HENRY BELL, Appellant, v. REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, MONTSERRADO COUNTY.

Decided December 4, 1936.

Appellant was convicted of grand larceny in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit and appealed to this Court. On appearing before the Court, he withdrew his appeal and prayed the mercy of the Court. Appeal dismissed and recommendation for mercy made to Chief Executive.

Henry Bell for appellant. The Attorney General of Liberia for appellee.

MR. JUSTICE RUSSELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is before this Court upon an appeal .from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Montserrado County at its August term, 1935.

The records of this case show that the appellant was indicted by the grand jurors of the County aforesaid for the commission of the crime of grand larceny by stealing a diamond from one Zachariah A. Jackson, and when arraigned on the twenty-ninth day of August, 1935, he pled not guilty; whereupon a jury was empanelled to try the issue thus joined between the appellant and appellee. After the evidence on both sides had been heard, the jury in the case returned a verdict of guilty against the appellant, whereupon the trial judge rendered a final judgment sentencing the appellant to fifteen years’ imprisonment and restitution of the diamond, or the value thereof, to which verdict and final judgment the appellant excepted and appealed to this Court of last resort.

On the 25th day of November, 1936, when this case was called for hearing, and while the records were being read, a letter was handed to the Marshal of this Honorable Court for delivery to the Court, which letter when opened and publicly read was as follows, to wit:

“JAIL HOUSE, MONROVIA, LIBERIA,
November 25th, 1936.
“YOUR HONOURS:

“Your undersigned petitioner begs humble permission to show that he was indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the First Judicial Circuit Court, at the 1935 August term of said court on a charge of Grand Larceny, for stealing a diamond stone from one Zachariah Jackson; before and during the trial of said case, the undersigned desired and expressed to his counsel H. Lafayette Harmon, that he should give up the diamond and beg the mercy of the court, but he was advised by his said counsel not to give up the diamond to the owner or the court; subsequently, the said H. Lafayette Harmon demanded and received the stolen diamond from your petitioner and contracted that he would defend me to the last before the courts ; not having anyone to stand my appeal bond I was put in Jail where I am at present; Mr. Harmon I understand has neglected to appear before the court to defend me this morning when the case was called; if this information is true, I respectfully ask that your honourable court will designate a lawyer to represent me, because I am destitute of money to defend myself.

“Since I have been in prison Mr. Harmon sent me from time to time eight pounds sterling but having been in jail so long, the amount is exhausted.

“Respectfully submitted,
[Sgd.] HENRY BELL.”

Inasmuch as no member of the Court was acquainted with the person or the signature of the said Henry Bell, it became important to ascertain if the said letter really emanated from him, and whether or not the signature was his. The Court, therefore, ordered issued a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum for the appellant to appear to testify as to the authenticity of the said letter, and the genuineness of the said signature. Whereupon in due course the appellant appeared, and in open court made the following statement:

“Ques. Are you the Henry Bell?” “Yes.” “Ques. Did you send a letter here?” “Yes.” “Ques. Did you send this letter voluntarily, i.e. of your own free will?” “Yes, I did.” “Ques. Can you read and write?” “Yes, sir, a little.” “Ques. If you should see your signature would you recognize it?” “Yes.” The letter was ordered passed to Mr. Bell for him to identify his signature thereon. Mr. Bell, after having inspected the letter and the signature thereon, said that it was his signature, and that he dictated the letter and it was typewritten by a friend. Mr. Bell then said for the benefit of the Court, that he had the letter written by a friend, asking the Court to be allowed a representative, since the counsel, Counsellor H. Lafayette Harmon, had abandoned his case before this court. Mr. Bell continued : “On yesterday Counsellor Harmon sent Counsellor Tubman to ask me if I still desired him to argue my case in the Supreme Court. I told Counsellor Tubman to tell Counsellor Harmon not to be worried about this. When the lower court’s Judge rendered his final judgment against me, he said that if I gave up the diamond stone, he would immediately release me; or if I told who had the diamond without giving it up, he would give me three years’ imprisonment; or if I did not give up the diamond or tell who had it, he would sentence me to imprisonment for fifteen years. I rose upon my feet to talk, but they said that I could not talk except through my counsel. It was then I got a chance to see my Counsellor, Senator Harmon, and I suggested to Counsellor Harmon to give up the diamond, since indeed he had heard the final judgment of the judge. He asked me if I was crazy, and said, what would he get out of the whole matter for pleading for me? I said to him that I would give him a consideration by giving him my deeds to keep until such time when I would be in a position to pay him for his services rendered in my behalf. Then he, Counsellor Harmon, said to me, that he had enough land and did not want any more, and that I should not be afraid he could get me out of this matter. But instead of getting me out, he has gotten me further into it. Since I have been in prison, he went to Bassa and tried to sell my mother out of house and home, under pretext that he wanted money to fight my case in the Supreme Court, and that his action was based upon a note I have given him. Your Honours, I have really given Mr. Harmon the diamond in question; I gave it to him before the matter was investigated in Bensonville in Mr. Justice Brontis’ court. This diamond was given to me by Mrs. Laura Wright, Zack Jackson’s aunt.” “Ques. Did you write that letter?” “Yes. I begged a friend of mine to write this letter and I signed it.” A sheet of paper was given Mr. Bell for him to sign his name in order that the two signatures might be compared. Mr. Bell having signed his name on said sheet of paper, it was passed to the Court to be compared with the signature on the letter. This having been done, a similarity between the signature of the letter, and that on the blank sheet of paper was clearly discernible.

When the case was again called for hearing on the second day of December, 1936, the appellant appeared to represent himself in person, because he had given notice to this Honorable Court that he had given his counsel notice that he did not require his services in the case further. He then voluntarily withdrew his bill of exceptions, admitted that he was guilty of the crime with which he was charged, that is, that he had taken the diamond in question and had given it to Mr. Harmon who was his lawyer at the time, and then prayed the mercy of the Court.

Inasmuch as in the constitutional division of the powers of this government, we are obligated to the administration of justice, and the power to grant mercy is delegated to the Chief Executive, except apparently in the case of infants, or first offenders, when the trial court, having all the facts before it, may mitigate the punishment, or suspend sentence as the circumstances may seem to warrant; we can only take note of appellant’s plea. But inasmuch as the privilege of reviewing the facts has been withdrawn from us by his waiver of his bill of exceptions, we feel that we have no longer the power to reverse, modify or affirm the judgment as would have been the case had we been privileged to review the records, but can only affirm the judgment of the lower court, upon his voluntary admission made in open court. Nevertheless, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the earnestness of the appellant’s plea for mercy and the note of sincerity which seems to us to have rung through his statement, and the apparent contrition of his application, we most strongly join our appeal to his for such executive clemency as His Excellency, having all the facts before him, might feel that the appellant should in mercy receive ; and it is hereby so ordered.

Appeal dismissed.