supreme Court of the United States held, among other things, that the word “employee” is not a word of art. It takes color from its surroundings and frequently is carefully defined by the statute where it appears. That the word “employee” is not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning is apparent from an examination of recent legislation. Thus, the Social Security Act specifically provides that “the term, ’employee’ includes an officer of a corporation”, 42 USC, section 130, (a) and (b), while the Fair Labor Standards Act specifically exempts “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, professional, or local retailing capacity ….” It is further provided that “where the term ’employee’ has been used in statutes without particularized definition it has not been treated by the courts as a word of definite content.” [1940] USSC 100; 310 U.S. 534, 545, Note 29.
Black’s Law Dictionary, after giving the definition of the word employee, provides that:

“‘Employee’ must be distinguished from ‘independent contractor’, ‘officer’, ‘vice principal’, etc. The term is often specifically defined by statutes; and whether one is an employee or not within a particular statute will depend upon facts and circumstances.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (4th ed.).
Our own statutes provide for the exclusion of a lot of persons from the definition of the term employee. Examples are the Minimum Wages Act, the Maximum Hour Act, the Weekly Rest Days and Public Holidays Act, and the Annual Leave Act. For the benefit of this opinion, we shall quote the relevant portions of these acts:

“MINIMUM WAGES

§ 500. Employees for whom minimum wages may be fixed – Minimum wages may not be fixed by the Minimum Wage Board for the following:

(a) “government employees;

(b) employees engaged in domestic or professional service;

(c) employees in undertaking in which fewer than four employees are employed;

(d) employees in undertakings in which only members of the employer’s family are employed;

(e) those holding a managerial position or employed in a confidential capacity; and

(f) seamen for whom the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs is authorized to fix crapes by Sec 316 of the Maritime Law.”

“MAXIMUM HOURS

§ 700. Application of Chapter. – This chapter applies to all employees with the exception of the following:

(a) “government employees;

(b) employees engaged in domestic or professional service;

(c) employees in undertakings in which fewer than four employees are employed;

(d) employees in undertakings in which only members of the employer’s family are employed;

(e) those holding a managerial position or employed in a confidential capacity;

(f) ruber-tree tappers and ether agricultural workers whose work is defined by an assigned task and not by hours.”

“WEEKLY REST DAYS AND PUBLIC HOLIDAYS

§800. Application of Chapter. – This chapter applies to all employees with the exception of the following:

(a) “government employees;

(b) employees engaged in domestic or professional service;

(c) employees in undertakings in which fewer than four employees are employed;

(d) employees in undertakings in which only members of the employer’s family are employed;

(e) those holding a managerial position or employed in a confidential capacity.”

“ANNUAL LEAVE

§900. Application of Chapter. – This chapter applies to all employees with the exception of the following:

(a) “government employees;

(b) employees engaged in domestic or professional services;

(c) employees in undertakings in which fewer than four employees are employed;

(d) employees in undertakings in which only mem-bers of the employer’s family are employed;

(e) those holding a managerial position or employed in a confidential capacity.”
We consider the payment of redundancy benefit as a com-pensation not because of occupational injury, but as a com-pensation for terminating the services of an employee due to no fault of his prior to the expiration of his contract. With this in view, we shall now resort to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, especially the definition of employee under that Act, since there is no provision in our statute for redundancy payment or compensation as we have earlier noted. Labour Law of Liberia,
Section 3501(g)(1), (II), (III), (IV), (V), (VI) and (VII) of the Labor Law provide:

(g) “Employee” includes every person who is employed (or in the case of a person disabled or dead as the consequence of an occupational injury or disease, who has been employed) under contract of service or of apprenticeship or training entered into with an employer not exempt under the provisions of this section either before or after the effective date of this chapter, whether such contract is express or implied, oral or written; provided, however, that the following persons are excluded from the definition:

(i) Seamen or mariners or seagoing laborers (as defined in section 200 of the labor Law) employed on board vessels registered under the provisions of chapter 2 of the Maritime Law;

(ii) Members of the employer’s family dwelling in his house or in the curtilage thereof;

(iii) Casual Workers (unless they are inured while on the premises of their employer’s business, place or manufacturing establishment ;

(iv) Domestic servants;

(v) Persons whose employment is of a casual nature and who are employed other than for the purposes of the employer’s trade or business (unless four or more persons otherwise within this exclusion are employed by the same employer simultaneously or unless such persons are employed for the purposes of any game or recreation and are engaged or paid through a club);

(vi) Public employees subject to statute containing equivalent or more favorable provisions for compensation or occupational injury or disease; provided; however, that no public employee shall be entitled to compensation under both this chapter and under such other statute; and

(vii) Foreign employees in Liberia of private or public employers if by special contract such emplo-yees are entitled to compensation for occupational injury and disease that is equivalent to or more favorable than the provisions of this chapter.”

According to section 3501 (g) (vii) of the Liberian labour statute just quoted, foreign employees in Liberia of private or public employers, if employed by special contract, are entitled to compensation that is equivalent to or more favorable than the provisions of said statute, are excluded from the definition of the term “employee”. As we have earlier stated in this opinion the question of redundancy has not had any legislation and the policy has not been legally challenged with reference to employees who are entitled to and those not entitled to receive the benefits, so as to have the Court address the issue. We have therefore considered the most related sub-sections of 3501 (g), quoted above, which make reference to payment of compensa-tion as being applicable to employees entitled to compensation under the labor policy.
We have cited these various statutes of our Labor Law to see if the appellee could fit into any of the definitions given by that law. We observe, however, that to the contrary, sections 500, 700, 800 and 900, quoted above, exclude under sub-sections (b) and (e) of each of those sections, employees engaged in domestic or professional services and those holding a managerial position or employed in a confidential capacity. The appellee being an accountant falls under subsections (b) and (e). In addition, section 3501, subsection (g)(vii), which relates to foreign employees in Liberia, in both the public and private sectors, also exclude the employee from the definition of an employee.
In the case at bar, the record shows that the appellee had enjoyed the benefits of the International Foreign Policy, voluntarily signed by him under the confidential salary change as follows:

1. Foreign service base premium of 15% equivalent to $125.50 – Salary increase.

2. Liberian premium 15% amounting to $6125.00-salary increase.

3. The continuation of his medical benefit coverage for six months after the termination of his services which commenced from February 28, 1982, when he was terminated, and ended on August 28, 1982.

4. Two weeks pay for each year of service in accordance with the foreign policy.

5. Eligibility for pension at the age of 55 years in accordance with the Foreign Policy.
The Liberian labor policy relating to redundancy payment awards one month’s pay for each year of service, but does not provide for any other benefits thereafter, such as pension and extension of medical coverage for the period of six (6) months after termination of service. We therefore feel that although Section 3501(g)(vii), relates to compensation for occupational injury and disease, it could be applicable in this case because the benefits enjoyed by appellee are more favorable to those enjoyed by Liberian employees under the Liberian policy of redundancy payment. Accordingly, we hold that section 3501(g)(vii), which excludes foreign employees from the definition of the term employee, applies to appellee.
In the light of all we have narrated and the law cited, we hold that the judgment of the trial court must crumble and same is hereby reversed. And it is so ordered.

Judgment reversed.