ORLANDO KRANGAR et al. and G. RUDOLPHUS BROWN, Director of Labour Standards, Ministry of Labour, Appellants, v. NATIONAL PORT AUTHORITY, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE NATIONAL LABOUR COURT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.
Heard: December 19, 1989. Decided: January 9, 1990.
1. A default judgment granted in favor of a party by the hearing officer would not legally stand where there was no proof given in support of said default judgment as the law requires.
2. The labor court is authorized to make a finding of facts and conclusions of law in the conduct of all cases brought before it, and may revise, affirm or modify wholly or in part any judgment before it when the interest of justice so requires, or remand a case for further proceedings with such instructions or orders as may be necessary and proper.
Appellants instituted an action of unfair labor practices against the appellee, alleging that they were employed as casual laborers by the appellee over a period of one to eight years, and that their status was later changed to that of regular employees; but that the appellee has denied them annual leave and transportation allowances. After several postponements of the hearing, either at the request of appellants or appellee, the case was finally called for hearing on April 7, 1989. At the call of the case, neither the appellee nor its counsel was present; and the counsel for appellants moved the investigation to enter a judgment by default against the appellee, and the request was granted by the hearing officer. Appellants then took the stand and produced evidence to prove the allegations as contained in their complaint against the appellee. Thereafter the hearing officer awarded the appellants a total sum of $113,411.55 as compensation for annual leave and transportation allowances. Appellee excepted to the hearing officer’s ruling and petitioned the National Labour Court for judicial review of the hearing officer’s ruling.
On judicial review before the National Labour Court, the judge, after entertaining argument pro et con on the petition and the returns, ruled remanding the case to the Ministry of Labor for rehearing for want of sufficient proof to support the decision of the hearing officer. The appellants excepted to the ruling of the Labor Court Judge and announced an appeal to the Supreme Court.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the National Labour Court judge did not err when he remanded the case to the Ministry of Labour for rehearing for reason of insufficiency of evidence. The ruling of the Labour Court Judge was therefore affirmed.
Samuel M Kpana appeared for the appellants. Charles W. Brumskine appeared for the appellee.
MR. JUSTICE BELLEH delivered the opinion of the Court.
On October 14, 1989, Orlando Krangar, et al., appellants herein, through their counsel filed a complaint with the Ministry of Labor against the management of the National Port Authority, appellee herein alleging “unfair labor practices”.
The basis of the complaint is that appellants were allegedly employed as casual laborers by the appellee over a period between one to eight years. Initially, they were paid bi-weekly on hourly rates, but thereafter, due to appellees’ financial restraint, appellee decided to pay appellants on a monthly basis as it paid its regular employees. Appellants contended that the appellee deliberately and intentionally refused to change their status from casual laborers; that is, to reclassify them as “permanent employees” and put them on appellee’s regular payroll, even though they were employed for a long period of time and worked directly under the supervision of appellee’s employees.
They also claimed that because they were never classified as “permanent employees” they were denied annual leave and transportation allowances.
On February 14, 1989, pursuant to citation, the Ministry of Labour commenced hearing into appellants’ complaint with the qualification of appellants’ three witnesses in the persons of Messrs. Orlando Krangar, Edwin Massaquoi, and William Freeman. Two of these witnesses testified on behalf of appellants. Because of appellee’s claim of insufficiency of evidence, which was sustained by the National Labour Court, let us examine the testimonies of these two witnesses.
ORLANDO KRANGAR’S TESTIMONY:
“To start with, we worked with National Port Authority (NPA) ranging from one year to eight years. During our time at N. P. A., we were issued type-written identification cards. We worked eight hours a day. We were placed on a monthly time sheet; we were paid in a legitimate N PA envelope. We were also treated as permanent employees. We used to receive our salaries and wages at the end of each day worked. We were also given various working positions within our assigned sections.”
EDWIN MASSAQUOI’S TESTIMONY:
“We worked for N PA for several years and they paid us after every two weeks. NP A employed us as casual workers and they kept us, and after certain time changed our status; that is, they divided us among the various sections according to the trade we know. After this, they promised to employ us permanently. They did give some of us casual workers permanent status but not all of us; and because of the casual status, which, according to them, is the status in which we were employed, they did not give us transportation, annual leave or overtime. This is why we brought them here. Also management paid us in NPA envelope as was done for the permanent employees and they also issued us gate passes.”
The record reveals that during the pendency of this matter at the Ministry of Labour, several assignments were made for hearing which had to be postponed either upon the request of appellants or appellee. However, on April 5, 1985, when the case was called for resumption of the trial, counsel for appellee and his client did not appear. Whereupon appellants’ counsel applied to court for default judgment pursuant to the relevant provisions of 1NA decree no. 21. Appellants’ application was granted and ruling was entered on the evidence on the record as at the time of the application for default judgment. The hearing officer ruled appellee liable to appellants and awarded them the amount of $113,411.55, representing compensation for annual leave and transportation allowances. When appellee became aware of the ruling of the hearing officer, its counsel excepted to said ruling and gave notice to petition the National Labour Court for a judicial review of the case, which appellee eventually did. A petition for judicial review was filed by appellee and returns were filed by appellants.
After pleadings had rested, the judge of the National Labour Court, His Honour, Arthur K. Williams, entertained arguments pro et con on the petition as well as the returns, ruled remanding the case to the Ministry of Labour for re-hearing for want of sufficient proof to support the decision of the hearing officer.
“. . .Upon careful perusal of the records, there is no sufficient proof to warrant the ruling of the hearing officer by default. The record is completely devoid of the petitioner’s employment records, time served, and period within which respondents were denied transportation. Also there is no showing as to whether respondents were permanent employees and were entitled to transportation and other entitlements. All of these evidentiary materials in support of the complaint should have been submitted to the hearing officer. In default judgment, the complainant is always required to give proof in support of his complaint or claim and to the satisfaction of the hearing officer, so that the hearing officer may be able to arrive at concrete and transparent justice.
Wherefore and in view of this, the court is inclined to remand this case to the hearing officer to re-hear the said case and have both parties appear before it and testify on their own behalf and present evidence in substantiation of their claims and defenses. The case is therefore remanded to the hearing officer. Costs in these proceedings to abide the final determination in this case. And it is so ordered.”
Appellants, being dissatisfied with the judgment of the National Labour Court, excepted to it and announced an appeal to this Court of last resort for final determination on a one-count bill of exceptions. We hereunder quote its relevant portion.
“1. That Your Honour’s judgment was against the weight of the evidence produced for your review; together with the legal procedure set for the review of such finding emanating from an administrative agency.
In your judgment, Your Honour set aside the finding of the hearing officer when it is not within Your Honour’s province to review factual finding, when you are generally limited to examination of the legal procedure, which might work prejudice against the petitioner in the administrative agency below. For example, Your Honour said ‘upon careful perusal of the record there is no sufficient proof to warrant the ruling of the hearing officer by default.’ A reviewing court of administrative determination should not disturb the finding of facts by the agency and therefore such finding is final and binding and should not be set aside.”
The case was regularly assigned and the necessary notice of assignment having been duly served by the marshal of this Court, the parties appeared and argued their respective sides of the case as contained in the briefs filed in the office of the Clerk of this Court.
Appellants, during oral argument coupled with what we have been able to digest from our perusal of the records transmitted on appeal, principally contended that “Your Honour’ s judgment was against the weight of the evidence produced for your review, together with the legal procedure set for the review of such finding emanating from an administrative agency, In your judgment, Your Honour set aside the finding of the hearing officer when it is not within Your Honour’s province to review factual finding, when you are generally limited to examination of the legal procedure which might work prejudice against the petitioner in the administrative agency below. . ..”
In essence, appellants are contending that besides the judgment of the National Labour Court being contrary to the evidence, appellants also challenged the authority of the National Labour Court to examine the finding of the Ministry of Labour based upon a thorough investigation which culminated in a default judgment in favour of appellants as in the instant case. Therefore, according to appellants, such factual finding of an administrative agency is not subject to any review by the National Labour Court.
Appellee, on the other hand, in countering this argument, contended that the decision of the hearing officer, whereby he rendered judgment in favour of appellants and awarded them the sum of $113,411.55 as compensation for annual leave and transportation allowances, is without any legal or factual basis. Appellee further contended that while it may be true that appellants did apply to the hearing officer for a default judgment, and that the hearing officer did order the entry of such judgment in favour of appellants, the default judgment was never made perfect by production of evidence on the part of appellants as required under 1NA Decree No. 21, as well as the several holdings of this Honourable Court, in support of appellants’ claim that they worked for appellee for number of years without receiving any fringe benefits as permanent employees. Therefore, appellee maintains that the National Labour Court could not have legally upheld such baseless decision of the hearing officer, and hence, the judge of the National Labour Court, according to appellee, did not commit any reversible error when he remanded the case to the Ministry of Labour for re-hearing.
The issue therefore presented for our determination is whether or not the National Labour Court should have affirmed the ruling of the hearing officer in the absence of sufficient evidence in support of appellants’ claim.
As we have earlier stated in this opinion, appellee was ruled liable by the Ministry of Labour in an action of unfair labor practices instituted by appellant, whereby the hearing officer awarded a total sum of $113,411.55 as compensation for annual leave and transportation allowances. The record attempts to show that during the hearing several postponements had to be made by the hearing officer either on the motion of appellants’ counsel or that of counsel for appellee. Consequently; when the case was finally re-assigned on April 7, 1989 for resumption of the trial, the hearing officer ordered the issuance and service of the notice of assignment and same was issued, served and returned served by the ministerial officer of the Ministry of Labour. But when the hearing was ordered resumed, counsel for appellants, observing the absence of appellee and its counsel, applied to the hearing officer to be granted a default judgment in keeping with INA decree no. 21. The records show that appellants’ application was granted and a default judgment was ordered entered, and same was entered in favour of appellants. Thereafter, the hearing officer proceeded to award the amount of $113,411.55 as compensation, as stated supra.
What is amazing is that there is no showing, whatsoever that appellants ever took the stand and produced witnesses to prove the allegations as obtained and set forth in their complaint against appellee. NA decree no. 21 provides on default judgment, as follows:
“If a defendant in a labor case has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial, or if the hearing officer or the Board of General Appeals orders a default for any other failure to proceed, the complainant may seek a default judgment against the defendant. On an application for a default judgment, the applicant shall file proof of service of the summons and complaint and give proof of the facts constituting the claim and the default judgment, and the Ministry of Labour is hereby empowered to enforce such judgment by imprisonment until said default judgment is fully complied with.”
In keeping with the statute quoted above, we are of the opinion that the default judgment granted in favour of appellants by the hearing officer could not legally stand as there was no proof given in support of it as required by law. The testimonies of those two witnesses for the appellants never dwelled on any material aspect of the claims. We therefore hold that the judge did not err when he remanded the case to the Ministry of Labour for a re-hearing for insufficiency of evidence.
Regarding the contention of appellants with respect to the power of the National Labour Court to examine and pass upon the finding of the Ministry of Labour or any administrative agency on factual issues, we take recourse to the Act to Repeal an Act Amending the Labor Practices Law of Liberia With Respect to Administration and Enforcement, and to Amend Decree No. 21 of the Interim National Assembly in Connection Therewith, approved October 22, 1986:
“Section 23.1. LABOUR COURTS ESTABLISHED: There is established in each of the Counties of the Republic of Liberia a Labour Court to be seated in the Capital City of each County.
Section 23.2. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE. The Labour Court shall be a court of limited jurisdiction and shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all labor cases as appealed to it from the decisions of hearing officers or labor commissioners in the county where it is established. The procedure and method of enforcement shall be the same as that of the debt court, except as modified herein.”
Section 23.4. PROCEDURE ON REVIEW: In the conduct of all cases brought before it, the labor courts shall be guided by the rules of the debt courts and shall make a finding of facts and conclusion of law thereon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 23 of the Revised Civil Procedure Law of Liberia and may revise, affirm or modify, wholly or in part, any judgment before it, as to any party and, when the interest of justice so required, remand a case to the hearing officer or Labor Commissioner for further proceedings, with such instructions or orders as may be necessary and proper.”
In view of what we have stated and the authorities cited, it is our considered opinion that the judgment of the National Labour Court remanding the case to the Ministry of Labour for re-hearing be, and the same is hereby affirmed to all intents and purposes. Costs to abide final determination of the case. The Clerk of this Court is hereby ordered to send a mandate to the court below to give immediate effect to this judgment. And it is so ordered.
Judgment affirmed; case remanded.